This dissertation argues that there is an agreed upon commonsense view of violence, but beyond this view, definitions for kinds of violence are essentially contested and non-neutrally, politically ideological, given that the political itself is an essentially contested concept defined in relation to ideologies that oppose one another. The first chapter outlines definitions for a commonsense view of violence produced by Greene and Brennan. This chapter argues that there are incontestable instances of violence that are almost universally agreed upon, such as when an adult intentionally smashes a child’s head against a table, purposefully causing harm. It is also claimed that, because political, ideological distinctions between kinds of violence arise from the creation of moral equivalences to the commonsense view of violence, political ideology is the source of disagreement. The second chapter argues that the concept of violence and of the political are essentially contested concepts. Gallie’s criteria for what counts as an essentially contested concept are utilized in order to argue that violence is an essentially contested concept at the level of the political, though not at the level of the commonsense view of violence. In fact, the paradigmatic cases that the commonsense view of violence pertains to serve as the core cases that are then interpreted as kinds of violence at the ideological level. To define violence as altogether wrong, or to define kinds of violence as acceptable and others as wrong is itself a politically ideological move to make, such as when liberalism defines its own uses of violence as justified and legitimate, and its enemy’s violence as unjustifiable and illegitimate. The World Health Organization and Bufacchi’s definitions for violence are presented, as are the definition for terroristic violence defined by Nagel. Erlenbusch’s critique of a liberal view, such as that of Nagel and the World Health Organization, is addressed as a reflection on the fact that, beyond the commonsense view of violence, violence is an essentially contested concept for which an ideologically, politically non-neutral definition is unlikely. The third chapter outlines numerous definitions produced by various philosophers, historians, and theorists, such as Machiavelli, Arendt, Hobbes, Kant, Treitschke, Weber, Bakunin, Sorel, Žižek, and Benjamin. The definitions produced by each demonstrates that person’s political ideological assumptions. Their definitions demonstrate an ongoing disagreement, in the sense of Rancière’s formulation for what counts as a disagreement in that each theorist defines kinds of violence under the yoke of their own political ideology. They all might agree that a single act is violent, under the commonsense view of violence, but they disagree concerning what kind of violence it is. So, though they may point to the same events and actions as examples of violence, what they mean fundamentally differs, and this means that they disagree. Their disagreement arises due to their respective political ideologies. This disagreement shows that there is no neutral justification for the neutrality of a state, particularly if a neutral state must defend itself. The state is instead defined in historically contextual terms of how the state relates to kinds of violence, and the distinctions between kinds of violence are not themselves politically, ideologically neutral. So, the concept of violence, beyond the commonsense view, is an essentially contested concept for which a non-neutral definition is unlikely. Beyond the commonsense view, political ideology is inextricably bound up within distinctions between kinds of violence. The fourth chapter then examines arguments on the question of whether nonviolence counts as a kind of violence. If distinctions between kinds of violence are essentially contested and non-neutrally defined, and nonviolence is defined as distinct from violence, then it follows that nonviolence is an essentially contested concept for which no non-neutral definition is possible, at least beyond a commonsense view of nonviolence. A commonsense view of nonviolence is defined as the assumption that nonviolence is not violent in the way that the commonsense view defines violence. That is, nonviolence occurs when there is no action or event that most people would define as a violent one. Definitions for nonviolence, civil disobedience, nonviolent political actions, and nonviolent direct actions are then outlined. These definitions aim at showing that the doctrine of nonviolence does not merely refer to nonviolent acts, but to a strategy that is a means to defeating violence. Given that what counts as the nonviolence that defeats violence is ideologically a matter of disagreement, nonviolence, in this sense, can count as a kind of violence. The fifth chapter concludes, raising questions concerning how violence can be valued, the degree to which a state cannot neutrally justify its neutrality, and the degree to which, beyond the commonsense view of violence, there ever could be agreement concerning what counts as kinds of violence. 1 In this dissertation, I draw on a number of ideas/passages that appeared earlier in my paper “The Efficacy of Scapegoating and Revolutionary Violence," in Philosophy, Culture, and Traditions: A Journal of the World Union of Catholic Philosophical Societies, ed. William Sweet, 10(2014), 203-219. I am grateful to the editors of the journal for permission to draw on this material here.

