This thesis spotlights eleven formative moments or ‘events' in the history of twentieth-century art music in Greece. They date from 1908 to 1979 and are ordered by two master narratives, the ‘Great Idea' and the ‘European Idea', concepts with multifarious implications for the making of contemporary Greece. The nature of the musical works presented during these events, the particular kind of reception they received, the debates they generated, and the role their composers hoped they would play in the construction of a contemporary Greek musical identity are some of the indicative issues that will be discussed, and always in relation to the prevailing political and social context. More specifically, I will try to show by way of these events how politics and culture were inextricably tied together. In some cases the events directly mirrored the political divisions and social tensions of their time, while in others they formed an easy (‘innocent') prey to political agendas – indigenous and foreign – that were at some remove from matters aesthetic. The discussion of these historical moments in the concert life of Greece is partly based on secondary sources, but it is also supported by extensive archival research. It is hoped that both the general approach and the new findings will enrich and update the existing literature in English, and that they may even serve to stimulate further research in the music history of other countries located in the so-called margins of Europe.

Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2002. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The purpose of this study is to determine how the role and identity of the Nonaligned Movement (NAM) changed during and after the Cold War. The demise of the Movement in the post-Cold War era, predicted by some scholars, is discussed. This study examines whether the Movement merely offered an alternative grouping during the Cold War. The issue that becomes evident with respect to the Cold War is to show the terror it brought about and how the Third World became the battleground of the Superpowers. The question as to what extent the role played by the Movement defused the Cold War is investigated. It is shown that the Movement sent emissaries to Washington and Moscow to resolve the German Crisis in 1961 and to reduce the arms race. A historical overview of the Movement is offered, which determines the role of Afro- Asianism in the birth of the Nonaligned Movement. It is explained that the 1955 Bandung conference gathered leaders from independent African and Asian states - with different foreign policies - which created energies that in the following years greatly affected Third World politics and the shaping of nonalignment. This study traces also the role of different gatherings of the Movement up to the Durban Summit of 1998. At issue are also participating countries in the 1961 Belgrade Summit, which are described, as well as the growth of the Movement's membership. Different goals of the Movement are examined. Some, like nuclear disarmament, the right to self-determination, peaceful coexistence, and the right for the Palestinians to a homeland, were adopted during the Cold War and still remain valid. Others, like protection of the environment, and the struggle for human rights, were implemented during the post-Cold War era. The détente allowed the Movement to launch a New International Economic Order. An attempt is made to show the failure and success of the Movement in this respect. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die doel van hierdie studie is om te bepaal hoe die rol en identiteit van die Onverbonde Beweging (NAM) tydens en na die Koue Oorlog verander het. Die ondergang van die Beweging in die na-Koue Oorlogse era soos deur sommige kenners voorspel is, word ook ondersoek. Die studie het probeer vasstelof die Beweging 'n alternatiewe groepering tydens die Koue Oorlog teweeg gebring het. Die kwessie met betrekking tot respect tot die Koue Oorlog bewys dat terreur meegebring word en hoe die Derde Wêreld die slagveld van die Supermoondhede gemaak het. Daar word ook gepoog om vas te stel tot watter mate die Beweging 'n rol gespeel het in die ontlonting van die Koue Oorlog. In die verband word onder andere verwys na die Beweging se pogings om die Duitse Krisis (1961) te ontlont en die wapenwedloop te beëindig deur die stuur van afgevaardigdes na Washington en Moskou. In 'n historiese oorsig van die Beweging word die rol wat 'n Afro-Asiatiese gevoel/gees in die stigting van die Onverbonde Beweging gespeel het, ondersoek. Die studie toon aan hoe die Bandung Konferensie van 1955 leiers van onafhanklike state van Afrika en Asië, wat uiteenlopende buitelandse beleidsrigtings gehad het, bymekaar gebring het. Hierdie uiteenlopendheid het 'n dinamika geskep wat Derde Wêreldse politiek en die aard van onverbondenheid wesenlik beinvloed het in die jare na die Konferensie. Verskeie byeenkomste van die Onverbonde Beweging tot en met die Durbanse spitsberaad (1998) word ontleed. Die samestelling en verloop van die spitsberaad in Belgrado in 1961 en die groei in die lidmaatskap van die Beweging kom onder andere onder die loep. Verskeie van die Beweging se doelwitte wat tydens die Koue Oorlog beslag gekry het en steeds geldig is, word onder die soeklig geplaas. Kernkrag ontwapening, die reg op selfbeskikking, vreedsame naasbestaan en die Palestyne se reg op 'n eie staat/tuisland is voorbeelde in die verband. Ander doelwitte van die beweging wat veral in die na-Koue Oorlogse era geimplementeer is, soos die bewaring en beskerming van die omgewing en die stryd om menseregte, word ook ondersoek. Die loodsing van 'n Nuwe Internasionale Ekonomiese Orde deur die Beweging wat deur die détente van die na-Koue Oorlogse era moontlik gemaak is, word ook bespreek en die sukses en mislukking daarvan geëvalueer.

