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Orientador: Osmy Faria Gabbi Junior / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-03T23:36:02Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Almeida_JoaoJoseRodriguesLimade_D.pdf: 11611923 bytes, checksum: 6ec8a458cfd4d25653c8485f34afb3c7 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2004 / Resumo: Esta tese é uma exposição crítica de elos conceituais manifestos pela teoria de Lacan e pela psicanálise pragmática, esta última circunscrita aos trabalhos de Marcia Cavell e de Jurandir Freire Costa. Sem descuidar a investigação exegética, pretende-se aqui apresentar uma visão panorâmica das composições conceituais e dos sentidos que adquirem as palavras no conjunto de cada prática teórica. Pelo fato de que recorrem a certas concepções de linguagem como forma de resolução de problemas metaffsicos e clínicos herdados da teoria de Freud, denomino os dois tipos de teoria como "psicanálises lingüísticas". Seu comportamento, no entanto, é tratado como compulsivo, uma vez que a prática teórica obedece cegamente a um conjunto de técnicas e procedimentos incorporados à ação de sanear a teoria de impurezas conceituais. Cada uma das psicanálises lingüísticas adotou a sua própria concepção de linguagem. Lacan, como alternativa à concepção referencialista da linguagem pressuposta por Freud, utilizou uma concepção idealista, e a psicanálise pragmática, uma concepção comportamental, para atender a seus respectivos fins. O trabalho consiste em questionar a substancialização da linguagem, no caso de Lacan, e o desvio mentalista e mecanicista, no caso da psicanálise pragmática. Aparentemente nada indica que a clínica necessitasse de tais supostos, nem que estas teorias não houvessem introduzido novos problemas metafísicos / Abstract: This work is a critical exposition of conceptuallinks manifestedby the Lacanian theory and the pragmatic psychoanalysis, the latter circumscribed to texts of both Marcia Cavell and Jurandir Freire Costa. It is intended to get a panoramic presentation from the conceptual composition and ftom the meaning that the words acquire in the whole of each theoreticalpractice,without overlooking the exegeticalinvestigation.The two types of psychoanalytical theory are called "linguistic psychoanalysis", as they appealled to certain conceptions of language as a form of resolution of metaphysical and clinical problems inherited from Freudian theory. Nonetheless, their theoretical behaviour are considered as compuJsive,inasmuch as their theoreticalpractice blindly obey to a set of technicsand procedures incorporated to the action of cleaning the theory ftom conceptualimpurities.Each one adoptedits own conceptionoflanguage. Lacan, as an alternative to the referential conception of language presupposed by Freud, employed an idealist conception, and the pragmatic sychoanalysisresorted to a behavioral point of view, to accomplish their respective tasks. The work consists in questioning Lacan's substantialization of language, and the mentalism and mecanicism presented in the pragmatic psychoanalysiscase. Nothing seems to indicate that clinics would need such resorts, nor that those theories would not introduced new metaphysical problems / Doutorado / Doutor em Filosofia

This dissertation is an attempt and, if you will, a temptation to engage with the ‘disturbing’ prospect of the truth of skepticism. All of Stanley Cavell’s works refer to the truth of skepticism, and yet the discourse surrounding this concept is sparse and often engaged minimally. The truth of skepticism is that “the human creature’s basis in the world as a whole, its relation to the world as such, is not that of knowing, anyway not what we think of as knowing” (The Claim of Reason, p.241). In order to make sense of what he means by what “we think of as knowing” Cavell provides a philosophical framework in which to understand skepticism and what it threatens: through his notion of “criteria” taken from Ludwig Wittgenstein; the concept of the “ordinary” derived from the works of J.L. Austin; and the “search for community” as a problem of “acknowledgement” or “avoidance” as opposed to a problem of knowledge. I argue that the “standard” (Stephen Mulhall’s) reading of Cavell fails to fully account for the truth of skepticism and I propose reading Cavell as a Nietzschean Versucher – one who attempts and searches endlessly, never fully embracing any particular view. By reading Cavell in this way, I explore how to do genuine philosophy and consider how to address the role of traditional epistemological problems in the face of Cavell’s framework. Beyond the traditional philosophical questions of skepticism, I address how the theoretical musings of the first half of the dissertation can be used in practice – or one could say how they reflect on the ordinary. Following Cavell, I connect philosophy and art as sister disciplines concerned with similar problems such as epistemological skepticism itself. To show these connections I analyze two plays and three films: Shakespeare’s The Winter’s Tale and Othello, alongside The Philadelphia Story (1940), Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind (2004), and Her (2013). By engaging these pieces with Cavell’s philosophical framework in mind, I show how sexual jealousy is a form of living one’s skepticism in a real context that cannot be so easily dismissed by philosophers who claim that skepticism is somehow empty, confused, or nonsense. By showing how the threat of skepticism is a part of our ordinary lives, I conclude by considering how we might recover from our skepticism. Skepticism is not the end, it is the beginning.

