This work examines the relationship between moral philosophy and literature. I start by exploring a dialectic that exists between “prevalent view” theorists (i.e., D. D. Raphael and Onora O'Neill), who argue that the moral interest of literature lies in explicit deliberative arguments modeled in literary texts, and Diamondian realist theorists (i.e., Alice Crary, Cora Diamond and Iris Murdoch), who argue that the “prevalent view” is too narrow. Rather, the ways in which literature affects us emotionally can make ineliminable contributions to fully rational moral thought. In Chapter Two, I explore potential challenges to this position, drawn from the works of Simon Blackburn. He argues that there are epistemological concerns (it relies upon a faulty view of language), and moral concerns (specifically relativism) with Diamondian realism. I respond to these challenges in Chapter Three and conclude that Crary, Diamond, and Murdoch have given us a better picture of literature's moral value.

Cora Diamond nous présente dans son œuvre L’Esprit Réaliste une méthode nous permettant de répondre à la question « comment vivre? ». Elle nous présente aussi une méthode nous permettant d’élargir notre raisonnement moral et sortir du vocabulaire limité d’une interprétation plus traditionnelle de la philosophie morale. Aux questions de jugements, d’évaluations, de dilemmes et de métaéthique, elle souhaite introduire des concepts comme ceux de l’imagination, de l’improvisation, de la perception morale, de la texture d’être et d’aventure. La possibilité est aussi ouverte pour chercher une éducation morale non édifiante par la littérature. En effet, élargir le raisonnement moral implique aussi de ne pas se limiter à la forme argumentaire traditionnelle en philosophie. Il s’agit de voir la pertinence dans des œuvres littéraires comme des romans de fiction et des œuvres poétiques, mais aussi dans des œuvres cinématographiques. Diamond nous présente donc avec une éthique qui ne nous apporte pas de connaissances prescriptives, mais plutôt une connaissance conceptuelle et sensible. Elle nous apprend à voir les différences entre différentes conceptions de la vie, à se connaître soi-même et à aller à la rencontre de l’autre. / Cora Diamond presents to us in her work The Realistic Spirit a method allowing us to answer the question “how to live?” It also presents us with a method by which we can broaden our moral reasoning and break out of the limited vocabulary of a more traditional interpretation of moral philosophy. To questions of judgments, evaluations, dilemmas and meta-ethics, she wishes to introduce concepts such as those of imagination, improvisation, moral perception, texture of being and adventure. The possibility is also opened for seeking a non-edifying moral education through literature. Indeed, expanding moral reasoning also implies not being limited to the traditional form of argument in philosophy. It is about seeing the relevance in literary works like fiction novels and poetic works, but also in cinematographic works. Diamond therefore presents us with an ethic that does not provide us with prescriptive knowledge, but rather conceptual and sensitive knowledge. It teaches us to see the differences between different conceptions of life, to know ourselves and to meet others.

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The aim of this Master’s thesis is to achieve philosophical clarity on an interpretative problem I have been struggle with in Euripides’ Medea: That Medea murders her own children, while claimingto love them. Situated within the philosophical and literary tradition of ordinary language philosophy and ordinary language criticism, the thesis draws on ideas, theoretical discussions, and concepts from Ludwig Wittgenstein, Toril Moi, Stanley Cavell, Cora Diamond, and Niklas Forsberg – but also Søren Kierkegaard. The analysis is divided in two parts. The first is anarticulation of the grammar of my problem through Cora Diamond’s conception of the phenomenon “a difficulty of reality”, and an emulation of a hermeneutical strategy to deal with such problems, which I identify in Søren Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling. I reach the conclusion that the co-existence of Medea’s murder och love is a paradox, which cannot be thought. The second part of the analysis is an attempt to step out of this paradox. Here, I compare Medea to Stanley Cavell’s readings on the Shakespearean tragedies Othello and King Lear, and Cavell’s ideas on “lived scepticism”, “avoidance of love” and “best case of acknowledgment”. By doing this, I am able to form the hypothesis that Medea’s understanding of “love” has been severely damagedafter Jason’s betrayal, and that she actually fails to sensically mean that she loves her children. In its use of my own confusion as a starting point and in employing Toril Moi’s views on reading, this thesis continuously stresses the individual reader’s responsibility in literary interpretation, as well as the importance of daring to voice or personal struggles, questions, and interests – even (or especially) when reading great classics.