Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited / Since the fall of the Iron Curtain, the issue of civil-military relations has become critical to the development of the new Eastern European democracies. Both the United States and Germany have a long civil-military relations tradition. A comparison of the United States' and Germany's approaches to civil-military relations will provide clear examples for new democratic states to follow, as they develop their civil-military relations, especially as they consider multi-national NATO units. Following an overview of civil-military theory, this thesis highlights the historical and political developments of civil-military relations within both countries. The thesis further explains the similarities and differences in their developments, as well as the implications for the military profession. The thesis provides a comparison of both approaches to the military profession and to the primary civil-military relations theory, in order to determine if the requirement of democratic civilian control over the military has been met. The thesis summarizes advantages and disadvantages of both American and German approaches. / Lieutenant Colonel (GS), German Army

Thesis (MA (Political Science))--University of Stellenbosch, 2007. / Private military companies (PMCs)are increasing becoming involved in modern conflicts providing specialised skills such as combat services, planning, intelligence, training, support and technical assistance. They provide an alternative to weak state governments as Western governments have become increasingly reluctant to commit their troops to be involved in the civil conflicts of the developing world. Supporters of the employment of private forces see them as an effective solution to this combination of need from conflict-ridden weak states and reluctance of Western governments and international organisations to intervene in these conflicts ...

A research report submitted to the Faculty of Management, University of the Witwatersrand, in 50% fulfilment of the requirement for the degree of Master of Management (in the Field of Security). March 2016 / Defence Review 2015 concluded that the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) was in a “critical state of decline”, faced imminent and irreversible loss of capabilities and questioned its ability to meet all of its ordered defence commitments (Department of Defence, 2015c, pp. ix; 99). This is a grave indictment considering it is entrusted with the constitutional mandate to defend the Republic (Republic of South Africa, 1996, Sec 200). This begs the question “what went wrong?” Causes raised include the apparent disjuncture between the defence mandate and budget. It is unlikely, however that the blame can be attributed to a funding shortfall and overly ambitious defence mandate, alone. Some question whether a flawed institutional civil control structure might be to blame for compromising military command and thereby the ability of the armed forces to ensure effective defence. Did the new government go too far in imposing robust civil control over the SANDF in 1994, effectively emasculating the SANDF? Alternatively is the selected model for South Africa’s civil control and oversight regimes simply inappropriate or otherwise ineffective? Whether the failure lies with the selected model itself or in its execution are issues that were examined in the study. This study takes as its point of departure, various Defence Review 2015 policy proposals that, it was argued, point to deeper flaws in the institutional civil-military arrangements within the DOD. As such, they are fundamental to our understanding of the civil control challenges confronting the DOD and the formulation of policy options and recommendations. What the study highlighted was that the ultimate challenge for the DOD could be reduced in simple terms to finding an agreeable solution that would satisfy both the statutory civil control precepts and the Chief SANDF’s desire for freedom from undue interference with his executive military command. Central to the entire civil control debate is of course the balance DOD design, around which the DOD transformation project is structured, and the role of the Sec Def in exercising civil control in a ‘collaborative relationship’ with the Chief SANDF. There is general consensus that the balance DOD design has 1 Colonel C.B. Hepburn, late of the Transvaal Scottish, is employed on a term contract as Deputy Director Departmental Performance Monitoring and Evaluation; Defence Policy, Strategy and Planning Division; Defence Secretariat. His staffing at the integrated Defence Head Office provided him with access to the strategic level of defence policy decision-making and daily engagement with senior leaders at the point of interface between the ‘civilian’ Defence Secretariat and the Defence Force. The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defence or any other agency of the South African government. C.B. HEPBURN 416498 failed to live up to expectations and that it has proven difficult to establish and maintain the optimum balance between civil control and an effective armed service. What is equally obvious is that even after more than two decades of democratic consolidation; the DOD has yet to complete its transformation. If Defence Review 2015 is anything to go by then it can be expected that the process is set to continue for at least the next 25 years. That civil control remains a contested concept within the DOD is not in doubt. The solutions may be elusive; however, there is strong evidence that the answers lie more with how the Def Sec should be capacitated rather than the current focus on repositioning to better enable civil control of defence and to perform the duty assigned to it. Structural issues are clearly a factor and should indeed be dealt with in the broader DOD reorganisation. Nonetheless, there is a strong argument presented that instead of restructuring, better use should be made of performance agreements, delegations and detailed instructions. Given that the DOD is recognised in law as a ‘special case’, there should be a strong legal argument for amending the applicable legislation to make provision for a ‘special delegation regime’ or performance agreements, as a solution to the DOD’s immediate needs for providing an effective armed service. Keywords: Civil control; oversight; Defence Review 2015; South African National Defence Force; armed services; budget; civil-military relations; Constitutional mandate; defence ministry, military command and control, defence secretariat. / GR2018

