La tesi ha per oggetto l’autotutela amministrativa, specialmente quella c.d. decisoria “spontanea”, ovvero quell’insieme di poteri che consentono all’amministrazione di riesaminare i propri provvedimenti e di rimuoverli a vario titolo.
Di questi poteri si è indagato il fondamento dogmatico e positivo. La questione del fondamento è stata per lunghi anni affrontata dalla dottrina e dalla giurisprudenza in termini totalmente pre-critici e non problematici: l’esistenza di questi poteri era semplicemente scontata e le riflessioni sulla loro base giuridica si esaurivano perlopiù nella constatazione della loro necessità nell’immemore consenso circa la loro ammissibilità. Negli ultimi anni, invece, una parte degli Autori ha disconosciuto la natura implicita e per così dire “originaria” di questi poteri e ne ha perciò patrocinato la stretta riconduzione al principio di legalità: in altre parole, l’annullamento e la revoca non sarebbero affatto conseguenza della c.d. inesauribilità del potere amministrativo – negata da questa dottrina – e sarebbero perciò oggi ammissibili unicamente nei casi e nei modi disciplinati dalle due norme introdotte nella legge sul procedimento nel 2005. Ciò a garanzia della certezza dei rapporti giuridici e del legittimo affidamento dei destinatari dei provvedimenti ampliativi. Secondo un filone ricostruttivo in pare contrastante con il primo, altri Autori hanno inteso valorizzare gli elementi de iure condito a favore della obbligatorietà dell’avvio del procedimento di riesame, auspicandone contemporaneamente la generalizzazione, nell’ottica di una più complessiva trasformazione dell’annullamento d’ufficio in un nuovo istituto ibrido, rispondente alla funzione di alternative dispute risolution system o, se si vuole, di ricorso gerarchico. Per le stesse ragioni, l’istituto dovrebbe perdere il carattere ampiamente discrezionale, in favore di una vincolatezza totale o parziale. Questo secondo “fronte di attacco” alla ricostruzione tradizionale intende offrire soluzione al venir meno del sistema dei controlli di legalità sull’azione amministrativa. Lo studio ha sottoposto a verifica entrambi i filoni evolutivi richiamati, discostandosi dal secondo e, pur accogliendo parte delle argomentazioni ad esso sottostanti, anche dal primo. Quanto alla teoria dell’esauribilità del potere amministrativo, oggetto della prima linea evolutiva, si è ritenuto di condividere le considerazioni circa la tutela dell’affidamento degli interessati e della stabilità dei rapporti giuridici. È parsa tuttavia meglio rispondente alle categorie generali e alle esigenze del sistema (anche sulla base di una visione del diritto amministrativo quale “diritto dei terzi”, per natura volto alla tutela dell’interesse generale e non solo dell’interesse privato particolare coinvolto dall’esercizio del potere) la conservazione della tradizionale inesauribilità del potere, seppur assai mitigata, nella pratica, con riferimento all’esercizio dei poteri di ritiro degli atti favorevoli ai privati il cui affidamento sia concretamente meritevole di tutela. La natura discrezionale dell’annullamento d’ufficio (e della revoca), sottoposta a critica dalla seconda linea evolutiva, viene difesa sia sul piano del diritto positivo e pretorio (attraverso la riconduzione dei principali casi di annullamento c.d. doveroso al modello generale), sia sul piano delle categorie generali, a partire dalla natura dei poteri coinvolti e dall’analisi delle posizioni giuridiche dei soggetti interessati dai procedimenti di secondo grado. / The thesis focuses on the Italian system of so called autoprotection or selfprotection. This expression refers to the powers of public administration to revoke its own acts when deemed necessary to repair a vice of legitimacy or a vice of opportunity, without being bind to resort to the courts. Given the aim of this powers – the same of first grade powers plus a semi-judicial one – they are usually meant by judges and scholars as “widely discretionary”. Furthermore, it has always been believed that the choice to activate the correspondent proceeding is totally free for public administration; consequently, a demand of interested parties does not make binding the start of the procedure, opposite to what happens with administrative appeal proceedings. In recent years ECJ, ECHR and national case law has emboldened the limits to selfredress, making clear that legitimate expectations and the public interest to legal certainty must be taken into consideration and given sufficient protection. Lately, also the Legislator followed, making the annulment and the revocation harder to be put in effect when the first act is favorable to the addressed subject. In such cases, the revocation cannot be ordered for a mere reconsideration of already known circumstances (ius poenitendi) but only if new ones show up. At the same time, ex officio annulment is precluded after 18 months from the issuing of the first act, instead of the previous general limit of a “reasonable time”. On the other hand, the case law has apparently pointed out some hypothesis of mandatory annulment, such as for “anticomunitarian acts” and cost-producing acts. Based on these two orientation, some scholars suggested a global rethinking of the self-protection, its bases and its rules. The study analyzes the case law and the latest legislative reforms, proving that no mandatory annulment exists in the Italian legal system. Therefore, nor the ECJ principle of equivalence nor other principles require that selfredress become generally obliged. The thesis also aims to prove that selfprotection remains a discretionary power, in order to ensure that the contrasting needs (the rule of law on the one hand, and the legal certainty and legitimate expectation on the other hand) can be properly balanced in every decision, according to the Constitutional provision of article 97, which requires that both impartiality and good administration are pursued.

