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EMPIRICAL COMPARISON OF THE STATISTICAL METHODS OF ANALYZING INTERVENTION EFFECTS AND CORRELATION ANALYSIS BETWEEN CLINICAL OUTCOMES AND SURROGATE COMPOSITE SCORES IN RANDOMIZED CONTROLLED TRIALS USING COMPETE III TRIAL DATAXu, Jian-Yi 10 1900 (has links)
<p><strong>Background:</strong> A better application of evidence-based available therapies and optimal patient care are suggested to have a positive association with patient outcomes for cardiovascular disease (CVD) patients. Electronic integration of care tested in the Computerization of Medical Practices for the Enhancement of Therapeutic Effectiveness (COMPETE) Π study showed that a shared electronic decision-support system to support the primary care of diabetes improved the process of care and some clinical markers of the quality of diabetes care. On the basis of COMPETE Π trial, COMPETE Ш study showed that older adults at increased risk of cardiovascular events, if connected with their family physicians and other providers via an electronic network sharing an intensive, individualized cardiovascular tracking, advice and support program, enhanced their process of care – using a process composite score to lower their cardiovascular risk more than those in conventional care. However, results of the effect of intervention on composite process and clinical outcomes were not similar – there was no significant effect on clinical outcomes.</p> <p><strong>Objectives:</strong> Our objectives were to investigate the robustness of the results based the commonly used statistical models using COMPETE III dataset and explore the validity of the surrogate process composite score using a correlation analysis between the clinical outcomes and process composite score.</p> <p><strong>Methods:</strong> Generalized estimating equations (GEE) were used as a primary statistical model in this study. Three patient-level statistical methods (simple linear regression, fixed-effects regression, and mixed-effects regression) and two center-level statistical approaches (center-level fixed-effects model and center-level random-effects model) were compared to reference GEE model in terms of the robustness of the results – magnitude, direction and statistical significance of the estimated effects on the change of process composite score / on-target clinical composite score. GEE was also used to investigate thecorrelation between the clinical outcomes and surrogate process composite scores.</p> <p><strong>Results:</strong> All six statistical models used in this study produced robust estimates of intervention effect. No significant association between cardiovascular events and on-target clinical composite score and individual component of on-target clinical composite score were found between the intervention group and control group. However, blood pressure, LDL cholesterol, and psychosocial index are significant predictors of cardiovascular events. Process composite score can both predict the cardiovascular events and clinical improvement, but the results were not statistically significant- possibly due to the small number of events. However, the process composite score was significantly associated with the on-target clinical composite score.</p> <p><strong>Conclusions:</strong> We concluded that all five analytic models yielded similar robust estimation of intervention effect comparing to the reference GEE model. The relatively smaller estimate effects in the center-level fixed-effects model suggest that the within-center variation should be considered in the analysis of multicenter RCTs. Process composite score may serve as a good predictor for CVD outcomes.</p> / Master of Science (MSc)
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Obrigação de não concorrência nos contratos empresariais: do trespasse de estabelecimento aos contratos associativos / Non-compete obligation in company contracts: from the sale and purchase agreement of business establishment to the association agreementsMartorano, Luciana dos Santos 27 May 2013 (has links)
A presente dissertação trata da obrigação de não concorrência nos contratos empresariais. O trabalho divide-se em duas partes. A primeira será dedicada a introduzir os fundamentos teóricos necessários à compreensão da função exercida pela obrigação de não concorrência em cada um dos tipos contratuais que será individualmente analisado na segunda parte. Assim, a primeira parte traçará um panorama geral sobre os princípios e conceitos essenciais à compreensão da função jurídica e econômica que a obrigação de não concorrência exerce nos contratos empresariais. Inicialmente, dissertaremos sobre os princípios constitucionais da livre concorrência e da livre iniciativa, informando o papel que eles desempenham na proteção dos mercados e no desenvolvimento econômico nacional. Em seguida, apresentaremos um breve escorço histórico das políticas de defesa da concorrência engendradas pela legislação infraconstitucional pátria na consecução dos referidos princípios constitucionais. A partir da definição desses princípios e da análise da evolução