Cette thèse analyse les raisons qui ont poussé le Japon à se retirer en 1936 du système de contrôle des armements navals établis en 1922. La littérature sur le sujet est particulièrement pauvre pour ce qui est de la science politique et ne parvient pas à systématiser les différentes variables afin de mieux comprendre l’extrême complexité du processus de décision japonais. Appréhender ce processus permet d'aborder une problématique plus générale, qui est de comprendre pourquoi les états mettent fin à des relations de nature coopérative, préférant poursuivre une politique de sécurité unilatérale malgré les coûts que cela peut engendrer. Le modèle théorique de cette thèse propose l’hypothèse suivante: certains changements dans le système international affectent l'influence relative des différentes institutions domestiques prenant part à la formulation des politiques étrangères. En cas de tensions internationales, l'expertise des forces armées prend de l’importance pour la formulation des politiques étrangères. Dans un tel scénario, il est probable que le pays se retire de l'accord de contrôle des armements si ses forces armées s’opposent au maintien de cet accord. Les forces armées désavouent l'accord si ce dernier est intrusif dans des domaines relevant de l'expertise de l’institution militaire au point de menacer sa capacité à répondre à une nouvelle menace extérieure. Le degré d'influence des forces armées et l'intensité du conflit entre militaires et civils pour ce qui concerne la politique de défense nationale constituent les deux variables qui déterminent la propension d'un état à privilégier une approche unilatérale de sa politique étrangère en matière de sécurité. / This thesis aims at assessing the causes of Japan's decision to withdraw in 1936 from the so-called Washington system of naval arms control. The existing literature is weak in the field of political science and fails to efficiently systematize the different variables to understand the highly complex Japanese decision-making process. To better understand this process helps in addressing a more general question: Why do states choose to pursue an independent and unilateral foreign security policy instead of a cooperative approach, despite the cost a withdrawal may engender? This thesis' theoretical framework is based on the academic literature on civil-military relations, and proposes the following hypothesis: Changes in the international system affect the relative influence different domestic institutions have on the formulation of foreign policy. In case of emerging international tensions, the military’s expertise acquires new importance for the formulation of foreign policy. In such a scenario, the arms control agreement does not survive if the military establishment advocates against the maintenance of the agreement. The military establishment opposes the agreement if it is so intrusive into its traditional sphere of responsibility that it negatively affects its ability to deal with a worsening security environment. The level of influence the military establishment possesses over the formulation of foreign security policy and the intensity of conflict in civil-military relations are the two variables of the thesis, which account for a state's propensity to privilege a unilateral approach to its foreign security policy.

During the Korean War the White House and the Army publicized the Medal of Honor to achieve three outcomes. First, they hoped it would have a positive influence on public opinion. Truman committed to limited goals at the start of the war and chose not to create an official propaganda agency, which led to partisan criticism and realistic reporting. Medal of Honor publicity celebrated individual actions removed from their wider context in a familiar, heroic mold to alter memory of the past. Second, the Army publicized the Medal of Honor internally to inspire and reinforce desired soldier behavior. Early reports indicated a serious lack of discipline on the front lines and the Army hoped to build psychological resilience in the men by exposing them to the heroic actions of other soldiers. Finally, the Cold War spawned a great fear of communist subterfuge in the United States, which was exacerbated by the brainwashing of prisoners of war. The White House and the Army reached out to marginalized elements of American society through the Medal of Honor to counter communist propaganda. The Korean War remains an understudied era of American history, yet it was incredibly important to the United States and the world. The war influenced the United States to maintain a large standing military prepositioned around the world to protect its interests. Achieving the status quo antebellum validated the containment strategy against communism, which heavily influenced the decision to intervene in Vietnam. The United Nations, ostensibly in charge of allied forces in the Korean War, gained credibility from preventing the loss of South Korea. Despite these important effects of the war on world history, scholars continue to focus on World War II and Vietnam. This study seeks to build on the relative dearth of scholarly material on the Korean War by examining in historical context the manipulation of a symbol that intersected both the military and the home-front to influence behavior.

Thesis (M.A. in Security Studies (Homeland Security and Defense))--Naval Postgraduate School, March 2006. / AD-A445 450. Thesis Advisor(s): Christopher Bellavita. "March 2006." Includes bibliographical references (p.69-71). Also available online.

Since the early 1990s the use of private military companies (PMCs) has proliferated. Especially the United States are increasingly turning to private contractors to perform military tasks. Privatization advocates claim that PMCs work cheaper than the military. In addition to that, PMCs give the cover of plausible deniability that regular troops lack. But the fact that legislative control or public debate are missing raises the question of accountability and underlines the need for legal means to control and regulate PMCs and their operations.

