Submitted by Andrea Virginio Machado (andrea.machado@fgv.br) on 2008-09-18T18:43:30Z No. of bitstreams: 1 063202007_Dissertação_Francisco_Junqueira_Costa.pdf: 351812 bytes, checksum: 1cbedf11fe59a9c983ffc29b89970b47 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Francisco Terra(francisco.terra@fgv.br) on 2008-09-18T19:24:59Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 063202007_Dissertação_Francisco_Junqueira_Costa.pdf: 351812 bytes, checksum: 1cbedf11fe59a9c983ffc29b89970b47 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2008-09-18T19:24:59Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 063202007_Dissertação_Francisco_Junqueira_Costa.pdf: 351812 bytes, checksum: 1cbedf11fe59a9c983ffc29b89970b47 (MD5) / This article studies a model where, as a consequence of private information, agents do not have incentive to invest in a desired joint project, or a public good, when they are unable to have prior discussion with their partners. As a result, the joint project is never undertaken and inefficiency is observed. Agastya, Menezes and Sengupta (2007) prove that with a prior stage of communication, with a binary message space, it is possible to have some efficiency gain since 'all ex-ante and interim efficient equilibria exhibit a simple structure'. We show that any finite message space does not provide efficiency gain on the simple structure discussed in that article. We use laboratory experiments to test these results. We find that people do contribute, even without communication, and that any kind of communication increases the probability of project implementation. We also observed that communication reduces the unproductive contribution, and that a large message space cannot provide efficiency gain relative to the binary one.

Hypothetical bias continues to be a challenge for practitioners of the contingent valuation method (CVM). This study compared the effect of three hypothetical bias mitigation techniques in a CVM survey focused on estimating maximum willingness to pay for a beach conditions monitoring service among U.S. Gulf Coast beachgoers. Beach conditions information is known to affect beach patronage but no valuation study has yet estimated its value. The two techniques tested are: budget and substitutes cheap talk treatments and certainty follow-up. We presented a theoretically consistent model of budget-constrained utility maximization which accounts for the respondents’ subjective probability of a good beach trip with and without the beach conditions information. Interval regression was used to estimate respondents WTP for beach conditions monitoring service. Both mitigation treatments were unable to mitigate HB. The mean WTP was $3.39 and the net benefit for the program was between $188,531,063 and $391,474,452.

<p>This study examines several emerging topics in strategic communication and information design. The first chapter studies the role of verification in persuasion and its interaction with commitment in a Bayesian persuasion framework in which the sender is not fully bound by the committed plan. Both theoretically and experimentally, we demonstrate that making verification easier can significantly improve information transmission when commitment is low, but its effect is limited when commitment is high. However, empirically receivers do not respond as strongly as predicted by theory, which is consistent with base-rate neglect and conservatism. On the other hand, senders generally anticipate receivers' actions and best respond to the empirical behavior of receivers. We provide empirical implications for cases where verification is instrumental in improving information transmission and where it is not. </p> <p><br></p> <p>The second and third chapters are based on joint work with Dr. Collin Raymond. In the second chapter, we investigate how increasing the complexity of the message space in the presence of limited memory can reduce misrepresentation in strategic communication. We enrich a standard cheap talk game so that senders must communicate not just a payoff-relevant state, but also payoff-irrelevant attributes correlated with the state.  We show that increasing the set of attributes that may need to be reported (i.e., the complexity of the game) improves the amount of information transmitted in equilibrium. Our findings demonstrate that the reporting of redundant information may induce equilibria that feature improved outcomes compared to simpler, more direct reporting systems, and point out the importance of complexity when trying to induce truthful information revelation.</p> <p><br></p> <p>In the third chapter, we analyze some extensions on the effect of complexity. We present experimental evidence which shows that  too much of an increase in complexity leads to a reversal of those gains. Limited memory on the part of players, as well as the relative complexity faced by senders and receivers, drives these changes, and individuals experience cognitive costs when dealing with complex environments that they are willing to pay to avoid. </p> <p><br></p>

Cette thèse de doctorat traite de différentes questions concernant la communication et la transmission d’informations dans le cadre de la théorie des jeux. J’analyse différents dilemmes auxquels peut être confronté un joueur qui envoie des informations. Ces dilemmes correspondent aux questions suivantes: "Devrais-je investir dans un message vérifiable?", "Quand dois-je transmettre mon information?" et "Est-il préférable de ne pas envoyer mon information et uniquement de recueillir l’information des autres?". Cette thèse comprend une introduction et trois chapitres. L’introduction contient une motivation générale pour les trois problèmes que je présente dans cette thèse. Je donne une vue d’ensemble détaillée de tous les chapitres, j’examine la littérature relative au sujet et je la compare à mes résultats. / This Ph.D dissertation addresses different issues concerning communication and information transmission in a game theoretical framework. I analyze different dilemmas that a player who sends information has to deal with. These dilemmas correspond to the following questions: "Should I invest into a verifiable message?", "When should I pass my information?" and "Is it better if I do not send my information, but collect information from others?". This thesis includes an introduction and three chapters. The introduction contains a general motivation for the three different problems that I model in this thesis. I give a detailed overview of all the chapters, survey the related literature and compare it to my results.

This paper discusses the ability of models on cheap talk, and of audit and liability regulations, to provide analytically-based assessment of credibility of management forecast disclosure in market and regulated settings. While credibility is linked to restrictive conditions in pure market settings, regulatory enforcement does not necessarily contribute to forecast credibility. Key findings imply that ex ante approaches, including audit and tort liability in general, as well as partly verifiable disclosures supplementing the forecast and safe harbour provisions in particular can contribute to forecast credibility. Overall results suggest that the usefulness of managerial forecast disclosure should not be overestimated, as neither market nor regulatory mechanisms can overcome the problems related to non-verifiability.