histórica da defesa da concorrência, exporemos conclusões sobre o objetivo e os objetos mediatos e imediatos de tutela da concorrência. Em seguida, trataremos da atividade empresarial desempenhada nos mercados concorrenciais, dissertando de forma breve sobre a teoria geral da empresa e sobre os conceitos de empresário, empresa e estabelecimento empresarial, dedicando atenção especial ao estudo dos elementos e atributos da azienda, principalmente no que se refere ao aviamento e à clientela. Por fim, encerraremos a primeira parte com um capítulo dedicado à definição do conceito da obrigação de não concorrência, dissertando sobre a sua natureza jurídica, histórico doutrinário e jurisprudencial, aplicação no ordenamento jurídico brasileiro e alienígena, teorias justificadoras, hipóteses de incidência e limites de aplicação nos contratos empresariais. A segunda parte será dedicada à análise efetiva dos contratos empresariais e terá como objetivo demonstrar a função que a obrigação de não concorrência exerce nos negócios jurídicos e como ela pode ser determinante para conferir eficácia às obrigações principais assumidas pelos contratantes. Por fim, apresentar-se-á conclusão ao trabalho, buscando-se evidenciar a importância da incidência da obrigação de não concorrência em determinados contratos empresariais como ferramenta essencial ao exercício da livre concorrência e da livre iniciativa. / This dissertation addresses the non-compete obligation in company contracts. The paper is divided into two parts. The first part will introduce the theoretical fundaments required to understand the function of the non-compete obligation in each contract type, which will be individually analyzed in the second part. Thus, the first part will trace an overall scenario of the principles and concepts required for understanding the legal and economic function of the non-compete obligation in corporate contracts. Initially, we will discuss the constitutional principles of free competition and free initiative, informing the role played by each in market protection and in the national economic development. Next, we will present a brief historical background on anti-trust policies adopted by the national infraconstitutional laws in meeting said constitutional principles. From the definition of these principles and the analysis of the historical course of anti-trust practice, we will present conclusions on the aims and mediate and immediate objects of anti-trust protection. Next, we will address business activities performed in competitive markets, briefly discussing the general theory of company and the concepts of company owner, company and business establishment, with emphasis on the study of the elements and attributes of the azienda, mainly goodwill and customer base. The first part will conclude with a chapter dedicated to defining the concept of the non-compete obligation, discussing the legal nature, doctrine and jurisprudence background, application in the Brazilian and international legal order, justifying theories, hypothesis of application and limitations on the application in company contracts. The second part will address the analysis of company contracts and will aim at demonstrating the function of the non-compete obligation in legal transactions and how decisive it can for the effectiveness of the main obligations undertaken by the contracting parties. In conclusion, this paper will highlight the importance of the application of the non-compete obligation in certain company contracts as an essential instrument for free enterprise and free initiative.
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Konkurenční doložka v české a americké právní úpravě / Covenant not to compete in the legal system of Czech republic and the USAVraždová, Michaela January 2016 (has links)
The aim of this thesis is to describe the current legal regulations of covenant not to compete in the Czech Republic and the USA - particularly in the states of New York and California, to refer to the advantages and disadvantages of these regulations and to think if these very different regulations could inspire each other in some areas. I decided to write half of the thesis about covenant not to compete in the USA because of my study experience in American law school where I understood more closely the common law system of law and because I did not find any Czech article which would write about this topic in the USA and I wanted to fill in this blank space. This thesis is devided into three parts. The first chapter is dedicated to the current wording of covenant not to compete in the Czech Republic. In the particular subchapters there are described the constitutional roots of covenant not to compete, which activities can be banned by the covenant not to compete, which information the employee must have acquired, with what types of employess the covenant can be entered into and in what area scope, what is the maximum time period during which the employee can be banned, what compensation the employer has to pay to the employee and how the covenant can be terminated. The sources for this chapter...