M.Litt et Phil. / In die post-Koue Oorlogse internasionale politiek is daar state wat, veral in die Weste, as verstotelinge gebrandmerk word. Dit is state soos Irak, Iran, Libie en Noord-Korea. Dit is geen nuwe verskynsel in die internasionale politiek dat sommige state deur ander verstoot of geIsoleer word nie. Bolsjewistiese Rusland is 'n goeie voorbeeld van 'n staat wat voor die Koue Oorlog geIsoleer is. Rhodesia (ne sy eensydige onafhanklikheidsverklaring in November 1965), Suid-Afrika (tydens apartheid), Israel, Taiwan en Chili is maar 'n paar voorbeelde uit die Koue Oorlogera. GeIsoleerde state is egter nog nie dikwels bestudeer nie. Studies wat wel daaroor gedoen is, het op die sogenaamde paria- state van die Koue Oorlog gefokus. In hierdie studie sal die klem op die verstotelingstate van die post-Koue Oorlogse internasionale politiek geplaas word. In Oktober 1995 het die Verenigde Nasies (VN) sy vyftigste bestaansjaar gevier. President Bill Clinton het 'n onthaal in New York gehou om die geleentheid to herdenk en het at die VN-lidstate, behalwe agt, uitgenooi. Die wat nie uitgenooi was In die post-Koue Oorlogse internasionale politiek is daar state wat, veral in die Weste, as verstotelinge gebrandmerk word. Dit is state soos Irak, Iran, Libie en Noord-Korea. Dit is geen nuwe verskynsel in die internasionale politiek dat sommige state deur ander verstoot of geIsoleer word nie. Bolsjewistiese Rusland is 'n goeie voorbeeld van 'n staat wat voor die Koue Oorlog geIsoleer is. Rhodesia (ne sy eensydige onafhanklikheidsverklaring in November 1965), Suid-Afrika (tydens apartheid), Israel, Taiwan en Chili is maar 'n paar voorbeelde uit die Koue Oorlogera. GeIsoleerde state is egter nog nie dikwels bestudeer nie. Studies wat wel daaroor gedoen is, het op die sogenaamde paria- state van die Koue Oorlog gefokus. In hierdie studie sal die klem op die verstotelingstate van die post-Koue Oorlogse In die post-Koue Oorlogse internasionale politiek is daar state wat, veral in die Weste, as verstotelinge gebrandmerk word. Dit is state soos Irak, Iran, Libie en Noord-Korea. Dit is geen nuwe verskynsel in die internasionale politiek dat sommige state deur ander verstoot of geIsoleer word nie. Bolsjewistiese Rusland is 'n goeie voorbeeld van 'n staat wat voor die Koue Oorlog geIsoleer is. Rhodesia (ne sy eensydige onafhanklikheidsverklaring in November 1965), Suid-Afrika (tydens apartheid), Israel, Taiwan en Chili is maar 'n paar voorbeelde uit die Koue Oorlogera. GeIsoleerde state is egter nog nie dikwels bestudeer nie. Studies wat wel daaroor gedoen is, het op die sogenaamde paria- state van die Koue Oorlog gefokus. In hierdie studie sal die klem op die verstotelingstate van die post-Koue Oorlogse internasionale politiek geplaas word. In Oktober 1995 het die Verenigde Nasies (VN) sy vyftigste bestaansjaar gevier. President Bill Clinton het 'n onthaal in New York gehou om die geleentheid to herdenk en het at die VN-lidstate, behalwe agt, uitgenooi. Die wat nie uitgenooi was nie, was Birma, Kuba, Iran, Irak, Libie, Noord-Korea, Soedan en Somalie. Somalie is nie uitgenooi nie omdat by nie 'n regering gehad het nie. Die ander sewe word deur Washington as verstotelingstate beskou. Twee interessante weglatings van die "swartlys" was Nigerie en die Federale Republiek van Joego-Slawie, wat In die post-Koue Oorlogse internasionale politiek is daar state wat, veral in die Weste, as verstotelinge gebrandmerk word. Dit is state soos Irak, Iran, Libie en Noord-Korea. Dit is geen nuwe verskynsel in die internasionale politiek dat sommige state deur ander verstoot of geIsoleer word nie. Bolsjewistiese Rusland is 'n goeie voorbeeld van 'n staat wat voor die Koue Oorlog geIsoleer is. Rhodesia (ne sy eensydige onafhanklikheidsverklaring in November 1965), Suid-Afrika (tydens apartheid), Israel, Taiwan en Chili is maar 'n paar voorbeelde uit die Koue Oorlogera. GeIsoleerde state is egter nog nie dikwels bestudeer nie. Studies wat wel daaroor gedoen is, het op die sogenaamde paria- state van die Koue Oorlog gefokus. In hierdie studie sal die klem op die verstotelingstate van die post-Koue Oorlogse internasionale politiek geplaas word. In