The paper analyses impacts of the North Atlantic Council positions on perceptions of US - European relations in 21st century. First, the opening chapter clarifies under what circumstances was the organization born and what roles did it play during the following five decades. The text suggests an existence of 4 long-term constants in Allied relations. Next, the core of the paper looks at short-term repercussions (military, economic, political and other) of particular positions of the North Atlantic Council and their projection into perceptions of the transatlantic relations both by the general public and political elites. The analysis focuses on 6 situations: 1) NATO's response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, 2) the Alliance's crisis on the eve of the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, 3) the beginning of NATO's engagement in Afghanistan in 2003, 4) military capabilities reforms launched at the 2002 Prague Summit, 5) NATO's position towards missile defense at the 2008 Bucharest Summit, and 6) France's return to NATO's military structures in 2009. Finally, the paper concludes with an application of the findings on the new NATO Strategic Concept, which was adopted at the 2010 Lisbon Summit.

As iniciativas de política externa, de defesa e de segurança que compõem a inserção internacional do Brasil no período 2003-2014 repercutiram nas relações do país com as grandes potências, suscitando uma intensa produção discursiva que busca traduzir o significado da recente inserção internacional do país e informar estratégias que possam dar conta das demandas de um novo relacionamento com o Brasil. Nesse contexto, há um conjunto de instituições de importância crescente, cujas práticas, representações e discursos precedem, informam e pretendem influenciar os processos de definição de agenda, formulação de política e tomada de decisão no âmbito das políticas externa, de defesa e de segurança, sobretudo das grandes potências: os think tanks, instituições dedicadas à produção e à articulação de conhecimentos voltados a políticas públicas de âmbito doméstico e internacional. Assim, o problema de pesquisa que orienta o trabalho refere-se ao seguinte questionamento: como os principais think tanks que buscam influenciar as formulações estratégicas para as políticas externa, de defesa e de segurança na Alemanha e na França têm representado a inserção internacional recente do Brasil e o papel desempenhado pelo país no seu entorno estratégico? O objetivo geral da dissertação é, portanto, fornecer uma análise do discurso acerca da inserção internacional recente do Brasil (2003-2014) veiculado por publicações selecionadas dos quatro principais think tanks da Alemanha e da França. O trabalho lança mão da fundamentação teórico-metodológica da análise de discurso pósestruturalista e busca sustentar a tese de que é possível depreender da análise das publicações selecionadas um conjunto de discursos básicos que estruturam as principais representações desses atores sobre a recente inserção internacional do Brasil, dentre os quais se destacam o discurso da inovação diplomática, do ineditismo e do soft power socioeconômico dos governos Lula; o discurso do reformismo moderado, que associa as identidades de “parceiro responsável” e “líder pragmático” ao Brasil, em contraposição ao “radicalismo” e ao “populismo” da Venezuela; e o discurso da pretensão de projeção global de poder. / Brazil’s foreign, defense and security policies between 2003-2014 affected its relations with the great powers, raising a variety of discourses that seek to translate the country’s recent international insertion and inform strategies that may cope with the demands of a new relationship with Brazil. In this context, there is a set of increasingly important institutions whose practices, representations and discourses precede, inform and seek to influence agenda setting, as well as policy and decision making processes in the fields of foreign, defense and security policies, especially of great powers: think tanks, institutions whose activities are mainly focused on producing and engaging knowledge on domestic and international public policies. The research problem orienting this monograph is, thus, the following: how do the most important foreign, defense and security policy think tanks in Germany and France represent Brazil’s recent international insertion and the role it plays in its regional surrounding area? The main aim of this project is, therefore, to offer an analysis of the discourse on Brazil’s recent international insertion (2003-2014) produced and disseminated by four of the most important think tanks in Germany and France. The monograph adopts post-structuralist discourse analysis as its theoretical and methodological foundation and lays out the argument that the analysis of selected think tanks’ publications reveals a set of basic discourses structuring key-representations of identity attributed to Brazil. Among them, three basic discourses are highlighted throughout the discussion: Lula’s diplomatic innovation and socioeconomic soft power discourse; the moderate reformism discourse, which links the identities of a “responsible partner” and “pragmatic leader” to Brazil in opposition to the “radicalism” and “populism” attributed to Venezuela; last but not least, the discourse on Brazil’s alleged claim to global power projection.

