‘Essentialism’ and ‘constructivism’ are two epistemological perspectives that have been used in the philosophical analysis of mystical experience. ‘Essentialism’ attempts to establish mystical experience as a distinct category of experience, cutting across cultural boundaries. ‘Constructivism’ attempts to establish mystical experience as unique to its various cultural contexts. The two viewpoints are variously held in opposition. ‘Constructivism’ often appears as something of an assumed perspective and is rarely, if ever, defended (in any depth) by the individuals whose views it apparently represents. Recent ‘essentialist’ thinkers (‘non-constructivists’) have taken issue with this tendency to assume ‘what is to be proved’, and have reasoned in attempts to establish ‘constructivisim’ as inappropriate to certain experiences that appear to be found recurring in reports of mystical experiences across cultures. However, those analyses have been concerned to recommend their own (‘essentialist’ / ‘non-constructivist’) position and have, therefore, operated with a certain amount of bias, despite elements of commendable intent. Indeed it is in virtue of these commendable elements i.e. by exploring the epistemological assumptions of authors who attempt to make mystical experience culture specific, that ‘essentialists’ posit and provide justification for the classification of ‘constructivism’ as a distinct philosophical approach to the data of enquiry. ‘Constructivists’ (so-called), on the other hand, tend to emphasise the importance and role of context in their discussions, and in some cases reject the classification of their views as particularly ‘constructivist’. The thesis examines the reasonable defensibility of ‘nonconstructed’ mystical experience from three perspectives: ‘essentialist’, ‘constructivist’ and ‘contextualist’ – outlining considerations for anyone approaching the material via each, and addressing the relevant issues of diversity at tension between these recognisable philosophical viewpoints.

One of the core questions in contemporary metaethics concerns the nature and status of moral claims. However, this question presupposes that morality is unified, and that a single metaethical account will suffice. This thesis aims to challenge that presupposition. In particular, I argue that there is a substantial theoretical payoff to be had from combining two distinct metaethical theories – realism, on the one hand, and constructivism, on the other – whilst limiting the scope of each. In the realist case, the discourse aims to describe a particular feature of reality; in the constructivist case, the discourse aims to solve some of the coordination problems faced by people as social beings. We have, therefore, two distinct sources of moral reasons. The resulting ‘hybrid’ theory is appealing at the metaethical level, but also yields an attractive picture at the applied level. Specifically, it retains the core intuition underlying utilitarianism, whilst incorporating a broadly contractarian account of morality. On this account, our reasons for not harming other persons are at least the same as our reasons for not harming animals – but we have additional reasons to refrain from harming persons. Chapter One establishes a moderate presumption in favour of moral realism, understood as the claim that moral discourse aims to represent the world, deals in objective truths, and yields statements capable of truth or falsity. Chapter Two addresses arguments for moral antirealism: these arguments can be met by restricting the scope of moral realism. Chapter Three explores the content of the resultant moral realism: specifically, realism about the intrinsic value of hedonic states. Chapter Four deals with that part of morality which is unaccounted for by restricted moral realism, and offers an outline form of contractarian constructivism. Chapter Five investigates the consequences of the hybrid metaethical theory for applied ethics.

No description available.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Hawaii at Manoa, 2002. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 238-249).

Thesis (M.A.)--Catholic Theological Union at Chicago, 1999. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 84-87).

