O presente estudo é constituído de cinco ensaios relativamente autossuficientes, mas redigidos tendo em vista um objetivo comum, que será perseguido por várias vias—a saber, a exploração de um núcleo de problemas filosóficos relacionados com a possibilidade, e com a própria inteligibilidade, do solipsismo. Os resultados obtidos nesses ensaios, assim como os caminhos que levam a eles, pretendem servir como exemplos para a extração de lições mais gerais sobre o método filosófico, e sobre a própria natureza humana. O procedimento adotado para esse fim consiste na leitura de um conjunto de escritos de filósofos contemporâneos que refletiram profundamente sobre o solipsismo— sobretudo Peter Strawson, Ludwig Wittgenstein, e Stanley Cavell. A tese central à qual procuro fornecer suporte por meio dessas leituras é que o solipsismo é uma resposta intelectualizada, e radical, a um conjunto de dificuldades práticas ou existenciais relacionadas com a finitude da condição humana. (Essas mesmas dificuldades originam respostas menos radicais, que são manifestas por meio de outras “posições filosóficas”— ou, pelo menos, é isso que tentarei mostrar.) Estar sujeito a essas dificuldades implica estar permanentemente sujeito à ameaça da solidão, da privacidade e da perda de sintonia em relação ao mundo e aos demais sujeitos. Reconhecer e levar a sério a possibilidade dessa ameaça implica reconhecer que somos, individual e imprevisivelmente, responsáveis por superá-la (um ponto que é notado, mas superestimado, pelo cético, que interpreta nossos limites como limitações), bem como reconhecer a força da tentação (demasiado humana) de tentar reprimi-la (como faz o dogmático/realista metafísico) ou sublimá-la (como faz o idealista/solipsista). Buscar uma filosofia aberta ao reconhecimento de que nossa experiência é essencialmente limitada e condicionada—em especial, pelo fato de que temos corpos, e com eles vontades, desejos, temores, fixações e sentimentos que não escolhemos, e que informam nossa racionalidade e moldam nossas atitudes em relação ao mundo e aos demais sujeitos—é parte da tarefa contínua de aceitação de nossa finitude, em direção à qual o presente estudo pretende ter dado os primeiros passos. / This study consists of five essays which are nearly self-contained, yet written with a common goal, which will be pursued by various routes—namely, the exploration of a core of philosophical problems having to do with the possibility, and the very intelligibility, of solipsism. The results obtained in these essays, as well as the paths leading to them, are intended to serve as examples from which some general lessons about the philosophical method, and about human nature itself, are to be drawn. The procedure adopted for that end consists in reading a set of writings by contemporary philosophers who have thought deeply about solipsism—most notably Peter Strawson, Ludwig Wittgenstein and Stanley Cavell. The central thesis to which I seek to provide support through those readings is that solipsism is an intellectualized response, and a radical one at that, to a set of practical or existential difficulties related to the finitude of the human condition. (Those same difficulties may as well promt less radical responses, which are expressed by other “philosophical positions”—or so I shall try to show.) Being subjected to those difficulties implies being permanently subjected to the threat of loneliness, of privacy, of loosing attunement with the world and others. To acknowledge and to take seriously the possibility of that threat means to acknowledge that we are responsible, individually and unpredictably, for coming to grips with it (a point which is noted, but overrated, by the skeptic, who takes our limits as limitations), as well as acknowledging the strength of the (all-too-human) temptation of trying to repress it (as does the dogmatic/metaphysical realist) or to sublimate it (as does the idealist / solipsist). To seek an attitude open to the acknowledgement that our experience is essentially limited and conditioned—in particular, by the fact that we have bodies, and with them wills, desires, fears, fixations and feelings that we do not choose, and which inform our rationality and shape our attitudes toward the world and others—is part of the continuous task of accepting our finitude, a goal toward which I claim to have taken some preliminary steps with this study.