Många av dagens fredsfrämjande insatser genomförs i insatsområden som åtminstone vid en första anblick tycks vara av litet geopolitiskt eller ekonomiskt intresse för de intervenerande staterna. För svenskt vidkommande motiveras ibland Sveriges engagemang i exempelvis Afghanistan med att den terrorism och drogproduktion som härrör därifrån hotar och påverkar även människor i Sverige. Ytterligare en möjlig motivering har att göra med spridningsrisken; för att minska risken för spridning av en konflikt utanför det ursprungliga konfliktområdet intervenerar utomstående stater. Men vilken bild av den svenska statens motiv för att engagera Försvarsmakten i fredsfrämjande internationella insatser målas upp i riksdagsdebatten? Är argumenteringen rationell och visar de motiv som förs fram att Sverige faktiskt gynnas av att delta, eller grundar sig viljan att hjälpa till i att den svenska staten anser sig vara moraliskt förpliktigad att ingripa, om förmågan finns, då mänskliga rättigheter kränks? Föreliggande uppsats syftar till att klarlägga hur de två största, blockpolitiskt åtskilda riksdagspartierna motiverade besluten att deltaga i de internationella insatserna i Afghanistan och Libyen. Detta görs genom en argumentationsanalys, där de båda partiernas respektive argument struktureras och kategoriseras på ett överskådligt sätt. Resultatet från undersökningen är inte entydigt, men argument som tydligt anknyter till konkreta rationella vinster för Sverige används av båda partierna sparsamt. Istället ligger tyngdpunkten vid argument som har en närmare koppling till Sveriges nationella identitet och strategiska kultur. / Many of the peace supporting operations conducted today are undertaken in areas of operations with seemingly little geopolitical or economical interest to the intervening parties. From a Swedish perspective the contribution to the operations in for instance Afghanistan is sometimes motivated by stating that the terrorism and drug production that originates in Afghanistan threatens and effects even people living in Sweden. The risk of a potential expansion of the area of conflict is another plausible motivation to intervene for participating states. But how are the motives of the Swedish government to engage the Swedish Armed Forces in peace supporting operations depicted in Swedish Parliament debate? Is the argumentation rational and do the motives that are brought forward show that Sweden actually benefits from participating, or is the willingness to contribute derived from a sense of being morally obliged to take action, if capable, whenever human rights are violated? The essay in hand is intended to make clear how the two largest, policy divided, parties of the Swedish Parliament have motivated the decisions to participate in the international operations conducted in Afghanistan and Libya. This is accomplished through an argumentation analysis, in which the arguments of the two parties are structured and categorised in a perspicuous way. The results from the study are not unambiguous, but arguments that in a clear way are connected to rational Swedish benefits are sparsely used by both parties. The emphasis of the debate is rather on arguments with a close connection to the Swedish national identity and strategic culture.

