2011年5月臺灣爆發不肖業者將具有毒性之塑化劑添加入合法食品添加物─起雲劑當中，販賣給多家食品業者，用以生產各種食品及飲料，戕害國民健康。惟案件中消費者僅獲賠求償額的兩千分之一，差距甚大，明顯不如預期，更是引發社會諸多撻伐。本論文藉由上述塑化劑案件，探討食品安全消費訴訟消費者求償困境並檢討現行法的缺失與不足，以符合消費者權益保障之宗旨。 文章中首先針對食品安全消費訴訟特性以及我國食品管制上主管機關的權責劃分進行概念性介紹，並就訴訟中消費者可主張的民法、消費者保護法、食品安全衛生管理法上請求權基礎進行要件及爭點說明。其次，就損害賠償之概念及損害進行界定與討論。另由於此類型訴訟，消費者食用問題產品後，多半不會產生立即性身體傷害或臨床病徵，導致訴訟上消費者就其所受之損害難以舉證而敗訴，故本文藉由參酌美國毒物侵權行為訴訟上之損害認定，將損害概念擴張至損害或「損害之虞」，以解決訴訟上消費者損害認定不易的難題。 此外，於因果關係舉證方面，則藉由德國環境責任法、德國基因科技法上之原因推定理論、美國法上市場佔有率責任之因果關係以及日本法上疫學因果關係理論，作為此類型訴訟我國因果關係認定之參考，並就損害賠償範圍、我國懲罰性賠償金制度的引進、目的、重要爭點等析述討論之。最後，本論文藉由實務上判決，觀察現行食品安全衛生管理法第56條法院適用情形，從中檢討現行條文不盡完備之處，並嘗試提出相關修法建議，希冀可作為將來立法者修法之參考。 / In May, 2011 the Taiwan Food and Drug Administration reported that plasticizers, such as: di(2-ethylhexyl)phthalate (DEHP) and di(iso-nonyl)phthalate (DINP), were illegally added to clouding agents used in foods and several beverages.The endocrine disruptors have been linked to developmental problems with children and pregnant women, etc.This paper would mainly discuss the issues of the reflection of civil liabilities arising from food scandals, particularly focus on the plasticizer food scandal in Taiwan. First, the author gives an overview of consumer litigation of food safety, food administration in Taiwan, and the basic of claim such as the Civil law, the Act Governing Food Safety and Sanitation as well as the Consumer Protection Law.Secondly, interprets the concept of civil compensationand expand the traditional concept of personal injury to risk of injury (the plaintiff has not manifested any symptoms of disease but may suffer from illness in the future) by referring to toxic tort.Thirdly, illustrates the special rules on causation in the aspect of the environmental liability law, the biotech law and the market share liability to solve the problems of the causation.Fourthly,probes the compensation scope and punitive damages. Finally,by observing court decisions on article 56 of the Act Governing Food Safety and Sanitation, the author analyzes the deletion of existing legal norms and suggests a proposal for law amendments.

L'elaborato si propone di analizzare le conseguenze dannose scaturenti dalla violazione dell'art. 2103 c.c. Nel primo capitolo ci si sofferma sul concetto di danno, rendendo notizia delle varie teorie concernenti il sistema di responsabilità civile. Nel secondo capitolo si esplorano le diverse ipotesi di danno. in particolare: danni da inadempimento, alla professionalità, alla salute ed esistenziale. Nel terzo capitolo si affronta il tema della tutela assicurativa del danno biologico, ponendo in evidenza i rapporti tra l'indennizzo erogato dall'I.N.A.I.L. ed il risarcimento del danno differenziale. / The dissertation concerns torts and liability in case of transgression of the paragraph 2103 of the Italian civil code. The first chapter is dedicated to torts and liability theories. The second chapter is about various kinds of torts, in the Italian civil code regulation. The author speaks about downgrading consequences, involving workers' health and competences. Moreover he speaks about the loss of enjoyment of life, pain and suffering, caused by the employer's unlawful behaviour. The third chapter concerns workers' insurance, halfway social insurance and accident insurance.