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Essays in Labor and Financial EconomicsGopal, Bhargav January 2023 (has links)
More than one-third of US-listed companies had all-male corporate boards in 2015. Quotas are discussed as policy levers to increase gender diversity, but there is much controversy whether they can increase female representation without harming organizational outcomes. Using the passage of a California law in 2018 that required the presence of at least one woman on corporate boards by the end of the following year, in the first chapter of my dissertation I estimate the effects of gender quotas on firm performance. I find the quota reduced the share of all-male boards by thirty percentage points within one year, with no reductions in operating performance, firm values, or shareholder returns within three years. These results question why all-male boards were prevalent prior to the legislation. I find that women directors are less likely to possess top-level experience and employment connections with corporate executives, which both appear as viable explanations. These findings provide insight on why women continue to lack representation in corporate leadership.
Non-compete agreements are provisions within employment contracts that prevent workers from joining competing firms. They are prevalent in the US workforce, with 38% of workers having signed such clauses at some point in their careers. Despite their vast usage, there is limited research on the incentives for workers and firms to use non-compete agreements. In the second chapter, we show that non-compete agreements can create one market failure – inefficient lack of job separation – while mitigating a separate market failure – inefficient provision of industry-specific investment by firms. The model yields the predictions that (i) non-compete agreements are more likely to be used in industries where employer training is more "general" and (ii) non-compete signers have longer job tenures and receive more firm-provided investment relative to similar workers without non-compete agreements. Using newly-released panel data on the usage of non-compete agreements from the NLSY97, we confirm the model's predictions. Non-compete signers are more concentrated in knowledge-intensive industries and remain with their employers for 3 more months than individuals without such agreements. Non-compete signers also receive more employer-provided investment, but do not experience higher wage growth.
Non-compete agreements are provisions within employment contracts that prevent workers from joining competing firms. In the third chapter, using the Current Population Survey, 18 state-level non-compete policy changes between 1992-2014, and hand-collected data on workers exempt from non-compete enforcement, I study the effects of non-compete regulation on labor market outcomes using a triple-differences research design. I find that a standard deviation increase in non-compete enforcement raises hourly wages by 3-7%, with larger gains for job leavers than job stayers. Non-compete enforcement is not associated with job mobility, unemployment, or labor force participation decisions. The findings are interpreted through the lens of an incomplete contracting model. Under the model’s assumptions, non-compete agreements mitigate the market failure of underprovided firm-sponsored general training, thus increasing the worker’s productivity. The extent to which the worker is compensated for this increase in productivity depends on labor market competition at the time of contracting. The fact that increased enforcement raises the wages of job leavers more than job stayers is consistent with the model’s predictions.
