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This thesis examines the appeal to ordinary language as a distinctive methodological feature in the later philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein and the work of J. L. Austin. This appeal situates our language and concepts within the broader forms of life in which we use them, and seeks to ‘disenchant’ idealizations that extract our language and concepts from this broader context. A disenchanted philosophy recognizes our forms of life as manifestations of attunement: a shared common ground of understanding and behaviour that cannot itself be further explained or justified. By working through the consequences of seeing our forms of life as ultimately ungrounded in this way, the thesis illuminates the underlying importance of play to shared practices like language. The first two chapters consider the appeal to ordinary language as it features in the work of Austin and Wittgenstein, respectively. By placing each author in turn in dialogue with Jacques Derrida, the thesis draws out the importance of seeing our attunement as ungrounded, and the difficulty of doing so. Austin’s appeal to a ‘total context’ betrays the sort of idealization Austin himself opposes, whereas Wittgenstein and Derrida must remain self-reflexively vigilant in order to avoid the same pitfall. Chapter Three explores connections between the appeal to ordinary language and Martin Heidegger’s analysis of ‘average everydayness’ in Being and Time. Heidegger takes average everydayness to be a mark of inauthenticity. However, in acknowledging the ungroundedness of attunement, the appeal to ordinary language manifests a turn similar to Heidegger’s appeal to authenticity. Furthermore, Wittgenstein’s use of conceptual ‘pictures’ also allows him to avoid some of the confusions in Heidegger’s work. Chapter Four considers the nature of our ungrounded attunement, and argues that we both discover and create this attunement through play, which is unregulated activity that itself gives rise to regularity.

Målet med denne bacheloroppgåva var å studere to bøker av Tomas Espedal og Kristian Lundberg for å sjå kva deira språklege grep kunne seie oss om synet på språk og røyndom i bøkene. Eg studerte bøkene imot kunsten og imot naturen av Espedal og Yarden og Och allt skall vara kärlek av Lundberg med vekt på dei språklege verkemidla dei har brukt. Alle bøkene går innunder omgrepet sjølvframstillande litteratur og eg har jamstilt formen med dei andre språklege verkemidla for å sjå kva også sjangeren dei har skrive i har hatt å seie for å kunne utrykkje eit syn på forholdet mellom språk og verd i bøkene. Eg tok utgangspunkt i teorien rundt språkfilosofi og underleggjering i litteraturen og brukte dette som grunnlag for min komparative analyse. Det eg til slutt kom fram til er at både formen og dei andre språklege verkemidla utrykkjer eit syn på språket som utilstrekkeleg og røyndommen som noko subjektivt som heile tida er i forandring. Ein konstruerer si eiga verd gjennom ein individuell bruk av språket. Dei litterære grepa utrykkjer dette på ulikt sett, som til dømes komposisjonen som vitnar om ei uoversikteleg verd og eit minne ein ikkje kan stole på. Prosainnslaga viser til ei verd utan klare grenser og med eit behov for eit språk som kan vise til noko meir enn dei språklege bileta vi allereie kjenner. Sjølvframstillinga i seg sjølv viser til ei subjektiv røynd, med eit subjektiv språk der grensene mellom fakta og fiksjon er utflytande. Dermed kan ein forstå desse fire bøkene som eit forsøk på å seie noko meir enn det språket kan utrykkje og som eit lite klapp på skuldra som fortel deg at det finst ei sanning så lenge du godtek at den er subjektiv og konstruert i språket.

