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The current thesis aimed to identify the process through which jurors reach their decisions, and to investigate the factors that may make the trial by jury process unfair for the individuals involved in criminal trials (i.e., the defendant, the prosecution and the defence). An initial literature review highlighted that two separate threshold models may be able to explain the processes (i.e., both rational and intuitive) through which jurors reach their decisions: 1) the Diffusion Threshold Model and 2) the Counter Threshold Model. The first study investigated which model of juror decision making was appropriate. In this quasi-experiment, 60 participants took part, and made verdicts (of Guilty, Not Guilty and Not Proven) over nine vignettes. Participants were asked to rate the evidence as either Guilty, Not Guilty or Not Proven, and to state how likely (from 1-100) they thought it was that the defendant was guilty. After all the evidence had been presented, participants were asked to give a verdict. Then, participants were asked to state the last piece of evidence they needed to reach said verdict (symbolising the threshold). The results suggested that the Diffusion Threshold Model best explained the decision processes of jurors. The second study investigated if the reaching of a threshold caused confirmation bias and/or evidence distortion to occur, and if information interaction allowed said threshold to be reached. Each of the 108 participants listened to one vignette, which contained an opening statement, eight pieces of evidence (four prosecution and four defence) and two closing statements (one prosecution and one defence). Participants were asked to state their perceived likelihood of guilt in regard to the defendant after each piece of evidence. After all the evidence had been presented, participants were asked to give a verdict and to state the last piece of evidence they needed to give said verdict (symbolising the threshold). The results showed that information integration occurred throughout a trial, but the reaching of a threshold promoted confirmation bias. The third study looked to investigate potential factors that may have an impact on juror perceptions of guilt and the verdicts given by jurors. In this study, 128 participants listened to two vignettes. The vignettes were manipulated, and counterbalanced, for both the anchor (strong versus weak initial piece of evidence) and number of verdicts available (two-verdicts were available or three-verdicts were available with the additional Not Proven verdict) factors. Participants also completed the Pre-trial juror bias questionnaire (PJAQ), which allowed participants to be categorised according to their bias. The results highlighted that pre-trial biases did have an impact on the belief of guilt given, and that jurors in a three-verdict system were less likely to give a Not Guilty verdict in comparison to jurors in a two-verdict system. The findings in the current thesis have suggested that the Diffusion Threshold Model can adequately explain the process through which jurors reach their decisions, that individuals integrate information until they reach an appropriate threshold, that the reaching of a threshold can promote confirmation bias, and that extra-legal factors, such as pre-trial biases, can have an impact on juror perceptions of guilt. The results also highlighted that certain factors (i.e., thresholds that promote confirmation bias) may make the trial by jury process unfair for individuals (i.e., the defendant) who are involved in a criminal trial.

Thesis (LLD (Public Law))--University of Stellenbosch, 2010. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The guarantee of a fair trial is fundamental to the criminal process of every modern society. Like all civilised nations, Botswana’s legal order provides for the protection of accused persons through the guarantee of a fair trial. But equality of arms, a central feature of medieval trial by combat, seems to have disappeared from modern criminal procedural systems. The question arises, therefore, whether criminal justice systems sufficiently cater for the fair trial of accused persons. This thesis will argue that the present legal and institutional framework for the protection of fair trial rights in Botswana falls short of guaranteeing procedural equality and that this severely compromises fairness. The institutional framework does not support equality of arms and therefore leaves procedural rights in a basic state of application. The thesis, therefore, seeks to analyse the protection of fair trial rights in