Cotutelle / La présente thèse propose de traverser l’ensemble de l’œuvre cinématographique de Johan van der Keuken (1938-2001) en suivant le fil de la collection. Partant d’une reconnaissance de curieuses configurations d’objets et de corps rappelant les chambres de merveilles de la Renaissance et les entresorts du 19ème siècle, elle élabore un cadre théorique original fondé sur des travaux de Stanley Cavell, Gilles Deleuze et Siegfried Kracauer, afin d’analyser ce qui dans ce cinéma réfléchit le devenir filmique d’objets et d’êtres vivants saisis à même la vie ordinaire. Cette analyse s’enracine dans la pratique d’une forme d’ekphrasis qui veut épouser les rythmes, mouvements et inflexions de ce cinéma et de ses personnages, dont l’écriture répète les collections musicales. La thèse expose ainsi les responsabilités du cinéaste aux prises avec diverses formes de difformités, de marginalité et d’exclusion dues au colonialisme et à la logique réifiante du monde capitaliste, et montre comment les images qu’il réalise par les moyens propres au médium cinématographique manifestent un regard qui à la fois assume la violence inhérente à ce médium et parvient à en faire un instrument d’émerveillement. Ce regard collectionneur et merveillant affronte résolument l’exhibition, le voyeurisme, la stigmatisation, le sensationnalisme, l’accumulation, l’abstraction, la dispersion, la réification, pour en dégager une ligne de fuite au lieu d’en reconduire la violence. Tout en les heurtant, il suscite dans notre regard et notre écoute un amour du monde tel qu’il est. Van der Keuken met ainsi en œuvre, jusque dans le dernier film qu’il réalise alors qu’il est mis devant l’inévitabilité de sa propre mort, une éthique du cinéma dans l’oscillation entre merveille monstrueuse et merveille merveilleuse. / This dissertation offers a path through the complete œuvre of filmmaker Johan van der Keuken (1938-2001), guided by the notion of collecting. Highlighting the curious configurations of objects and bodies that call to mind Renaissance-era Wunderkammern and nineteenth century freak shows, this dissertation formulates an original theoretical framework based on the works of Stanley Cavell, Gilles Deleuze and Siegfried Kracauer. This framework enables the dissertation to analyze how van der Keuken’s cinema thinks through the filmic becoming of objects and living beings plucked out of ordinary life. This analysis is rooted in an ekphrastic practice that seeks to mold itself to the rhythms, movements, and inflections of this filmic universe and its characters, whose composition repeats musical collections. The dissertation thus demonstrates the filmmaker’s responsibilities as he grapples with diverse forms of deformity, marginalization and exclusion due to colonialism and the objectifying logic of a capitalistic world, and shows how the images he creates through the means unique to the medium of cinema manifest a gaze that both acknowledges the inherent violence of the medium and manages to turn it into an instrument of wonder. This collecting and wondering gaze resolutely confronts the risks of exhibition, voyeurism, stigmatization, sensationalism, accumulation, abstraction, dispersion, and objectification, in order to open a line of flight rather than reproducing violence. Even while shocking our eyes and ears, van der Keuken elicits in our gaze and in our listening a love of the world just as it exists. He thus experiments, up through his final film, directed as he faces his inevitable death, a film ethics that oscillates between monstruous wonder and wonderous wonder.