Foreign investments in SADC are regulated by Annex 1 of the SADC Protocol on Finance and Investments (SADC FIP), as well as the laws of SADC Member States. At present, SADC faces the challenge that this regime for the regulation of foreign investments is unstable, unsatisfactory and unpredictable. Furthermore, the state of the rule of law in some SADC Member States is unsatisfactory. This negatively affects the security of foreign investments regulated by this regime. The main reasons for this state of affairs are briefly explained below. The regulatory regime for foreign investments in SADC is unstable, due to recent policy reviews and amendments of key regulatory instruments that have taken place. Major developments in this regard have been the suspension of the SADC Tribunal during 2010, the amendment of the SADC Tribunal Protocol during 2014 to bar natural and legal persons from access to the Tribunal, and the amendment of Annex 1 during 2016 to remove investor access to international investor-state arbitration, better known as investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS). The regulation of foreign investments in SADC has been unsatisfactory, among others because some SADC Member States have failed or neglected to harmonise their investment laws with both the 2006 and the 2016 Annex 1. Furthermore, SADC Member States such as Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Malawi, Mauritius, Seychelles, Eswatini, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe have multiple Regional Economic Community (REC) memberships. This places these Member States in a position whereby they have conflicting interests and treaty obligations. Finally, the future of the regime for the regulation of foreign investments in SADC is unpredictable, due to regional integration efforts such as the recent formation of the COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Free Zone (T-FTA) and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). The T-FTA is entitled to have its investment protocol, while the AfCFTA investment protocol will be negotiated from 2018 until 2020. These developments entail that the 2016 Annex 1 will soon be replaced by an investment protocol at either the T-FTA or AfCFTA levels, thereby ushering a new regime for the regulation of foreign investments in SADC. The unknown nature of the future regulations create uncertainty and instability among foreign investors and host states alike. This study analyses the regulation of foreign investments in terms of Annex 1 and selected laws of SADC Member States. In the end, it makes the three findings mentioned above. In order to address these findings, the study makes four recommendations. The first is that foreign investments in SADC must be regulated at African Union (AU) level, by means of an AfCFTA investment protocol (which incidentally is now the case). Secondly, investor-state disputes must be referred to the courts of a host state, optional ISDS, the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (ACJ&HR) or other agreed forum. Thirdly, an African Justice Scoreboard (AJS) must be established. The AJS will act as a gateway to determine whether an investor-state dispute shall be referred to the courts of a host state, ISDS, the ACJ&HR or other forums. Fourthly, the office of an African Investment Ombud (AIO) must be created. The AIO shall facilitate the early resolution of investor-state disputes, so as to reduce the number of disputes that may end-up in litigation or arbitration. / Mercantile Law / LL. D.

