Typescript. / Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Hawaii, 1967. / Bibliography: leaves [179]-183. / iii, 183 l

Thesis (doctoral)--Lund University, Sweden, 1989. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 154-170).

No description available.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Sydney, 2008. / Title from title screen (viewed March 11, 2009) Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy to the Dept. of Indian Sub-Continental Studies. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Sydney, 2009. / Title from title screen (viewed September 18, 2009) Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy to the Dept. of Studies in Religion, Faculty of Arts. Includes bibliographical references. Also available in print form.

Zugl.: Diss. Univ. University of South Africa (UNISA), Pretoria, 2007. / Includes bibliography (S. 179-183) and index.

Zugl.: Diss. Univ. University of South Africa (UNISA), Pretoria, 2007. / Includes bibliography (S. 179-183) and index.

While much of Nāgārjuna’s writings are aimed at deconstructing fixed views and views that hold to some form of substantialist thought (where certain qualities are held to be inherent in phenomena), he does not make many assertive propositions regarding his philosophical position. He focuses most of his writing to applying the prasaṅga method of argumentation to prove the importance of recognizing that all phenomena are śūnya by deconstructing views of phenomena based on substance. Nāgārjuna does, however, assert that all phenomena are empty and that phenomena are meaningful because śūnyatā makes logical sense.1 Based on his deconstruction of prevailing views of substance, he maintains that holding to any view of substance is absurd, that phenomena can only make sense if viewed from the standpoint of śūnyatā. This thesis grapples with the problem that Nāgārjuna does not provide adequate supporting arguments to prove that phenomena are meaningful due to their śūnyatā. It is clear that if saṃvṛti is indiscernible due to its emptiness, saṃvṛtisatya cannot be corroborated on its own terms due to its insubstantiality. But how does viewing phenomena as empty make them meaningful? Scholars who base their understanding of how meaning is established in Nāgārjuna’s thought based on Candrakīrti’s interpretation of his twotruths formulation, which grants both paramārtha and saṃvṛti truths their distinctive truth-values, tend to prove the distinctive truth of saṃvṛti in terms of its linguisticallybased, conventional status.2 I am critical of this approach and argue, instead, that an explanation of how phenomena are meaningful due to their emptiness is found in the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra’s (PPM)’s use of metaphoricity. Rather than seeing the two truths as distinctive, I argue that saṃvṛtisatya and paramārthasatya both make sense based on their metaphorical relationship in that they are both śūnyatā and that phenomena point to, or are metaphors for, the all-inclusive śūnyatā of reality akin to understanding of ākāśa in the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras which although experienced cannot be cognitively grasped. / Religious Studies & Arabic / D. Litt. et Phil. (Religious Studies)

This doctoral research has the purpose of articulating a consistent presentation of the Buddhist concept of selflessness as explained by the great Tibetan Buddhist scholar Tsongkhapa (Tibet, 13571419 CE), who composed some major philosophical masterpieces about this key Buddhist concept based on Ngrjuna´s (India, ca 150250 CE) famous Mla-madhyamaka-krik (MMK). Tsongkhapa presents himself as a follower of Ngrjuna, that is, as a proponent of the \'Middle Way\' (madhyamaka, dbu ma pa) Buddhist philosophical school. As our study of the first treatise in which he presents his view on selflessness advanced, we realized that it was necessary to dedicate part of our research to the analysis of the epistemological theory that substantiates his explanation of selflessness, since his approach to the subject is based on the use of what he calls \'rational analysis\' and \'inferential knowledge\'. Therefore, a preliminary part of our thesis is dedicated to the clarification of Tsongkhapa´s conceptions of rational analysis and inferential knowledge, which are based primarily on the theory of \'valid cognition\' (pramna, tshad ma) elaborated centuries earlier by the great Indian scholar Dharmakrti (6th and 7th centuries CE). The next stage of our research was guided by the following question: since, for Tsongkhapa, not possessing a self means the same as not possessing a nature (svabhva, rang zhin), a concept upon which Dharmakrti´s explanation of inferential knowledge is based, how does Tsongkhapa combine his presentation of selflessness with Dharmakrti´s epistemology without generating internal contradictions in his system? We have concluded that, in Tsongkhapa´s presentation of selflessness as united with causation, that is, as one implying the other due to the introduction of the key distinction between \'inherent nature\' and \'mere nature\', there is no contradiction between his epistemological use of inferences based on the notion of mere natures (recognized as conventional) and his final ontological assertion that phenomena lack inherent natures. / A presente pesquisa de doutoramento tem por finalidade articular uma apresentação consistente do conceito budista de anatma (ausência de identidade) segundo a explicação do grande pensador tibetano Tsongkhapa (Tibete, 13571419 D.C.), que compôs relevantes obras filosóficas sobre esse conceito budista fundamental, baseadas no famoso tratado Mla-madhyamaka-krik (MMK) de Ngrjuna (Índia, ca 150250 D.C.). Tsongkhapa se apresenta como um seguidor de Ngrjuna, ou seja, como um proponente da escola de filosofia budista \'Caminho do Meio\' (madhyamaka, dbu ma pa). À medida que nosso estudo do primeiro tratado em que ele articula sua visão da noção de anatma (ausência de identidade) se desenvolvia, percebemos que seria necessário dedicar parte de nossa pesquisa à análise da teoria epistemológica que fundamenta sua explicação da \'ausência de identidade\' (dos fenômenos), visto que sua abordagem baseia-se na utilização do que ele chama de \'análise racional\' e \'conhecimento por inferência\'. Dessa forma, a primeira parte de nossa tese é dedicada à compreensão das noções de \'análise racional\' e \'conhecimento por inferência\' usadas por Tsongkhapa, que se baseiam principalmente na teoria sobre as \'cognições válidas\' (pramna, tshad ma), elaborada séculos antes pelo grande pensador indiano Dharmakrti (séculos VI e VII). A etapa seguinte de nosso trabalho teve como fio-condutor a seguinte questão: visto que, para Tsongkhapa, a ausência de identidade (anatma, dak me) significa o mesmo que não ser dotado de uma \'natureza\' (svabhva, rang zhin), conceito sobre o qual a explicação de Dharmakrti do conhecimento por inferência se baseia, como Tsongkhapa elabora conceitualmente a articulação da epistemologia de Dharmakrti com sua explicação da ausência de identidade dos fenômenos sem gerar contradições internas em seu sistema? Concluímos que, na apresentação de Tsongkhapa, em que a noção de causalidade passa a implicar a de \'ausência de identidade\' devido à introdução da distinção essencial entre \'natureza inerente\' e \'mera natureza\', não há contradição entre seu uso epistemológico de inferências baseadas na noção de \'meras naturezas\' (reconhecidas como convencionais) e sua afirmação ontológica final da ausência de natureza inerente nos fenômenos.

Proponents of Middle Way (Sanskrit: Madhyamaka) Buddhist philosophy argue that all phenomena lack inherent nature. This dissertation provides an analysis of the meaning of inherent nature and the lack of inherent nature in the basic physical character of non-living physical phenomena as indicated by certain interpretations of ancient and contemporary Middle Way Buddhist philosophy, contemporary Western analytic metaphysics, philosophy of science, and physics. The primary intellectual focus in the dissertation is Madhyamaka. I explicate an interpretation of Madhyamaka that is both amenable to discourse and dialogue with the other disciplines, and also consistent with at least some extant Madhyamaka interpretations. The discourse and dialogue with other disciplines results in a revision of some of the arguments of Madhyamaka—specifically making it consistent with modern physics. However, that revision does not deny the foundational view of Madhyamaka that there is no inherent nature in phenomena, but rather supports it within the revised interpretation. Additionally, I also find that this foundational view provides at least heuristic guidance in development of a generic interpretive framework (‘contextualization’ and Physics Pluralism) that I then apply in criticism and revision of some arguments in modern analytic metaphysics and in philosophy of science.That generic interpretive framework is used within this dissertation in examination of Western analytic metaphysics and philosophy of science. While I find independent support for that framework within contemporary philosophy, the framework also reflects an interpretation of Madhyamaka that I develop as a variation of the classic two truths view of Madhyamaka. My interpretation of the classical expression of the two truths is that there is relative existence of inherent nature that may be reflected in our conventions of discourse and habit, while ultimately no inherent nature can be found when the phenomena are analyzed more fully. In my modified interpretation of the two truths that corresponds to modern physics, for some phenomena inherent nature is found within specific (‘local’) contexts of discourse or domains of physics theory applicability, yet when we take a ‘global’ view that acknowledges many domains and relationships between domains we find an ultimate relationality rather than inherent nature.