金融秩序之維持基於金融機構的穩健運作，金融機構穩健運作之關鍵來自內部控制制度的落實，而此一制度係建構在公司治理—強化經營者責任上。2013年底，我國公司治理機制一項重大變革為審計委員會之設置要求。因此本研究即探討審計委員會與內部控制缺失之關聯性。以2013年至2015年上市櫃金融控股公司（包含其銀行和保險子公司）以及上市櫃和興櫃的銀行及保險公司為研究對象。 本研究發現：審計委員會與內部控制缺失具統計上的顯著關聯性。審計委員會的設立與內部控制缺失呈顯著負相關；監督者（獨立董監事及審計委員會成員）會計或財務專業的比例，並未與內部控制缺失成顯著負相關，拆出分獨立董監事和審計委員會兩項不同監督機制，其成員會計或財務專業的比例與內部控制缺失也並未呈現顯著的負相關；金融控股母公司的獨立董事同時兼任子公司獨立董事，則與較多的裁罰件數成顯著正相關。另外研究也發現，部分會計師事務所與金融業者內部控制缺失呈顯著的負相關。 綜上結果隱含以下推論：審計委員會監督功能發揮，將幫助金融業者減少內部控制缺失的發生，不過獨立董事在同一金控體系兼任多家公司獨立董事的情形，並未有較佳的監督效果出現。由於我國金融業者發生的內部控制缺失類型多樣，因此在審計委員的安排上，除了會計或財務專業的審計委員，也可廣納其他專業的專家學者擔任，另外會計師事務所也可扮演完善內部控制制度的一個輔助角色。 / To find out the effect of the audit committee on internal control, this study examines the association between audit committees and internal control deficiencies.The samples are listed financial holding companies including their bank and insurance subsidiaries, bank, and insurance companies in TWSE and OTC in Taiwan over the period from 2013 to 2015. I find that the audit committees are negatively associated with the internal control deficiencies. However, there is no association between the audit committees of accounting or financial expertise and internal control deficiencies. Besides, I find that the circumstances that the independent directors of the financial holding parent companies also serve as an independent directors of the subsidiaries are positively associated with more incidences of penalty cases. Taken together, the empirical result indicates the association between the audit committees and internal control deficiencies in Taiwan financial industry.

Magister Legum - LLM / South Africa

Thesis M.COM. (Accounting)) -- University of Limpopo, 2019 / The apparent weaknesses in corporate governance of state-owned enterprises and poor audit reports have heightened the concern of investors and the state as the major shareholder of these enterprises returns. Audit committees as a mechanism for good corporate governance plays a major role in enterprise performance. These state-owned enterprises play a vital role in the economy of South Africa. This study examines the effect of audit committee composition (independence, gender diversity, financial expertise and size) on financial performance measured by return on assets using major state-owned enterprises listed on Schedule 2 of PFMA. The results show that the audit committee size, gender diversity and financial expertise has an insignificant positive relationship with ROA, whereas the independence of audit committee members has an insignificant negative association. The result of the study may be beneficial to various stakeholders and boards of enterprises to make some proper decisions on audit committee composition to attract more investors and at the same time safeguarding the investments of shareholders.

Proper records management plays a significant role in the auditing process, risk management and wider corporate governance. Despite this role, in South Africa, many governmental bodies are issued with disclaimer reports every year by the Auditor-General of South Africa (AGSA) due to a lack of supporting documentation. This problem is exacerbated by the exclusion of records management from the criteria for a sound financial management infrastructure in many governmental bodies. The other dilemma is that some records such as financial records, personnel records and electronic records usually fall outside the jurisdiction of the organisation’s records manager. Utilising the King Report III as a framework, this study sought to develop a framework to embed records management practices into the auditing process in the public sector of South Africa, with a view to entrench a culture of clean audits. The study relied on mixed methods research (MMR), with the quantitative study conducted first through informetrics analysis of audit reports, while the qualitative paradigm was used to substantiate numerical data. Data collection adopted a multi-approach with four key sources of data: a questionnaire, interviews, literature review and publicly available data from the consolidated general reports of AGSA. The study revealed that most governmental bodies have established internal audit units, audit committees and records management units, which did not work in unison. In most governmental bodies records management did not form part of the audit scope and records management professionals were not part of the audit committees. As a result, most governmental bodies continued to receive negative audit opinions from AGSA. The study recommends that records management community should utilise auditing and risk management as a springboard to propel records management to the new heights. A further empirical study on the role of auditing and risk management in records management that embraces both the private and public sectors is recommended. / Information Science / D. Litt. et Phil. (Information Science)