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Communities of resistance are increasingly turning to radical tactics, including acts of civil disobedience, to fight back against encroaching fossil fuel infrastructure. The fight against the Mountain Valley Pipeline (MVP) is no exception. The MVP is a 303-mile long proposed fracked gas pipeline in Virginia and West Virginia. I apply radical flank effect (RFE) theory and the theory of movement dynamism to understand the role of civil disobedience, as a radical flank, in the MVP resistance movement. I contribute to the literature on RFEs by focusing primarily on how the radical flank of this movement has affected within-movement social dynamics, like trust, unity, and interpersonal relations. I rely on 15 semi-structured interviews with pipeline fighters, both those who have and have not participated in acts of civil disobedience, to gain insight into the use of civil disobedience, as a radical flank in the movement. This movement has used diverse tactics to challenge construction of the MVP, making it a strong case for understanding the role of radical tactics, and their relationship to moderate tactics. I find several positive RFEs (energizing effects, connecting effects, engaging effects, uniting effects, and movement outcome effects) and some potential negative RFEs (conflict/alienation, fear of consequences and organizational risks). I also find evidence of movement dynamism in the form of an ecosystem of tactics which emerged in the MVP resistance movement. Movement actors kept moderate and radical flanks publicly separate for strategic reasons while overlapping membership bridged the social dynamics of the movement, encouraging cohesion and collective movement identity. / Master of Science / Communities concerned about climate change are increasingly breaking the law in order to make their voices heard and stop dangerous coal, oil and natural gas projects. These actions are called civil disobedience and they have been used for decades in the United States, most prominently in the Civil Rights Movement. One such example in the fight against climate change is the resistance to the Mountain Valley Pipeline, a 303-mile long proposed natural gas pipeline in Virginia and West Virginia. I use social movement theories to understand the role that civil disobedience has played in the Mountain Valley Pipeline resistance movement. Specifically, I look at how the use of civil disobedience in this movement has affected the social dynamics of the movement, like trust, unity, or relationships in the movement. I spoke with 15 community members who have been active in fighting this pipeline to learn more. This movement has involved a wide range of different tactics, including civil disobedience, so it is a strong example to study for this research. My interviews with the community members revealed several positive effects as a result of the use of civil disobedience in the movement as well as a few potential risks/dangers. I also found that civil disobedience was able to work together with other types of tactics in a vibrant ecosystem that included mutual benefit. At the same time, I find that community members sought to keep some of the illegal tactics separate from more moderate tactics, like lawsuits or public comment submissions, in order to keep the moderate tactics safe. Despite this separation, I find that significant overlap of community members across different types of tactics was able to maintain a cohesive, common identity and unify people who were participating in different tactics, but fighting the same pipeline.

This thesis examines the concept of civil disobedience, and the role the latter can play in a democratic society. It aims to offer a moral justification for civil disobedience that departs from consequentialist or deontological considerations, and focuses instead on virtue ethics. By drawing attention to the notion of civic virtues, the thesis suggests that, under some circumstances, an act of civil disobedience is the very act displaying a virtuous disposition in the citizen who disobeys. Such disposition is interpreted in light of a duty each individual has to respect her fellow citizens as autonomous agents. This grounds, in turn, a moral obligation to respect the law. The central claim of the thesis is that the obligation towards the law is fulfilled not only through acts of obedience but also, under different circumstances, through acts of disobedience. The status of non-violence as a necessary component of civil disobedience is questioned, and it is argued that a degree of force or violence may be permissible in civil disobedience, when it is compatible with the duty to respect others’ autonomy. Subsequently, the thesis offers an analysis of ‘reasonableness’ as a civic virtue, and by comparing three different approaches to the issue of reasonable disagreement among democratic citizens, it defends the deliberative approach as the most suited for treating fellow citizens as autonomous agents. The last two chapters focus on the importance, for an act of civil disobedience, of the agent’s willingness to accept the legal consequences of her law-breaking behaviour. It is argued that a civil disobedient has an obligation to face the prospect of being punished for the breach of the law. However, in considering the behaviour of a virtuous civil disobedient who appears at her criminal trial, it is also claimed that she should plead not guilty and aim to persuade her fellow citizens that she does not deserve to be punished, because what she did does not constitute a criminal wrong. In doing so, this thesis depicts civil disobedience not as a merely permissible form of behaviour, but as a morally praiseworthy conduct within a democratic community.