Concept éminemment polysémique, le sens commun a été déprécié par un vaste pan de la philosophie occidentale, qui y a vu au mieux l’expression de croyances infondées, au pire la manifestation de croyances erronées et naïves. Là où bon nombre de commentateurs ont repéré dans les pensées mêmes d’Henri Bergson, Stanley Cavell et Gilles Deleuze, trois grandes figures de la philosophie du cinéma, des critiques adressées au sens commun, nous nous efforçons ici de tirer au clair la conception positive qu’ils développent de cette notion, en dépit des soupçons occasionnels qu’ils font peser sur elle. Plus précisément, nous tâchons d’expliquer jusqu’à quel point certaines acceptions du sens commun permettent de satisfaire l’ambition de connaître le réel lui-même. En premier lieu, nous passons en revue l’argumentation élaborée par certains réalistes spéculatifs (en particulier Quentin Meillassoux et Graham Harman) afin de clarifier d’une part des réflexions qui feront l’objet de discussions et de répliques dans les chapitres subséquents et, d’autre part, de montrer que la dépréciation philosophique du sens commun se prolonge jusque dans les débats les plus actuels sur l’objectivité. Nous faisons ressortir par la suite les angles sous lesquels le sens commun est susceptible de nous rapprocher du réel d’après Bergson, Cavell et Deleuze. En second lieu, nous entrons de plain-pied dans le domaine du cinéma et examinons en quoi différentes œuvres du renouveau du cinéma québécois (Denis Côté, Stéphane Lafleur, Sébastien Pilote, Rafaël Ouellet, Xavier Dolan, Anne Émond, Rodrigue Jean, le collectif Épopée, Mathieu Denis et Simon Lavoie) viennent à leur manière compléter, radicaliser ou critiquer les réflexions développées dans la première partie autour du sens commun et du réel. À l’encontre de ceux qui qualifient ces œuvres de « mimétiques », « peu songées » et « esthétisantes », nous mettons donc en évidence la façon dont ces films, attentifs à la profondeur de l’expérience ordinaire et à l’exigence de trouver un certain équilibre entre le devenir incessant et la stabilité constante, parviennent à nuancer et à raffiner la philosophie. / The eminently polysemic concept of common sense was depreciated by a vast segment of Western philosophy, which saw at best in it the expression of unwarranted beliefs, at worst the manifestation of erroneous and naïve beliefs. Where many commentators have pinpointed critiques of common sense in the thoughts of Henri Bergson, Stanley Cavell and Gilles Deleuze, three prominent figures of the philosophy of cinema, we strive here to bring out the positive conception they develop of that concept, notwithstanding the occasional suspicion they may cast on it. To put it in more precise terms, we seek to explain to what extent certain meanings of common sense are apt to satisfy the ambition of knowing reality itself. In the first place, we review the argument elaborated by certain speculative realists (specifically Quentin Meillassoux and Graham Harman) in order to clarify, on the one hand, reflections which will be the object of discussions and replies in the subsequent chapters, and, on the other hand, to show that the philosophical depreciation of common sense goes on even in the most contemporary debates on objectivity. We then bring out the angles under which, according to Bergson, Cavell and Deleuze, common sense is apt to bring us closer to reality itself. In the second place, we enter fully into the field of cinema and examine in what way different works associated with the revival of Quebec cinema (Denis Côté, Stéphane Lafleur, Sébastien Pilote, Rafaël Ouellet, Xavier Dolan, Anne Émond, Rodrigue Jean, the collective Épopée, Mathieu Denis and Simon Lavoie) end up completing, radicalizing or criticizing in their way the reflections developed in the first part around common sense and the real. In opposition to those who characterize those works as « mimetic », « thoughtless » and « aestheticizing », we thus bring to the fore the way in which those films, paying attention to the depth of ordinary experience and to the requirement of finding a certain balance between incessant becoming and constant stability, do succeed in nuancing and refining philosophy.

O presente estudo é constituído de cinco ensaios relativamente autossuficientes, mas redigidos tendo em vista um objetivo comum, que será perseguido por várias vias—a saber, a exploração de um núcleo de problemas filosóficos relacionados com a possibilidade, e com a própria inteligibilidade, do solipsismo. Os resultados obtidos nesses ensaios, assim como os caminhos que levam a eles, pretendem servir como exemplos para a extração de lições mais gerais sobre o método filosófico, e sobre a própria natureza humana. O procedimento adotado para esse fim consiste na leitura de um conjunto de escritos de filósofos contemporâneos que refletiram profundamente sobre o solipsismo— sobretudo Peter Strawson, Ludwig Wittgenstein, e Stanley Cavell. A tese central à qual procuro fornecer suporte por meio dessas leituras é que o solipsismo é uma resposta intelectualizada, e radical, a um conjunto de dificuldades práticas ou existenciais relacionadas com a finitude da condição humana. (Essas mesmas dificuldades originam respostas menos radicais, que são manifestas por meio de outras “posições filosóficas”— ou, pelo menos, é isso que tentarei mostrar.) Estar sujeito a essas dificuldades implica estar permanentemente sujeito à ameaça da solidão, da privacidade e da perda de sintonia em relação