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Notre étude s'attache à reconnaitre en Thompson Clarke, le précurseur d'un contextualisme épistémique puissant qui rend compte de l'applicabilité conceptuelle et ce que prétendent signifier les philosophes. En effet, Clarke examine les définitions épistémologiques traditionnelles à propos de la nature des concepts, du philosopher, de l'ordinarité et du scepticisme. En étudiant la nature de l'épistémologie traditionnelle, il ambitionne de substituer à la méthode austinienne, sa propre méthode d'examen des présupposés concernant la nature de l'expérience et du langage. Il défend ainsi une philosophie de la connaissance programmatique qui nous interroge sur ce que nous faisons avec nos concepts en matière de connaissance. Elle peut être réalisée à partir de l'examen du legs du scepticisme, à savoir : un nouvel éclairage apporté à la nature et aux procédures du scénario sceptique montre manifestement que la prétendue objectivité attribuée à l'ordinarité n'est que superficielle ou relative. L'idée clarkienne de relative non-objectivité n'est en aucune mesure identifiable ou réductible à un relativisme ou à un subjectivisme épistémique. Selon Clarke, il n'existe pas de traits internes à l'expérience. Il suggère simplement que l'existence des objets nous est confirmée à partir de traits caractéristiques que nous discernons, reconnaissons et identifions comme tels. Ces traits qui caractérisent les objets nous permettent d'établir l'applicabilité des concepts. Or, l'ordinarité n'a pas proprement de traits qui la restreindraient à être de telle ou telle manière, comme le prétendent les philosophes et les sceptiques. Cette prétention relève d'un rêve d'une complétude intégrale de la concevabilité de la structure de l'ordinarité partagé implicitement par les épistémologues et leurs détracteurs, les sceptiques. Le rêve et la veille ne sont pas deux expériences au sein d'un genre qu'il suffirait d'identifier. Tout comme le rêve n'a pas de traits caractéristiques qui viendraient déterminer son application ou sa non-application, l'ordinarité n'a pas de traits en propre qui nous permettent fondamentalement de déterminer et de fixer, ni une limite à celle-ci, ni une frontière absolue entre le philosophique et le non philosophique. Pour ces raisons, selon Clarke, nous ne savons pas foncièrement, ni ce qu'est un concept, ni pourquoi les concepts et leurs applications, comme ceux de Plain et de Philosophical, sont susceptibles d'être sensible au contexte. / Our study focuses on the recognition that Thompson Clarke was the precursor of a powerful epistemic contextualism which gives an account of conceptual applicability and what philosophers claim to mean. Clarke examines the traditional epistemological definitions pertaining to the nature of concepts, of philosophizing, of ordinarity and of skepticism. By studying the nature of traditional epistemology, his ambition is to substitute his own method for examining presuppositions with regard to the nature of experience and of language for that of Austin. He thus defends a philosophy of programmed understanding which makes us look at what we do with our concepts regarding understanding. It can be achieved by an examination of the legacy of skepticism, i.e. a new light thrown on the nature and the procedures of the skeptic’s scenario manifestly show that the so-called objectivity attributed to ordinarity is only superficial or relative. The Clarkian idea of relative non-objectivity is in no way identifiable with, or merely reduced to, epistemic relativism or to epistemic subjectivism. According to Clarke, experience has no internal features. He simply suggests that the existence of objects is confirmed by characteristic features that we discern, recognize and identify as such. These features which characterize objects enable us to establish the applicability of the concepts. However, ordinarity does not strictly have features which would restrict it from being thus or thus as philosophers and skeptics claim. This claim belongs to a dream of a completedness of the conceivability of the structure of ordinarity shared implicitly by the epistemologists and their detractors, the skeptics. The states of dreaming and waking are not two experiences of a type which it suffices to identify. Just as the dream does not have characteristic features which will determine its application or its non-application, ordinarity does not have features of its own which fundamentally enable us to determine and to fix either a limit to it, or an absolute boundary between the philosophical and the non philosophical. For these reasons, according to Clarke, we don’t really know what a concept is, nor why concepts and their applications, such as those of the Plain and of the Philosophical, are likely to be context-sensitive.

