The CEO of a large listed firm is often under public scrutiny due to listing requirements of stock exchanges of the respective country as well as pressures from stakeholders. Of these stakeholders, shareholders are mostly interested in the firm performance as it relates to their investment to determine if their investment is still worthwhile as well as to determine its returns. A CEO has the duty of ensuring that a firm meets its set targets and the responsibility of having to account for any deviations from these targets. In a firm with sound corporate governance measures, any underperformance experienced by the firm should result in the CEO being replaced and when targets met, the CEO being rewarded. However this is not always the case and this study considers the key determinants of CEO turnover as it later aims to determine what these key determinants are in South African JSE-listed firms as well as the correlation with CEO turnover. This study examines the relationship between ownership structure and board characteristics on CEO-firm performance sensitivity. The population for this study was 60 companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. The period covered for this study runs over 5 years from 2013 to 2017. This period was chosen mainly because data for some companies was missing for the period beyond 2017. Thus, excluding companies that had no data for the period beyond 2017 could have reduced the sample further and would have made the analysis less meaningful. The study reports three important findings. The first is that CEO turnover is insensitive to firm performance, irrespective of whether it is an accounting-based firm performance (i.e CEO turnover vs EBIT/Assets ratio) or market-based measure of firm performance (lagged stock returns, 18, 24, and 36 months respectively). Second, the findings of this study show that CEO age and institutional ownership are inversely related to CEO turnover. In addition, board size becomes a significant determinant of CEO turnover when the model in includes returns lagged over 36 months or when the EBIT/Assets ratio is part of the Model (see models 7 and 8), although this is only at 10% level of significance. Third, board insiders and firm size are found to be unrelated to CEO turnover.

CEO compensation is an important issue since shareholders, politicians, regulators, and the media have different opinions on the appropriate level. Critics argue that CEO compensation is excessive due to the weak link to firm performance, but even though the field has been thoroughly researched there are mixed findings regarding the relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance. Literature suggests that this could be due to that each economy is unique and has its specificities when determining CEO compensation. CEO compensation in Sweden is generally lower than in the US and Britain, but the performance of the firm is the same or even better. Therefore, the aim of this paper was to study the relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance in the Swedish context. Through a univariate, bivariate, and multivariate analysis of 38 firms on the Nasdaq OMX Stockholm, our findings show that there is no significant relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance in Swedish listed firms when using standard control variables. This result is more consistent with the managerial power theory and less with the agency theory and contract theory. The findings suggest that there is no alignment between Swedish CEOs' compensation incentives and the shareholders' interest (i.e., firm performance).

This dissertation is composed by two essays that explore corporate governance issues in S&P firms. The first essay examines changes in corporate governance after a firm gets added to the S&P 500 index? Using firms added from 1994 to 2007, this paper examines how governance mechanisms change for these firms. Specifically, I look at both the overall governance and details on how each mechanism changes. I find that governance improves after being added to the index. Controlling for firm size, leverage, prior firm performance, and growth opportunities, the market reacts positively to governance improvements as a whole. In addition, changes in governance are positively associated with changes in operating performance. In the second essay, the departure of a CEO often raises questions about who will replace him/her. This study examines the homogeneity/heterogeneity nature of the internal labor market using a novel measure, a heterogeneity index, which captures the concentration of executive compensation levels. I find that a more homogeneous internal labor market is associated with (1) a greater likelihood of an internal replacement, (2) a higher probability of a CEO turnover, and (3) a bigger tournament prize. In addition, the negative performance-turnover relationship is strengthened by a more homogeneous internal labor market. The heterogeneity index seems to proxy for internal labor market competition.

This thesis investigates Swedish market reactions to CEO turnover and further studies how the size of these market reactions can be explained by company specific and CEO specific factors. Through t-tests and multivariate analysis this study analyses 136 CEO turnover announcements from the years 2017-2022 to find proof of a market reaction and to find potential explanations to the size of these market reactions. The results of this study show that the Swedish market on average reacts positively to CEO turnover announcements regarding the studied firms abnormal return and cumulative abnormal return, which shows that CEO turnover announcements contain useful information for investors. Our study finds indications of differences market reactions size of CEO turnover announcements between small and big firms and differences in market reaction regarding the experience level of the appointed CEO. Our study also found that a company's ROA, M/B, and their appointed CEO's experience level influence the size of these market reactions. As the market reactions due to CEO turnover often occurred the days before the CEO turnover announcement, this study's also found indications of potential insider information leakage within Swedish firms.