Oktober 1995 het die Verenigde Nasies (VN) sy vyftigste bestaansjaar gevier. President Bill Clinton het 'n onthaal in New York gehou om die geleentheid to herdenk en het at die VN-lidstate, behalwe agt, uitgenooi. Die wat nie uitgenooi was nie, was Birma, Kuba, Iran, Irak, Libie, Noord-Korea, Soedan en Somalie. Somalie is nie uitgenooi nie omdat by nie 'n regering gehad het nie. Die ander sewe word deur Washington as verstotelingstate beskou. Twee interessante weglatings van die "swartlys" was Nigerie en die Federale Republiek van Joego-Slawie, wat normaalweg ook deur die Verenigde State van Amerika (VSA) as verstotelinge beskou word (Geldenhuys, 1997:15). Vir die doel van hierdie studie word hierdie nege beskou as die post-Koue Oorlogse verstotelingstate. Die meeste van hulle word nie slegs deur die VSA as verstotelinge behandel nie, maar deur verskeie ander state, en in sommige gevalle selfs deur die internasionale gemeenskap in die bree.

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This dissertation is a focused analysis of the origins, organization, training, politics, and combat capability of the Army of the Republic of Viet Nam (ARVN) from 1954 to 1963, the leading military instrument in the national counterinsurgency plan of the government of the Republic of Viet Nam (RVN). Other military and paramilitary forces that complemented the army in the ground war included the Viet Nam Marine Corps (VNMC), the Civil Guard (CG), the Self-Defense Corps (SDC) and the Civil Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) which was composed mainly of the indigenous populations in the Central Highlands of South Vietnam. At sea and in the air, the Viet Nam Air Force (VNAF) and the Viet Nam Navy (VNN) provided additional layers of tactical, strategic and logistical support to the military and paramilitary forces. Together, these forces formed the Republic of Viet Nam Armed Forces (RVNAF) designed to counter the communist insurgency plaguing the RVN. This thesis argues the following. First, the origin of the ARVN was rooted in the French Indochina War (1946-1954). Second, the ARVN was an amalgamation of political and military forces born from a revolution that encompassed three overlapping wars: a war of independence between the Vietnamese and the French; a civil war between the Vietnamese of diverse social and political backgrounds; and a proxy war as global superpowers and regional powers backed their own Vietnamese allies who, in turn, exploited their foreign supporters for their own purposes. Lastly, the ARVN failed not because it was organized, equipped, and trained for conventional instead of counterinsurgency warfare. Rather, it failed to assess, adjust, and adapt its strategy and tactics quickly enough to meet the war’s changing circumstances. The ARVN’s slowness to react resulted from its own institutional weaknesses, military and political problems that were beyond its control, and the powerful and dangerous enemies it faced. The People’s Army of Viet Nam (PAVN) and the People’s Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF) were formidable adversaries. Not duplicated in any other post-colonial Third World country and led by an experienced and politically tested leadership, the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam (DRVN) and the National Front for the Liberation of Southern Viet Nam (NFLSVN) exploited RVN failures effectively. Hypothetically, there was no guarantee that had the US dispatched land forces into Cambodia and Laos or invaded North Vietnam that the DRVN and NFLSVN would have quit attacking the RVN. The French Far East Expeditionary Corps (FFEEC)’ occupation of the Red River Delta did not bring peace to Cochinchina, only a military stalemate between it and the Vietnamese Liberation Army (VLA). Worse yet, a US invasion potentially would have unnerved the People’s Republic of China (PRC) which might have sent the PLAF to fight the US in Vietnam as it had in Korea. Inevitably, such unilateral military action would certainly provoke fierce criticism and opposition amongst the American public at home and allies abroad. At best, the war’s expansion might have bought a little more time for the RVN but it could never guarantee South Vietnam’s survival. Ultimately, RVN’s seemingly endless political, military, and social problems had to be resolved by South Vietnam’s political leaders, military commanders, and people but only in the absence of constant PAVN and PLAF attempts to destroy whatever minimal progress RVN made politically, militarily, and socially. The RVN was plagued by many problems and the DRVN and NFLSVN, unquestionably, were amongst those problems.