As iniciativas de política externa, de defesa e de segurança que compõem a inserção internacional do Brasil no período 2003-2014 repercutiram nas relações do país com as grandes potências, suscitando uma intensa produção discursiva que busca traduzir o significado da recente inserção internacional do país e informar estratégias que possam dar conta das demandas de um novo relacionamento com o Brasil. Nesse contexto, há um conjunto de instituições de importância crescente, cujas práticas, representações e discursos precedem, informam e pretendem influenciar os processos de definição de agenda, formulação de política e tomada de decisão no âmbito das políticas externa, de defesa e de segurança, sobretudo das grandes potências: os think tanks, instituições dedicadas à produção e à articulação de conhecimentos voltados a políticas públicas de âmbito doméstico e internacional. Assim, o problema de pesquisa que orienta o trabalho refere-se ao seguinte questionamento: como os principais think tanks que buscam influenciar as formulações estratégicas para as políticas externa, de defesa e de segurança na Alemanha e na França têm representado a inserção internacional recente do Brasil e o papel desempenhado pelo país no seu entorno estratégico? O objetivo geral da dissertação é, portanto, fornecer uma análise do discurso acerca da inserção internacional recente do Brasil (2003-2014) veiculado por publicações selecionadas dos quatro principais think tanks da Alemanha e da França. O trabalho lança mão da fundamentação teórico-metodológica da análise de discurso pósestruturalista e busca sustentar a tese de que é possível depreender da análise das publicações selecionadas um conjunto de discursos básicos que estruturam as principais representações desses atores sobre a recente inserção internacional do Brasil, dentre os quais se destacam o discurso da inovação diplomática, do ineditismo e do soft power socioeconômico dos governos Lula; o discurso do reformismo moderado, que associa as identidades de “parceiro responsável” e “líder pragmático” ao Brasil, em contraposição ao “radicalismo” e ao “populismo” da Venezuela; e o discurso da pretensão de projeção global de poder. / Brazil’s foreign, defense and security policies between 2003-2014 affected its relations with the great powers, raising a variety of discourses that seek to translate the country’s recent international insertion and inform strategies that may cope with the demands of a new relationship with Brazil. In this context, there is a set of increasingly important institutions whose practices, representations and discourses precede, inform and seek to influence agenda setting, as well as policy and decision making processes in the fields of foreign, defense and security policies, especially of great powers: think tanks, institutions whose activities are mainly focused on producing and engaging knowledge on domestic and international public policies. The research problem orienting this monograph is, thus, the following: how do the most important foreign, defense and security policy think tanks in Germany and France represent Brazil’s recent international insertion and the role it plays in its regional surrounding area? The main aim of this project is, therefore, to offer an analysis of the discourse on Brazil’s recent international insertion (2003-2014) produced and disseminated by four of the most important think tanks in Germany and France. The monograph adopts post-structuralist discourse analysis as its theoretical and methodological foundation and lays out the argument that the analysis of selected think tanks’ publications reveals a set of basic discourses structuring key-representations of identity attributed to Brazil. Among them, three basic discourses are highlighted throughout the discussion: Lula’s diplomatic innovation and socioeconomic soft power discourse; the moderate reformism discourse, which links the identities of a “responsible partner” and “pragmatic leader” to Brazil in opposition to the “radicalism” and “populism” attributed to Venezuela; last but not least, the discourse on Brazil’s alleged claim to global power projection.

Submitted by LIS BARRETO null (lisbarretori@gmail.com) on 2016-09-25T23:17:06Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Lis Barreto dissertação versão definifiva.pdf: 1067617 bytes, checksum: cbb3752fbf19e479269f890a4b31cc65 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Felipe Augusto Arakaki (arakaki@reitoria.unesp.br) on 2016-09-27T14:38:21Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 barreto_l_me_mar.pdf: 1067617 bytes, checksum: cbb3752fbf19e479269f890a4b31cc65 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-09-27T14:38:21Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 barreto_l_me_mar.pdf: 1067617 bytes, checksum: cbb3752fbf19e479269f890a4b31cc65 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-07-29 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) / Neste trabalho, analisamos a forma com que os temas da defesa foram tratados dentro da política externa dos governos de Lula da Silva e Rousseff (2003-2014). Por