The aim of this Master’s thesis is to achieve philosophical clarity on an interpretative problem I have been struggle with in Euripides’ Medea: That Medea murders her own children, while claimingto love them. Situated within the philosophical and literary tradition of ordinary language philosophy and ordinary language criticism, the thesis draws on ideas, theoretical discussions, and concepts from Ludwig Wittgenstein, Toril Moi, Stanley Cavell, Cora Diamond, and Niklas Forsberg – but also Søren Kierkegaard. The analysis is divided in two parts. The first is anarticulation of the grammar of my problem through Cora Diamond’s conception of the phenomenon “a difficulty of reality”, and an emulation of a hermeneutical strategy to deal with such problems, which I identify in Søren Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling. I reach the conclusion that the co-existence of Medea’s murder och love is a paradox, which cannot be thought. The second part of the analysis is an attempt to step out of this paradox. Here, I compare Medea to Stanley Cavell’s readings on the Shakespearean tragedies Othello and King Lear, and Cavell’s ideas on “lived scepticism”, “avoidance of love” and “best case of acknowledgment”. By doing this, I am able to form the hypothesis that Medea’s understanding of “love” has been severely damagedafter Jason’s betrayal, and that she actually fails to sensically mean that she loves her children. In its use of my own confusion as a starting point and in employing Toril Moi’s views on reading, this thesis continuously stresses the individual reader’s responsibility in literary interpretation, as well as the importance of daring to voice or personal struggles, questions, and interests – even (or especially) when reading great classics.

This thesis re-examines Shakespeare’s creation of tragic character through the concept of ‘arrivals’. What arrives is not an ‘individual’ but what I call a ‘subject’, which is a diffused dramatic process of arriving, rather than a self-contained entity that arrives in a final form. Not all characters are ‘subjects’. A subject only arrives through dramatic ‘events’ that rupture the existing structures of the play-world and the play-text. The generators of these irruptions are found equally in the happenings of plot and in changes of poetic intensity and form. The ‘subject’ is thus a supra- individual irruption that configures new forms of language, structure, and action. Accordingly, I explain why scrupulous historicism’s need for nameable continuums is incommensurate to the irruptive quality of Shakespearean character. The concepts of ‘process’, ‘subject’ and ‘event’ are informed by a variety of thinkers, most notably the contemporary French philosopher Alain Badiou. Badiou develops an ‘evental’ model of subjectivity in which the subject emerges in fidelity to a ‘truth- event’, which breaks into a situation from its ‘void’. Also important is the process- orientated philosophy of Bergson and Whitehead, which stresses that an entity is not a stable substance but a process of becoming. The underlying connection between the philosophers I embrace – also including the likes of Žižek, Kierkegaard, Latour, Benjamin, and Christian thinkers such as Saint Paul and Luther – is that they establish a creative alternative to the deadlock between treating the subject as either a stable substance (humanism) or a decentred product of its place in the world (postmodernism). The subject is not a pre-existing entity but something that comes to be. It is not reducible to its cultural and linguistic circumstances but is precisely what exceeds those circumstances. Such an excessive creativity is what gives rise to Shakespeare’s subjects and, I argue, underpins the continuing force of his drama. But it also produces profound dangers. In Shakespeare, ‘events’ consistently expose subjects to uncertainty, catastrophe, and horror. And these dangers imperil both the subject and the relationship between Shakespeare and the affirmative philosophy of the event.