A obrigação política é interpretada como um problema de cooperação. Inicialmente rejeita-se a idéia de que a cooperação sempre emerge do equilíbrio de ações autointeressadas. Discutindo alguns dos mais conhecidos princípios morais para a obrigação política são rejeitadas princípios verticais, como a gratidão e o consentimento, e alguns princípios horizontais, como dever natural e deveres associativos. Defende-se, por fim a equidade como um princípio moral capaz de dar sentido à obrigação política entendida como requisito de uma sociedade entendida como um empreendimento cooperativo. / Political obligation is treated as a cooperation problem. At first, an account that cooperation always emerges as equilibrium of self-interested actions is rejected. Discussing some of most popular moral principles of political obligations, we reject vertical principles, as gratitude and consent, and some horizontal principles, like associative and natural duty, that are not centered in the idea of society as cooperation. Finally, the principle of fairness is defended as the most adequate moral principle to make sense of political obligation as requisite of a society understood as a cooperative venture.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:21:31Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Roberto Bolonhini Junior.pdf: 1433097 bytes, checksum: f1ae1673addb53b257298bd28f4aa300 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-03-06 / This thesis demonstrates the social function of ownership from a new perspective phatic-social. At first we try to study the essential elements possessory where the phenomenon was structured throughout history; later, we do a study of the Tridimensional Theory of Law by Miguel Reale at the vision of Maria Helena Diniz, as well as the principle of human dignity enshrined in the charter. Then, the possession is studied socially and economically in the theories of Antonio Hernandez Gil, Perozzi and Saleilles comparing these scholars thought the thoughts of Jhering and Savigny. After this study dogmatic, is set to address the issue possessory actually factual-evaluative Brazilian and necessity of pursuing a real possession qualified for their functionalization, we emphasize the invasions and occupations of areas were not fulfill its function, made by popular movements in order civil disobedience and fulfill the social function of ownership; criticizes also the structure agrarian-urban Brazilian real estate, which favors the few over the many as a legacy of the colonial structure of exploitation, it is also a comparative study with alien legislation, demonstrating the adoption of constitutions in social function of property, but also the constitutional legislation which regulates the possession. We suggest a new theory, called the theory of social consciousness and their reflections on possessory title, lege ferenda suggestions are made, as well as changes in Brazilian law, thus seeking a new way of exercising possessory social function, unlike than was previously proposed by the doctrine / A presente tese demonstra a função social da posse a partir de uma nova perspectiva fático-social. Num primeiro momento, busca-se estudar os elementos possessórios essenciais em que o fenômeno se estruturou ao longo da história. Posteriormente, faz-se um estudo da teoria tridimensionalista de Miguel Reale na visão de Maria Helena Diniz, como também, do princípio da dignidade humana consagrado na carta constitucional. Em seguida, a posse é estudada socialmente e economicamente à luz das teorias de Antonio Hernandez Gil, Perozzi e Saleilles, comparando o pensamento desses doutrinadores aos pensamentos de Ihering e Savigny. Após este estudo dogmático, passa-se a enfrentar a questão possessória na realidade fático-valorativa brasileira e na necessidade do exercício de uma posse qualificada para sua real funcionalização. Enfatiza-se as invasões e ocupações das áreas desfuncionalizadas, feitas por movimentos populares como forma de desobediência civil e cumprimento da função social da posse; critica-se ainda, a estrutura agrário-urbana imobiliária brasileira, que privilegia poucos em detrimento de muitos como uma herança da estrutura colonial de exploração; faz-se ainda, um estudo comparado com a legislação alienígena, especialmente demonstrando a adoção nas constituições da função social da propriedade, como também, da legislação infraconstitucional que disciplina a posse. Sugere-se uma nova teoria, denominada teoria da consciência social possessória e seus reflexos no direito de propriedade, sugestões de lege ferenda são feitas, como também alterações na legislação brasileira, buscando-se assim uma nova maneira de exercício da função social possessória, diversamente do que até então foi proposto pela doutrina