meio da análise da bibliografia especializada, de documentos oficiais do governo e de declarações oficiais, procuramos identificar de que maneira os dois governos pretendiam tratar do tema da defesa e de que maneira este tema se relacionaria com a política externa. Após a fase de avaliação do planejamento, procuramos a existência de resultados concretos e avaliar se houve, de fato, uma maior inclusão de temas da defesa na agenda de política externa. O trabalho parte do pressuposto de que, apesar do tema da defesa ser, por excelência, um tema de política externa, historicamente ele tem sido pouco tratado na agenda da política externa brasileira, situação esta que se agravou durante os governos da década de 1990. Contudo, a partir de 2003, o discurso governamental apontou para uma mudança neste padrão e, seguindo este indício, buscamos identificar de que maneira esta mudança foi apresentada no planejamento governamental e se houve desdobramentos na relação entre a defesa e política externa brasileira. / En este trabajo analizamos la manera que los temas de la defensa han sido tratados dentro de la política externa de los gobiernos Lula da Silva y Rousseff (2003-2014). Por análisis de la bibliografía especializada, de documentos oficiales del gobierno y declaraciones oficiales, buscamos identificar cómo los dos gobiernos trataban de abordar el tema de la defensa y de qué manera este tema se relacionaría con la política exterior. Después de la fase de evaluación de la planificación, buscamos la existencia de resultados concretos y comprobamos si había, de hecho, una mayor inclusión de elementos de la defensa en la agenda de la política exterior. El trabajo presupone que a pesar del tema de la defensa ser, por excelencia, un asunto de política exterior, históricamente ha sido poco utilizado en la agenda de la política exterior brasileña, situación que se agravó durante los gobiernos de la década de 1990. Sin embargo, a partir de 2003, el discurso del gobierno señaló para un cambio de este estándar y, siguiendo esta pista, buscamos identificar cómo este intento de transformación ha sido presentado en la planificación gubernamental y evaluar si ha representado alguna alteración de relación entre la defensa y la política exterior brasileña. / In this dissertation we analyze the way the theme defense was treated inside the foreign policy during the administration of Lula da Silva and Rousseff (2003-2014). Through the analysis of specialized bibliography, official government documents and official statements, we search to identify the way the two governments intended to treat the theme of defense in a way that it would relate to foreign policy. After the analysis of the governmental planning, we look if there were indeed results of a bigger inclusion of defense in the foreign policy agenda. Assuming that even though defense is by excellence a theme of foreign policy, historically it has been very little dealt in the agenda of Brazilian foreign policy and the situation only got worse during the nineties administration. However, since 2003 the government speech has pointed to a change in this pattern and, following this indication, we aim to identify in which way this intention of transforming has been presented in governmental planning in addition to evaluating if it represented any alteration in the relation between defense and Brazilian foreign policy.

As iniciativas de política externa, de defesa e de segurança que compõem a inserção internacional do Brasil no período 2003-2014 repercutiram nas relações do país com as grandes potências, suscitando uma intensa produção discursiva que busca traduzir o significado da recente inserção internacional do país e informar estratégias que possam dar conta das demandas de um novo relacionamento com o Brasil. Nesse contexto, há um conjunto de instituições de importância crescente, cujas práticas, representações e discursos precedem, informam e pretendem influenciar os processos de definição de agenda, formulação de política e tomada de decisão no âmbito das políticas externa, de defesa e de segurança, sobretudo das grandes potências: os think tanks, instituições dedicadas à produção e à articulação de conhecimentos voltados a políticas públicas de âmbito doméstico e internacional. Assim, o problema de pesquisa que orienta o trabalho refere-se ao seguinte questionamento: como os principais think tanks que buscam influenciar as formulações estratégicas para as políticas externa, de defesa e de segurança na Alemanha e na França têm representado a inserção internacional recente do Brasil e o papel desempenhado pelo país no seu entorno estratégico? O objetivo geral da dissertação é, portanto, fornecer uma análise do discurso acerca da inserção internacional recente do Brasil (2003-2014) veiculado por publicações selecionadas dos quatro principais think tanks da Alemanha e da França. O trabalho lança mão da fundamentação teórico-metodológica da análise de discurso pósestruturalista e busca sustentar a tese de que é possível depreender da análise das publicações selecionadas um conjunto de discursos básicos que