This dissertation is a focused analysis of the origins, organization, training, politics, and combat capability of the Army of the Republic of Viet Nam (ARVN) from 1954 to 1963, the leading military instrument in the national counterinsurgency plan of the government of the Republic of Viet Nam (RVN). Other military and paramilitary forces that complemented the army in the ground war included the Viet Nam Marine Corps (VNMC), the Civil Guard (CG), the Self-Defense Corps (SDC) and the Civil Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) which was composed mainly of the indigenous populations in the Central Highlands of South Vietnam. At sea and in the air, the Viet Nam Air Force (VNAF) and the Viet Nam Navy (VNN) provided additional layers of tactical, strategic and logistical support to the military and paramilitary forces. Together, these forces formed the Republic of Viet Nam Armed Forces (RVNAF) designed to counter the communist insurgency plaguing the RVN. This thesis argues the following. First, the origin of the ARVN was rooted in the French Indochina War (1946-1954). Second, the ARVN was an amalgamation of political and military forces born from a revolution that encompassed three overlapping wars: a war of independence between the Vietnamese and the French; a civil war between the Vietnamese of diverse social and political backgrounds; and a proxy war as global superpowers and regional powers backed their own Vietnamese allies who, in turn, exploited their foreign supporters for their own purposes. Lastly, the ARVN failed not because it was organized, equipped, and trained for conventional instead of counterinsurgency warfare. Rather, it failed to assess, adjust, and adapt its strategy and tactics quickly enough to meet the war’s changing circumstances. The ARVN’s slowness to react resulted from its own institutional weaknesses, military and political problems that were beyond its control, and the powerful and dangerous enemies it faced. The People’s Army of Viet Nam (PAVN) and the People’s Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF) were formidable adversaries. Not duplicated in any other post-colonial Third World country and led by an experienced and politically tested leadership, the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam (DRVN) and the National Front for the Liberation of Southern Viet Nam (NFLSVN) exploited RVN failures effectively. Hypothetically, there was no guarantee that had the US dispatched land forces into Cambodia and Laos or invaded North Vietnam that the DRVN and NFLSVN would have quit attacking the RVN. The French Far East Expeditionary Corps (FFEEC)’ occupation of the Red River Delta did not bring peace to Cochinchina, only a military stalemate between it and the Vietnamese Liberation Army (VLA). Worse yet, a US invasion potentially would have unnerved the People’s Republic of China (PRC) which might have sent the PLAF to fight the US in Vietnam as it had in Korea. Inevitably, such unilateral military action would certainly provoke fierce criticism and opposition amongst the American public at home and allies abroad. At best, the war’s expansion might have bought a little more time for the RVN but it could never guarantee South Vietnam’s survival. Ultimately, RVN’s seemingly endless political, military, and social problems had to be resolved by South Vietnam’s political leaders, military commanders, and people but only in the absence of constant PAVN and PLAF attempts to destroy whatever minimal progress RVN made politically, militarily, and socially. The RVN was plagued by many problems and the DRVN and NFLSVN, unquestionably, were amongst those problems.