Ce mémoire de maîtrise porte sur le scepticisme inhérent au langage quotidien et la reproduction de ce scepticisme dans l'art cinématographique. Plus précisément, nous examinons les thèses du philosophe américain Stanley Cavell qui propose une analyse du scepticisme du langage -autant un scepticisme face au monde extérieur qu'un scepticisme face à autrui -par le cinéma. Nous cherchons à définir à la fois les scepticismes cavelliens et la reproduction particulière qu'en fait le cinéma. Ceci nous permettra d'établir l'utilité sociale du scepticisme quotidien, de même que le rôle indispensable du cinéma pour sa recouvrance. L'hypothèse générale tirée de cette étude est que la communication sociale est basée sur une reconnaissance mutuelle et un rapport au monde extérieur dont le scepticisme est une composante inhérente. Le cinéma peut jouer un important rôle dans notre perception de cette condition en nous fournissant des exemples d'individus outrepassant les risques du scepticisme qui nous empêchent de reconnaître autrui. Nous établissons l'utilité sociologique et philosophique du cinéma dans sa reproduction des formes de scepticisme traversant le langage quotidien et découvrons la signification et les impacts du scepticisme quotidien dans nos relations sociales et notre rapport au monde extérieur. Cette étude permet aussi de parfaire notre connaissance de philosophes peu abordés au Québec, des auteurs de tradition anglaise et américaine exerçant une philosophie proche des considérations communes et quotidiennes ; Cavell souhaite la renaissance d'une philosophie américaine accessible et traitant de conditions quotidiennes. Une philosophie proche de la sociologie: le scepticisme quotidien origine du partage social du langage, toutes les questions qui lui sont liées relèvent de la sociologie. Cavell aspire aussi à rectifier notre compréhension de la philosophie d'Austin et de Wittgenstein; des philosophes peu étudiés par la francophonie nord-américaine. ______________________________________________________________________________ MOTS-CLÉS DE L’AUTEUR : Stanley Cavell, Scepticisme, Langage, Wittgenstein, Cinéma, Art.

京都大学 / 0048 / 新制・論文博士 / 博士(教育学) / 乙第13298号 / 論教博第169号 / 新制||教||190(附属図書館) / 京都大学大学院教育学研究科臨床教育学専攻 / (主査)准教授 齋藤 直子, 教授 西平 直, 准教授 Jeremy Rappleye / 学位規則第4条第2項該当 / Doctor of Philosophy (Education) / Kyoto University / DGAM

Ce mémoire vise à explorer le lien étroit unissant le scepticisme philosophique, le dispositif cinématographique et la tétralogie de Gus Van Sant : Gerry, Elephant, Last days et Paranoid Park. À partir de la philosophie de Stanley Cavell, il sera d’abord question de développer le scepticisme comme condition d’existence et non plus comme doctrine philosophique. Stanley Cavell fait bifurquer le problème sceptique de la cognition vers l’éthique et nous verrons comment Gus Van Sant, en proposant un cinéma du désoeuvrement et de la mélancolie où l’individu est en rupture avec le monde, rejoint cette dimension éthique du scepticisme par le cinéma. Ensuite, il s’agira de voir comment le dispositif cinématographique est l’expression même du scepticisme cavellien et comment il permet de tendre vers le perfectionnisme moral en imposant la reconnaissance de son existence à travers la décision morale. Enfin, nous verrons comment Gus Van Sant, en réinventant le plan-séquence et le ralenti, répond singulièrement au problème posé par le scepticisme en réintégrant l’individu dans le monde à force de manipulations formelles qui sont autant de réponses au désoeuvrement contemporain comme condition existentielle. Ces réponses trouvées par Gus Van Sant ne sont pas des solutions, mais une exploration des dimensions d’un problème qu’il renouvèle : le scepticisme. / This thesis aims to explore the close ties between philosophical skepticism, the cinematic apparatus and Gus Van Sant's tetralogy of films: Gerry, Elephant, Last Days and Paranoid Park. From Stanley Cavell’s philosophical perspective, we will first address the question of skepticism as a condition of existence rather than a philosophical doctrine. Stanley Cavell redirects the skepticism problem of cognition towards ethics and we will look at how Gus Van Sant meets the ethical dimension of skepticism by offering a cinema of idleness and melancholia in which individuals are at odds with the world. Furthermore, we will study how the cinematic apparatus is the very expression of Cavellian skepticism and how it moves toward moral perfectionism by forcing the recognition of our existence through moral decision-making. Finally, we will look at how Gus Van Sant, in a singular manner, addresses the problem raised by skepticism by reinventing the sequence shot and the slow motion, and therefore reinstates the individual to the world through formal manipulations that respond to modern idleness as an existential condition. The answers Gus Van Sant has found are not solutions, but rather the exploration of the dimensions of a problem he is restating: skepticism.

