Les biens immatériels que possèdent les entreprises, sont le plus souvent des droits de propriété industrielle ou un savoir-faire tenu secret. Leur exploitation indirecte, nationale ou internationale, s’effectue à travers la conclusion de différents contrats d’exploitation. Avec la mondialisation, ces contrats sont au cœur de l’économie moderne et constituent l’un des outils de transfert de technologie. Cette thèse propose une analyse globale des contrats d’exploitation des droits de propriété industrielle et de savoir-faire en droit marocain et en droit français. Dans la première partie, on expose leur régime général, en droit des contrats, droit de la propriété industrielle et droit de la concurrence. La deuxième partie propose une analyse unitaire de chaque type de ces contrats dans ces deux systèmes et traite leurs régimes spécifiques. / Intangible property owned by companies consists most often of the industrial property rights or a secret know-how. Their indirect exploitation, national or international, is made through the concluding of various contracts of exploitation. With the globalization, these contracts are at the heart of the modern economy and constitute one of the most important tools of technology transfer. This dissertation offers a global analysis of the various contracts of exploitation of the industrial property rights and know-how in Moroccan law and in French law. The first part of the thesis exposes their general regime under contract law, industrial property law and competition law. The second part proposes a unitary analysis, which views the problems raised by each type of these contracts in these two legal systems and treats their specific regimes.

O direito antitruste, atualmente ditado pela Lei 12.529 de 30 de novembro de 2011, e o direito da propriedade intelectual permeiam o ordenamento jurídico brasileiro buscando regrar condutas e procedimentos com vistas a tutelar, de um lado, a livre concorrência e, de outro, estimular a inovação e o desenvolvimento tecnológico do país. No exercício de ambos os direitos, muitas vezes observam-se conflitos, que aparentemente revelam uma contradição: a concessão de exclusividade de exploração de bens intangíveis, tais como patentes e desenhos industriais, conflita com a livre concorrência, sendo uma excludente da outra. Entretanto, essa contradição, como se verá, encontra-se superada. Em nosso sistema jurídico não há direitos absolutos que possam justificar a dominância pura e simples de um sobre o outro sem medir as consequências. O equilíbrio é buscado através da vedação legal aos abusos de direito, especialmente abusos de direito de propriedade intelectual e o exercício abusivo de poder econômico. Adicionalmente, a Constituição Federal subordina o uso da propriedade à sua função social. O presente estudo analisa as questões que envolvem esse aparente conflito e os abusos decorrentes do exercício desses direitos. O tema é introduzido com a análise da interface entre o direito da propriedade intelectual e o antitruste e as questões de direito dela decorrentes. A seguir, são analisados o abuso de direito, o abuso de poder econômico e o abuso de posição dominante, com destaque para o entendimento da existência de venda casada mesmo que o vínculo ocorra com diferimento no tempo. O estudo prossegue discorrendo sobre a livre iniciativa e a livre concorrência, bem como o instituto do desenho industrial e seu eventual uso abusivo. Também são analisados o mercado de reposição de peças e partes de produtos complexos e sua repercussão no Brasil e no exterior, e a posição do CADE sobre eventuais condutas anticompetitivas. A jurisprudência comentada ilustra as diversas posições doutrinárias acerca da matéria. O monopólio decorrente de direito de propriedade intelectual seria benéfico para a eficiência e regulação dos mercados, apesar de seus eventuais efeitos contra os interesses do consumidor? Este ensaio procura responder essa indagação, aprofundando o debate sobre o conflito entre o monopólio concedido por desenho industrial às peças de reposição de objetos complexos e a liberdade de escolha do consumidor. Oferece ainda uma proposta legislativa que visa assegurar o equilíbrio entre os direitos dos envolvidos. / The antitrust law, currently under Law 12,529, of November 30, 2011, and the intellectual property law is within the Brazilian juridical ordination, seeking to rule conducts and procedures intended to protect the free competition, on one hand, and to stimulate the innovation and technological development of the country, on the other hand. In the performance of both rights, conflicts are many times observed, which apparently reveal a contradiction: the granting of exclusivity for the exploitation of intangible goods, such as patents and industrial designs, conflicts with the free competition, excluding one another. Said contradiction, however, has been overcome, as it will be noticed. Our juridical system encompasses no absolute rights liable to justify the pure and simple dominance of one on the other, without assessing the consequences. The balance is searched by means of the legal prevention of the abuses of right, especially the abuses of the intellectual property law and the abusive exercise of the economic power. In addition, the Federal Constitution subordinates the use of property to its social function. This study analyzes the issues involving this apparent conflict and the abuses resulting from the enforcement of said rights. The theme is introduced with the analysis of the interface between the intellectual property right and the antitrust one and the resulting legal issues. Then, the abuse of right, the abuse of economic power and the abuse of the dominant position are analysed, pointing out the understanding of the existence of a tying arrangement, even though the binding occurs with deferral in time. The study proceeds by analyzing the free initiative and the free competition, as well as the industrial design institute and its eventual abusive use. The parts reposition and parts of complex products and their repercussion in Brazil and overseas, the CADE´s position as to eventual anticompetitive conducts are also analyzed. The commented jurisprudence illustrates the several opinion of jurists on this matter. Would the monopoly resulting from the intellectual property right benefit the market efficiency and regulation, despite the eventual effects against the consumer interests ? This paper seeks to reply such a question, by deepening the debate on the conflicts between the monopoly granted by industrial design to spare parts of complex objects and the consumer´s free choice. It also offers a legislative proposal intended to ensure the balance between the involved parties´ rights.

Abstract Copyright is designed to not interfere with society's general and overriding interest of effective competition. An effective market competition benefits consumers by lowering prices, raising the quality and expands the range of goods and services. The purpose of the paper is to investigate if the collecting societies licensing violates competition laws. On the basis of the investigation regarding the bill for a new Swedish copyright law (URL), mainly the new wording that regulates the license agreement, corresponds to the EU competition rules and customs within the area. The collecting societies licensing violates the competition laws in the following cases • Discrimination of members because of nationality •           Authors transferring their sole rights to global exploitation •           The collecting society have the right to manage the rights after the author have left as a member •           Users that are established abroad do not get access to the repertoire of  the collecting societies, the same goes for concerted practice if this is the purpose or result •           Parallel behaviours that cannot be explained objectively •           Dividing the market •           Fixed Prices •           Refusal to sign multi-territorial licenses •           Apply different conditions for equivalent transactions resulting in competition disadvantages for a company that cannot be justified by reasonable causes Currently there are no indications that the new bill to a new URL violates EU law. The author of the paper thinks this may change if the collective management extends, so that other member states get the extended license agreements, then the single market is affected by the competition restriction that the new bill to the URL mean. The author of the paper thinks that the bill for a new URL should be changed so that a collective society will not get monopoly to sign licenses with extended license agreements. / Sammanfattning Upphovsrätten är utformad i syfte att inte inkräkta på samhällets generella och överordnade intresse av en effektiv konkurrens. En effektiv marknadskonkurrens gynnar konsumenterna genom att den pressar priserna, höjer kvaliteten och ökar utbudet av varor och tjänster. Syftet med uppsatsen är att utreda om upphovsrättsorganisationernas licensering strider mot konkurrenslagstiftningen. Utifrån den utredningen granskas om lagförslaget till en ny URL, framförallt den nya lydelsen som reglerar avtalslicenser, stämmer överens med EU:s konkurrensregler och praxis på området.  I följande fall strider upphovsrättsorganisations licensering mot konkurrensrätten •           Diskriminering av medlemmarna på grund av nationalitet •           Upphovsmännen överlåter sina rättigheter med ensamrätt för en global exploatering •           Upphovsrättsorganisationen har rätt att förvalta rättigheterna efter att upphovsmannen utträtt som medlem •           Användare som är etablerade utomlands får inte tillgång till upphovsrättsorganisationens repertoar, gäller även samordnade förfaranden om detta är syftet eller resultatet •           Parallella beteenden som inte kan förklaras objektivt •           Uppdelning av marknaden •           Prissamarbeten •           Vägra teckna multi-territoriella licenser •           Tillämpa olika villkor för likvärdiga transaktioner med följden att ena bolaget får en konkurrensnackdel som inte går att rättfärdiga genom sakliga skäl I nuläget finns inget som tyder på att det nya lagförslaget till en ny URL strider mot EU-rätten. Enligt uppsatsförfattarens åsikt kan detta ändras om den kollektiva förvaltningen utökas så att den får avtalslicensverkan även i andra medlemsländer varpå den inre marknaden påverkas av den konkurrensbegränsning som det nya lagförslaget till en ny URL innebär. Uppsatsförfattaren anser att lagförslaget till en ny URL bör ändras så att inte en upphovsrättsorganisation ges monopol att teckna licens med avtalslicensverkan.

This work includes analysis of application of rules of the Competition law in European Community and in the Republic of Lithuania, those concerned to the abuse of the dominant position connected to unfair pricing. There is laid the detailed explanation of concept of the unfair pricing, distinguishing the four groups of such pricing – excessive pricing, „predatory” pricing, discriminatory pricing and unfair discounts and rebates.

Définies comme des pratiques contractuelles abusives dans les rapports entre professionnels, les pratiques restrictives amoindrissent considérablement la capacité concurrentielle du partenaire commercial. Le droit de la concurrence et plus particulièrement, le droit des pratiques anticoncurrentielles peut constituer une voie de droit permettant la répression de ces comportements. L’étude menée permet de s’interroger sur l’efficacité de l’entente et des abus de domination, entendus comme concepts d’accueil, afin de lutter contre les pratiques restrictives. Alors même que les abus de domination présentent des points de convergence importants avec la notion de «pratique restrictive », l’appréhension est profondément nuancée. Les exigences textuelles inhérentes à la démonstration de l’abus de position dominante (102 TFUE et art. L.420-2, al. 1er du Code de commerce) sont drastiques et l’appréciation de l’abus de dépendance économique en droit français (art. L.420-2, al. 2 du Code de commerce) est si étroite qu’elle ne permet pas de faciliter la captation positive des pratiques restrictives. En outre, la preuve de la restriction de concurrence est difficile à rapporter en présence de comportements qui atteignent, le plus souvent, le simple partenaire contractuel et non le marché entendu dans sa globalité. Paradoxalement, si l’entente apparaît comme un concept peu ressemblant dans ses composantes à la notion de «pratique restrictive », l’appréhension y est privilégiée. Afin de faciliter la mutation de la pratique en comportement concerté, les autorités de concurrence procèdent à une lecture généreuse du critère de la concertation. La restriction de concurrence fait également l’objet d’une appréciation compréhensive. Que l’appréhension soit opérée au titre de l’entente ou des abus de domination, des pistes de réflexion sont proposées afin de perfectionner le traitement concurrentiel des pratiques restrictives. / Defined as unfair contractual practices in relations between professionals, restrictive practices significantly undermine the competitiveness of the trading partner. Competition law and, more specifically, antitrust law can be a remedy to the suppression of these behaviours. The study raises questions about the effectiveness of the cartel and abuse of dominance in the fight against restrictive practices. The analysis tends to gauge their understanding through the prism of the two concepts that are cartels and abuse of dominance. Even as abuse of dominance have important points of convergence with the concept of “restrictive practice”, apprehension is deeply nuanced. Textual requirements inherent in the demonstration of the abuse of dominant position (102 TFUE andart. L.420-2, al. 1 of the Commercial Code) are drastic and appreciation of the abuse of economic dependence in French law (art. L.420-2, al. 2 of the Commercial Code) is so narrow that it does not facilitate the positive uptake of restrictive practices. In addition, evidence of the competition restriction is difficult to bring in conduct that reach, in most cases, the mere contractual partner and not the market heard in its entirety. Paradoxically, if the cartels appears to be a bit like concept in its components to the concept of “restrictive practice ", apprehension is preferred. To facilitate the transfer of practice concerted behaviour, competition authorities proceed to a generous reading of the meeting of minds. Competition restriction is also the subject of a comprehensive appreciation. That apprehension is made under the cartel or abuse of dominant position, actionable insights are proposed to improve the competitive treatment of restrictive practices.

L'adhésion de l'Arabie Saoudite à l'Organisation Mondiale du Commerce (OMC) a joué un rôle moteur dans le développement de son système juridique. Elle a créé la nécessité urgente de développer et de conformer son système judiciaire au libéralisme dominant du commerce mondial. Elle a également donné lieu à l'adoption de la Loi Saoudienne de la Concurrence n°(M/24), le 11 février 2014, en faveur de la protection de la concurrence et la prévention des pratiques monopolistiques. Cette loi vise à faire respecter deux règlementations importantes. La première vise à maintenir les pratiques et le comportement concurrentiels des entreprises qui participent activement au marché, par l'interdiction d'ententes anticoncurrentielles, y compris l'abus de pouvoir de marché, dont certaines entreprises dominantes peuvent se rendre coupables par l'emploi de pratiques concurrentielles. Le second règlement porte sur la préservation de la structure du marché et la restriction des politiques d'entreprise visant à concentrer les opérations. Car, il est naturel que les entreprises cherchent à la fois à gérer leur développement sur le marché et à limiter les effets des politiques anticoncurrentielles et de concentration, en vue de maintenir la liberté de la concurrence.L'étude des pratiques de la Loi saoudienne sur la concurrence révèle, néanmoins, certaines insuffisances, qui sont déterminées en plusieurs points dans les lois française et européenne sur la concurrence. L'objet de cette recherche vise donc à répondre à la nécessité de combler les lacunes de la législation saoudienne. Cette étude comprend également trois types d'actions judiciaires en matière de droit de la concurrence. / Saudi Arabia's recent adhesion to the World Trade Organization (WTO) has created a pressing necessity to develop and conform its judiciary system to the high liberalism of global commerce. Including the adoption of a law favoring the protection of market competition and the prevention of monopolizing practices, in the context of the Saudi Competition Act N° (M/24) of 11111 of February 2014. This law seeks to enforce two important regulations. The first is to maintain the competitive practices and behavior of businesses actively participating in the market by disallowing anti-competitive agreements, as well as the abuse of power that certain dominant companies in the market may be guilty of by not employing competitive practices. The second regulation is the preservation of the structure of the industry market by managing and thereby limiting company policies seeking to concentrate operations, as it is natural that companies seek to manage their market development and as such limit the effects of anti-competitive concentration policies to ensure freedom of competition. While studying these practices in the Saudi Competition Act, insufficiency and negligence has been determined on multiple items mentioned and described in the French and European competition laws, as such the researcher judges it necessary to fill the gaps of these lacking areas in the Saudi legislation. This study also comprises three types of judiciary action in competition law.

O direito antitruste, atualmente ditado pela Lei 12.529 de 30 de novembro de 2011, e o direito da propriedade intelectual permeiam o ordenamento jurídico brasileiro buscando regrar condutas e procedimentos com vistas a tutelar, de um lado, a livre concorrência e, de outro, estimular a inovação e o desenvolvimento tecnológico do país. No exercício de ambos os direitos, muitas vezes observam-se conflitos, que aparentemente revelam uma contradição: a concessão de exclusividade de exploração de bens intangíveis, tais como patentes e desenhos industriais, conflita com a livre concorrência, sendo uma excludente da outra. Entretanto, essa contradição, como se verá, encontra-se superada. Em nosso sistema jurídico não há direitos absolutos que possam justificar a dominância pura e simples de um sobre o outro sem medir as consequências. O equilíbrio é buscado através da vedação legal aos abusos de direito, especialmente abusos de direito de propriedade intelectual e o exercício abusivo de poder econômico. Adicionalmente, a Constituição Federal subordina o uso da propriedade à sua função social. O presente estudo analisa as questões que envolvem esse aparente conflito e os abusos decorrentes do exercício desses direitos. O tema é introduzido com a análise da interface entre o direito da propriedade intelectual e o antitruste e as questões de direito dela decorrentes. A seguir, são analisados o abuso de direito, o abuso de poder econômico e o abuso de posição dominante, com destaque para o entendimento da existência de venda casada mesmo que o vínculo ocorra com diferimento no tempo. O estudo prossegue discorrendo sobre a livre iniciativa e a livre concorrência, bem como o instituto do desenho industrial e seu eventual uso abusivo. Também são analisados o mercado de reposição de peças e partes de produtos complexos e sua repercussão no Brasil e no exterior, e a posição do CADE sobre eventuais condutas anticompetitivas. A jurisprudência comentada ilustra as diversas posições doutrinárias acerca da matéria. O monopólio decorrente de direito de propriedade intelectual seria benéfico para a eficiência e regulação dos mercados, apesar de seus eventuais efeitos contra os interesses do consumidor? Este ensaio procura responder essa indagação, aprofundando o debate sobre o conflito entre o monopólio concedido por desenho industrial às peças de reposição de objetos complexos e a liberdade de escolha do consumidor. Oferece ainda uma proposta legislativa que visa assegurar o equilíbrio entre os direitos dos envolvidos. / The antitrust law, currently under Law 12,529, of November 30, 2011, and the intellectual property law is within the Brazilian juridical ordination, seeking to rule conducts and procedures intended to protect the free competition, on one hand, and to stimulate the innovation and technological development of the country, on the other hand. In the performance of both rights, conflicts are many times observed, which apparently reveal a contradiction: the granting of exclusivity for the exploitation of intangible goods, such as patents and industrial designs, conflicts with the free competition, excluding one another. Said contradiction, however, has been overcome, as it will be noticed. Our juridical system encompasses no absolute rights liable to justify the pure and simple dominance of one on the other, without assessing the consequences. The balance is searched by means of the legal prevention of the abuses of right, especially the abuses of the intellectual property law and the abusive exercise of the economic power. In addition, the Federal Constitution subordinates the use of property to its social function. This study analyzes the issues involving this apparent conflict and the abuses resulting from the enforcement of said rights. The theme is introduced with the analysis of the interface between the intellectual property right and the antitrust one and the resulting legal issues. Then, the abuse of right, the abuse of economic power and the abuse of the dominant position are analysed, pointing out the understanding of the existence of a tying arrangement, even though the binding occurs with deferral in time. The study proceeds by analyzing the free initiative and the free competition, as well as the industrial design institute and its eventual abusive use. The parts reposition and parts of complex products and their repercussion in Brazil and overseas, the CADE´s position as to eventual anticompetitive conducts are also analyzed. The commented jurisprudence illustrates the several opinion of jurists on this matter. Would the monopoly resulting from the intellectual property right benefit the market efficiency and regulation, despite the eventual effects against the consumer interests ? This paper seeks to reply such a question, by deepening the debate on the conflicts between the monopoly granted by industrial design to spare parts of complex objects and the consumer´s free choice. It also offers a legislative proposal intended to ensure the balance between the involved parties´ rights.

No description available.

The study shows that multi-sided markets pose difficulties when the relevant product market is to be defined. These difficulties pertain to two questions. The first question is whether one or several markets should be defined. In this regard, it is not easy to extract a coherent method from the cases examined. Instead, the methods applied give the impression of ad hoc-solutions, where similar circumstances result in dissimilar outcomes. Indeed, it is hard to reconcile the different market definitions in Visa International MIF and MasterCard MIF. The uncertainties are not limited to these two cases, as the methods applied in Google Shopping too give rise to ambiguities. Why was the market for general search engine platforms separated into two distinct product markets, but the market for comparison shopping services encompassed both sides? Unfortunately, this discussion was not present in the decision. This only serves to reinforce the impression that these questions are solved on an ad hoc-basis. A clear method of approaching multi-sided markets is desirable, not least because the enforcement of competition rules must be characterized by consistency and foreseeability. Hopefully, the judgement in Google Shopping will bring further clarity to this. Nonetheless, the conclusion is that one market should be defined when differences between competitive constraints on the two sides are absent. E contrario, this means that two markets should be defined when such differences are present. This is true regardless of the market in question being a transaction or a non-transaction market. This method seems preferable to strictly adhering to the division of multi-sided markets into transaction or non-transaction markets. If the Commission’s analysis is correct in that there are no differences in competitive constraints on the two sides of comparison shopping services, in combination with crossing network effects, the platform’s multi-sidedness is a necessary trait for both sides. This means that a substitute has to be multi-sided in order for it to be included on the relevant product market, which minimizes the risk for false negatives. Vice versa, the definition of two markets allows for one-sided products to be included on the relevant product market, which minimizes the risk for false positives. This is important not only for the binary finding of dominance or non-dominance, but also the degree of dominance. As concluded above, incorrectly defining one market may artificially inflate the degree of dominance into false super-dominance, and incorrectly defining several markets may artificially dilute the degree of dominance. The second question is how substitutability should be measured. It is obvious from the cases examined that qualitative measures are used and not quantitative measures. The products’ characteristics, intended use, purpose, functionalities, users’ perceptions of the product, etc. were given much attention. The SSNIP test was not applied in any of the cases. The first conclusion to be drawn from the examination above is therefore that the difficulties regarding measuring substitutability on multi-sided markets mainly concern quantitative measures. The arguments against applying a SSNIP test related to the cellophane fallacy (in two different forms, one of which was deceivingly similar to the reverse cellophane fallacy) and differences in price sensitivities between the two sides. Network effects present an additional difficulty, which may lead to exaggerated results when measuring substitutability. The second conclusion to be drawn is that there exists a reluctance to apply a SSNIP test in a way that is tailored for multi-sided markets. One method that has been proposed is to apply the test on the total sum paid by both sides, while allowing the intermediary to adjust the increase in price in accordance with its price structure. The categorical dismissal of applying the test in this way suggests that adapted versions have some time to wait before being introduced into case law and decisional practice. If they, as their proponents argue, are a robust way of broadening the evidence of possible substitutability, this is unfortunate. The risk of defining the market overly narrow or overly broad is of course present in this regard as well. A broader spectrum of evidence therefore minimizes the risk of incorrectly finding both dominance and non-dominance.

The thesis deals with competition law (law on unlawful restriction of competition as well as unfair competition) in Russian Federation, it particularly compares Russian and Czech law. Its content is first a brief introduction to Russian competition law, sources of law etc. Next chapters are devoted to basic concepts of this branch of law. Law about abuse of dominant position, cartels, control of mergers, and unfair competition has been analysed. The last chapter deals with the supervision in the disucussed area.