This dissertation is a focused analysis of the origins, organization, training, politics, and combat capability of the Army of the Republic of Viet Nam (ARVN) from 1954 to 1963, the leading military instrument in the national counterinsurgency plan of the government of the Republic of Viet Nam (RVN). Other military and paramilitary forces that complemented the army in the ground war included the Viet Nam Marine Corps (VNMC), the Civil Guard (CG), the Self-Defense Corps (SDC) and the Civil Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) which was composed mainly of the indigenous populations in the Central Highlands of South Vietnam. At sea and in the air, the Viet Nam Air Force (VNAF) and the Viet Nam Navy (VNN) provided additional layers of tactical, strategic and logistical support to the military and paramilitary forces. Together, these forces formed the Republic of Viet Nam Armed Forces (RVNAF) designed to counter the communist insurgency plaguing the RVN. This thesis argues the following. First, the origin of the ARVN was rooted in the French Indochina War (1946-1954). Second, the ARVN was an amalgamation of political and military forces born from a revolution that encompassed three overlapping wars: a war of independence between the Vietnamese and the French; a civil war between the Vietnamese of diverse social and political backgrounds; and a proxy war as global superpowers and regional powers backed their own Vietnamese allies who, in turn, exploited their foreign supporters for their own purposes. Lastly, the ARVN failed not because it was organized, equipped, and trained for conventional instead of counterinsurgency warfare. Rather, it failed to assess, adjust, and adapt its strategy and tactics quickly enough to meet the war’s changing circumstances. The ARVN’s slowness to react resulted from its own institutional weaknesses, military and political problems that were beyond its control, and the powerful and dangerous enemies it faced. The People’s Army of Viet Nam (PAVN) and the People’s Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF) were formidable adversaries. Not duplicated in any other post-colonial Third World country and led by an experienced and politically tested leadership, the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam (DRVN) and the National Front for the Liberation of Southern Viet Nam (NFLSVN) exploited RVN failures effectively. Hypothetically, there was no guarantee that had the US dispatched land forces into Cambodia and Laos or invaded North Vietnam that the DRVN and NFLSVN would have quit attacking the RVN. The French Far East Expeditionary Corps (FFEEC)’ occupation of the Red River Delta did not bring peace to Cochinchina, only a military stalemate between it and the Vietnamese Liberation Army (VLA). Worse yet, a US invasion potentially would have unnerved the People’s Republic of China (PRC) which might have sent the PLAF to fight the US in Vietnam as it had in Korea. Inevitably, such unilateral military action would certainly provoke fierce criticism and opposition amongst the American public at home and allies abroad. At best, the war’s expansion might have bought a little more time for the RVN but it could never guarantee South Vietnam’s survival. Ultimately, RVN’s seemingly endless political, military, and social problems had to be resolved by South Vietnam’s political leaders, military commanders, and people but only in the absence of constant PAVN and PLAF attempts to destroy whatever minimal progress RVN made politically, militarily, and socially. The RVN was plagued by many problems and the DRVN and NFLSVN, unquestionably, were amongst those problems.

My research provides a historical and archaeological context for this thesis, in which I argue the JB-2 missile is historically significant as a unique example of the rapid duplication of enemy technology for both physical and psychological retaliation, as a crucial link in the chain of development for America’s cruise missile program, and for its role in early Cold War deterrence. Jet Bomb model number 2 (JB-2), America’s first operationally successful, mass produced cruise missile, developed as a direct copy of the German V-1, with slight variation in manufacture due to differences between German and American components, machinery and tooling. Continuing modifications of the JB-2 during its service life led to improvements in performance, control, and accuracy. From 1944 to 1953, the JB-2 transitioned from a weapon quickly prepared for wartime deployment to an essential test vehicle for the United States Army, Air Force and Navy while supporting the U.S. policy of containment during the early Cold War.