This dissertation studies a group of contemporary Anglo-American novelists who contribute to the development of a new humanism after the postmodern critique of Euro-American culture. As such, these writers respond to positions in twentieth-century philosophy that converge in a call for silence which has an ontological as well as ethical valence: as a way of rigorously thinking the ‘outside’ to language, it avoids charges of metaphysical inauthenticity; as an ethical stance in the wake of the Shoah, it eschews a complicity with the reifications of modern culture. How to reconcile this post-metaphysical promise with the politico-aesthetic inadequacy of speechlessness is the central question for this nexus of novelists—David Markson, Bret Easton Ellis, David Foster Wallace, and Zadie Smith—at the center of which the study locates Wallace as a key figure of contemporary literature. By reconstructing the conversation among these authors, this dissertation argues that the nexus writers turn to indirect means of representation that do justice to the demand for silence in matters of metaphysics, but also gesture past it in the development of a neo-romantic aesthetics that invites the humanist category of the self back onto the scene after its dismissal by late postmodernism. The key to such indirection lies in an aporetic method that inspires explorations of metaphysical assumptions by seducing readers to an ambiguous site of aesthetic wonder; in conversation with a range of contemporary philosophers, the dissertation defines this affective site as a place of proximity, rather than absorption or detachment, which balances out the need for metaphysical distance with the productive desire for a fullness of experience. Such proximate aesthetic experiences continue the work of ‘doing metaphysics’ in post-metaphysical times by engaging our habitual responsiveness to the categories involved. Hence the novels discussed here stage limit cases of reason such as the unknowable world, the unreachable other, the absence of the self, and the unstable hierarchy between irony and sincerity: Markson’s Wittgenstein’s Mistress imagines skepticism as literal abandonment and reminds us of our metaphysical indebtedness to a desired object/world; Ellis’s American Psycho shows the breakdown of communication due to a similarly skeptical vision of human interaction and presents a violence that tries to force a response from the desired subject/person; Wallace’s Infinite Jest creates a large canvas on which episodes of metaphysical and literal ‘stuckness’ afford possibilities for becoming human; Smith’s The Autograph Man, finally, pays attention to gestural language at the breaking point of materialism and theology, nature and culture, tragedy and comedy. / Graduate / 2020-08-01

This study claims that formally experimental novels written in the early twentieth century place urgent, if often implicit, demands for acknowledgment upon their readers. Scholars have long held that the economic and cultural upheavals of the early twentieth century led novelists to doubt language’s referential capacities. But, even as signal modernist works by E.M. Forster, Virginia Woolf, William Faulkner, and others move away from a view of language as a means of gaining knowledge, they also underscore its capacity to grant acknowledgment; they treat words as tools for recognizing and responding to the inner lives of others. Stanley Cavell finds such a vision of language in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations (1953), a work Cavell describes as “modernist.” This dissertation demonstrates that Wittgenstein’s interest in acknowledgment emerges via his negotiation of the same historical forces with which literary modernism grapples: industrialization, World War, cross-cultural encounter. I argue that modernist representations of consciousness offer readers a way of hearing what Wittgenstein calls “the silent soliloquy of others,” giving