estruturam as principais representações desses atores sobre a recente inserção internacional do Brasil, dentre os quais se destacam o discurso da inovação diplomática, do ineditismo e do soft power socioeconômico dos governos Lula; o discurso do reformismo moderado, que associa as identidades de “parceiro responsável” e “líder pragmático” ao Brasil, em contraposição ao “radicalismo” e ao “populismo” da Venezuela; e o discurso da pretensão de projeção global de poder. / Brazil’s foreign, defense and security policies between 2003-2014 affected its relations with the great powers, raising a variety of discourses that seek to translate the country’s recent international insertion and inform strategies that may cope with the demands of a new relationship with Brazil. In this context, there is a set of increasingly important institutions whose practices, representations and discourses precede, inform and seek to influence agenda setting, as well as policy and decision making processes in the fields of foreign, defense and security policies, especially of great powers: think tanks, institutions whose activities are mainly focused on producing and engaging knowledge on domestic and international public policies. The research problem orienting this monograph is, thus, the following: how do the most important foreign, defense and security policy think tanks in Germany and France represent Brazil’s recent international insertion and the role it plays in its regional surrounding area? The main aim of this project is, therefore, to offer an analysis of the discourse on Brazil’s recent international insertion (2003-2014) produced and disseminated by four of the most important think tanks in Germany and France. The monograph adopts post-structuralist discourse analysis as its theoretical and methodological foundation and lays out the argument that the analysis of selected think tanks’ publications reveals a set of basic discourses structuring key-representations of identity attributed to Brazil. Among them, three basic discourses are highlighted throughout the discussion: Lula’s diplomatic innovation and socioeconomic soft power discourse; the moderate reformism discourse, which links the identities of a “responsible partner” and “pragmatic leader” to Brazil in opposition to the “radicalism” and “populism” attributed to Venezuela; last but not least, the discourse on Brazil’s alleged claim to global power projection.

Submitted by Elesbão Santiago Neto (neto10uepb@cche.uepb.edu.br) on 2018-05-14T20:39:50Z No. of bitstreams: 1 PDF - Rochele Karina Costa de Moraes Abumansur.pdf: 32162977 bytes, checksum: 427fdd6f08102d0be3803f15882a5097 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-05-14T20:39:50Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 PDF - Rochele Karina Costa de Moraes Abumansur.pdf: 32162977 bytes, checksum: 427fdd6f08102d0be3803f15882a5097 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-06-19 / CAPES / This research has as its central objective comparative analysis of defense and security plans adopted by the Colombian government of Alvaro Uribe and Juan Manuel Santos, as well as its political and security agendas. This study considers the common defense and security as State Policy which is part of the common foreign to consider as the main threat to state security to Colombian guerilla activity, production of drug trafficking and human rights abuses suffered by the population. The time frame relevant to the purposes of the research extends the Alvaro Uribe government (2002 - 2010) to half of the first term of the government of Juan Manuel Santos (2010 - 2012), in as much as in the previous period only serves to support historic for understanding of recent events. The main conclusion of this study focuses on detecting differences and / or similarities between the security plans of both governments to resolve the matter then whether there is progress or setbacks in the solution of the Colombian conflict and the search for peace in that country. / Esta pesquisa tem como objetivo central a análise comparativa dos planos de defesa e segurança da Colômbia adotados pelos governos de Álvaro Uribe e Juan Manuel Santos, assim como suas políticas e agendas de segurança. Este estudo entende a política de defesa e segurança como Política de Estado da qual faz parte a política externa para segurança e considera como principal ameaça à segurança estatal colombiana a ação das guerrilhas, a produção do narcotráfico e o desrespeito aos direitos humanos sofridos pela população. O recorte temporal pertinente aos propósitos da pesquisa estende-se do governo Álvaro Uribe (2002 – 2010) à metade do primeiro mandato do governo de Juan Manuel Santos (2010 – 2012), na medida em que o período anterior apenas nos serve de suporte histórico para entendimento dos acontecimentos recentes. A principal conclusão deste estudo incide em detectar diferenças e/ou semelhanças entre os planos de segurança de ambos os governos para então solucionar a questão de saber se há progressos ou retrocessos na solução do conflito colombiano e na busca pela pacificação daquele país.