This article discusses the complex relationship between the state and the military in Latin American societies. Defining the state in Latin America as a weak one, it contains a typology of the different roles played by the military in the 20th century. In this context, the ambivalent impact of the USA as well as the search of the Latin American military for “new tasks” since the 1990s is discussed. The article concludes with the challenges for civil-military relations in the current democratic regimes in Latin America.

Since the beginning of the 1970s a lot of countries in Latin America has been starting the transition to democracy. The article analyses the role played by the military in this process, especially the effects of civildemocratic governments – sometimes failing in – gaining power over the military. It is described how and why the army occasionally kept their independence from the civil power and how this influenced the consolidation of democracy.

CIMIC er, som et interface mellem den militære styrke og de civile omgivelser, siden ”Balkanmissionerne”blevet en væsentlig del af konceptet for at skabe en effektiv militær indsats i PeaceOperations. CIMIC konceptet, som blev anvendt relativt succesfuldt under ”Balkan-missionerne,vurderes at være det samme, som i dag anvendes i Irak. Men virker dette koncept samtidigt med,at koalitionen er blevet en del af de stridende parter? Virker det samtidigt med, at volden er rettetmod koalitionen? Og virker det i et operationsmiljø som er langt fra at være ”safe and secure” –og hvor kontrollen med de stridende parter må siges at være begrænset?På baggrund af disse spørgsmål har hensigten med denne ”uppsats” været at analysere udvalgtetilfælde af dansk CIMIC, i relation til COIN-operationer for at kunne pege på, hvorvidt danskCIMIC kan siges at have haft den ønskede effekt og dermed understøttet opnåelsen af deoperative målsætninger. Denne opgave skal således ses som et bidrag til en vurdering afCIMIC´s evne som ”Force Multiplier” i COIN-operationer. Opgaven er besvaret gennem atundersøge følgende spørgsmål: Hvad skal der opnås med CIMIC under COIN-operationer?Hvordan kan effekten af CIMIC måles under COIN-operationer? Hvilken effekt kan det siges atdanske CIMIC-enheders indsats har haft under COIN-operationerne i Irak? Er de opnåedeeffekter i overensstemmelse med målsætningerne?Følgende fem analysefaktorer er udledt og har dannet grundlag for, hvorvidt det kan siges omdansk CIMIC har virket i COIN-operationer: (1) Forbedring af hverdagen for befolkningen, (2)samarbejde og koordination med civile organisationer (forbindelsesvirksomhed), gennemførelseaf (3) informationsindhentning, informationsspredning og vurderinger (Situational Awareness),(4) uddannelse i lokale forhold for egne styrker og (5) Force Protection.Resultatet af undersøgelsen er, at CIMIC inden for alle analysefaktorer samlet set har vist, atCIMIC som minimum har haft en moderat effekt. Det er derfor konkluderet, at CIMIC-konceptethar virket i COIN-operationer og at CIMIC dermed har kunnet fungere som en ”ForceMultiplier”. / Since the missions in the Balkans during the 1990´s CIMIC has become a vital part of theconcept of creating effective Peace Operations, by acting as an interface between the militaryforces and the civilian environment. The CIMIC concept being used with relative success duringthe “Balkans-missions” is, in principle, the same concept being used in Iraq today. But does thisconcept work also if the coalition becomes part of the warring parties? Does it work when theviolence is also directed at the coalition? And does it work in an operational environment whichis far from being safe and secure, and with a limited or with no control of the warring factions?Using the above questions as the background, the aim of this paper has been to analyse specificcases of Danish CIMIC related to COIN-operations. This has been done in order to identify towhich extent Danish CIMIC has achieved the desired effects and thereby supported theoperational objectives. This paper can be seen as a contribution to the evaluation of CIMIC as aForce Multiplier in COIN-operations. The paper has been aimed at answering the followingquestions: What is CIMIC to achieve within COIN-operations? How can the effects of CIMICwithin COIN-operations be measured? What are the effects of Danish CIMIC within the COINoperationsin Iraq? Have the desired effects been achieved and thus supported the operationalobjectives?In order to identify to which extent Danish CIMIC has been effective within the COINoperationsin Iraq, the analysis of the paper focuses on the following five distinctive factors: (1)Improvement of the living standards for the local population (2) Co-operation and Co-ordinationwith civilian organizations (Liaison activity), (3) Information gathering, information sharing, andassessments (Situational Awareness), (4) Education of own troops concerning the localenvironment as well as cultural awareness, and finally (5) Force Protection.The analysis of the above mentioned factors shows that CIMIC has had a positive effect withregard to the COIN-operations. The measured effects range from no effect to high effect, with anaverage effect that can be best described as moderate. It is therefore the conclusion of the paperthat the CIMIC concept has worked within the COIN-operations in Iraq, and that it has thusacted as a Force Multiplier. / Avdelning: ALB - Slutet Mag 3 C-upps. Hylla: Upps. ChP 06-08