us words by which we might adopt an attitude of acknowledgment toward the otherwise unvoiced inner lives of socially marginalized figures. Chapter One considers the crisis of reason that convulses early twentieth-century Britain and demonstrates how Forster’s Howards End (1910) and Woolf’s Mrs. Dalloway (1925) critique excessive commitments to rationality as counterproductive to the acknowledgment of politically disenfranchised citizens. Chapter Two discusses Ford Madox Ford’s The Good Soldier (1915), Woolf’s To the Lighthouse (1927), and Nella Larsen’s Passing (1929): three texts that, I show, cast traditional Victorian marriage as an unsatisfying form of intimacy and depict speakers hesitant to acknowledge their desires for alternative, same-sex modes of intimate relation. Chapter Three examines Faulkner’s portrayal of capitalist modernization in The Sound and the Fury (1929) and As I Lay Dying (1930), arguing that characters in these novels insist on the immitigable privacy of their experiences and struggle accordingly to gain acknowledgment from family members. Chapter Four reads Richard Wright’s Black Boy (1945) and Ralph Ellison’s Invisible Man (1952) as two texts that represent the psychological experience of having one’s humanity go brutally unacknowledged under Jim Crow. / 2020-11-07T00:00:00Z

Ce mémoire vise à explorer le lien étroit unissant le scepticisme philosophique, le dispositif cinématographique et la tétralogie de Gus Van Sant : Gerry, Elephant, Last days et Paranoid Park. À partir de la philosophie de Stanley Cavell, il sera d’abord question de développer le scepticisme comme condition d’existence et non plus comme doctrine philosophique. Stanley Cavell fait bifurquer le problème sceptique de la cognition vers l’éthique et nous verrons comment Gus Van Sant, en proposant un cinéma du désoeuvrement et de la mélancolie où l’individu est en rupture avec le monde, rejoint cette dimension éthique du scepticisme par le cinéma. Ensuite, il s’agira de voir comment le dispositif cinématographique est l’expression même du scepticisme cavellien et comment il permet de tendre vers le perfectionnisme moral en imposant la reconnaissance de son existence à travers la décision morale. Enfin, nous verrons comment Gus Van Sant, en réinventant le plan-séquence et le ralenti, répond singulièrement au problème posé par le scepticisme en réintégrant l’individu dans le monde à force de manipulations formelles qui sont autant de réponses au désoeuvrement contemporain comme condition existentielle. Ces réponses trouvées par Gus Van Sant ne sont pas des solutions, mais une exploration des dimensions d’un problème qu’il renouvèle : le scepticisme. / This thesis aims to explore the close ties between philosophical skepticism, the cinematic apparatus and Gus Van Sant's tetralogy of films: Gerry, Elephant, Last Days and Paranoid Park. From Stanley Cavell’s philosophical perspective, we will first address the question of skepticism as a condition of existence rather than a philosophical doctrine. Stanley Cavell redirects the skepticism problem of cognition towards ethics and we will look at how Gus Van Sant meets the ethical dimension of skepticism by offering a cinema of idleness and melancholia in which individuals are at odds with the world. Furthermore, we will study how the cinematic apparatus is the very expression of Cavellian skepticism and how it moves toward moral perfectionism by forcing the recognition of our existence through moral decision-making. Finally, we will look at how Gus Van Sant, in a singular manner, addresses the problem raised by skepticism by reinventing the sequence shot and the slow motion, and therefore reinstates the individual to the world through formal manipulations that respond to modern idleness as an existential condition. The answers Gus Van Sant has found are not solutions, but rather the exploration of the dimensions of a problem he is restating: skepticism.