Since the end of the Cold War, Japan’s defense policy and politics has gone through significant changes. Throughout the post cold war period, US-Japan alliance managers, politicians with differing visions and preferences, scholars, think tanks, and the actions of foreign governments have all played significant roles in influencing these changes. Along with these actors, the Japanese prime minister has played an important, if sometimes subtle, role in the realm of defense policy and politics. Japanese prime ministers, though significantly weaker than many heads of state, nevertheless play an important role in policy by empowering different actors (bureaucratic actors, independent commissions, or civil actors), through personal diplomacy, through agenda-setting, and through symbolic acts of state. The power of the prime minister to influence policy processes, however, has frequently varied by prime minister. My dissertation investigates how different political strategies and entrepreneurial insights by the prime minister have influenced defense policy and politics since the end of the Cold War. In addition, it seeks to explain how the quality of political strategy and entrepreneurial insight employed by different prime ministers was important in the success of different approaches to defense. My dissertation employs a comparative case study approach to examine how different prime ministerial strategies have mattered in the realm of Japanese defense policy and politics. Three prime ministers have been chosen: Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro (1996-1998); Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro (2001-2006); and Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio (2009-2010). These prime ministers have been chosen to provide maximum contrast on issues of policy preference, cabinet management, choice of partners, and overall strategy. As my dissertation finds, the quality of political strategy has been an important aspect of Japan’s defense transformation. Successful strategies have frequently used the knowledge and accumulated personal networks of bureaucrats, supplemented bureaucratic initiatives with top-down personal diplomacy, and used a revitalized US-Japan strategic relationship as a political resource for a stronger prime ministership. Though alternative approaches, such as those that have looked to displace the influence of bureaucrats and the US in defense policy, have been less successful, this dissertation also finds theoretical evidence that alternatives may exist.

The reason for conducting this case study is to analyze the roles of the Armed Forces of Sweden, as described by the Swedish policymakers. The research question is firstly what those roles are, and as a secondary objective, if those roles are conflicting. By analyzing the two major policy documents produced on Swedish security and defense policy during the period 2015-2020 these questions have been answered. The concept of roles has been central to the thesis and how conflicting roles are a source of organizational problems. The analysis of the material has been done by using discourse analysis in order to identify roles and the underlying discourse where they are constructed. Earlier research shows the importance of security and defense policy in directing the Armed Forces on what and how they should function. The roles were inductively found to be those of National Defender, Neighborhood Helper, Domestic Resource, and Expeditionary Crisis Manager. The results from this thesis show that the Policymakers view the two former roles concerned with national defense and providing military assistance in Sweden’s close vicinity as primary roles for the Armed Forces. The roles could be conflicting because of the non-alignment status of Sweden during the periods. The level of cooperation with other states and/or organizations makes Sweden’s ability to receive and give help uncertain. This is important in understanding Swedish defense and security policy in the context of its application to become a NATO member state in 2022.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited / This thesis analyzes the "updated Petersberg tasks" included in the draft treaty establishing a Constitution for the European Union. The original Petersberg tasks called for forces capable of humanitarian and rescue missions, peacekeeping operations and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. The updated tasks add conflict prevention, joint disarmament, military advice and assistance, post-conflict stabilization, and support to third countries in combating terrorism. The thesis focuses on the requirements of these tasks and the capabilities of the European Union's civilian agencies and military forces to execute them. It explores the meaning of the new missions, their specific capability requirements, and the prospects for the European Union to meet these requirements. It concludes that the European Union is currently capable of undertaking the missions that require mostly civilian tools or medium-level military forces for their conduct. The European Union does not at present have the relevant capabilities for the missions that demand more advanced military forces. / Major, Hellenic Army