Thesis (MA (Political Science))--University of Stellenbosch, 2009. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Africa(ns) are currently marginalised within the discipline of International Relations. This thesis explores the possibility that employing a constructivist approach could facilitate the inclusion of Africa as an object of study and Africans as potential agents of IR knowledge within the discipline by bridging a theoretical abyss. Two discourses, namely the rationalist and Africanist, are identified. They frame the sides of the theoretical abyss to which Africa(ns) have been marginalised within IR. These discourses adhere to the opposing analytical approaches which constitute the Third Debate, namely rationalism and reflectivism. This thesis proposes two theoretical reconstructions that can facilitate the bridging of this theoretical abyss. The theoretical reconstructions are explicated by employing different research stances. The researcher is situated within the intellectual space afforded by the boundaries of the discipline in order to propose the first reconstruction. The second theoretical reconstruction is proposed by problematising the boundaries the discipline of IR. This study found that constructivism facilitates the process of establishing the middle ground between rationalism and reflectivism and in so doing could include Africa as an object of study. It also found that the intervention of constructivism facilitated a necessary change in the culture of the discipline to create the possibility of extending the notion of engaged pluralism and re-imagining the discipline as a disciplinary community of difference. This leads to the opening up of the necessary dialogical space to include Africans as potential agents of IR knowledge. Constructivism is therefore the mutually constituting link between the two proposed theoretical reconstructions as they are made possible by its intervention in the discipline. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Afrika(ne) word huidiglik gemarginaliseer binne die dissipline van Internasionale Betrekkinge. Hierdie tesis ondersoek die moontlikheid dat die gebruik van ‘n konstruktiwistiese benadering die insluiting van Afrika as ‘n onderwerp van studie of Afrikane as potensiële agente van IB kennis deur die oorbrugging van ‘n teoretiese kloof kan fasiliteer. Twee diskoerse, naamlik die rasionalistiese and die Afrikanistiese, word geïdentifiseer. Hierdie diskoerse stel die sye van die teoretiese kloof voor waarin Afrika(ne) gemarginaliseer word binne IB. Hulle hou verband met die twee opponerende analitiese benaderings van rasionalisme en reflektiwisme wat die Derde Debate uitmaak. Hierdie tesis stel twee teoretiese rekonstruksies voor wat die oorbrugging van die teoretiese kloof kan fasiliteer. Hierdie teoretiese rekonstruksies word ontvou deur verskillende navorsingsposisies in te neem. Die navorser plaas homself binne die intellektuele spasie wat deur die grense van die dissipline toegelaat word om sodoende die eerste rekonstruksie voor te stel. Die tweede rekonstruksie word voorgestel deur die problematisering van die grense van die dissipline. Hierdie studie het gevind dat konstruktiwisme die proses van die opstelling van ‘n middelgrond tussen rasionalisme en reflektiwisme fasiliteer en sodoende Afrika as ‘n onderwerp van studie kan insluit. Die studie het ook gevind dat die toetrede van konstruktiwisme die nodige verandering aan die kultuur van die dissipline veroorsaak het wat die moontlikheid skep dat die begrip van ‘engaged pluralism’ uitgebrei en die hervoorstelling van die dissipline as a dissiplinêre gemeenskap van diversiteit kan word. Hierdie hervoorstelling lei tot die skepping van die nodige dialogale spasie om Afrikane as potensiële agente van IB kennis in te sluit. Konstruktiwisme is dus die onderliggende skakel wat die twee voorgestelde teoretiese rekonstruksies moontlik maak deur die benadering se toetrede tot die dissipline.

This thesis defends John Rawls’s constructivist theory of justice against three distinct challenges. Part one addresses G.A. Cohen’s claim that Rawls’s constructivism is committed to a mistaken thesis about the relationship between facts and principles. It argues that Rawls’s constructivist procedure embodies substantial moral commitments, and offers an intra-normative reduction rather than a metaethical account. Rawls’s claims about the role of facts in moral theorizing in A Theory of Justice should be interpreted as suggesting that some of our moral beliefs, which we are inclined to hold without reference to facts, are, in fact, true, because certain facts obtain. This thesis and the acknowledgement of the moral assumptions of Rawls’s constructivism help to show that Rawls does not, and does not need to, deny Cohen’s thesis. Part two defends the characterization of the decision problem in Rawls’s original position as a decision problem under uncertainty. Rawls stipulates that the denizens of the original position lack information that they could use to arrive at estimates of the likelihood of ending up in any given social position. It has been argued that Rawls does not have good grounds for this stipulation. I argue that given the nature of the value function we should attribute to the denizens of the original position and our cognitive limitations, which also apply to the denizens of the original position, their decision problem can be characterized as one under uncertainty even if we stipulate that they know that they have an equal chance of being in any individual’s place. Part three assesses the claim that a true commitment to Rawls’s difference principle requires a further commitment to an egalitarian ethos. This egalitarian ethos is offered as a means to bring about equality and Pareto-optimality. Accordingly, I try to undermine the case for an egalitarian ethos by challenging the desirability of the ends it is supposed to further or by showing that it is redundant. I argue that if primary goods are the metric of justice, then Pareto optimality in the space of the metric of justice is undesirable. I then argue that if the metric of justice is welfare, depending on the theory of welfare we adopt, an egalitarian ethos will either be redundant or will have objectionably paternalistic consequences.