違約金酌減並非一個自行運作之制度，而必須與其他制度相配套方能妥善運作，故本文首先進行違約金類型認定之說明，以期與比較法上有抑或是沒有違約金制度之國法加以相較，如此方更能說明我國法沒有如同英美法之違約金法則（penalty rule）之原因，換言之，違約金之認定與酌減，並非是二個獨立之制度，研究國內外之法會發現，二者是相牽連的制度，故僅單獨進行違約金酌減制度之說明，不足以完整敘明，必定要兼明辨如何認定違約金之類型。 再者，違約金條款之酌減在實務上遭遇的問題甚多，本文將先提供思考面向的五個層次（權利主體、發生要件、行使方式、斟酌因素、舉證責任），再以實體面以及程序面加以分析細部問題，實體問題最為重要者，即為法院為酌減時應審酌之諸事項，亦是本文強烈建議立法的部分；而程序部分最為重要者有涉及處分權主義之發動權限問題，以及涉及辯論主義（協同主義）的舉證責任事項。希冀在有體系之研討下，可以作為實務遇有違約金酌減相關問題時之參考。 此外，違約金過低是否應酌加，抑或有其他配套可供解決，亦是比較法上饒富興味之疑問，本文亦將會說明解決方法。

Dans la plupart des disciplines juridiques, le motif légitime se présente comme un standard de justification des actes. Il fait obstacle à l’application de la norme, en fondant un droit ou en exonérant d’un devoir. Le droit pénal se montre réticent à l’endroit de cette notion floue qui connaît pourtant un essor sans précédent. Afin de justifier la marge d’appréciation laissée au juge, le motif légitime est généralement conçu comme un mobile, ce qui accentue la confusion entre les causes objectives et subjectives d’irresponsabilité. L’insuffisance de l’approche formelle du mécanisme justificatif explique sa subjectivation progressive. L’analyse du motif légitime suppose de revisiter la théorie de la justification à travers une conception substantielle de l’illicéité, apte à unifier son régime. L’étude de la finalité justificative du motif légitime permet de mieux comprendre la souplesse de ses conditions de mise en œuvre. Le motif légitime renverse la présomption d’illicéité fondant la responsabilité. Le jugement de valeur porté sur l’infraction est la raison d’être du reproche social. Elle se distingue de son attribution à l’auteur qui relève d’un jugement de réalité sur sa volonté. Le motif légitime procède des circonstances extérieures à l’infraction autorisant la vérification concrète de son illicéité. La nature objective du motif légitime est conforme à son effet exonératoire de responsabilité opérant in rem et non in personam. Ses conditions d’application semblent, en revanche, doublement dérogatoires au droit commun de la justification, tant à l’égard de ses critères larges que de son domaine étroit. Il est cantonné à des infractions de risque abstrait pour des valeurs secondaires dont la présomption d’illicéité est artificielle. Le prévenu doit rapporter la preuve de la légitimité concrète de son acte, alors que la légitimité abstraite de la répression est sujette à caution. L’expansion de ce domaine dérogatoire de la répression révèle l’insuffisant contrôle de sa nécessité abstraite. En tout état de cause, la mention spéciale du motif légitime est inutile car toute infraction en fait implicitement réserve, en sorte qu’il se conçoit comme un standard général de justification. Il confère au juge la libre appréciation de la nécessité concrète de la répression, au regard du contexte de chaque espèce qui échappe par nature à la loi ne pouvant régler a priori tous les conflits de valeurs. La justification a postériori des infractions socialement nécessaires ou insignifiantes renforce l’autorité de la loi en garantissant une application conforme à sa finalité de protection des valeurs. / In many legal disciplines, the legitimate reason is a model of justification of acts. The legitimate reason prevents the enforcement of the law, either by creating a right or by exempting someone from a duty. Despite an unprecedented boom, criminal law is hesitant about this vague notion. In order to justify judges' assessment margin, the legitimate reason is commonly considered as a motive. This accentuates the confusion between objective and subjective causes of irresponsibility. The formal approach of the justificatory process is inadequate, making the process increasingly biased. The analysis of the legitimate reason requires a re-examination of the justification theory using a solid understanding of unlawfulness which can help standardize its implementation. The study of the legitimate reason’s justificatory function allows a better understanding of the flexibility of its implementation requirements. The legitimate reason reverses the presumption of unlawfulness on which liability is based. The cause of liability is conditioned by the value judgment made about the offence, whereas the judgment of the reality of the offender’s intention is the condition of his imputation. The legitimate reason stems from circumstances that are external to the offence, and which enable the review of its lawfulness. The objective nature of the legitimate reason is aligned with the fact that it exempts from liability in rem and not in personam. However, the requirements for its application seem exceptional to the common law of justification in two regards: its broad criteria and its narrow field. It is limited to offences of abstract risk that protect secondary values for which the presumption of unlawfulness is artificial. The defendant must prove the legitimacy of his act whereas the abstract legitimacy of the suppression is unconfirmed. The expansion of this dispensatory field of suppression reveals an inadequate control of its abstract necessity. In any case, bringing up legitimate reason is useless as it is implicit to any offence and is considered as a general model of justification. It leaves the judge free to assess the necessity of the penalty on a case by case basis, as the law, by nature, cannot resolve all value conflicts. The post facto justification of socially necessary offences or even trivial offences reinforces the authority of the law by ensuring an enforcement that is aligned with the law's aim of protecting values.