Kant attributes the power to awaken one from dogmatic slumber to skepticism and to the antinomy of pure reason; in his accounts of his own awakening and the origin of the critical philosophy, he credits the antinomy and his memory of David Hume. This essay suggests that Kant’s primary aim in the first Critique was to find a resolution to the antinomy; an examination of this resolution shows Kant’s memory of Hume critical to Kant’s enterprise. Kant’s resolution to the antinomy exploits metaphors of war, jurisprudence, slumber, and historical development, as well as his Transcendental Deduction and explanation of transcendental illusion, to unravel the riddle of metaphysics and provide for both the possibility of objective knowledge and the possibility of freedom.

THE FORMATION OF THE SELF AS MENTAL UNITY AND MORAL AGENCY IN HUME&rsquo / S PHILOSOPHY This dissertation proposes to analyze the stages in the formation of the idea of self in Hume&rsquo / s philosophy. According to Hume we have no a simple and individual impression that we can call the self &amp / #8722 / where the self is the totality of conscious life of a person. Nevertheless, we do have an idea of personal identity that must be accounted for. He begins his explanation of this idea by noting that our perceptions are fleeting, and he concludes from this that all we are is a bundle of different perceptions. But as a result of such a consideration Hume argues that he failed to find sufficient account for the relation between the idea of self involved in the indirect passions of pride and humility and the idea of self associated with its mental aspect. In this dissertation it is attempted to show that these two aspects of the self do not contradict, but rather they co-exist, and such a co-existence of the two aspects of the self should be recognised as an empirical fact. This means that the self is not a mere bundle of perceptions, but it is at least a very peculiar form of the relational unity of perceptions.

This dissertation aims to determine the role of human nature in Hume&#039 / s philosophy. It will examine how moral motivation arises when one takes human nature as the basis of moral philosophyWhat is maintained here is that Hume approaches his rival rationalist philosophers whom he criticised for drawing on metaphysics and rational methods in building the foundation of their ethics. Hume&rsquo / s &ldquo / science of man&rdquo / attempts to isolate the basis of ethics from metaphysical and rational elements. However, this paper demonstrates that in doing so, Hume actually resorts to reason. Further, certain inconsistencies in Hume&rsquo / s argument can only be resolved by recourse to metaphysics. To make this clear I examine how the passions that Hume puts forward as the basis of human nature cause sympathy and build a sense of morality. Since the most basic feature of human nature exists within the concept of &ldquo / being-human&rdquo / , the necessity of metaphysical and ontological explanations will be shown. Hume&rsquo / s position on the goodness or wickedness of human nature is examined. As a result, the purpose of this research is to show that it is not possible to isolate ethics from metaphysical elements by constructing a science based on Newtonian methods.

Traditionally, the central threat to the defensibility of the range of practices and attitudes constitutive of moral criticism has been seen to be posed by the Causal Thesis, the view that all actions have antecedent causes to which they are linked by causal laws of the kind that govern other events in the universe. In such a world, agents lack the sort of underived origination and agency required for the appropriateness of moral criticism. However, Peter Strawson’s “Freedom and Resentment” marks a move away from a metaphysical conception of agency and conditions of the appropriateness of moral criticism. On Strawson’s account, the problem of moral responsibility is centrally a normative problem, a problem about the moral norms that govern interpersonal relationships, and the conditions of appropriateness of the range of attitudes and sentiments occasioned by the agents’ fulfillment or non-fulfillment of these norms. In this dissertation I argue that the success of normative conceptions of conditions of appropriateness of moral criticism is contingent of the amelioration of the tension between two strategies in “Freedom and Resentment.” Naturalist interpretations hold that sentiments and practices constitutive of moral criticism are natural features of human psychological constitution, and therefore neither allow nor require justification. Rationalist interpretation, by contrast, are based on an analysis of conditions under which moral criticism can be justifiably modified or suspended. Both of these strategies, I argue, are false. The naturalistic interpretation is false not because of its inability to offer a plausible account of the conditions of justifiability of reactive attitudes, but rather because of its inability to offer a principled account of the way moral norms are grounded. The rationalistic interpretation, in turn, not only relies on an implausible psychological account of conditions of responsible agency, but puts an unacceptable emphasis on the agent’s intention. A plausible interpretation of the normative strategy requires emphasizing not only the significance of attitudes and feelings, but also the role reasons play in constituting moral norms and justifying moral criticism / Thesis (Ph.D, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2010-07-05 16:42:43.601