Botswana in light of the principle of equality of arms. The thesis explores the origins and theoretical foundations of the principle. It recognises that the present application of the principle occurs by implicit countenance. The absence of any constitutional recognition of the principle leaves procedural rights in a basic state of application. The thesis discusses the practical implications of an express recognition and constitutional application of the principle in the adversarial system. Equality of arms should be central in the criminal process and no party should have an unfair advantage over the other. The thesis recognises that the prosecution is in a position of advantage in that it has the support of the state. This advantage manifests itself in the form of vast resources regarding expertise, investigatory powers and legislative powers. Disparities in resources, the ability to investigate and access to witnesses create an inequality of arms between the state and the accused. This can only be balanced and countered by empowering the accused with constitutional and procedural rights that specifically protect the accused in the face of the might of the state. These procedural rights include the presumption of innocence, the right to legal representation and the right to disclosure. It is argued, however, that though accused-based rights and constitutional rules of procedure generally protect the accused and ensure that the process is fair, they mainly remain theoretical declarations if they are not applied in line with equality of arms. In other words, the meaningful enjoyment of these rights by the accused, demands the strengthening of resources and legislative and institutional governance. Fairness in criminal trials is epitomised in the balance between the overwhelming resources of the state and the constitutional protection of the accused. Otherwise, the constitutional protection afforded to the accused is compromised. The first part engages the reader with the development of accused-based rights and introduces the constitutionalisation of procedural rights in Botswana. It discusses the scope and application of the principle of equality of arms, develops its relevance to the adversarial system and justifies an application of the principle in Botswana domestic law. It makes a comparison between the adversarial and inquisitorial models while recognising the growing tendency towards convergence. It highlights the adversarial system as interest-based, and recognises the indispensability of the principle of equality of arms to such a system. While recognising that inquisitorial procedures often offend equality of arms, the role of the inquisitorial system in ensuring equality of arms is also recognised. It measures and analyses the normative value, application and recognition of equality of arms in Botswana’s legal system, arguing for express recognition and a conceptual application of the principle by the courts. It is reasoned that express recognition of the principle will result in fuller protection and better realisation of accused-based rights. Exploring the adversarial-inquisitorial dichotomy, it recognises the need for convergence, but emphasises the principle of equality of arms and the right to adversarial proceedings as the foundation for fair trials. The second part analyses the investigation process and generally bemoans the great inequalities at this stage of the criminal process. It discusses procedural and evidential rules that serve to minimise the imbalances and the role that exclusionary rules play in ensuring fair trials and reliable verdicts. The third part identifies specific trial rights which are relevant to the principle of equality of arms. Central to the discussion are the right to legal representation and the presumption of innocence which are discussed in chapters 7 and 8 respectively. These two important rights are central to the protection of the accused but unfortunately are the most compromised due to lack of resources and legislative intervention. Chapter 9 deals with other rights that are relevant to the principle as well as the ability of the accused to present his case and effectively defend himself. It emphasises the need for the courts to engage in the trial, thereby enabling the unrepresented accused. The fourth part contains final conclusions which argue that the principle of equality of arms forms the basis for the full realisation of individual procedural rights and advocates for the recognition of the principle in the Botswana legal order. It is concluded that the constitutional enshrinement of fair trial rights and their basic application by the courts, without actual measures to ensure their realisation, are insufficient. Suggestions include legislative and institutional reforms, as well as a constitutional recognition of the principle of equality of arms. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die waarborg van ‘n billike verhoor is fundamenteel tot die strafprosesregstelsel van elke beskaafde gemeenskap. Soos in ander beskaafde lande, word die beskuldige in Botswana ook beskerm deur die reg op ‘n billike verhoor. In die Middeleeue was gelykheid van wapens (“equality of arms”) die sentrale kenmerk van die tweegeveg as geskilberegtigingsmetode. Dit blyk egter dat hierdie sentrale kenmerk afwesig is in moderne strafprosesregstelsels is. Die vraag ontstaan of hierdie toedrag van sake ‘n beskuldige se reg op ‘n billike verhoor op risiko plaas. In hierdie tesis word betoog dat die posisie in Botswana van so ‘n aard is dat “ongelyke bewapening” veroorsaak dat die reg op ‘n billike verhoor belemmer word. Die plaaslike institusionele bedeling onderskraag nie die beskerming van gelykheid van wapens nie en veroorsaak derhalwe dat prosessuele regte in “a basic state of application” is, met ander woorde, op ‘n eenvoudige en meganiese toepassingvlak is. Met die norm van gelyke bewapening as vertrekpunt, ondersoek hierdie tesis die beskerming van die reg op ‘n billike verhoor in Botswana. ‘n Ondersoek word geloods na die oorsprong en toereriese basis van die beginsel van gelyke bewapening. Die afwesigheid van uitdrukklike grondwetlike erkenning van die beginsel, word vergelyk met die praktiese implikasies en uitdruklike grondwetlike erkenning en toepassing in ‘n adversatiewe stelsel. Gelykheid van wapens behoort sentraal tot die strafproses te wees en geen party behoor ‘n onbillike voordeel bo die ander te geniet nie. In hierdie tesis word erken dat die vervolging bloot vanweë die feit dat dit deur die staatsmasjienerie ondersteun word, wesenlik bevoordeel word bo die individu as aangeklaagde. Dit gaan hier om toegang tot hulpbronne soos deskundigheid, asook die rol wat misdaadondersoekmagte en ander wetgewing speel. Ongelykhede byvoorbeeld in hulpbronne, in die vermoë om misdaad te ondersoek en in die toegang tot getuies, dra alles daartoe by dat ‘n wanbalans tussen die staat en die individu ontstaan. Die verlening van prosessuele regte aan die beskuldigde is ‘n metode om die balans te probeer herstel. Voorbeelde van sulke regte is die reg om onskuldig vermoed te wees, die reg op ‘n regsverteenwoordiger en die reg op insae in verklarings. In hierdie tesis word egter betoog dat alhoewel hierdie regte en ander grondwetlike strafprosedures die beskuldigde kan beskerm en die billikheid van die proses kan bevorder, dit absoluut noodsaaklik is dat voormelde regte en prosedures in lyn met die beginsel van gelykheid van wapens geïnterpreteer en toegepas moet word. Betekenisvolle afdwinging en toepassing van ‘n beskuldigde se regte verg versterking van bronne en die institusionele bedeling. Billikheid in die strafverhoor word gekenmerk aan die graad van balans wat bereik kan word tussen die oorvloedige hulpbronne van die staat teenoor die grondwetlike beskerming van die beskuldigde. In die afwesigheid van ‘n balans, word die beskuldigde benadeel. Die eerste gedeelte van hierdie tesis behandel die ontwikkeling van die beskuldigde se regte en bevat ‘n inleiding tot die konstitusionalisering van prossuele regte in Botswana. In Deel Een word die omvang en toepassing van die beginsel van gelykheid van wapens bespreek en word die relevantheid van hierdie beginsel in die adversatiewe proses identifiseer, veral wat Botswana betref. Die adversatiewe en inkwisitoriese modelle word vergelyk en bespreek met erkenning aan die moderne neiging dat die twee modelle besig is om in een te vloei – die sogenaamde verskynsel van “convergence”. Daar word aangetoon dat gelykheid van wapens die adversatiewe model onderlê. Hierteenoor is dit so dat die inkwisitoriese model ook erkenning aan gelykheid van wapens verleen. Daar word betoog dat gelykheid van wapens ‘n normatiewe waarde het en uitdruklik in Botswana deur die howe erken moet word. Uitdruklike erkenning sal tot groter beskerming en realisering van ‘n beskuldigde se regte lei. In Deel Een word ook tot die slotsom geraak dat alhoewel daar ‘n behoefte aan “convergence” is, dit onvermydelik tog ook so is dat gelykheid van wapens en die reg op ‘n adversatiewe proses die grondslag van ‘n billike verhoor vorm. In Deel Twee word die misdaadondersoekproses ontleed en word die grootskaalse ongelykhede wat hier onstaan en bestaan, bespreek. Daar word gelet op prosesregtelike en bewysregtelike reëls wat hierdie ongelykhede kan minimaliseer. Die rol van uitsluitingsreëls ter bevordering van ‘n billike verhoor en ‘n betroubare bevinding, word ook aangespreek. Deel Drie identifiseer spesifieke verhoorregte wat in ‘n besondere direkte verband met die beginsel van gelykheid van wapens staan. Hier is veral twee regte van besondere belang: die reg op ‘n regsverteenwoordiger (hoofstuk 7) en die reg om onskukdig vermoed te wees (hoofstuk 8). Ongelukkig is dit so dat hierdie twee regte erg ondermyn word. Die reg op resverteenwoordiging word ingekort deur ‘n gebrek aan finansiële bronne terwyl die vermoede van onskuld deur wetgewing ondergrawe word. In hoofstuk 9 word ander relevante regte bespreek en word die noodsaak van ‘n aktiewe hof in die geval van ‘n onverteenwoordigde beskuldigde bepleit Deel Vier bevat finale gevolgtrekkings. Daar word betoog dat die beginsel van gelykheid van wapens die basis vorm in die volle relisering van individuele regte en, verder, dat hierdie beginsel ten volle in die regstelsel van Botswana erken behoort te word. Blote grondwetlike verskansing van die grondwetlike reg op ‘n billike verhoor en ‘n blote basiese interpretasie daarvan deur die howe, is onvoldoende wanneer daar geen maatreels is om die haalbare realisering af te dwing nie. Wetgewende en institusionele hervorming is nodig, asook ‘n grondwetlike erkenning van die beginsel van gelykheid van wapens. / Research funds made available by Prof. S. E. van der Merwe

"Rwanda was largely destroyed in 1994. Among an endless host of problems, highly complex questions and dilemmas of justice, unity, and reconciliation haunt Rwanda to this day. A basic question confronting Rwanda is how to deal with the legacy of the conflict that culminated in the genocide of the Tutsi and in the massacres of Hutu opponents of the genocide. The UN set up an International Criminal Tribunal in Arusha, Tanzania, and Rwanda has its own courts. In both cases, the process of trying accused genocidaires is long, laborious, and frustrating. Only eight convictions have been handed down in Arusha after five years of work, while in Rwanda only some 3,000 cases have been disposed of. At least 120,000 detainees are in prisons around the country, the vast majority of whom are accused of participation in the genocide. At the present rate it is estimated that it will take anywhere between two and four centuries to try all those in detention. The Rwandese government has developed a new procedure called “gacaca,” lower-level tribunals that attempt to blend traditional and contemporary mechanisms to expedite the justice process in a way that promotes reconciliation. The impact of gacaca remains to be seen, and as a process, it certainly needs an evaluation or, at least, an attempt to evaluate its possible contribution to the perplexing questions of justice, unity and social reconstruction in the aftermath of genocide. This paper mainly aims to analyse the draft legislation on the gacaca jurisdictions. Further, this essay attempts to examine the impact of criminal trials in the aftermath of mass violence and genocide. Although conventional wisdom holds that criminal trials promote several goals, including uncovering the truth; avoiding collective accountability by individualising guilt; breaking cycle of impunity; deterring future war crimes; providing closure for the victims and fostering democratic institutions, little is known about the role that judicial intervention have in rebuilding societies. The present essay deals only with criminal trials. By definition, these are focused on the perpetrators of abuses and their allies. Although not examined in the essay, a comprehensive and holistic approach to dealing with a legacy of past atrocities should also include range of victim-focused efforts, such as programs for compensation and rehabilitation, the establishment of memorials, and the organisation of appropriate commemorations. The main sources of this study are textbooks, articles from journals and official documents of national and international bodies. Since this essay aims at evaluating the gacaca proposals, a great deal of attention is paid to the terms of the draft legislation. It is certainly premature to make an in-depth assessment of a draft law and the merits and flaws of the legal institution it is designed to set up. Only gradually and over a period of time can the gacaca become effective and credible. Further research aimed at gathering data through interviews, field observations, participant observation, study and analysis of the implementation can also illuminate experience in ways that analysis of published sources do not. A thorough