Le développement des modes alternatifs de règlement des différends dans les contrats administratifs est une nécessité. En effet, l’encombrement des juridictions administratives, conjugué au besoin d’un règlement des différends plus consensuel et apaisé, plaide en faveur de l’émergence d’une justice alternative. Néanmoins, l’ordre public encadrant l’activité des personnes publiques, et protégé par des normes impératives, impose que le développement des modes alternatifs soit régulé. À ce titre, l’étude du droit positif démontre que ce phénomène n’est pas inconnu dans le règlement des différends intéressant les contrats administratifs. Par exemple, les parties à un différend peuvent déjà librement recourir aux modes amiables (médiation, conciliation ou transaction), et quelques dérogations au principe d’interdiction faite aux personnes publiques de recourir à l’arbitrage sont prévues. Cela étant, les lacunes et les défaillances du régime actuel des modes alternatifs dans les contrats administratifs (absence de véritable statut du médiateur, défaut d’encadrement de la conciliation inter partes, complexité de la notion de concessions réciproques ou, encore, difficulté pour le juge administratif d’asseoir sa compétence en matière d’arbitrage international...) complexifient leur compréhension et leur mise en œuvre et risquent, par suite, d’accroître les violations de l’ordre public. Il est donc nécessaire de proposer un régime pérenne des modes alternatifs permettant d’assurer, d’une part, la protection des normes impératives du droit public et, d’autre part, la liberté des parties dans le choix et la conduite d’une justice alternative. Pour cela, leur futur régime devra autoriser l’arbitrage dans les contrats administratifs et le doter de garanties procédurales prenant en compte sa nature spécifique mais, aussi, certaines caractéristiques inhérentes aux personnes publiques et au droit administratif. De même, les procédures de médiation et de conciliation devront être améliorées afin d’assurer aux parties, un encadrement souple et favorable à la conclusion de transactions équilibrées et sécurisées. Enfin, ce régime devra définitivement consacrer le rôle du juge administratif. À cet effet, ce dernier pourra être amené à assister les parties dans la mise en œuvre des modes alternatifs (création d’un juge administratif d’appui dans l’arbitrage, combinaison des procédures de référé avec les modes amiables...). Le juge administratif devra être aussi chargé du contrôle de conformité de la solution alternative à l’ordre public. Cette attribution de compétence, qui résonne de plus fort en matière d’arbitrage international, est indispensable à la protection de l’intérêt public. Ce n’est qu’à ces conditions, que le développement des modes alternatifs de règlement des différends pourra prendre toute sa place dans les contrats administratifs. / The development of alternative dispute resolution in administrative contracts is a necessity. Indeed, the congestion of the administrative courts, combined with the need for a more consensual and calm settlement of disputes, pleads in favour of the emergence of an alternative justice. Nevertheless, the public order governing the activities of public bodies, and protected by imperative norms, requires that the development of alternative methods be regulated. As such, the study of positive law shows that this phenomenon is not unknown in the settlement of disputes concerning administrative contracts. For instance, the parties to a dispute can already freely resort to amicable methods (mediation, conciliation or settlement agreement), and some exceptions to the principle prohibiting public bodies from resorting to arbitration are provided for. However, the voids and shortcomings of the current system of alternative dispute resolution in administrative contracts (lack of proper status of the mediator, paucity of framework for inter partes conciliation, complexity of the concept of reciprocal concessions or, difficulty for the administrative judge to assert its competence in international arbitration...) make its understanding and implementation more complex and more prone to increasing public order violations. It is therefore necessary to propose a sustainable regime of alternative methods to ensure, on the one hand, the protection of peremptory norms of public law and, on the other hand, the freedom of the parties in the choice and conduct of an alternative justice. For that purpose, the future regime will have to authorize arbitration in administrative contracts and endow it with procedural guarantees taking into account its specific nature but also certain characteristics inherent in public entities and administrative law. Furthermore, the mediation and conciliation procedures will have to be improved in order to provide the parties with a flexible framework conducive to the conclusion of balanced and secure settlement agreements. Finally, this regime must definitively establish the role of the administrative judge. To this end, that judge may be called upon to assist the parties in the implementation of alternative methods (creation of an administrative support judge in arbitration, combination of interim reliefs with amicable procedures...). The administrative judge must also be responsible for checking the compliance of the alternative solution to the public order. This attribution of jurisdiction, which is resonates all the more in international arbitration, is fundamental for the protection of the public interest. It is only under these conditions that the development of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms can take its place in administrative contracts.