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Essays on Sales Force Career IncentivesBanerjee, Somnath 01 January 2015 (has links)
This dissertation uses game theoretic models in a principal-agent framework to study how firms optimally manage long term career related incentives for their sales people. When sales people put sales effort they face incentives not only from short term incentives like commissions and bonuses but also from long term rewards associated with progression in their career. In particular, sales people are often motivated to get promoted and avoid being laid off, to get selected to managerial positions and to form stronger relationships with customers so that they can bargain for higher wages in the future, respectively. Three different essays examine each of these three career related incentives and how firms can optimally manage them. Essay 1 (Chapter 2) studies why and how firms use a type of promotion and layoff policy, called the Forced Ranking policy, to provide optimal long term career incentives to sales people. Findings from the essay suggests that when sales people are ambiguity averse and there is economic uncertainty regarding promotions and layoffs, firms are likely to commit to a promotion policy but may or may not commit to a layoff policy as part of Forced Ranking. Interestingly, it is shown that firms enjoying higher margins are more likely to commit to both promotion and layoffs, consistent with observations from industry practice. Results also suggest that in absence of costs from promoting and laying off employees, firms should use an up-or-out contract to motivate the sales force. Essay 2 (Chapter 3) investigates how career incentives associated with promotion of sales employees to sales management roles may interfere with selection of the right sales managers. The essay was motivated by the common observation that organizations often promote their best sales people to sales managerial roles but after promotion find that the sales people are not as good as they were expected to be in their new roles, a phenomenon called Peter Principle. An alternative explanation for this phenomenon of adverse selection is provided and possible solutions are analyzed as part of the essay. In essay 3 (Chapter 4) long term career incentives that sales reps face when they can form relationships with their customers are considered. Loyalty generated from customer-salesperson relationships is often "owned" by the sales person and it can be lost if the sales person moves to another firm. Therefore, firms compete for both customers as well as sales reps with the objective of poaching customers that are loyal to the sales reps. The essay analyzes how firms can deal with such a competition. Findings suggest that contrary to general beliefs, the presence of anti-employee poaching regulations like Non-Compete clauses, or tacit collusion to not poach each other's employees may hurt firm profits under some conditions. Overall, the dissertation answers how firms can manage sales force career incentives to maximize profits.
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Compete: Urban Land Institute | Gerald D. Hines student urban design competitionPerry, John January 1900 (has links)
Master of Landscape Architecture / Department of Landscape Architecture/Regional and Community Planning / Stephanie A. Rolley / The Urban Land Institute / Gerald D. Hines Student Urban Design Competition offers
teams of multi-disciplinary graduate students the opportunity to address a large scale site that
presents complex challenges requiring practicable, innovative solutions reflecting responsible
land use. Solutions must incorporate design, planning, market potential, market feasibility, and
development. Some of the brightest students from universities across the United States and
Canada compete annually, incorporating bold ideas, outstanding graphics, and great
presentations in order to win the competition. The scale of the competition and the quality of
entries makes it difficult to advance from the initial submission round to the final four entries
selected for the final phase of the competition.
Entering the competition is a complex process requiring adherence to a multitude of rules
and regulations about team formation, design solutions, financial information, presentation
materials, and deadlines. This study documents the process of one student team entering the 2009
competition. Analysis of previous competition responses and principles of urban design theory
informed an innovative design solution that incorporates sustainability, livability, and
connectivity.
This project analyzes previous project entries, looking for patterns and indicators to guide
the competition response. Combining the analysis and design philosophy, which utilizes specific
sustainable landscape architectural principles, forms the framework of the design solution. The
response focuses on process-driven design implementing sustainable frameworks that account
for existing an emergent ecologies, historical and cultural relevance, energy efficiency,
hydrological patterns, and public transportation. Results of the study led to conclusions regarding
team organization, teamwork, graphic composition, and presentation that will be beneficial for
future competition entrants.
