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Terapeutens rätt : rättslig och terapeutisk logik i domstolsförhandlingarJacobsson, Maritha January 2006 (has links)
In this dissertation, I explore a quite unique legal situation, namely administrative court hearings relating to coercive interventions: the Care of Young Persons Act (LVU), Care of Abusers (Special Provisions) Act (LVM), and the Compulsory Psychiatric Care Act (LPT). There are three central participatory roles in the court hearings: The official party is the authority who files the application for coercive intervention – either a chief psychiatrist or a social welfare board (typically represented by a social worker or sometimes a lawyer assisted by a social worker), whereas the citizen party is the person about whom the application is brought. The citizen party is represented by a legal representative. The professionals represent two different logics: therapeutic and judicial. The purpose of this dissertation has been to study the tension between therapeutic and judicial logic in court hearings relating to compulsory care. With theoretical concepts from Scott (1995) and Wetherell & Potter (1998), it is possible to say that the therapeutic and judicial logics are built up by institutional elements that are communicated through interpretative repertoires. Three questions are central: 1. How do professional participators handle the different role expectations embedded in therapeutic and judicial logic? In this case, I am particularly interested in role conflicts faced by social workers and psychiatrists. 2. How do different institutional elements (regulative, normative/cognitive) play out in the court hearings? 3. To what extent can these court hearings be considered a scrutinizing order of discourse, where the arguments of official party are subjected to critical examination? In my analysis I am inspired by both critical discourse analysis and organizational theory, more precisely, new institutionalism. These two perspectives provide useful insights and make it possible to combine the micro- and macro levels in the analysis. Data for the analysis consist of 43 court hearings and 31 interviews, gathered from two different county administrative courts in Sweden. All written documents used and produced by the courts are also part of our data. The dissertation consists of five studies that indicate that the court hearings hardly can be described as a scrutinising order of discourse. In spite of this, the court constantly finds that the legal criteria for coercive intervention are satisfied. Neither the official party nor the legal representative argue according to a judicial logic. Instead, therapeutic logic dominates the order of discourse. When the arguments for compulsory care are therapeutic, they are not explicitly related to the criteria in the law. In my interpretation, the reason why the conflict between therapeutic and judicial logic is not realised can be found in the existence of a logic of normalisation. This ideological logic of normalisation can be found in most of the institutions in the Swedish society and are built on the idea of traditional welfare norms.
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Terapeutens rätt : rättslig och terapeutisk logik i domstolsförhandlingarJacobsson, Maritha January 2006 (has links)
<p>In this dissertation, I explore a quite unique legal situation, namely administrative court hearings relating to coercive interventions: the Care of Young Persons Act (LVU), Care of Abusers (Special Provisions) Act (LVM), and the Compulsory Psychiatric Care Act (LPT). There are three central participatory roles in the court hearings: The official party is the authority who files the application for coercive intervention – either a chief psychiatrist or a social welfare board (typically represented by a social worker or sometimes a lawyer assisted by a social worker), whereas the citizen party is the person about whom the application is brought. The citizen party is represented by a legal representative. The professionals represent two different logics: therapeutic and judicial.</p><p>The purpose of this dissertation has been to study the tension between therapeutic and judicial logic in court hearings relating to compulsory care. With theoretical concepts from Scott (1995) and Wetherell & Potter (1998), it is possible to say that the therapeutic and judicial logics are built up by institutional elements that are communicated through interpretative repertoires. Three questions are central:</p><p>1. How do professional participators handle the different role expectations embedded in therapeutic and judicial logic? In this case, I am particularly interested in role conflicts faced by social workers and psychiatrists.</p><p>2. How do different institutional elements (regulative, normative/cognitive) play out in the court hearings?</p><p>3. To what extent can these court hearings be considered a scrutinizing order of discourse, where the arguments of official party are subjected to critical examination?</p><p>In my analysis I am inspired by both critical discourse analysis and organizational theory, more precisely, new institutionalism. These two perspectives provide useful insights and make it possible to combine the micro- and macro levels in the analysis. Data for the analysis consist of 43 court hearings and 31 interviews, gathered from two different county administrative courts in Sweden. All written documents used and produced by the courts are also part of our data.</p><p>The dissertation consists of five studies that indicate that the court hearings hardly can be described as a scrutinising order of discourse. In spite of this, the court constantly finds that the legal criteria for coercive intervention are satisfied. Neither the official party nor the legal representative argue according to a judicial logic. Instead, therapeutic logic dominates the order of discourse. When the arguments for compulsory care are therapeutic, they are not explicitly related to the criteria in the law. In my interpretation, the reason why the conflict between therapeutic and judicial logic is not realised can be found in the existence of a logic of normalisation. This ideological logic of normalisation can be found in most of the institutions in the Swedish society and are built on the idea of traditional welfare norms.</p>
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Viešumo principas baudžiamojo proceso teisėje / Principle of publicity in criminal procedure lawBaranauskienė, Vita 31 March 2006 (has links)
The work analyses the principle of publicity of judicial proceedings as established in both international and national legislation.The content of the principle of publicity is defined and its components are identified,i.e.the open hearing,the pasing and pronouncing of a sentence at the hearing,the publicity and accessibility of a case file,and the publication of the court decisions.The exceptions from the principle of publicity related to the criminal acts committed by minors,protection of private life of the participants in the proceedings,and witnesses or suffered parties to whom anonymity is applied, are examined in greater detail.