The aim of this study is to demonstrate how the complementary concepts of stability and change could manifest during the therapeutic process, specifically with clients showing the symptom of dependency. The study is guided by a literature study on systems/cybernetic theory with a focus on the cybernetic complementarity of stability and change. A brief description is provided of the symptom of dependency from a more traditional lineal perspective as well as a non-lineal (systemic) perspective. A single case study is utilized to describe how both stability and change could manifest in the therapeutic process. From this description the relevance and usefulness of addressing both stability and change during the therapeutic process emerge and are outlined. / Social Work / M. A. (Social Science Mental Health)

The aim of this study is to demonstrate how the complementary concepts of stability and change could manifest during the therapeutic process, specifically with clients showing the symptom of dependency. The study is guided by a literature study on systems/cybernetic theory with a focus on the cybernetic complementarity of stability and change. A brief description is provided of the symptom of dependency from a more traditional lineal perspective as well as a non-lineal (systemic) perspective. A single case study is utilized to describe how both stability and change could manifest in the therapeutic process. From this description the relevance and usefulness of addressing both stability and change during the therapeutic process emerge and are outlined. / Social Work / M. A. (Social Science Mental Health)

La tentative menée ici consiste à s’adresser au travail de William James (1842-1910) afin d’y chercher des moyens pour répondre à un problème qui nous concerne intensément :celui du décret séparant la connaissance et le changement. James nous rend en effet sensibles à la manière dont les conceptions habituelles avaient constamment maintenu un point de vue qui interdisait en principe qu’une idée puisse faire une différence. Il nous permet également de sentir à quel point ces conceptions ne peuvent qu’être profondément désespérantes. Cinq moments vont se succéder. Dans un premier temps, il s’agira, avec James, de nous connecter à la situation déconnectée, de saisir cette situation dans les dispositifs mêmes qui y creusent un gouffre séparant « la pensée » d’une « réalité » qui lui semble étrangère. Cette « saisie » s’efforce de remédier à l’anesthésie face à des conceptions qui produisent le désespoir et l’indifférence (« Se connecter / Situer »). Dès lors qu’est, au moins partiellement, levée la sidération qu’entraînent les versions rationalistes des connaissances, il devient possible de ré-épaissir ce que James appelle les « trois départements » de l’intelligence, ces modes d’expériences qui nourrissent les pratiques concrètes de connaissance. Pour commencer, c’est « agir » qui n’apparaît plus comme une incongruité quand il est question de connaître. La quête de certitudes indifférentes n’est pas tenable :connaître requiert la culture d’une confiance active et collective capable de rendre vraies des idées non-garanties (« Faire confiance / Agir »). Ensuite, c’est à propos des sensations que l’on s’aperçoit combien rien ne justifie de les vider de toute activité et de toute capacité. Cinq contraintes jamesiennes (épaissir, particulariser, pluraliser, relativiser, machiner) sont convoquées pour explorer les possibilités ouvertes à cet égard par un empirisme radical (« Faire le plein / Sentir »). Mais, les sensations ne se distinguant des conceptions que d’un point de vue pratique, les premières ne retrouvent pas des couleurs sans que les secondes n’en fassent autant. Les conceptions sont libérées de l’obligation qui leur était faite de seulement « copier » une réalité supposément toute faite ;prises concrètement, elles apparaissent comme pouvant désigner ces opérations délicates qui permettent aux mondes de déplier de multiples versions. C’est toute une agitation que de concevoir (« Faire des histoires / Concevoir »). Ces opérations jamesiennes (« se connecter », « faire confiance », « faire le plein », « faire des histoires ») ne visent aucunement la révélation d’une « nature » qui définirait la « pensée », mais, au contraire, elles visent l’activation de possibilités inattendues d’inventer des connaissances significatives, particulières et intéressantes. Il apparaît que ces possibilités – c’est l’hypothèse de James – avaient été tout spécialement limitées par l’omission des expériences concrètes de relation. Cette omission s’était accompagnée de la constitution tout à fait effective d’une pensée « privée » (« privée » à plus d’un titre). Il s’agit alors de relayer encore cette autre opération jamesienne – qui irriguait toutes les autres mais qui exige pour finir une attention spécifique –, celle qui consiste à restaurer les expériences de relation et à intensifier l’importance des « marges » et des « radicelles » (« S’associer / Agirpâtir »). / Doctorat en Philosophie / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished