Legal rules protecting the economic competition against abusive pricing practices are traditionally part of the public branch of competition law. Sensitive drafting of the law by legislator or the prudence of law interpretation by the competition authority or the court in the specific case predetermines the companies` willingness to develop dynamically on the relevant market. Legislation of the poor quality prospectively misleading decisional practice can lead in two extreme situations; on one side unlimited freedom for the dominant company, on the other side unfounded and excessive sanctions, which distract the companies` ambitions to achieve excellence. The topic - The Protection of Economic Competition with Special Regard to Pricing - is dealt in five chapters of the thesis. The aim of the paper is to analyze substantial components in each price form of abuse, solve the relevant questions of law with regard to case study concerning both the European and the Czech context and consider where the development of this law field currently results in. The methodology is mainly based on the comparative and critical research of the decisional practice. Chapter One surveys predatory pricing. It contains passage on the price-costs test, which is the major issue also for the following chapters of the study....

The aim of this thesis is to analyse how the margin squeeze developed within the reasoning of the European Union. Margin squeeze is a special type of abuse of dominant position. This type of abuse has massively developed in last years. However, we cannot say that it is totally new form of abuse as we can find certain cases that concern margin squeeze already in the 70s. Nevertheless, especially because of the liberalisation of network industries in the 90s, this abuse has substantially spread up and because of that there was a necessity to answer certain questions that were unclear until that time. This thesis is composed of four main chapters that are further composed of particular subchapters for the purpose to analyse this development. Chapter one is dedicated to general characteristic of the margin squeeze. This abuse is first of all classified as a special type of the abuse of dominant position according to article 102 TFEU. Afterwards, the chapter concerns about the definition of this abuse and its particular legal and economical characters. This all from theoretical point of view. Chapter two briefly discuss the most significant cases that concern margin squeeze and that were decided by European institutions. All these cases are ordered chronologically and the main goal is to describe its...

Abuse of Dominant Position in the ICT Sector: A European Perspective Abstract The concept of abuse of dominant position refers to business practices in which a dominant market player may engage in order to maintain or strengthen its position in the market, and are prohibited under Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. This master's thesis provides insight into theory and decisional practice of abuse of dominant position within the EU with particular focus on the area of information and communication technologies (ICT). The ICT industry belongs among the fastest developing, with many new powerful market players emerging, often creating entirely new markets for themselves. This is where a potential risk for an abuse of dominance occurs and why many of the breakthrough cases in the previous years have been related to this sector. Since not only their products but also their business models are innovative, the competition policy must advance accordingly. This thesis firstly introduces the economic background and the policy objectives of contemporary EU competition rules. It is followed by a step-by-step examination of the assessment on the position of the investigated firm in the relevant market and the legality of the practice in question. Highlighted are the aspects which have...

O Direito Internacional da Concorrência é o ramo do direito que protege o exercício da liberdade de concorrência. Liberdade esta que, com o desenvolvimento do mundo globalizado, vem sendo atacada pelas multinacionais, causando prejuízo às economias tanto locais quanto internacionais, assim como aos consumidores, se fazendo necessária a intervenção estatal para regulação desses conflitos. Entretanto, emerge um novo conflito quando o Estado detém o controle acionário de uma empresa, como é o caso das empresas estatais. Tal panorama vem se agravando e causando conflitos concorrenciais no cenário global. A China, país em que tradicionalmente o governo detinha controle de todas as empresas nele constituídas, após a abertura de mercado, vem adotando constantes reformas de políticas de mercado com o viés de introduzir a alta tecnologia e expandir as relações comerciais com os demais países do mundo. Hodiernamente, após as reformas comerciais e estruturais das empresas estatais, a China determinou que setores-chave considerados importantes para segurança econômica chinesa serão de controle estatal, isto é, com monopólio estatal. Isto posto, a presente investigação procurou verificar se as empresas estatais chinesas estariam abusando de sua posição dominante para além das fronteiras e infringindo, sobretudo, a própria legislação concorrencial da China, cuja promulgação fora exigida pelos demais membros da Organização Mundial do Comércio. A investigação se dividiu em três partes essenciais: primeiro sobre as transformações econômicas, mercantis, sociais e jurídicas chinesas, principalmente no período posterior ao século XX; na segunda parte, se tratou do direito concorrencial na China, confrontando-o com as empresas estatais; e no último capítulo, foram verificados casos administrativos e judiciais perante os órgãos de regulamentação concorrencial. Pretendeu-se, pelo método dedutivo de pesquisa, verificar se a dicotomia formada entre a proteção governamental às empresas estatais fere a liberdade de um mercado competitivo. Buscou-se, assim, verificar se a atividade das empresas estatais chinesas ocupou fatia relevante de mercado a ponto de abusar da sua posição dominante e se é a China um palco para a aplicação de penalidades, visando à ordem e à liberdade concorrencial. Conclui-se que ocorre tratamento desigual na imposição de penalidades por práticas de abuso de posição dominante quando se tratam de empresas estrangeiras e empresas estatais chinesas. Denotou-se por meio da análise casuística que os esforços dos órgãos de fiscalização concorrencial chineses no combate a práticas anticoncorrenciais são alcançados, até o presente momento, quando versam sobre empresas estrangeiras, enquanto que as empresas estatais recebem tratamento dessemelhante e permissivo às práticas monopolistas. / The International Competition Law is the law that protects the freedom of competition. Freedom of which, with the development of the globalized world, comes under attack by multinationals, causing damage to the economies both local and international, as well as consumers, making it necessary the state intervention to regulate these conflicts. However, emerges into a new conflict when the state holds a controlling stake of the company, such as state-owned enterprises. This scenario has been growing worse and causing conflicts competitive on the global stage. China, which traditionally held control of all companies set up in it, after the opening of the market, has been adopting constant market policy reforms with the bias to introduce high technology and expanding trade relations with other countries worldwide. In our times, after trade and structural reforms of state-owned enterprises, China has determined that key sectors of the economy considered important to China's economic security will be of state control. Accordingly, the present investigation sought to ascertain whether chinese state-owned enterprises were abusing their dominant position beyond the borders and in particular violating China's own competition law, which was demanded by the other members of the World Trade Organization The investigation was divided into three essential parts: first on the chinese economic, mercantile, social and legal transformations, mainly in the period after the twentieth century; on the second part, it dealt with competition law in China, confronting it with state enterprises; and in the last chapter, administrative and judicial cases were verified before the regulatory bodies of competition. It was intended, by the deductive method of research, to verify if the dichotomy formed between governmental protection of state-owned enterprises hurts the freedom of a competitive market. It was therefore sought to ascertain whether the activity of Chinese state-owned enterprises occupied a relevant market share to the extent of abusing its dominant position and whether China is a stage for the application of penalties for order and competitive freedom. It is concluded that there is unequal treatment in the imposition of consequences for abuse of dominant positions when dealing with foreign companies and chinese state-owned enterprises. The case-by-case analysis has shown that the efforts of Chinese competition authorities in the fight against anticompetitive practices have so far been reached when dealing with foreign companies, while state-owned enterprises are treated differently and permissively from monopoly practices.

<p>Competition law is an area which is going through changes over time, especially EC competition law in regard to the ongoing process of market integration. The definition of the relevant geographic market within EC competition law is of importance to define, both in case law and for undertakings and their businesses, as the law should be predictable. Before Article 82 of the EC Treaty, which prohibits abusive behaviour by undertakings, is applicable the relevant geographic market has to be defined. As is the case with the Merger Regulation, the relevant geographic market has to be defined to make an assessment of the undertakings’ activities. The definition of the geographic market is then used as a tool in the analysis of the assessment of competition and the effects of measures carried out by undertakings which restrain competition. Thus, the definition of the relevant geographic market is crucial for the purposes of Community competition law.</p><p>The definition of the relevant geographic market can be said to be an area where “the objective conditions of competition applying to the product in question must be the same for all traders” as established in United Brands. In Deutsche Bahn it was clarified that “... the definition of the geographical market does not require the objective conditions of competition between traders to be perfectly homogenous”. It is enough if they are similar, therefore areas in which the objective conditions of competition are different, are not considered to be a uniform market.</p><p>In the Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law the Commission’s work to define the relevant geographic market is described as well as the evidence the Commission contemplates in its assessment. The substitutability test is relied on by the Commission. In case law from the European Court of Justice, the Court of First Instance, and the Commission, different factors are scrutinized to establish the relevant geographic market. Such factors are e.g., the undertakings’ activities, barriers to trade, and barriers to entry.</p><p>The significance of the evidence and the factors used in the definition of the relevant geographic market are debatable. The factors considered vary on a case to case basis and they need to differ to make a correct assessment of the relevant geographic market in every case within EC competition law.</p>

Competition law is an area which is going through changes over time, especially EC competition law in regard to the ongoing process of market integration. The definition of the relevant geographic market within EC competition law is of importance to define, both in case law and for undertakings and their businesses, as the law should be predictable. Before Article 82 of the EC Treaty, which prohibits abusive behaviour by undertakings, is applicable the relevant geographic market has to be defined. As is the case with the Merger Regulation, the relevant geographic market has to be defined to make an assessment of the undertakings’ activities. The definition of the geographic market is then used as a tool in the analysis of the assessment of competition and the effects of measures carried out by undertakings which restrain competition. Thus, the definition of the relevant geographic market is crucial for the purposes of Community competition law. The definition of the relevant geographic market can be said to be an area where “the objective conditions of competition applying to the product in question must be the same for all traders” as established in United Brands. In Deutsche Bahn it was clarified that “... the definition of the geographical market does not require the objective conditions of competition between traders to be perfectly homogenous”. It is enough if they are similar, therefore areas in which the objective conditions of competition are different, are not considered to be a uniform market. In the Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law the Commission’s work to define the relevant geographic market is described as well as the evidence the Commission contemplates in its assessment. The substitutability test is relied on by the Commission. In case law from the European Court of Justice, the Court of First Instance, and the Commission, different factors are scrutinized to establish the relevant geographic market. Such factors are e.g., the undertakings’ activities, barriers to trade, and barriers to entry. The significance of the evidence and the factors used in the definition of the relevant geographic market are debatable. The factors considered vary on a case to case basis and they need to differ to make a correct assessment of the relevant geographic market in every case within EC competition law.

<p>This thesis intends to analyze and clarify the legal position regarding abuse of a dominant position and particularly tying practices. The practice is central within European competition law and has been highly discussed in literature recently. In Article 102 TFEU it is explicitly stated that supplementary obligations which have no connection with the subject of such contracts, shall be considered as a way of abusing a position of strength. Although the method is often reasonable and very common within many business areas, it might be pursued as a tactic of excluding competition. The General Court’s decision in <em>Microsoft </em>led to some confusion as regards to the European approach towards tying practices. Prior to that judgment, the EU Courts appeared quite negative to the practice and seemed determined that the practice was in fact anticompetitive. For an example, in <em>Hilti </em>the Court found it sufficient that the company had deprived its costumers of a choice. The effects on competition were not analyzed in great detail and in most cases the EU Courts fined the undertaking involved in such business methods. However, in <em>Microsoft </em>the General Court took a new approach and focused on the actual effects that followed from the practice. Many argues that European competition law has moved from a <em>per se </em>approach to a <em>rule of reason</em> approach. In my opinion however, it seems relatively unclear whether or not this new approach shall apply to all versions of tying or if it was applied due to the certain circumstances involved in <em>Microsoft</em>. The tying practice involved a form of technical tying, i.e. an integration of two distinctive products. Cases prior to <em>Microsoft </em>mostly concerned a form of contractual tying and were treated very differently by the EU Courts. My opinion on the matter is therefore that it is not possible to declare a clear legal position regarding the practice of tying. There is a need for new judgments and official guidelines since the current situation deprives companies of legal security as concerns the practice of tying within European competition law.</p>

This thesis intends to analyze and clarify the legal position regarding abuse of a dominant position and particularly tying practices. The practice is central within European competition law and has been highly discussed in literature recently. In Article 102 TFEU it is explicitly stated that supplementary obligations which have no connection with the subject of such contracts, shall be considered as a way of abusing a position of strength. Although the method is often reasonable and very common within many business areas, it might be pursued as a tactic of excluding competition. The General Court’s decision in Microsoft led to some confusion as regards to the European approach towards tying practices. Prior to that judgment, the EU Courts appeared quite negative to the practice and seemed determined that the practice was in fact anticompetitive. For an example, in Hilti the Court found it sufficient that the company had deprived its costumers of a choice. The effects on competition were not analyzed in great detail and in most cases the EU Courts fined the undertaking involved in such business methods. However, in Microsoft the General Court took a new approach and focused on the actual effects that followed from the practice. Many argues that European competition law has moved from a per se approach to a rule of reason approach. In my opinion however, it seems relatively unclear whether or not this new approach shall apply to all versions of tying or if it was applied due to the certain circumstances involved in Microsoft. The tying practice involved a form of technical tying, i.e. an integration of two distinctive products. Cases prior to Microsoft mostly concerned a form of contractual tying and were treated very differently by the EU Courts. My opinion on the matter is therefore that it is not possible to declare a clear legal position regarding the practice of tying. There is a need for new judgments and official guidelines since the current situation deprives companies of legal security as concerns the practice of tying within European competition law.

This thesis deals with abusive tying practices and its concept under European Union law and United States of America law. Author tries to define concept of abusive tying practices and find necessary elements for legal assessment of tying. Moreover, author carries on the comparative analysis of the Microsoft tying cases in European Union and in United States of America, in order to find whether same elements of tying practices conditions the same outcome in the case law. / Šis darbas nagrinėja piktnaudžiaujančio susiejimo praktiką ir jos sąvoką pagal Europos Sąjungos ir Jungtinių Amerikos Valstijų teisės aktus. Autorė bando nustatyti piktnaudžiaujančio susiejimo veiklos koncepciją ir rasti susiejimo teisiniam įvertinimui reikalingus elementus. Be to, autorė atlieka lyginamąją analizę Microsoft susiejimo bylos Europos Sąjungos ir Jungtinių Amerikos Valstijų teismuose, su tikslu nustatyti ar tie patys elementai abiejose jurisdikcijose lemia tapačią teismų praktiką.

This work deals with legal aspects of collective dominant position under Article 82 of the Treaty establishing European Community (hereinafter- EC). The purpose is to reveal a legal definition and main features of collective dominant position. The author examines features and criteria which are established in the jurisprudence of EC institutions. The author examines features and criteria which are established in the jurisprudence of EC institutions. The author also indicates that the criteria for establishing collective dominance are not fully scrutinized under EC competition law. Moreover, the practice of EC institutions is analyzed not only under Article 82, which prohibits abuse of a dominant position, but also under Merger regulation to that extent which is necessary to reveal the main topic. Further the work presents problems which are found under these two institutions of EC competition law.