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On the limits of cheap talk for public good provisionCosta, Francisco Junqueira Moreira da 18 September 2008 (has links)
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063202007_Dissertação_Francisco_Junqueira_Costa.pdf: 351812 bytes, checksum: 1cbedf11fe59a9c983ffc29b89970b47 (MD5) / This article studies a model where, as a consequence of private information, agents do not have incentive to invest in a desired joint project, or a public good, when they are unable to have prior discussion with their partners. As a result, the joint project is never undertaken and inefficiency is observed. Agastya, Menezes and Sengupta (2007) prove that with a prior stage of communication, with a binary message space, it is possible to have some efficiency gain since 'all ex-ante and interim efficient equilibria exhibit a simple structure'. We show that any finite message space does not provide efficiency gain on the simple structure discussed in that article. We use laboratory experiments to test these results. We find that people do contribute, even without communication, and that any kind of communication increases the probability of project implementation. We also observed that communication reduces the unproductive contribution, and that a large message space cannot provide efficiency gain relative to the binary one.
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Mitigating Hypothetical Bias: An Application to Willingness to Pay for Beach Conditions InformationQuainoo, Ruth 10 August 2018 (has links)
Hypothetical bias continues to be a challenge for practitioners of the contingent valuation method (CVM). This study compared the effect of three hypothetical bias mitigation techniques in a CVM survey focused on estimating maximum willingness to pay for a beach conditions monitoring service among U.S. Gulf Coast beachgoers. Beach conditions information is known to affect beach patronage but no valuation study has yet estimated its value. The two techniques tested are: budget and substitutes cheap talk treatments and certainty follow-up. We presented a theoretically consistent model of budget-constrained utility maximization which accounts for the respondents’ subjective probability of a good beach trip with and without the beach conditions information. Interval regression was used to estimate respondents WTP for beach conditions monitoring service. Both mitigation treatments were unable to mitigate HB. The mean WTP was $3.39 and the net benefit for the program was between $188,531,063 and $391,474,452.
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ESSAYS IN STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION DESIGNJunya Zhou (15343993) 24 April 2023 (has links)
<p>This study examines several emerging topics in strategic communication and information design. The first chapter studies the role of verification in persuasion and its interaction with commitment in a Bayesian persuasion framework in which the sender is not fully bound by the committed plan. Both theoretically and experimentally, we demonstrate that making verification easier can significantly improve information transmission when commitment is low, but its effect is limited when commitment is high. However, empirically receivers do not respond as strongly as predicted by theory, which is consistent with base-rate neglect and conservatism. On the other hand, senders generally anticipate receivers' actions and best respond to the empirical behavior of receivers. We provide empirical implications for cases where verification is instrumental in improving information transmission and where it is not. </p>
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<p>The second and third chapters are based on joint work with Dr. Collin Raymond. In the second chapter, we investigate how increasing the complexity of the message space in the presence of limited memory can reduce misrepresentation in strategic communication. We enrich a standard cheap talk game so that senders must communicate not just a payoff-relevant state, but also payoff-irrelevant attributes correlated with the state. We show that increasing the set of attributes that may need to be reported (i.e., the complexity of the game) improves the amount of information transmitted in equilibrium. Our findings demonstrate that the reporting of redundant information may induce equilibria that feature improved outcomes compared to simpler, more direct reporting systems, and point out the importance of complexity when trying to induce truthful information revelation.</p>
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<p>In the third chapter, we analyze some extensions on the effect of complexity. We present experimental evidence which shows that too much of an increase in complexity leads to a reversal of those gains. Limited memory on the part of players, as well as the relative complexity faced by senders and receivers, drives these changes, and individuals experience cognitive costs when dealing with complex environments that they are willing to pay to avoid. </p>
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Essays on communication and information transmission / Essai sur la communication et la transmission d'informationsSchopohl, Simon 13 November 2017 (has links)
Cette thèse de doctorat traite de différentes questions concernant la communication et la transmission d’informations dans le cadre de la théorie des jeux. J’analyse différents dilemmes auxquels peut être confronté un joueur qui envoie des informations. Ces dilemmes correspondent aux questions suivantes: "Devrais-je investir dans un message vérifiable?", "Quand dois-je transmettre mon information?" et "Est-il préférable de ne pas envoyer mon information et uniquement de recueillir l’information des autres?". Cette thèse comprend une introduction et trois chapitres. L’introduction contient une motivation générale pour les trois problèmes que je présente dans cette thèse. Je donne une vue d’ensemble détaillée de tous les chapitres, j’examine la littérature relative au sujet et je la compare à mes résultats. / This Ph.D dissertation addresses different issues concerning communication and information transmission in a game theoretical framework. I analyze different dilemmas that a player who sends information has to deal with. These dilemmas correspond to the following questions: "Should I invest into a verifiable message?", "When should I pass my information?" and "Is it better if I do not send my information, but collect information from others?". This thesis includes an introduction and three chapters. The introduction contains a general motivation for the three different problems that I model in this thesis. I give a detailed overview of all the chapters, survey the related literature and compare it to my results.