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Aplicabilidade e limites das cláusulas de não concorrência nos contratos de franquiaSantos, Alexandre David 03 November 2016 (has links)
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Previous issue date: 2016-11-03 / The topic of this paper is the relationship between the franchiser and the franchisee. Our goal is to explore the non-compete clauses to unveil how they are being adopted and applied by main franchisors in Brazil; finding its thresholds. Despite the system's maturity, we are living with the legal franchising framework for more than 20 years. From a legal point of view and technical quality of the franchise agreements, we still have a lot to evolve. The study and development of non- compete clauses can improve the franchising system. In this world, franchisors are business players and agreement developers and non-compete clauses that are most the times abusive, generic and subject to relativization by the judge, thus generating uncertainty in business relations between the parties. The role of the non-compete clause is to is to safeguard the franchisor, responsible for the business creation and development, know-how, production techniques and management templates have to be safeguarded, mostly from the ones interested in taking advantage and getting such expertise, after a short relationship with the franchisor. The relationship between the franchiser and the franchisee is rich and conducive to facilitating the franchisee entrepreneur - sometimes inexperienced in that activity - access to the know-how of the activity and means of trade specific business organization, the franchise object. Please note that the transfer of know-how is an immaterial element, key to the development of the activity of the franchise business. In this paper, our questioning turns to the possibility of preventing the use of know-how and activity developed by the former franchisee at the end of the contractual relationship in complex and specific contexts. The review of the ten franchising agreements corresponding to fifty percent of current industries is revealing. All non-compete clauses have worrying technical deficiencies. We noted the lack of key, strategic and efficiency requirements, which can mean the relativization or invalidity of non-compete clauses and as result, legal uncertainty. As practical solutions we present the proposed modulation of non-compete clauses by the essential, strategic and efficiency requirements, creating two different classes as a means to provide legal certainty for franchising agreements. We propose the revision of the legal franchising landmark. / Este trabalho tem como tema a relação entre franqueador e franqueado. Nosso objetivo é explorar as cláusulas de não concorrência para revelar como estão sendo utilizadas e aplicadas pelos principais franqueadores no Brasil; identificar seus limites. Em que pese a maturidade do sistema, estamos há mais de 20 anos convivendo com o marco legal do franchising. Do ponto de vista jurídico e de qualidade técnica dos contratos de franquia, ainda precisamos evoluir. O estudo e o desenvolvimento das cláusulas de não concorrência podem contribuir para o aprimoramento do sistema de franchising. Nesse universo, os franqueadores são os protagonistas dos negócios e desenvolvedores dos contratos e das cláusulas de não concorrência que, às vezes, são abusivas, genéricas e sujeitas à relativização pelo julgador, gerando insegurança nas relações comerciais entre as partes. A função da cláusula não concorrencial é proteger o franqueador, responsável pela criação e desenvolvimento do negócio, o know-how, as técnicas de produção e modelos de gestão que devem ser resguardados, sobretudo de interessados em tirar proveito e obter tal expertise, após breve relação com o franqueador. A relação franqueador/franqueado é rica e propícia à facilitação ao empresário franqueado – às vezes, inexperiente naquela atividade – do acesso ao know-how da atividade desenvolvida e dos meios de organização comercial específicos do negócio, objeto da franquia. Vale ressaltar que a transferência do know-how é elemento imaterial, essencial ao desenvolvimento da atividade da franquia empresarial. Neste trabalho, nosso questionamento se volta para a possibilidade do impedimento da utilização do know-how e da atividade desenvolvida pelo ex-franqueado ao término da relação contratual em contextos complexos e específicos. A análise dos dez contratos de franquia que representam cinquenta por cento dos atuais segmentos do setor é reveladora. Todas as cláusulas de não concorrência possuem preocupantes deficiências técnicas. Constatamos a ausência de requisitos essenciais, estratégicos e de eficiência, o que pode significar a relativização ou nulidade das cláusulas de não concorrência e, consequentemente, insegurança jurídica. Como soluções práticas apresentamos a proposta de modulação das cláusulas de não concorrência por meio dos requisitos essenciais, estratégicos e de eficiência, criando duas classes distintas como forma de proporcionar segurança jurídica aos contratos de franquia. Propomos a revisão do marco legal do franchising.