本研究將總經理之異動分為自願性與非自願異動二種，主要探討董事會之特性與、控制股東與總經理發生非自願性異動間之關聯性，並且強調從董事會獨立性及最終控制者對董事會之控制力觀點，探討董事會解除總經理職務之決策行為。除此之外，本研究尚探討總經理異動後影響董事會選任繼任總經理之決策行為，主要從董事會之獨立性與異動前績效兩項觀點。研究樣本為民國八十八年至九十二年之台灣上市公司，探用Logit model來檢驗假說。 在總經理發生非自願性異動方面，實證結果顯示，當前期的績效愈差時，總經理發生非自願性異動的機率愈高，本研究並將董事會特性分為股權結構及董事會獨立性兩種，並加入最終控制者觀點，實證結果顯示，獨立董事的比率愈高，總經理發生非自願性異動的機率愈高，惟其結果不具統計上的重大性。總經理之持股比率佔董事全體持股比率較高時，愈容易發生總經理非自願性異動，但不具有統計上的重大性。當董事長與總經理為同一人時，較不易發生總經理非自願性異動。此外，在最終控制者方面，實證結果顯示，當控制股東席次控制權愈高時，總經理發生非自願性異動的機率愈低，控制股東的盈餘分配權與席次控制權的偏離程度愈大時，總經理發生非自願性異動的機率愈低，但不具統計上的重大性。 在繼任總經理特性與董事會特性關聯性方面，實證結果顯示，當異動前績效愈差時，董事會愈傾向於選用外部繼任者，但不具有統計上的重大性。獨立董事比率愈高，董事會愈傾向於選用外部繼任者。 　　整體而言，績效是影響我國上市公司總經理發生非自願性異動的重要原因之一，除此之外，董事長兼任總經理之情形，讓董事長有能力去阻止他們被撤換，進而降低總經理非自願性的離職機率。由於我國上市公司特殊的股權結構，使得控制股東掌控了董事會並且積極參與公司經營，造成董事會流於形式，無形中降低了董事會的監督職能，而設置獨立董事是提高董事會職能發揮的重要機制之一，在本研究中，雖未發現獨立董事的設置對於董事會的監督職能之顯著助益，但發現設置獨立董事在決定繼任者方面，能提出專業建言，使得董事會選任繼任總經理能有更廣泛的人選，而非侷限於公司內部。 / This research CEO turnover will divide into voluntary turnover and non- voluntary turnover. This research discusses the relationship among corporate performance, characteristics of board of the directors, non- voluntary CEO turnover and controlling shareholders. This research emphasizes the board of directors independence and the controlling shareholders’ controlling force over the board of directors and discusses the board of directors’ policy-making behavior of firing CEO.In addition, this research also discusses how does the board of directors appoint succeed CEO.The sample consists of all public companies listed on Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation over the four-year period 2000-2003.According to previous studies, the characteristics of the board of directors are ownership structure and independence. This research also considerate the controlling shareholders. This research provides evidence on the relationship between non- voluntary CEO turnover and corporate performance. The likelihood of non- voluntary CEO turnover is significantly negatively related to the pre-performance. Non- voluntary CEO turnover rate is low when the chairman of the board and CEO are the same person. In addition, this research provides evidence on the relationship between the board of directors independence and the characteristics of the succeed CEO.When the fraction of outside directors is high, the board of directors comparatively possibly appoints the outsider successor.

Aim: We find that there is a gap in the current research where the research available tends to focus on a narrower time frame and with performance based variables. This study aims to examine how the stock market has reacted to the announcement of a CEO-change between the years 2001-2021 on the Swedish stock market. Method: The study is carried out with a positivistic and a deductive approach, which are frequently used in quantitative studies. The study also uses an event study as its research design, where 786 CEO-changes and 358 companies are subject of the study Results and conclusion: The results show that as a whole, there is no significant abnormal return when CEO-changes are announced on the Swedish stock market. When external CEO:s are appointed, there is a statistically significantly negative abnormal return. When internal CEO:s are appointed, there is a statistically significantly positive abnormal return. Contributions of the thesis: The descriptive results could possibly give a better understanding of CEO-changes between the years 2001-2021 depending on recruitment-type and the nature of the departure. The results of the event study gives rise to an understanding of the behaviors of the stock market and the reaction to a CEO-change. Suggestions for future research: To conduct an equivalent study but focusing on company- specific factors to see if there is significant abnormal returns based on the companies performances. One could also study whether it makes a difference if the CEO has been in his position for a long time or if the performance of the CEO makes a difference.

No description available.