ao mundo e aos demais sujeitos. Reconhecer e levar a sério a possibilidade dessa ameaça implica reconhecer que somos, individual e imprevisivelmente, responsáveis por superá-la (um ponto que é notado, mas superestimado, pelo cético, que interpreta nossos limites como limitações), bem como reconhecer a força da tentação (demasiado humana) de tentar reprimi-la (como faz o dogmático/realista metafísico) ou sublimá-la (como faz o idealista/solipsista). Buscar uma filosofia aberta ao reconhecimento de que nossa experiência é essencialmente limitada e condicionada—em especial, pelo fato de que temos corpos, e com eles vontades, desejos, temores, fixações e sentimentos que não escolhemos, e que informam nossa racionalidade e moldam nossas atitudes em relação ao mundo e aos demais sujeitos—é parte da tarefa contínua de aceitação de nossa finitude, em direção à qual o presente estudo pretende ter dado os primeiros passos. / This study consists of five essays which are nearly self-contained, yet written with a common goal, which will be pursued by various routes—namely, the exploration of a core of philosophical problems having to do with the possibility, and the very intelligibility, of solipsism. The results obtained in these essays, as well as the paths leading to them, are intended to serve as examples from which some general lessons about the philosophical method, and about human nature itself, are to be drawn. The procedure adopted for that end consists in reading a set of writings by contemporary philosophers who have thought deeply about solipsism—most notably Peter Strawson, Ludwig Wittgenstein and Stanley Cavell. The central thesis to which I seek to provide support through those readings is that solipsism is an intellectualized response, and a radical one at that, to a set of practical or existential difficulties related to the finitude of the human condition. (Those same difficulties may as well promt less radical responses, which are expressed by other “philosophical positions”—or so I shall try to show.) Being subjected to those difficulties implies being permanently subjected to the threat of loneliness, of privacy, of loosing attunement with the world and others. To acknowledge and to take seriously the possibility of that threat means to acknowledge that we are responsible, individually and unpredictably, for coming to grips with it (a point which is noted, but overrated, by the skeptic, who takes our limits as limitations), as well as acknowledging the strength of the (all-too-human) temptation of trying to repress it (as does the dogmatic/metaphysical realist) or to sublimate it (as does the idealist / solipsist). To seek an attitude open to the acknowledgement that our experience is essentially limited and conditioned—in particular, by the fact that we have bodies, and with them wills, desires, fears, fixations and feelings that we do not choose, and which inform our rationality and shape our attitudes toward the world and others—is part of the continuous task of accepting our finitude, a goal toward which I claim to have taken some preliminary steps with this study.

O presente estudo é constituído de cinco ensaios relativamente autossuficientes, mas redigidos tendo em vista um objetivo comum, que será perseguido por várias vias—a saber, a exploração de um núcleo de problemas filosóficos relacionados com a possibilidade, e com a própria inteligibilidade, do solipsismo. Os resultados obtidos nesses ensaios, assim como os caminhos que levam a eles, pretendem servir como exemplos para a extração de lições mais gerais sobre o método filosófico, e sobre a própria natureza humana. O procedimento adotado para esse fim consiste na leitura de um conjunto de escritos de filósofos contemporâneos que refletiram profundamente sobre o solipsismo— sobretudo Peter Strawson, Ludwig Wittgenstein, e Stanley Cavell. A tese central à qual procuro fornecer suporte por meio dessas leituras é que o solipsismo é uma resposta intelectualizada, e radical, a um conjunto de dificuldades práticas ou existenciais relacionadas com a finitude da condição humana. (Essas mesmas dificuldades originam respostas menos radicais, que são manifestas por meio de outras “posições filosóficas”— ou, pelo menos, é isso que tentarei mostrar.) Estar sujeito a essas dificuldades implica estar permanentemente sujeito à ameaça da solidão, da privacidade e da perda de sintonia em relação ao mundo e aos demais sujeitos. Reconhecer e levar a sério a possibilidade dessa ameaça implica reconhecer que somos, individual e imprevisivelmente, responsáveis por superá-la (um ponto que é notado, mas superestimado, pelo cético, que interpreta nossos limites como limitações), bem como reconhecer a força da tentação (demasiado humana) de tentar reprimi-la (como faz o dogmático/realista metafísico) ou sublimá-la (como faz o idealista/solipsista). Buscar uma filosofia aberta ao reconhecimento de que nossa experiência é essencialmente limitada e condicionada—em especial, pelo fato de que temos corpos, e com eles vontades, desejos, temores, fixações e sentimentos que não escolhemos, e que informam nossa racionalidade e moldam nossas atitudes em relação ao mundo e aos demais sujeitos—é parte da tarefa contínua de aceitação de nossa finitude, em direção à qual o presente estudo pretende ter dado os primeiros passos. / This study consists of five essays which are nearly self-contained, yet written with a common goal, which will be pursued by various routes—namely, the exploration of a core of