and sound appraisal of this new institution must therefore wait some time. I shall nevertheless attempt in this essay to set out some initial and tentative comments on some of the salient traits of the future gacaca tribunals. This paper makes a preliminary “human rights impact assessment” of the implementation of the draft law establishing “gacaca jurisdictions”. The potential role of the new institution in rebuilding the Rwandese society is also discussed. Considering the many complex issues which still surround the process of justice in Rwanda six years after the genocide, as well as the continuing challenge to the judicial system in terms of the inadequacy of resources for dealing with such an enormous caseload, recommendations to help the process follow the analysis of the gacaca proposals (Chapter Three). To end impunity, it is necessary to respond in accordance with human rights law to the genocide and mass killings. Therefore, the starting point for our evaluation of the gacaca proposals will be an analysis of the proposals in human rights law. Does human rights law impose any affirmative duties to punish genocide and other mass killings that occurred in Rwanda? In addition, for the “gacaca jurisdictions” to be effective, they should not be viewed in isolation, as their performance will depend to a large extent on whether other judicial mechanisms and institutions are functioning properly. The relationships between the gacaca jurisdiction and other mechanisms are thus reviewed. In particular, the process of setting up the gacaca jurisdictions should include an evaluation of the genocide trials which have taken place to date both at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and in the domestic courts and apply the lessons learnt (Chapter Two). An evaluation of the potential contribution of the use of gacaca courts needs to be put into the broader context of the conflict in Rwanda. Thus, an analysis of the conflict in Rwanda is necessary to grasp the challenges facing the questions of justice and social reconstruction in the aftermath of genocide in Rwanda (Chapter One)." -- Introduction. / Prepared under the supervision of Professor Jeremy Sarkin, Faculty of Law, University of the Western Cape / Thesis (LLM (Human Rights and Democratisation in Africa)) -- University of Pretoria, 2000. / http://www.chr.up.ac.za/academic_pro/llm1/dissertations.html / Centre for Human Rights / LLM

Summaries in English and Afrikaans / Text in Afrikaans / In the past, witness statements obtained by or on behalf of a party to a criminal case were protected, from disclosure to the opponent, by privilege. The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate whether such claims to privilege are justified and whether openness before and during the trial is not perhaps more important to the interests of justice. The disclosure of witness statements to the defence is a commonly recognized practice all over the world. This practice enhances openness before and during the criminal trial. The arguments against and in favor of such a practice are many, but investigation into these has shown that it is in the interests of justice to disclose such statements to the defence, rather than to deny access. Furthermore, the writer investigates whether it would be in the interests of justice to compel the defence to assist the court in determining the truth. / In die verlede is getuieverklarings wat deur of ten behoewe van 'n party tot 'n strafsaak bekom is deur privilegie beskerm, teen openbaarmaking aan die teenstander. Verskeie argumente is aangevoer om die beroep op getuieverklaring privilegie te regverdig. Die doel van hierdie verhandeling is om ondersoek in te stel of sulke aansprake geregverdig is en of openheid voor en gedurende die verhoor nie meer belangrik vir die belang van geregtigheid is nie. Die openbaarmaking van getuieverklarings aan die verdediging is 'n algemeen erkende praktyk regoor die wereld. Hierdie praktyk bevorder openheid voor en tydens die strafverhoor. Die argumente vir en teen so 'n praktyk is baie en 'n ondersoek daarvan dui daarop dat dit in die belang van geregtigheid is om sulke verklarings aan die verdediging te openbaar, eerder as om toegang daartoe te weier. Die vraag is nou of dit nie ook in die belang van geregtigheid is dat die verdediging verplig word om die hof by te staan om die waarheid vas te stel nie. Ten slotte het die skrywer aan die hand gedoen dat partye tot 'n straf saak getuieverklarings gelyktydig voor die verhoor uitruil en ondersoek ingestel of so 'n praktyk in ooreenstemming met die Grondwet van Suid-Afrika 108 van 1996 kan wees. / Law / LL.M.