A company’s board of directors is ultimately responsible for putting effective corporate governance (CG) structures in place as mechanisms to enhance its accountability to stakeholders. An audit committee (AC), which is a subcommittee of the board, is one component of the company’s CG structures. In South Africa, legislation, the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) listing requirements, and the King code and report of Governance for South Africa 2009 (King III) deal with the composition and responsibilities of ACs. As the shares of AltX listed companies, which are categorised as high-growth potential, small to medium-sized listed companies, are traded publicly, they are required to comply with the Companies Act and to establish an AC according to the Act’s composition requirements to fulfil mandatory responsibilities. In terms of the JSE listing requirements, AltX listed companies must appoint an AC or explain their reason(s) for not doing so. As the total market capitalisation of AltX listed companies has increased by 87% over the past three years, greater numbers of stakeholder groups are being affected. Since stakeholder groups are protected when companies implement effective CG processes, the purpose of this study is to understand the way in which the AC of an AltX listed company, as an example of a high-growth potential, small to medium-sized listed company, adds value to the company and its stakeholders. Attributes that contribute to the value added by ACs were identified as being the characteristics of AC members; the fulfilment of responsibilities through optimised activities; and the fulfilment of responsibilities by maintaining healthy relationships with the board and information providers. An explorative qualitative case-based research design was applied in terms of which a single AltX listed company was selected according to predetermined selection criteria. Data were collected using individual semi-structured interviews, field notes and company documents. Descriptive open coding techniques were used for data analysis with the findings of the study subsequently being presented in terms of a theoretical framework of the attributes that influence the extent to which the AC adds value. The findings of the study confirm that these attributes of the AC facilitate its ability to add value to the AltX listed company investigated and its stakeholders in terms of enlightened shareholder theory. / Auditing / M. Com. (Auditing)

本研究以財務長與審計委員會相對任期作為財務長與審計委員會相對影響力之指標，探討財務長與審計委員會相對影響力對財務報表重編之影響。利用2007至2014年間中國滬深A股為樣本，本研究發現，財務長之任期較審計委員會長時，財務報表越有可能重編，顯示財務長相對於審計委員會影響力較大時，會降低財務報表品質。本研究亦發現，前述情況並不因為客戶重要性較高而更加明顯，顯示財務長與審計委員會相對影響力與財務報表重編之關係，不會受到客戶重要性的影響。 / This thesis uses the relative tenures of CFO and audit committee as an indicator of the relative power between CFO and audit committee, and examines the relation between the relative power of CFO versus audit committee and the probability of financial restatement. Based on a sample of A-share stocks listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen during 2007-2014, the empirical result shows that when CFO has relative higher tenure than audit committee, the incidence of financial restatement increases. This result suggests that CFO who has more power than audit committee tends to compromise the quality of financial statement, at least in terms of financial restatement. The empirical result also shows that the effect of the relative power of CFO and audit committee does not vary among clients’ importance.