philosophical problems having to do with the possibility, and the very intelligibility, of solipsism. The results obtained in these essays, as well as the paths leading to them, are intended to serve as examples from which some general lessons about the philosophical method, and about human nature itself, are to be drawn. The procedure adopted for that end consists in reading a set of writings by contemporary philosophers who have thought deeply about solipsism—most notably Peter Strawson, Ludwig Wittgenstein and Stanley Cavell. The central thesis to which I seek to provide support through those readings is that solipsism is an intellectualized response, and a radical one at that, to a set of practical or existential difficulties related to the finitude of the human condition. (Those same difficulties may as well promt less radical responses, which are expressed by other “philosophical positions”—or so I shall try to show.) Being subjected to those difficulties implies being permanently subjected to the threat of loneliness, of privacy, of loosing attunement with the world and others. To acknowledge and to take seriously the possibility of that threat means to acknowledge that we are responsible, individually and unpredictably, for coming to grips with it (a point which is noted, but overrated, by the skeptic, who takes our limits as limitations), as well as acknowledging the strength of the (all-too-human) temptation of trying to repress it (as does the dogmatic/metaphysical realist) or to sublimate it (as does the idealist / solipsist). To seek an attitude open to the acknowledgement that our experience is essentially limited and conditioned—in particular, by the fact that we have bodies, and with them wills, desires, fears, fixations and feelings that we do not choose, and which inform our rationality and shape our attitudes toward the world and others—is part of the continuous task of accepting our finitude, a goal toward which I claim to have taken some preliminary steps with this study.

No description available.

This dissertation is the application of counterfactual criticism to Shakespearean tragedy—supposing we are to ask, for example, “what if” Hamlet had done the deed, or, “what if” we could somehow disinherit our knowledge of Lear’s madness before reading King Lear. Such readings, mirroring critical practices in history, will loosely be called “counterfactual” readings. The key question to ask is not why tragedies are no longer being written (by writers), but why tragedies are no longer being felt (by readers). Tragedy entails a certain urgency in wanting to imagine an outcome different from the one we are given. Since we cannot change events as they stand, we feel a critical helplessness in dealing with feelings of tragic loss; the critical imperative that follows usually accounts for how the tragedy unfolded. Fleshing out a cause is one way to deal with the trauma of tragedy. But such explanation, in a sense, merely explains tragedy away. The fact that everything turns out so poorly in tragedy suggests that the tragic protagonist was somehow doomed, that he (in the case of Shakespearean tragedy) was the victim of some “tragic flaw,” as though tragedy and necessity go hand in hand. Only by allowing ourselves to imagine other possibilities can we regain the tragic effect, which is to remind ourselves that other outcomes are indeed possible. Tragedy, then, is more readily understood, or felt, as the playing out of contingency. It takes some effort to convince others, even ourselves, that the tragic effect resonates best when accompanied by an understanding that the characters on the page are free individuals. No amount of foreknowledge, on our part or theirs, can save us (or them) from tragedy’s horror.

No description available.

This dissertation is the application of counterfactual criticism to Shakespearean tragedy—supposing we are to ask, for example, “what if” Hamlet had done the deed, or, “what if” we could somehow disinherit our knowledge of Lear’s madness before reading King Lear. Such readings, mirroring critical practices in history, will loosely be called “counterfactual” readings. The key question to ask is not why tragedies are no longer being written (by writers), but why tragedies are no longer being felt (by readers). Tragedy entails a certain urgency in wanting to imagine an outcome different from the one we are given. Since we cannot change events as they stand, we feel a critical helplessness in dealing with feelings of tragic loss; the critical imperative that follows usually accounts for how the tragedy unfolded. Fleshing out a cause is one way to deal with the trauma of tragedy. But such explanation, in a sense, merely explains tragedy away. The fact that everything turns out so poorly in tragedy suggests that the tragic protagonist was somehow doomed, that he (in the case of Shakespearean tragedy) was the victim of some “tragic flaw,” as though tragedy and necessity go hand in hand. Only by allowing ourselves to imagine other possibilities can we regain the tragic effect, which is to remind ourselves that other outcomes are indeed possible. Tragedy, then, is more readily understood, or felt, as the playing out of contingency. It takes some effort to convince others, even ourselves, that the tragic effect resonates best when accompanied by an understanding that the characters on the page are free individuals. No amount of foreknowledge, on our part or theirs, can save us (or them) from tragedy’s horror.