Cette recherche part d’un double intérêt. Pour la spiritualité, dont on entend beaucoup parler dans un 21e siècle inquiet et en quête de nouveaux repères. Et pour le cinéma, ou 7e art, phénomène culturel phare des temps modernes, qui reflète abondamment les problématiques et questionnements du monde. À une époque où on observe une tendance à l’homogénéisation culturelle, résultat de la mondialisation économique, cette thèse traite du « cinéma transnational ». Elles aussi, les œuvres de ce cinéma traversent l’espace planétaire, mais tout en conservant un solide ancrage local et une singularité artistique. Ce sont en bonne partie les films que l’on retrouve dans les festivals internationaux, tels Cannes, Venise et Berlin. Le cinéma traduisant toutes les interrogations possibles du présent, plusieurs films apparaissent donc porteurs d’un questionnement à portée spirituelle. Et ce, avec des moyens non discursifs, propres à l’art cinématographique. Ils invitent aussi à la rencontre de l’autre. L’objectif de la thèse consiste à décrire comment, par l’analyse d’une douzaine de films transnationaux, on peut dégager de nouveaux concepts sur la façon avec laquelle se vit la spiritualité à notre époque, en relation avec l’autre, et pourquoi cette spiritualité s’accompagne nécessairement de considérations éthiques. Pour accomplir cette tâche, la thèse s’appuie sur les travaux de deux philosophes, Gilles Deleuze (France) et Stanley Cavell (États-Unis), qui ont marqué les études cinématographiques au cours des dernières décennies, par des approches jugées complémentaires pour cette recherche. Le premier a développé sa pensée à partir de ce qui distingue le cinéma des autres arts, et le second, à partir de l’importance du cinéma pour les spectateurs et les spectatrices. Enfin, la thèse se veut une théologie, ou pensée théologico-philosophique, indépendante d’une tradition religieuse et au diapason des réalités du 21e siècle. / This research is based upon two fields of interest. For spirituality, a concept very much to the fore in this troubled 21st century in search of fresh yardsticks. And for cinema, aka the 7th Art, a beacon on the cultural scene, with its insights in today’s issues and questionings. In this era of cultural homogenization, itself the result of economic globalization, this thesis probes “transnational cinema” for fresh answers. Transnational films cross the global space while keeping their local roots and own artistic identity. Very often one will find these works featured in the big film festivals, such as Cannes, Berlin or Venice. Focusing on today’s questionings and issues, many of these movies appear to be bearing a spiritual imprint, with non-discursive methods. They promote openness to others. The goal of this thesis is to describe, through an analysis of a dozen transnational films, how new concepts defining ways to live a spiritual life today can be found. Further the thesis will underline why this spirituality is linked with ethics. To reach that goal, the thesis relies strongly on the works of philosophers Gilles Deleuze (France) and Stanley Cavell (USA). Both have been judged to have complementary approaches for this research, and have made a strong mark on cinematographic studies in the last decades. Deleuze has developed his philosophy on what distinguishes cinema from the other arts. Cavell has focused his thoughts on the importance of cinema for its viewers. Finally, this thesis is in the form of a theology, or theologic-philosophic thought, not linked to a religious tradition and in synchronicity with its times.

This thesis explores Herman Melville’s relationship to sceptical philosophy. By reading Melville’s fictions of the 1840s and 1850s alongside the writings of Descartes, Berkeley, Hume, and Kant, I seek to show that they manifest by turns expression, rebuttal, and mitigated acceptance of philosophical doubt. Melville was an attentive reader of philosophical texts, and he refers specifically to concepts such as Berkeleyan immaterialism and the Kantian “noumenon”. But Melville does not simply dramatise pre-existing theories; rather, in works such as Mardi, Moby-Dick, and Pierre he enacts sceptical and anti-sceptical ideas through his literary strategies, demonstrating their relevance in particular regions of human experience. In so doing he makes a substantive contribution to a philosophical discourse that has often been criticised – by commentators including Samuel Johnson and Jonathan Swift – for its tendency to abstraction. Melville’s interest in scepticism might be read as part of a wider cultural response to a period of unprecedented social and political change in antebellum America, and with this in mind I compare and contrast his work with that of Dickinson, Douglass, Emerson, and Thoreau. But in many respects Melville’s distinctive and original treatment of scepticism sets him apart from his contemporaries, and in order to fully make sense of it one must range more widely through the canons of philosophy and literature. His exploration of the ethical consequences of doubt in The Piazza Tales, for example, can be seen to anticipate with remarkable precision the theories of twentieth-century thinkers such as Emmanuel Levinas and Stanley Cavell. I work chronologically though selected prose from the period 1849-1857, paying close attention to the textual effects and philosophical allusions in each work. In so doing I hope to offer fresh ways of looking at Melville’s handling of literary form and the wider shape of his career. I conclude with reflections on how Melville’s normative emphasis on the acknowledgement of epistemological limitation might inform the practice of literary criticism.