La thèse explore la question de l’efficacité des comités d’audit en France : les comités d’audit jouent-ils effectivement leur rôle ? La problématique de l’efficacité de ces comités dans le processus d’évaluation du gouvernement d’entreprise demeure importante dans le contexte français, où les textes (notamment les recommandations de la 8ème directive) restent très imprécis. Une première partie expose les critères d’efficacité et le fonctionnement général des comités d’audit à partir d’un état de la littérature et d’une étude empirique sur des données secondaires. Nous examinons de façon approfondie les principaux déterminants de la diligence d’un comité d’audit. Ce problème est examiné dans le cadre d’une relation d’agence et d’asymétrie d’information. Ainsi, notre étude dépasse le cadre de la simple existence d’un comité d’audit (purement formel), pour s’intéresser de plus près à la capacité de ces comités à protéger effectivement les intérêts des parties prenantes et ceci en renfonçant la qualité du contrôle interne et celle du processus de l’audit externe. / Corporate governance in France has developed considerably in recent years. The strengthening of governance procedures is illustrated by the creation of audit committees, which today exist in virtually all listed companies. However, the issue of the audit committee’s effectiveness in the corporate governance evaluation process remains significant in the French context, where the texts (particularly the recommendations of the 8th European Directive) continue to lack clarity. This thesis aims to contribute to our understanding of the “black box” of governance procedures by studying the way that the audit committee’s characteristics affect the extent of reporting on internal control and risk management procedures and on audit fees. It emphasizes that the mere existence of an audit committee is not sufficient; it also needs to be effective. To be effective it must have the necessary means (composition, diligence, and resources). This study therefore looks beyond the simple existence of the audit committee (purely formal) and focuses on attributes related to its composition, its diligence, and the diversity of its members in order to more closely examine the audit committee’s ability to protect stakeholder interests. To do this, we analyze 176 non-financial French listed companies during a period when establishing an audit committee was voluntary. The results obtained support previous works advocating that audit committees comply with best practice rules for expertise,independence, and diligence and be comprised of experienced and diverse members. Our results raise several questions on the scope of the transposition into French law of the 8th European Directive.

Audit committees (ACs) can enhance corporate governance in the public sector, particularly in State Owned Enterprises (SOEs). This study adopted a qualitative research approach to identify factors contributing to the effectiveness of ACs in selected Namibian SOEs to provide sound corporate governance. The empirical data was collected primarily through semi-structured interviews with participants as well as from field notes and company documents. The study highlighted certain AC characteristics and practices contributing to the effectiveness of ACs in selected Namibian SOEs to provide sound corporate governance. The mandate, composition, managing the activities of the AC, performance assessment of the members of the AC and reporting of the AC if applied correctly can enhance effectiveness of ACs. The study also highlighted weaknesses, suggesting that some of the ACs needed improvement in order to enhance corporate governance at SOEs. / College of Accounting Sciences / M. Phil. (Accounting Sciences)