Summaries in English and Afrikaans / Text in Afrikaans / In the past, witness statements obtained by or on behalf of a party to a criminal case were protected, from disclosure to the opponent, by privilege. The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate whether such claims to privilege are justified and whether openness before and during the trial is not perhaps more important to the interests of justice. The disclosure of witness statements to the defence is a commonly recognized practice all over the world. This practice enhances openness before and during the criminal trial. The arguments against and in favor of such a practice are many, but investigation into these has shown that it is in the interests of justice to disclose such statements to the defence, rather than to deny access. Furthermore, the writer investigates whether it would be in the interests of justice to compel the defence to assist the court in determining the truth. / In die verlede is getuieverklarings wat deur of ten behoewe van 'n party tot 'n strafsaak bekom is deur privilegie beskerm, teen openbaarmaking aan die teenstander. Verskeie argumente is aangevoer om die beroep op getuieverklaring privilegie te regverdig. Die doel van hierdie verhandeling is om ondersoek in te stel of sulke aansprake geregverdig is en of openheid voor en gedurende die verhoor nie meer belangrik vir die belang van geregtigheid is nie. Die openbaarmaking van getuieverklarings aan die verdediging is 'n algemeen erkende praktyk regoor die wereld. Hierdie praktyk bevorder openheid voor en tydens die strafverhoor. Die argumente vir en teen so 'n praktyk is baie en 'n ondersoek daarvan dui daarop dat dit in die belang van geregtigheid is om sulke verklarings aan die verdediging te openbaar, eerder as om toegang daartoe te weier. Die vraag is nou of dit nie ook in die belang van geregtigheid is dat die verdediging verplig word om die hof by te staan om die waarheid vas te stel nie. Ten slotte het die skrywer aan die hand gedoen dat partye tot 'n straf saak getuieverklarings gelyktydig voor die verhoor uitruil en ondersoek ingestel of so 'n praktyk in ooreenstemming met die Grondwet van Suid-Afrika 108 van 1996 kan wees. / Law / LL.M.

Ce mémoire étudie les modalités du traitement communautaire et judiciaire de l’infanticide en Nouvelle-France. Nous utilisons diverses sources textuelles et démographiques, notamment les dix procès pour infanticide ayant eu lieu dans la colonie sous l’Ancien Régime. Les dynamiques entre les accusées, les membres de leur communauté et les magistrats lors des procès révèlent l’existence de rapports de force et de solidarités propres aux collectivités de l’époque moderne. Nous nous questionnons ainsi sur les rôles joués par la communauté dans le jugement des femmes soupçonnées d’infanticide. Comment les femmes et les hommes de la Nouvelle-France conceptualisent-ils cet acte ? Quels facteurs mènent la communauté à judiciariser l’infanticide ? Nous interrogeons aussi les motivations des magistrats. Quels buts recherchent-ils ? Quelle sévérité démontrent-ils envers les femmes accusées ? Nous soulevons également la résistance que pouvaient opposer les accusées à ces forces. Quelle influence ont les accusées sur les procès menés et les sentences rendues contre elles ? Quelles stratégies peuvent-elles élaborer et exécuter en leur propre défense ? L’analyse du rôle des témoins tout au long de la procédure illustre la participation primordiale de la communauté au traitement de l’infanticide ainsi que les normes de genre et de classe imposées aux accusées par leurs contemporains (chapitre 2). L’étude des stratégies des accusées et du choix des peines révèle à la fois le poids de l’ordre social et marital renforcé par l’institution judiciaire et l’agentivité dont faisaient preuve les femmes de la Nouvelle-France (chapitre 3). / This thesis studies the ways in which infanticide was handled by communities and by the judicial system in New France. It draws on multiple textual and demographic sources, most notably the ten criminal trials for infanticide that occurred in the colony during the Old Regime. The dynamics between the accused, the members of their community and the magistrates during the trials reveal the existence of relations of power and solidarities that characterized collectivities in the early modern period. I therefore examine the roles played by the community in the prosecution of women suspected of infanticide. How did the women and men of New France conceptualize the act? What factors led the community to judicialize infanticide? I also examine the magistrates’ motivations. What goals did they have? What severity did they demonstrate toward accused women? Further, the thesis addresses the resistance that women could exert against these forces. What influence did the accused have on the course of the trials and the sentences pronounced against them? What strategies could they devise and execute in their own defence? Analyzing the role that witnesses played throughout the process illustrates the fundamental participation of the community in the treatment of infanticide as well as the gender and class norms imposed on the accused by their contemporaries (chapter 2). The study of the accused’s strategies and the sentences handed down against them reveals both the weight of the social and marital order reinforced by the judicial institution and the agency shown by the women of New France (chapter 3).