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Audiência de custódia : prelúdio da desconstrução da cultura de torturar no Brasil por meio da superação da normalidade do desumano?Santos, Ercolis Filipe Alves 23 February 2017 (has links)
The purpose of this study is to verify if the implantation of the judicial hearing of custody in
Brazil represents the beginning of a civilizing and humanizing process of the criminal justice
system, in so far as it translates into an instrument of criminal policy to combat the culture of
the normality of violence in the act of imprisonment. For that, a historical-evolutionary
clipping is made on the practice of torture, in search of a conceptual delimitation of this
phenomenon that has a significant conceptual variation. Next step, a correlation is drawn
between the custody hearing and the constitutional fundamental rights and guarantees of the
detainee in flagrant offence, specifically, as regards the violation of the detainee's physical
and moral integrity. In this historical and normative hermeneutic north, from a re-reading of
the Arendtian concept of banality of evil, it is investigated whether the custodial audience
would be a prelude to overcoming the normality of the inhumanity, the naturalization
(banalization) of violence in the act of imprisonment in flagrant offence. / O presente trabalho tem como finalidade verificar se a implantação da audiência judicial de
custódia no Brasil representa o início de um processo civilizatório e humanizador do sistema
de justiça criminal, na medida em que se traduz em um instrumento de política criminal de
combate à cultura da normalidade da violência no ato de prisão. Faz-se, para tanto, um recorte
histórico-evolutivo sobre a prática da tortura, em busca de uma delimitação conceitual desse
fenômeno que possui uma variação conceitual significativa. Ato contínuo, esboça-se uma
correlação entre a audiência de custódia e os direitos e garantias fundamentais constitucionais
do preso em flagrante delito, especificamente, no que tange à violação da integridade física e
moral do detento. Nesse norte hermenêutico histórico-normativo, a partir de uma releitura do
conceito arendtiano de banalidade do mal, investiga-se se a audiência de custódia seria um
prelúdio da superação da normalidade do desumano, da naturalização (banalização) da
violência no ato de prisão em flagrante delito.
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Rozsudek pro uznání a rozsudek pro zmeškání / Judgment by Acknowledgement and Judgment by DefaultKlein, Jakub January 2017 (has links)
70 Abstract This diploma thesis is focused mainly on the judgment by acknowledgement and judgment by default which are institutes of the civil procedural law, which purpose is mainly to increase the efficiency of the legal proceedings. The aim of the thesis is to offer a complete overview of the current legal legislation and its practical usage. At the same time this thesis attempts to cope with problems, which the current legislation suffers with, and offers convenient conceptual solutions. This piece of work is divided into five chapters. The first chapter generally concerns the judgment by acknowledgement and clarifies the conditions in details that are essential to meet for its issuance. It concurrently distinguishes the judgment issued on the basis of actual acknowledgement by defendant and a judgment issued on the basis of legal fiction of acknowledgement of claim. The second chapter is dedicated to the institute of judgment by default. In the first subchapter the individual preconditions for the judgment by default issuing are being discussed in details, whether the formal or the material ones. This subchapter is divided according to these individual preconditions. The second subchapter deals closely with the defence of the defendant consisting in the proposal of cancellation of the judgment by...
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