Актуальность темы исследования обусловлена ростом количества смен топ-менеджеров как в российских, так и в зарубежных компаниях, и очевидной связью между основными экономическими показателями фирмы (доходность акций, рентабельность активов, прибыль, динамика выручки и др.) и этими сменами топ-менеджеров. Цель диссертации – выявить и сравнить факторы, влияющие на смену топ-менеджеров в российских и зарубежных компаниях нефинансового сектора. Научная новизна исследования заключается в том, что были изучены более новые данные, т.к. большую часть исследовательской базы составили данные российских и зарубежных компаний за 2015–2016 гг., т.е. годы не начала экономического кризиса, а явной стагнации в российской экономике. Собранные данные показали, что акционеры-собственники, реагируя на негативную динамику основных показателей, либо меняли своих топ-менеджеров, в единичных случаях вынуждены были либо продавать контрольные пакеты акций своих компаний, либо объединяться с другими компаниями, т.е. запускать процессы слияния или поглощения. Тем не менее, к таким радикальным мерам прибегала лишь малая часть исследованных компаний, большинство же из них пыталось выправить ситуацию внутри компании путем смены руководства. Кроме того, удалось сравнить частоту смены топ-менеджеров в различных компаниях по результатам двух крупных экономических кризисов: 2008 года и 2014 года. Практическая значимость исследования обусловлена тем, что выводы, сформированные в результате исследования, позволяют выработать рекомендации по совершенствованию механизмов корпоративного управления в части мониторинга деятельности топ-менеджеров. / The relevance of the research topic is due to the increase in the number of turnover of CEOs in both Russian and foreign companies, and the obvious link between the main economic indicators of the company (stock returns, return on assets, profit, revenue dynamics, etc.) and these changes of top managers. The purpose of the thesis is to identify and compare the factors affecting the change of top managers in Russian and foreign companies in the non-financial sector. The scientific novelty of the research lies in the fact that newer data has been studied, since Most of the research base was made up of data from Russian and foreign companies for 2015–2016, i.e. The years did not start an economic crisis, but an apparent stagnation in the Russian economy. The collected data showed that the shareholders, in response to the negative dynamics of the main indicators, either changed their top managers, in isolated cases they had to either sell controlling stakes in their companies, or merge with other companies, i.e. launch merger or acquisition processes. Nevertheless, only a small part of the companies studied resorted to such radical measures, most of them tried to rectify the situation within the company by changing top-managers. In addition, it was possible to compare the frequency of change of top managers in different companies based on the results of two major economic crises: 2008 and 2014. The practical significance of the study is due to the fact that the conclusions formed as a result of the research allow developing recommendations for improving the corporate governance mechanisms in terms of monitoring the activities of CEOs.

為釐清經理人異動對公司日常營運決策及績效之影響及資訊內涵，本研究透過分析國內近五年來上市櫃公司樣本後發現，大多數發生經理人異動之公司多為一次且自願性之異動，而不是經常性之活動，此為一家公司經營權輪替之正常行為。至於其他發生非經常性異動之公司則多在5年內有高於2次以上之異動行為，此和該類公司經營績效不佳及集團內部有爭權行為有很大之關係。關於經理人異動事件宣告效果方面，本研究實證結果顯示，無論是何種異動原因，市場似乎皆呈現負向反應，且以非自願性異動事件負向反應程度為大。 至於經理人異動對公司投資及融資比例之影響方面，本實證結果顯示，不同之異動原因對公司投資、融資比例之影響亦不同。以自願性異動事件來說，事件發生前之固定資產成長率呈現遞增的現象，顯示經理人異動前其投資決策普遍較同業為積極，而事件發生後卻轉而成為較同業保守，顯示新上任者可能因為經驗之不足而不敢採行太積極的策略，而其負債比例在事件發生前逐年遞減，發生後則呈逐年遞增的現象。至於非自願性異動事件，本研究發現其在事件發生前即開始採行較保守的投資策略，推論可能和此類公司基本面較差，或是經理人進行資產誤置之行為所導致，異動後新繼任者之投資轉趨積極；而其於事件發生前負債比例增加，發生後則呈現減少的現象。 至於經理人異動後公司之績效情況，本研究結果顯示無論是會計指標或是市場績效指標，自願性異動樣本之結果在事件發生後公司經營績效皆較之前為差，和市場對事件宣告之反應相符合；但以非自願性異動樣本來說，事件發生後公司經營績效之指標皆較之前為佳，顯示當初事件發生時市場之反應似乎太過悲觀，但這部分的結果可能存在有存在偏誤(survival bias)之問題。 上述的實證結果使得台灣公司經理人異動和市場宣告反應、經營決策及績效首次獲得連結，對投資人在未來從事投資時可作為參考依據。 / In order to understand the information content of CEO turnover to corporate operating decision and performance, from analyzing the listing companies between 1997-2002 in TW, this research found that the most CEO turnover is once and voluntary activity, this is normal in the daily operation. As for the other involuntary turnover activity, which often happened in the company with bad performance or takeover. As for the announcement effect about CEO turnover, the article found that no matter what reasons, the effect is negative, and more significant in involuntary turnover. About the CEO turnover influence on corporate investing and financing decision, this article shows that different turnover reason would result in different decision. Take the companies with voluntary turnover for instance, the fixed asset growth rate grew before turnover but fell afterward. I assume that’s because new CEO takes more conservative investment decision than original one. And the leverage rate in this kind of companies falls before the event but grows afterward. As for the companies with involuntary turnover, this article found that the original CEO took more conservative investment decision than new CEO, this might be because of the worse fundamental situation in this kind of companies or the asset misallocation of the original CEO. And the leverage rate of involuntary turnover grows before the event but falls afterward.