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Konkurrensklausuler i anställningsavtal : En rättsdogmatisk studie / Non-Compete Clauses in Contracts of Employement : a Legal Dogmatic StudyAndrén, Gustav January 2009 (has links)
<p> </p><p>This essay aim to clear the regulations that adjusts the use of non-compete clauses in contracts of employement. The historical developement shows tendencies that more employees have contracts that includes non-compete clauses. This developement does not always correspond with what is allowed concerning these clauses. Non-compete clauses is adjusted by the regulations in the collective agreement known as the agreement of 1969. The agreement has also been accepted outside its regular field of application. Apart from the just mentioned agreement, unreasonable conditions of contracts kan be adapted to what is fair accordning to the swedish constitution of agreements. The paragraphs in question is the 36 and the 38 §§, that adjusts when you can shift the conditions. The 38 § is more applyable when it comes to conditions about non-compete clauses. The use of non-compete clauses is also regulated by practice in the court of law, the labour court. Many of the regulations are unspecified in their design. It is possible that these unspecified concepts are essential to maintain the possibility of applying the concepts to a larger amount of cases. The metaphysical concepts of the jurisprudence has been criticized several times during the historical developement, for example by the upholders of the positivistic Uppsala school of philosophy (the Scandinavian legal realism). The facts remains that because of its open device of concepts, the jurisprudence becomes dynamic and useable in a lot more contexts.</p><p> </p>
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Konkurrensklausuler i anställningsavtal : En rättsdogmatisk studie / Non-Compete Clauses in Contracts of Employement : a Legal Dogmatic StudyAndrén, Gustav January 2009 (has links)
This essay aim to clear the regulations that adjusts the use of non-compete clauses in contracts of employement. The historical developement shows tendencies that more employees have contracts that includes non-compete clauses. This developement does not always correspond with what is allowed concerning these clauses. Non-compete clauses is adjusted by the regulations in the collective agreement known as the agreement of 1969. The agreement has also been accepted outside its regular field of application. Apart from the just mentioned agreement, unreasonable conditions of contracts kan be adapted to what is fair accordning to the swedish constitution of agreements. The paragraphs in question is the 36 and the 38 §§, that adjusts when you can shift the conditions. The 38 § is more applyable when it comes to conditions about non-compete clauses. The use of non-compete clauses is also regulated by practice in the court of law, the labour court. Many of the regulations are unspecified in their design. It is possible that these unspecified concepts are essential to maintain the possibility of applying the concepts to a larger amount of cases. The metaphysical concepts of the jurisprudence has been criticized several times during the historical developement, for example by the upholders of the positivistic Uppsala school of philosophy (the Scandinavian legal realism). The facts remains that because of its open device of concepts, the jurisprudence becomes dynamic and useable in a lot more contexts.
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Essays on the macroeconomics of labor market and firm dynamicsGoudou, Felicien Jesugo 08 1900 (has links)
Cette thèse contribue à la compréhension des frictions sur le marché de travail et comment ces frictions affectent les agrégats macroéconomiques comme le chômage et la productivité. Elle jette également un regard critique sur les politiques environnementales telles que la taxe carbone et le financement vert. Le premier chapitre examine comment les contrats de non-competition signés entre employeurs et employés affectent le chômage, la productivité et le bien-être des agents dans l'économie. Ces contrats stipulent que l'employé travaillant sous ceux-ci ne doit en aucun cas travailler pour un employeur concurrent; et ce pour une période déterminée allant de un à deux ans après séparation avec son premier employeur. Ce type de contrat est récurrent aux Etats-Unis et affecte au moins un employé sur cinq dans ce pays. Les résultats des analyses montrent qu'une forte incidence effective de ces contrats peut non seulement comprimer les salaires mais générer du chômage. Ceci est essentiellement dû au fait que certaines personnes ayant signé ce contrat ont du mal à se trouver un nouvel emploi après s'être séparées de leur premier travail. L'article propose de baisser la durée des restrictions d'emploi de ces contrats dans le but d'amoindrir leur effets sur les travailleurs. Cependant, il est à noter que ces contrats sont en partie bénéfiques du fait de l'incitation pour les employeurs de former les employés sur le marché du travail, augmentant la productivité totale. Parlant de contrats d'emploi, le deuxième chapitre évalue les implications de la coexistence de contrats dits temporaires (contrat à durée déterminée) et permanents (contrat à durée indéterminée) sur le flux des travailleurs entre