The concept of age has undergone a shift from a non-specific measure of chronological age, to an identification of underlying biological, psychological and functional factors leading to age-related changes over time. Loss of neurons (atrophy) and cognitive decline in healthy aging fit well in to this age paradigm. The aging brain is thought to undergo functional shifts in information processing in response to atrophy, which is conceptualised as a “Compensation Hypothesis” of cognitive aging. Using behavioural (reaction time, variability measures, and accuracy on the n-back task of working memory), structural (stereological cortical volume estimates) and functional (functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging) approaches, this study documents decreased whole brain, prefrontal and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex volumes in older individuals. Further, slower, less accurate, and more variable performance on the n-back task in older participants was accompanied by a posterior-to-anterior shift in processing, confirming the Compensation Hypothesis of cognitive aging. The behavioural data combined with structural and functional findings, suggest an aging brain that neuropsychologically compensates over time by paradoxically placing further processing demands on a structurally compromised dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. This produces adequate but slower, more variable, and less accurate performance compared to younger brains; compensation occurs in age, but is not complete. Decision making research has pointed to the important role of emotion in judgement, and has implicated the orbitofrontal cortex as critical for this processing modality. The structural data in this study showed preferentially less volume in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, but maintained cortical volume in the orbitofrontal cortex with age. Younger individuals took longer and maintained their accuracy with increasing complexity during the n-back task, with older participants decreasing their accuracy but not to the level of chance with increasing task complexity. As such, decision making on the n-back task may have shifted with age from the pure processing power of the structurally compromised dorsolateral prefrontal cortex to increasing reliance on emotionally-guided decision making inputs mediated by the intact orbitofrontal cortex resulting in adequate but not fully compensated performance in older people. These findings are discussed in relation to evolutionary pressures on the human working memory system, Hume’s concepts of reason and the passions, and to the emerging field of neuroeconomics. / Graduate

Originally published as author's dissertation--Munich, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [245]-252).

PhDr. Tomáš Kunca The Humanist Virtuoso: Beginnings, Idea and Illustration of Hume's experimental philosophical anthropology in Treatise of Human Nature UK FHS, Praha 2013 Thesis introduces a concept of "The Humanist Virtuoso" as distinctive feature reflecting Hume's effort to introduce an idea of experimental philosophical anthropology based on study of human nature and manifested in his A Treatise of Human Nature. Concept is justified by three steps, through analysis of the beginnings of Hume's philosophy, explication of his "science of man" idea in Treatise and illustration of this idea in action, as appears in analysis of passions (Book 2). The beginnings of Hume's way to experimental philosophical anthropology are explained thorough interpretation of historical facts connected with his early study at College of Edinburgh. First meetings with culture of science ( both British Christian tradition of experimental philosophy and Newtonian mathematical philosophy) are considered as particularly important. Detailed analysis of pre-Treatise letters (the Letter to Physician and to Michael Ramsey) is provided to make explicit the beginnings of his "science of man" idea, turn to study of human nature. Castration of Treatise is observed and discussed via analysis of his letter to Home (1737). The second...

PhDr. Tomáš Kunca The Humanist Virtuoso: Beginnings, Idea and Illustration of Hume's experimental philosophical anthropology in Treatise of Human Nature UK FHS, Praha 2013 Thesis introduces a concept of "The Humanist Virtuoso" as distinctive feature reflecting Hume's effort to introduce an idea of experimental philosophical anthropology based on study of human nature and manifested in his A Treatise of Human Nature. Concept is justified by three steps, through analysis of the beginnings of Hume's philosophy, explication of his "science of man" idea in Treatise and illustration of this idea in action, as appears in analysis of passions (Book 2). The beginnings of Hume's way to experimental philosophical anthropology are explained thorough interpretation of historical facts connected with his early study at College of Edinburgh. First meetings with culture of science ( both British Christian tradition of experimental philosophy and Newtonian mathematical philosophy) are considered as particularly important. Detailed analysis of pre-Treatise letters (the Letter to Physician and to Michael Ramsey) is provided to make explicit the beginnings of his "science of man" idea, turn to study of human nature. Castration of Treatise is observed and discussed via analysis of his letter to Home (1737). The second...

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Cette présentation examinera le degré de certitude qui peut être atteint dans le domaine scientifique. Le paradigme scientifique est composé de deux extrêmes; causalité et déterminisme d'un côté et probabilité et indéterminisme de l'autre. En faisant appel aux notions de Hume de la ressemblance et la contiguïté, on peut rejeter la causalité ou le hasard objectif comme étant sans fondement et non empirique. Le problème de l'induction et le sophisme du parieur proviennent d’une même source cognitif / heuristique. Hume décrit ces tendances mentales dans ses essais « Of Probability » et « Of the Idea of Necessary Connexion ». Une discussion sur la conception de la probabilité de Hume ainsi que d'autres interprétations de probabilité sera nécessaire. Même si la science glorifie et idéalise la causalité, la probabilité peut être comprise comme étant tout aussi cohérente. Une attitude probabiliste, même si elle est également non empirique, pourrait être plus avantageuse que le vieux paradigme de la causalité. / This presentation examines the degree of certainty which can be attained in science. The scientific paradigm is composed of two extremes; causality and determinism on one end and probability and indeterminism on the other. By appealing to Hume’s notions of resemblance and contiguity, we can dismiss any claim of objective causality or chance as being ungrounded for lack of an empirical basis. The problem of induction as well as the gambler’s fallacy stem from the same cognitive/heuristic source. Hume describes these mental tendencies in his essays ‘Of Probability’ and ‘Of the Idea of Necessary Connexion’. This will necessitate a discussion of Hume’s notion of probability, as well as other interpretations of probability. While science has glorified and romanticized causality, probability can be understood as being just as consistent. While a probabilistic stance is as non-empirical as a causal stance, it will be remarked that we may benefit from a paradigmatic switch to probabilism.