隨著公司治理議題逐漸受到注意，我國政府制定了許多相關規範以使董事會對於公司管理者的監督功能健全。故本研究希望能藉由股票市場對於公司宣告總經理更換之反應，了解董事會是否發揮監督功能，撤換管理表現不佳的總經理。 本研究以2007年至2011年於證交所公開資訊觀測站之重大訊息公告專區宣告更換總經理之台灣上市公司為研究樣本，透過事件研究法計算個別公司更換總經理的宣告效果。 本研究首先探討市場對公司更換總經理之整體看法為何，再透過複迴歸分析進一步探討更換總經理前公司經營績效的好壞、卸任總經理之在位期間長短、卸任總經理是否離開公司、卸任總經理之持股百分比、董監事持股百分比、獨立董事人數占董事總人數之百分比等因素對宣告效果的影響。 實證結果有以下發現：(一) 更換前公司營運績效好壞對宣告效果有顯著的影響。更換前營運績效佳之公司有負面的宣告效果，更換前營運績效差之公司有正面的宣告效果。(二)更換前營運績效佳的公司，若卸任的總經理在位期間越長，則宣告效果越負面。(三)更換前營運績效差的公司，若卸任的總經理離開公司，則宣告效果比卸任的總經理沒有離開公司還要正面。(四)更換前營運績效差的公司，若原總經理持股百分比越高，則宣告效果越正面。表示對於這些總經理持股百分比高的公司而言，造成公司績效不佳的原因是總經理能力不足，而不是因為存在代理問題。(五)董監事持股百分比對更換總經理的宣告效果沒有顯著的影響。(六)獨立董事占公司董事總人數之百分比越高卻使更換總經理之宣告效果越負面，表示本研究之實證結果不支持獨立董事對更換總經理有正面的影響。 / This research studies the announcement effects of CEO turnovers with a view to understanding the reactions of stocks market toward CEO turnovers, and whether the boards play their role to oversee managers and replace those managers who perform poorly. This research collected samples from Taiwan listed companies who announced CEO turnovers during year 2007 through year 2011 and then calculated announcement effects by event study method. This research first studied the overall viewpoint of the stock market to CEO turnovers and then tried to figure out whether and how corporate operating performance before CEO turnovers, tenure of ex-CEO, whether the ex-CEO leaves the corporate, stock holding percentage of ex-CEO, stock holding percentage of directors and the percentage of number of independent directors accounts for total number of directors influence the announcement effects of CEO turnovers. This research finds that: (1) Companies’ performances before CEO turnover significantly influence the announcement effects. Sub-sample of well-performed companies has negative announcement effects and the sub-sample of poorly-performed companies has positive announcement effects. (2) For well-performed companies, the longer the tenure of ex-CEO, the more negative the announcement effect is. (3) For poor-performed companies, the announcement effect of companies whose ex-CEO leaves the company is more positive than those whose ex-CEO does not leave the companies. (4) For poorly-performed companies, the higher the ex-CEO stock holding percentage, the more positive the announcement effect is. It means that for those companies whose ex-CEO stock holding percentage is high, it is not agency problem that causes CEO to perform poorly but the lack of the CEO’s ability does. (5) The stock holding percentage of directors does not significantly influence the announcement effect. (6) The higher the percentage of number of independent directors accounts for the total number of directors, the more negative the CEO turnover announcement effect is. This means that the result of this research does not support that independent directors have a positive impact on CEO turnover.