"Thèse en cotutelle, Doctorat en philosophie: Université Laval, Québec, Canada, Philosophiæ doctor (Ph. D.) et École Normale Supérieure de Lyon, Lyon, France". / Tableau d’honneur de la Faculté des études supérieures et postdoctorales, 2017 / Concept éminemment polysémique, le sens commun a été déprécié par un vaste pan de la philosophie occidentale, qui y a vu au mieux l’expression de croyances infondées, au pire la manifestation de croyances erronées et naïves. Là où bon nombre de commentateurs ont repéré dans les pensées mêmes d’Henri Bergson, Stanley Cavell et Gilles Deleuze, trois grandes figures de la philosophie du cinéma, des critiques adressées au sens commun, nous nous efforçons ici de tirer au clair la conception positive qu’ils développent de cette notion, en dépit des soupçons occasionnels qu’ils font peser sur elle. Plus précisément, nous tâchons d’expliquer jusqu’à quel point certaines acceptions du sens commun permettent de satisfaire l’ambition de connaître le réel lui-même. En premier lieu, nous passons en revue l’argumentation élaborée par certains réalistes spéculatifs (en particulier Quentin Meillassoux et Graham Harman) afin de clarifier d’une part des réflexions qui feront l’objet de discussions et de répliques dans les chapitres subséquents et, d’autre part, de montrer que la dépréciation philosophique du sens commun se prolonge jusque dans les débats les plus actuels sur l’objectivité. Nous faisons ressortir par la suite les angles sous lesquels le sens commun est susceptible de nous rapprocher du réel d’après Bergson, Cavell et Deleuze. En second lieu, nous entrons de plain-pied dans le domaine du cinéma et examinons en quoi différentes oeuvres du renouveau du cinéma québécois (Denis Côté, Stéphane Lafleur, Sébastien Pilote, Rafaël Ouellet, Xavier Dolan, Anne Émond, Rodrigue Jean, le collectif Épopée, Mathieu Denis et Simon Lavoie) viennent à leur manière compléter, radicaliser ou critiquer les réflexions développées dans la première partie autour du sens commun et du réel. À l’encontre de ceux qui qualifient ces oeuvres de « mimétiques », « peu songées » et « esthétisantes », nous mettons donc en évidence la façon dont ces films, attentifs à la profondeur de l’expérience ordinaire et à l’exigence de trouver un certain équilibre entre le devenir incessant et la stabilité constante, parviennent à nuancer et à raffiner la philosophie. Mots-clés : sens commun, réel, ordinaire, chose en soi, objectivité, subjectivité, surinterprétation, culture populaire, actuel, virtuel, devenir, intensité, concrétude, cinéma, Henri Bergson, Stanley Cavell, Gilles Deleuze, Quentin Meillassoux, Graham Harman, Tristan Garcia, renouveau du cinéma québécois. / The eminently polysemic concept of common sense was depreciated by a vast segment of Western philosophy, which saw at best in it the expression of unwarranted beliefs, at worst the manifestation of erroneous and naïve beliefs. Where many commentators have pinpointed critiques of common sense in the thoughts of Henri Bergson, Stanley Cavell and Gilles Deleuze, three prominent figures of the philosophy of cinema, we strive here to bring out the positive conception they develop of that concept, notwithstanding the occasional suspicion they may cast on it. To put it in more precise terms, we seek to explain to what extent certain meanings of common sense are apt to satisfy the ambition of knowing reality itself. In the first place, we review the argument elaborated by certain speculative realists (specifically Quentin Meillassoux and Graham Harman) in order to clarify, on the one hand, reflections which will be the object of discussions and replies in the subsequent chapters, and, on the other hand, to show that the philosophical depreciation of common sense goes on even in the most contemporary debates on objectivity. We then bring out the angles under which, according to Bergson, Cavell and Deleuze, common sense is apt to bring us closer to reality itself. In the second place, we enter fully into the field of cinema and examine in what way different works associated with the revival of Quebec cinema (Denis Côté, Stéphane Lafleur, Sébastien Pilote, Rafaël Ouellet, Xavier Dolan, Anne Émond, Rodrigue Jean, the collective Épopée, Mathieu Denis and Simon Lavoie) end up completing, radicalizing or criticizing in their way the reflections developed in the first part around common sense and the real. In opposition to those who characterize those works as « mimetic », « thoughtless » and « aestheticizing », we thus bring to the fore the way in which those films, paying attention to the depth of ordinary experience and to the requirement of finding a certain balance between incessant becoming and constant stability, do succeed in nuancing and refining philosophy. Keywords: common sense, real, ordinary, thing-in-itself, objectivity, subjectivity, over-interpretation, popular culture, actual, virtual, becoming, intensity, concreteness, cinema, Henri Bergson, Stanley Cavell, Gilles Deleuze, Quentin Meillassoux, Graham Harman, Tristan Garcia, revival of Quebec cinema.