This thesis addresses the moral permissibility of illegal acts of animal liberation in the form of civil disobedience, acts of rescue, and acts of sabotage. Animal liberation movements have been the subject of much media and political attention, with particular focus on use liberationist strategies of intimidation, vandalism, and harassment. Governments have mobilised state apparatus in surveillance, infiltration, and investigation, and have characterising radical activism as 'terrorism'. The variety of illegal activities aimed at preventing harm to non-human animals, particularly those involving violence towards property or persons, have often been classified together under the term 'animal liberation' and assumed to be wrong. I argue that the assumption of wrongness is questionable because it fails to give significant weight to the justification for acts of animal liberation. I pose the question as to whether and what illegal practices of animal liberation are ethically justifiable. I begin by arguing that non-human animals are worthy of moral consideration for their own sake, because their sentience above a basic level, particularly their capacity to suffer, gives moral agents reasons to acknowledge and respect their goods. Following this, I defend the claim that liberal democratic states that fail to treat animals living within them with respect are unjust. This injustice provides a justification for civil disobedience on behalf of non-human animals. Following this, I argue that beings worthy of moral consideration are owed positive duties of aid and easy rescue and I extend third-party intervention theory to non-human animals under threat from humans. I explore the limits to the duties of aid and intervention, using principles drawn from those of humanitarian intervention to identify duty bearers, and I weigh those duties against duties to fellow citizens and the state.

Resumo: A Internet propiciou a formação de uma rede descentralizada de informações nunca antes encontrada em nossa sociedade. Baseando-se na digitalização dos produtos culturais, a arquitetura da rede permitiu uma ampla distribuição de informações de maneira fácil e relativamente barata, favorecendo uma distribuição cultural de novo tipo, baseada na facilidade de apropriação, de compartilhamento e de produção de réplicas idênticas ao original. Contudo, essa prática tão comum da cibercultura freqüentemente desconsidera as leis de proteção dos direitos autorais, pois estimula uma livre circulação de informações em detrimento da proteção dos interesses autorais e mercadológicos de distribuição. A Internet inaugura ainda novos movimentos sociais, pautados pela construção comum de licenças autorais atualizadas e de práticas políticas de Desobediência Civil nesse novo terreno de disputa. Portanto, objetivamos neste trabalho investigar as formas de distribuição de informação no arcabouço tecnoinformacional e as suas relações com as estruturas jurídicas das leis proteção autoral e com as velhas e novas formas de acumulação. / Abstract: The Internet made possible the beginning of a unique decentralized network of information in our society. Relied on the digitalization of cultural products, the net's framing allowed a biggest sharing of information in a easier and cheaper way, supporting a cultural distribution of a new kind, based on the facilities of appropriation, sharing and production of identical copies from the original one. However, this ciberculture common practice frequently disrespect the copyright laws, because it encourage a free circulation of information in detriment of the authors and merchandising interests protection. The Internet still made possible the emerging of new social movements, ruled by common construction of actualized author's licenses and by political actions of Civil Disobedience within this new space of conflict. Thus, our objective in this work is investigate the new paths of information sharing ways in the techno-informational structure and its relations with the juridical framing of the copyright and with the new and old ways of accumulation. / Orientador: Mauro de Mello Leonel Júnior / Coorientador: Aloísio Shumacher / Banca: Francisco Luiz Corsi / Banca: Pablo Ortelado / Mestre

The purpose of this study was to examine how four teachers with different teaching experiences treat and think about insubordination in school. The study emphasizes on questions like: When and why does disorder occur? How do the teachers manage disorderly conduct in the classroom? and Could there be a conflict between the teacher’s expectations and management, and the needs and motivation of the pupil?    It was evident through interviews with these four teachers that their statements could be divided into similar themes which subsequently could be put into the motivational structure of Abraham H. Maslow.        The conclusion of the study was that teachers may possibly have a better chance of managing disorder in their classroom if they are aware of the connection between disorderly conduct and a person’s needs and motivation.