Pour respecter les droits d’auteur, la version électronique de cette thèse a été dépouillée de certains documents visuels et audio‐visuels. La version intégrale de la thèse a été déposée à la Division de la gestion des documents et des archives. / Notre travail concernant Disney s’inscrit dans le champ de la musique de film, et même si le studio a fait l’objet de nombreuses recherches tant sur des questions esthétiques que culturelles, il reste intéressant à étudier, car il peut ainsi devenir l’objet de recherche, non sur l’originalité d’un corpus, mais sur un déplacement de la méthode, nous permettant d’interroger l’idéologie à l’œuvre. Notre thèse concentre son attention sur La Petite Sirène (1989), La Belle et la Bête (1991) et Aladdin (1992) où il nous semble que, en recourant à la recomposition de la musique de certaines séquences des films, nous puissions faire jouer à la part de virtualité du texte filmique un rôle dans cette entreprise critique : retrouver la voix des héroïnes Ariel, Belle et Jasmine. Nous pensons que les lectures préexistantes ont fait le choix de prioriser le récit et que le déplacement proposé par Stanley Cavell dans sa lecture de King Lear, prêtant la cohérence au personnage, nous invite, sur le même modèle, à faire une lecture similaire concernant les films de Disney. Si un geste de recomposition musicale peut nous aider à penser ce rapport au personnage, c’est parce que nous pensons que la musique peut faire entendre la virtualité d’un film (et plus précisément de ses personnages), et devenir par cela un geste d’analyse critique de son idéologie, et ici particulièrement des rapports de pouvoir. Recomposer certaines séquences importantes du film, c’est le rééclairer en reprenant les matériaux musicaux mêmes du compositeur du film (Alan Menken), pour en redistribuer les emphases — notion à laquelle nous ne donnons pas qu’une valeur musicale, mais une valeur philosophique, reprenant à Stanley Cavell cette idée qu’une différence d’accent peut faire toute la différence du monde. La recomposition musicale met en acte les allers-retours indispensables à la compréhension des séquences que nous travaillerons : elle redonne corps aux espaces de résonance du film et compose les affleurements d’une promesse initiale proposée par le film vis-à-vis de son héroïne. Elle aide à réfléchir au film et à ses interactions tout en faisant monter à la surface ladite promesse dont le film cherchait à bloquer l’actualisation. Ces allers-retours nous permettent de retrouver l’importance des numéros musicaux à l’intérieur des films dans lesquelles s’expriment les héroïnes. En prolongeant notre analyse par le prisme de l’intermédialité, nous réfléchissons à la porosité avec la scène de Broadway (ou plus précisément ici avec le off-Broadway) qui permettent des doubles lectures issues des numéros musicaux. L’ensemble de la musique, dans son lien au complexe audio-visuel, nous permet ainsi de réfléchir aux rapports de pouvoir inscrits dans le film. / From aesthetics to cultural studies, Disney has been the subject of many studies. Thanks to this prolific research, it is possible de study it by another methodological angle to understand the ideology of and within the movies. Within the academic field of film music, our thesis will draw its attention on The Little Mermaid (1989), Beauty and the Beast (1991) and Aladdin (1992). It seems that, thanks to an alternative version of the original score that we would compose, we may bring the potentiality inscribed in the movie to be a part of our critical study: find the heroines’ voice Ariel, Belle and Jasmine. We think that the previous studies of these films made the choice of prioritising a narrative analysis where ours is to take into account of the character’s consistency, as does Stanley Cavell in his reading of King Lear. The main idea is to see this new composition as an alternative version the composer could have come up with, and to measure how we can go from the recomposition to the original sequence and end up with another angle for the analysis of the movie. We think that this method will enable us to take account of the character’s consistency for the music can be a way to hear the potentiality of a movie (and specifically here, the characters), so it will be an opportunity to discuss Disney ideology. The musical recomposition of specifics sequences will help us to point out that the film makes a choice thanks to musical emphasis — notion that is not only musical but also philosophic, as Stanley Cavell points out that a difference of emphasis is able to make all the difference in the world. The musical recomposition enact the back and forth inside the different moments of the movie to help us understand what is at stake: it enlightens the resonances between the sequences and compose the surfacing promise initially build-up by the movie towards the heroine. It also helps us thinking about the movie’s interactions while getting to the surface the aforementioned promise the movie was trying to stop from actualising. Going back and forth into the movie thanks to the musical recomposition brings to light the importance of the musical numbers where the heroines have a space and moment to express themselves. By extending our analysis through the prism of intermediality, we consider the porosity of theses musical numbers with the Broadway stage (and more accurately the off-Broadway) whose enable us to do dual readings of the movie. All the music in its connexion to the rest of the audio-visual complex enable us to think about the power relations which occurs in the movie.