Why has some cyber-attacks been more successful than others? There has been in the near past examples of cyber-attacks used with different purposes. How do we understand these chosen targets and what result the attack accomplished? Research has discussed similarities between aviation warfare and cyber warfare, and how the first could explain what is happening in cyber warfare now. There is also opposing opinions whether cyber warfare should be seen as a method to alone force a will on your opponent or if cyber warfare should mere be supporting other military means. The essay test Warden’s theory “The Enemy as a System” capacity to explain why the effect of cyber-attacks can differ. It will also compare the effect in different cases based on standalone and supporting cyber-attacks. The essay concludes that Warden’s theory does not have any explanatory value but the difference in effective and ineffective cases is whether the cyber-attack was supporting other military means or a standalone attack.

After more than 30 years of research on cyberwar there is still many, and often contradicting views on what it is and what effects it can produce. This thesis studies how the Swedish political level understands cyberwar. The study was conducted using Ashraf’s definitional framework and framing methodology. The analysis is based on the empirical material of official documents pub-lished by the Swedish government. The study shows that the Swedish view on cyberwar is mainly realistic but, in some parts, also alarmistic according to the definitions in Ashraf’s framework. The thesis also shows that Ashraf’s framework is well suited to show what understanding a state has on cyberwar, but the framework also has some limitations. The result of this thesis gives a deeper knowledge on how Sweden understands cyberwar and can be used to improve on future polices and strategies.

Cyberkrigföring utgör ett allvarligt hot då det kan påverka ett modernt samhälle från distans. Västvärlden har trots större resurser och mer avancerad teknik inte lyckats möta rysk cyberkrigföring. Cyberkrigföring har trots jämförelser med massförstörelsevapen präglats av begränsningar i ny teoriutveckling samt en avsaknad av perspektiv avseende strid på djupet. Syftet med denna studie är att fylla denna teoretiska lucka genom att undersöka hur traditionella ryska teorier om djupoperationer kan förklara rysk cyberkrigföring i en modern kontext. Frågan undersöks genom en tematisk analys av två fall, cyberattackerna mot Estland 2007 samt den pågående konflikten i Ukraina från 2014 och framåt. Resultatet visar att den traditionella teorin är relevant och kan bidra till att förklara rysk cyberkrigföring både ur en fysisk- och en psykologisk dimension. Studiens största bidrag är en utveckling av den traditionella teorin för att bättre passa en modern kontext. Studien bidrar också till att öka förståelsen för rysk krigföring vilket kan medverka till bättre möjligheter för totalförsvaren i västvärlden att möta dessa typer av hot.

John A. Warden III is renowned as one of the theorists closest to devising a new paradigm in air power. His praised theory about the enemy as a system has showed applicable on terrorist organizations amongst other areas. The most recent developed domain for warfare is the so-called “cyberspace”. There is an on-going debate concerning the importance and definition of this domain and furthermore what potential and challenges it withholds as a future arena for warfare. Some claims that a cyberattack can’t be seen as an act of war due to its lack of physical violence. Previous research show however a lack in application of theories within this domain. This thesis therefore aims to examine to which extent Warden’s theory of the enemy as a system could be applied to the cyberattack known as Stuxnet. Results show that Warden’s theory have some applicatory power on the cyberattack Stuxnet, although primarily in an indirect aspect. This study therefore shows an ability concerning the theory’s applicatory power on other areas than air power. The findings of the research regarding previous arguments about cyberwar also states that a cyberattack now could be seen as physical violent. / <p><strong>Uppsatsen skriven VT 2017 under Termin 4 Officersprogrammet 15-18 med inriktning </strong><strong>mot flyg. Examen genomförs VT 2018.</strong></p>

A state’s right to self-defense depends on whether an attack on the state is regarded an act of war according to jus ad bellum. The UN Charter does not specifically mention cyber warfare and it is therefore unclear whether a cyber-attack can be classified as an act that corresponds to an armed attack. The debate amongst scholars has not led to consensus on the meaning of the concept of cyber warfare nor whether it can be regarded as an act of war. The purpose of this study was to analyze the concept of cyber warfare according to the theory of good concepts formed by John Gerring. The study aims to answer the questions of whether the definitions meet Gerring's criteria for a good concept and if any of the analyzed definitions can be considered compatible with jus ad bellum and thus give a state the right to self-defense. This study uses a qualitative concept analysis and analyzes three different definitions of cyber warfare with a focus on intention, effect and actor respectively. The results show that all definitions meet all the criteria to some extent. The actor-focused definition was considered a good concept at a high level, the intention-focused definition at a low level and the effect-focused at a very low level. Only Hathaway's effect-focused definition could in itself be considered compatible with jus ad bellum. The other definitions would require a more comprehensive interpretation of the UN Charter.