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-25T18:40:30Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Cesar de Alencar Leme de Almeida.pdf: 655055 bytes, checksum: f39f9ce0ebf4e900239c0acb570a56ae (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-06-09 / More and more, Brazilian companies have offered their securities to the investment public at international stock exchanges, especially the New York Stock Exchange. However, financially attractive to issuers as compared to other fund-raising sources, a public offering abroad calls for compliance with other regulatory requirements. In the case of the US, the financial scandals publicized early in this decade led to changes in money market regulations, with more stringent requirements on listed companies. Among the various requirements then imposed is the strengthening of Audit Committees for improvement of Corporate Governance practices. Because Audit Committees are not legally required under the Brazilian corporate legislation, the Brazilian Securities Commission (CVM) together with authorities from other countries which do not have such commission agreed with the Securities & Exchange Commission SEC to replace Audit Committees with similar agencies; e.g., the Fiscal Council, in the case of Brazil. According to the SEC, as it is independent of the Administrative Council, the Fiscal Council might perform an Audit Committee s functions, providing that some of the latter s attributions are also taken over. Against this background, there are currently two groups of Brazilian, non-financial companies listed in the New York Stock Exchange, namely: one which voluntarily formed its Audit Committee, and one which maintained its Fiscal Council with expanded functions, now known as "Conselho Fiscal Turbinado" (Powered Fiscal Council). The study was primarily designed to identify the Brazilian companies listed at the NYSE New York Stock Exchange, and among them, those which formed their Audit Committee and those which maintained their Fiscal Council. A bibliographic survey was conducted to identify the differences between the Brazilian and the US capital markets, the attributions assigned to Audit Committees, and their compliance with the respective agencies´ Internal Regulations. Thus, it was possible to check for compliance with these attributions and the similarity of functions established by the Audit Committees and Fiscal Councils researched. The research findings prove that the attributions of these two agencies are homogeneous. Lastly, possible new academic studies on this subject are presented / Cada vez mais, empresas brasileiras têm lançado seus papéis nas bolsas de valores internacionais, em especial na Bolsa de Valores de New York. Ao mesmo tempo em que é atrativo financeiramente para as empresas o lançamento de seus papéis no exterior, comparativamente com outras fontes de recursos, algumas exigências estabelecidas pelos órgãos reguladores precisam ser atendidas. No caso norte-americano, os escândalos vividos no início desta década fizeram com que a legislação que regulamenta o funcionamento do mercado de capitais fosse alterada, introduzindo normas mais rígidas para as empresas de capital aberto. Entre as diversas exigências impostas, está o fortalecimento do Comitê de Auditoria no processo de melhoria das práticas de Governança Corporativa. O Comitê de Auditoria, por não estar previsto na legislação societária brasileira, fez com que a Comissão de Valores Mobiliários, com outros países que também não possuem esse órgão, negociasse com a Security Exchange Commission SEC, a substituição do Comitê de Auditoria por órgãos assemelhados, no caso do Brasil, o Conselho Fiscal. A SEC entendeu que, por possuir independência em relação ao Conselho de Administração, o Conselho Fiscal poderia exercer as funções do Comitê de Auditoria, desde que algumas atribuições fossem a ele incorporadas. Diante desse cenário, existem atualmente dois grupos de empresas brasileiras, não financeiras, listadas na Bolsa de Valores de New York, aquele que constituiu o Comitê de Auditoria voluntariamente e o outro grupo que manteve o Conselho Fiscal com funções ampliadas, passando a ser conhecido como Conselho Fiscal Turbinado. O estudo consistiu primeiramente em identificar quais são as empresas brasileiras listadas na NYSE New York Stock Exchange. Entre essas empresas, quais instituíram o Comitê de Auditoria e quais mantiveram o Conselho Fiscal. Foi efetuado levantamento bibliográfico com o objetivo de apresentar as diferenças entre o mercado de capitais no Brasil e nos Estados Unidos da América, além de identificar as atribuições impostas aos Comitês de Auditoria, bem como a aderência dessas atribuições aos Regimentos Internos desses dois órgãos. Foi possível verificar não só o grau de atendimento em relação a essas atribuições, mas também o nível de similaridade de funções estabelecidas pelos Comitês de Auditoria e Conselhos Fiscais pesquisados. Os resultados da pesquisa comprovam, de forma inequívoca, que não há homogeneidade nas atribuições destes dois órgãos. Finalmente apresenta-se possíveis novos estudos acadêmicos que poderiam advir deste tema

本研究以權益基礎報酬占總報酬的比率來捕捉薪酬結構，並據以探討給予審計委員會的薪酬結構對於公司權益資金成本及信用評等之影響。利用 2006 至 2010 年間納入美國 S&P1500指數之公司 (排除金融服務與保險業) 為樣本，本研究發現，若權益基礎報酬佔審計委員會薪酬比率越高，其公司之權益資金成本越低，但該公司之信用評等卻越差。顯示權益基礎報酬之比重在二種財報使用者眼中具有不同涵義。投資人認為給予審計委員會較高之權益基礎報酬比重，可使監督更有效，投資人承擔之資訊風險降低，進而願意降低其要求報酬；信用評等機構則認為，給予較高的權益基礎報酬比重將傷害審計委員會獨立性，影響公司治理結構，並降低財務報導之品質，因而給予此類公司較差之信用評等。 / This study examines how investors and credit rating agents react to audit committees’ equity-based compensation. Based on a sample of S&P 1500 firms during 2006-2010, the empirical results show that firms who pay audit committees higher portion of equity-based compensation have lower cost of equity capital and lower credit rating. These results suggest different information users perceive and react to equity-based compensation in different ways. Particularly, investors appear to perceive that higher portion of equity-based compensation can align audit committee members’ interest with the shareholders’, leading to more effective monitoring and smaller information risk. Therefore, investors react by reducing their cost of equity capital. In contrast, credit rating agents appear to perceive that higher portion of equity-based compensation may harm audit committees’ independence, resulting in decreased quality of financial reporting. Therefore, credit rating agents react by downgrading firms’ credit ratings.