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Three Essays in Experimental EconomicsBradley, Austin Edward 21 June 2024 (has links)
The experiments presented and analyzed in this dissertation concern two well-established phenomena in behavioral economics: that human decision makers hold biased beliefs about probability and that free-form communication between economic agents promotes cooperation far in excess of what standard theory predicts. First, Chapter 2 studies subjective probability, focusing on the well-established existence of both the Hot Hand and Gambler's Fallacies — the false expectation of positive and negative autocorrelation, respectively. Both biases are prevalent throughout a wide variety of real-world contexts; what causes a person to favor one over the other? We conduct an experiment in which we observe fully informed subjects switching between the Hot Hand and Gambler's Fallacies when predicting future outcomes of mathematically identical sequences. Subjects exhibit the Gambler's Fallacy when predicting single outcomes but favor the Hot Hand when asked explicitly to estimate probabilities. Connecting our results to existing theory suggests that very subtle changes in framing lead decision makers to employ substantially different approaches to form predictions.
The remainder of this dissertation studies cheap talk communication between human subjects playing incentivised trust games. In Chapter 3, we study free-form communication using a dataset of over 1000 messages sent between participants in a laboratory Trust game. We employ Natural Language Processing to systematically generate meaningful partitions of the messages space which we can then examine with established regression approaches. Our investigation reveals features correlated with trust that have not previously been considered. Most notably, highly detailed, specific promises establish trust more effectively than other messages which signal the same intended action. Additionally, we observe that the most and least trusted messages in our dataset differ starkly in their quality. Highly trusted messages are longer, more detailed, and contain fewer grammatical errors whereas the least trusted messages tend to be brief and prone to errors.
In Chapter 4, we examine whether the difference is message quality affects trust by acting as a signal of effort. We report the results of an experiment designed to test whether promises which require higher levels of effort result in greater trust from their recipients. We find that more costly promises lead recipients to trust more frequently. However, there is no corresponding, significant difference in the trustworthiness of their senders. Further, when asked their beliefs explicitly, recipients do not believe that higher cost promises are more likely to be trustworthy. This presents a potential challenge to our understanding of trust between economic decision makers. If effort increases trust without altering receivers' beliefs, receivers must be concerned with factors other than their own payoff maximization. We conclude by presenting a follow-up experiment where varying effort cost cannot convey the sender's intentions, however, the results are inconclusive. / Doctor of Philosophy / This dissertation presents three projects in which we examine how human decision makers' choices differ from those predicted by standard economic theory. The experiments we conduct cover two broad topics: the way humans estimate the probability of random events and how communication leads to greater cooperation between agents with potentially conflicting monetary interests. It is well established that humans often hold distorted beliefs about probability. Depending on the direction of their bias, these beliefs are consistent with either the Hot Hand or Gambler's Fallacy. In Chapter 2, we examine the factors which may cause people to change the direction of their bias. Subjects exhibit the Gambler's Fallacy when predicting single outcomes, but favor the Hot Hand when asked explicitly to estimate probabilities. Chapters 3 and 4 study cheap talk communication between decision makers — messages which carry with them no commitment mechanism. It is no surprise to the average person that communication may enhance cooperation and trust between people. Experimental economists have verified this intuition in laboratory experiments and found that free-form communication is particularly effective. However, the precise mechanism through which free-form communication enhances cooperation is unclear. In Chapter 3, we collect a large dataset of free-form messages transmitted between players of an investment game. We then employ Natural Language Processing tools, novel to the Economics laboratory, to parse the unstructured data and identify message features associated with changes in trust and trustworthiness. Chapter 4 continues to examine communication, investigating whether the effort required to a promise affects its perceived or actual trustworthiness. We find that higher effort promises lead to greater trust, but find no corresponding increase in trustworthiness.
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Credibility of managerial forecast disclosure in market and regulated settingsDobler, Michael 10 December 2019 (has links)
This paper discusses the ability of models on cheap talk, and of audit and liability regulations, to provide analytically-based assessment of credibility of management forecast disclosure in market and regulated settings. While credibility is linked to restrictive conditions in pure market settings, regulatory enforcement does not necessarily contribute to forecast credibility. Key findings imply that ex ante approaches, including audit and tort liability in general, as well as partly verifiable disclosures supplementing the forecast and safe harbour provisions in particular can contribute to forecast credibility. Overall results suggest that the usefulness of managerial forecast disclosure should not be overestimated, as neither market nor regulatory mechanisms can overcome the problems related to non-verifiability.
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