chômage, emploi et non-participation au marché du travail durant le cycle de vie des agents. Cette analyse revêt une importance particulière du fait des effets de ces flux de travailleurs sur l'emploi agrégé et les salaires durant le cycle de vie des agents. Il en ressort que les transitions des individus d'un emploi permanent au chômage sont le plus important facteur expliquant l'emploi agrégé durant le cycle de vie des agents. Toute politique visant à augmenter l'emploi devrait cibler ce flux de travailleurs. Par ailleurs, la transition des individus d'un emploi temporaire vers le chômage se révèle être significatif dans l'explication du faible emploi des jeunes dans les pays européens comme la France, surtout pour ceux ayant un niveau d'éducation élevé. l'article va plus loin en construisant un model qui explique les profils de transitions observés durant le cycle de vie des agents et analyse comment les effets associés aux réformes de protection de l'emploi dans les pays européens sont distribués entre les travailleurs selon leur niveau d'éducation et âge. Enfin, le troisième chapitre jette un regard critique sur les politiques environnementales comme la taxe sur les émissions générées par les unités de production et le financement vert. L'article montre qu'en dépit de leur efficacité dans la réduction des émissions, ces politiques peuvent impacter négativement l'allocation des ressources comme le capital entre les firmes, réduisant la productivité agrégée. Ceci provient du fait que certaines entreprises très productives mais financièrement contraintes peuvent avoir des difficultés à investir dans la technologie de réduction de leurs émissions carbone alors que d'autres moins productives que les premières mais très riches, investissent plus facilement. Le poids du fardeau fiscal lié aux emissions force les premières à quitter le marché réduisant la productivité. Ceci suggère que d'autres politiques comme celle de subventions vertes sont importantes pour réduire ces potentielles distortions. / This thesis contributes to understanding labor market frictions and how these frictions impact macroeconomic aggregates such as unemployment and productivity. It also critically examines environmental policies such as carbon taxes and green financing. The first chapter examines how non-compete contracts signed between employers and employees affect unemployment, productivity, and welfare in the economy. These contracts stipulate that the employee, while under contract, cannot work for a competing employer for a specified period, typically ranging from one to two years after separation from their initial employer. This type of contract is widespread in the United States and affects at least one in five employees in the country. Results show that a high enforceable incidence of these contracts can compress wages and generate unemployment. This is primarily due to the fact that some individuals who have signed such contracts face difficulties in finding new employment after separating from their initial job. The article proposes reducing the duration of the post-employment restrictions of these contracts to mitigate their effects on workers. However, it is worth noting that these contracts partially benefit employers by incentivizing them to invest in employee training, thereby increasing overall productivity. Speaking of employment contracts, the second chapter evaluates the implications of the coexistence of temporary contracts (fixed-term contracts) and permanent contracts (indefinite-term contracts) on worker flows between unemployment, employment, and labor force non-participation over the life-cycle. This analysis is particularly important due to the effects of these flows on aggregate employment and wages over the life-cycle. It is found that transitions of individuals from permanent employment to unemployment are the most significant factor explaining aggregate employment over the life-cycle. Any policy aimed at increasing employment should target this flow of workers. Moreover, the transition of individuals from temporary employment to unemployment is significant in explaining the low employment of young individuals in European countries like France, especially for those with higher levels of education. The article goes further by constructing a model that explains the observed transition profiles during agents' life-cycle and analyzes how the effects linked to employment protection reforms in European countries are distributed among workers based on their level of education and age. Finally, the third chapter provides a critical assessment of environmental policies such as emissions taxes on production units and green financing. The article shows that despite their effectiveness in reducing emissions, these policies can negatively impact resource allocation, such as capital, among firms, thus reducing aggregate productivity. This is because some highly productive but seriously financially constrained firms may struggle to invest in emission reduction technology, while less productive but wealthy entrepreneurs invest more easily. The burden of emissions-related fiscal measures forces the former to exit the market, thereby reducing productivity. This suggests that other policies, such as green subsidies, are important to mitigate these potential distortions.
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