Ce mémoire est consacré aux théories à processus duaux, abondamment discutées dans la littérature récente en sciences cognitives. L'auteur y propose une version fortement amendée de l'approche défendue par Samuels (2009), remplaçant la distinction entre 'Systèmes' par une distinction entre 'Types de processus', qui permet de critiquer à la fois les approches (uniquement) modularistes et les approches décrivant une différence profonde entre deux systèmes ayant chacun leurs spécificités (fonctionnelles, phénoménologiques, neurologiques). Cependant, dans la version des théories à processus duaux défendue ici, la distinction entre 'Types de processus' n'est considérée a priori que comme une distinction heuristique permettant aux chercheuses et chercheurs de mieux comprendre l'esprit et d'en expliquer certaines propriétés. L'idée centrale défendue dans ce mémoire est que les processus cognitifs devraient y être distingués selon leur position dans un espace conceptuel multidimensionnel permettant de considérer l'ensemble des caractéristiques et des spécificités attribuées à un processus, cela étant préférable à les forcer dans l'un ou l'autre des 'Systèmes' ou des 'Types' identifiés dans les approches les plus influentes (cf. Evans, 2008). Une fois ce programme de recherche entamé, il sera alors possible de réviser la définition des concepts et des catégories utilisés pour refonder certaines notions présentes dans la littérature ('module', 'Système 1/2', etc.). L'argument se déroule en trois temps: 1) Le premier chapitre vise à clarifier la notion de 'module' très utilisée en sciences cognitives. Contre les approches visant à affaiblir cette notion afin que tous les processus de l'esprit soient considérés comme étant des modules, l'auteur - suivant notamment Faucher et Poirier (2009) et Samuels (2006) - jette le doute sur l'emploi qui est fait de cette notion par plusieurs auteurs très influents, notamment en psychologie évolutionniste (par exemple, Barrett, Carruthers, Cosmides, Tooby). 2) L'objectif du second chapitre est de présenter, examiner et critiquer plusieurs théories à processus duaux et de suggérer qu'aucune théorie actuellement discutée n'est adéquate pour décrire l'architecture de l'esprit. Les approches, particulièrement influentes ou représentatives, défendues par Stanovich (1999; 2004; 2009), par Evans (2008; 2009), par Lieberman (2007; 2009) et par Carruthers (2006; 2009) y sont abordées. 3) Dans le troisième chapitre, l'auteur critique le cadre développé par Samuels (2009), puis développe son approche des théories à processus duaux en montrant certains de ses avantages. ______________________________________________________________________________ MOTS-CLÉS DE L’AUTEUR : philosophie des sciences, sciences cognitives, psychologie, neurosciences, théorie à processus duaux, modularité, module, heuristique, biais, pensée critique, naturalisme.

In today's fast-paced, hyper-mediated society, the ability to balance accuracy and efficiency is essential. Media literacy educational programs have arisen to meet this need and proliferated in recent years. Although the practice of media literacy is thriving, its underlying mechanisms are poorly understood and evidence of effectiveness is mixed (e.g., Bergsma & Carney, 2008). A social psychological perspective has the potential to illuminate previously overlooked variables and inform research and practice in this growing field. In particular, whereas media literacy efforts typically emphasize thorough processing of media messages, dual-process theories of persuasion (e.g., Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) suggest this is not always realistic. When motivation or ability is compromised, individuals default to a low-effort processing mode, relying on peripheral cues or heuristics rather than carefully evaluating message arguments. In this mode, media messages can persuade unconsciously. Using a dual-process approach, the present research investigated how specific barriers to motivation (perceptions of personal invulnerability) and processing ability (emotion-based advertising, environmental distractions) influence the processes of media literacy. Participants (N = 882) were randomly assigned to 16 conditions in a 2 [vulnerability: demonstrated, control] x 2 [distractions: present, absent] x 2(2) [ad type: informational, emotional; two replicates of each type] between-subjects nested design. The vulnerability manipulation increased distrust in the target ads and reduced their persuasiveness, not through the hypothesized mechanism of heightened perceptions of vulnerability, but mediated by increased counterarguing. Relative to informational ads, emotional ads were judged more persuasive, attractive, similar to personal experience, and elicited greater identification. However, they were also rated less trustworthy than informational ads, suggesting emotional advertising largely bypasses logical decision-making processes. Distraction reduced counterarguing only among those who found the ad relatively unpersuasive. The results of this research highlight the central role of trust in media literacy processes. Although individuals recognize and distrust emotional forms of advertising, they are nonetheless persuaded by such appeals. Given the sophistication of contemporary advertising techniques and the ubiquity of distractions, the present research suggests new approaches to media literacy are needed, specifically tailored to decision-making under these more realistic media-use conditions.

Self-determination theory posits, through an organismic perspective of human development, that all humans are inherently curious to assimilate new information and all naturally behave for their psychological growth. Central to this natural tendency is the determinant role of the social environment in maintaining or hindering this inherent function of the self. Humans thus develop, through their life, motivational patterns that can be characterized as being either internalized or not. For SDT, this natural process of integrating one’s motives, values, and belief in the self can be observed through the internalization continuum of self-determination. The self-determination continuum describes the behavioral regulation of individuals and can be broke down in two large dimensions: autonomous vs controlled motivation. When applied to the educational context, the theory would say that students who invest themselves in their academic activities for more internalized and autonomous reasons will be more likely to experience positive educational outcomes (e.g., achievement, perseverance, deeper learning, well-being, and lower dropout intentions). However, recent meta-analyses revealed a small positive association between explicit self-evaluation of autonomous motivation (AM) and academic achievement (r ≈ .177; Cerasoli, Nicklin, & Ford, 2014; Richardson, Abraham, & Bond, 2012; Taylor et al., 2014). In those studies, the internalization dimensions have been mainly measured through self-report methodology, and even if those measures are valid and reliable they should only be interpreted as the accessible declared self-knowledge one individual has about his own motivational dispositions. As such, this thesis embarks on the premise that those explicit self-evaluations mainly tap into the reflective/conscious side on the human brain and that taking a dual-process perspective over the integration process could alleviate our understanding of human motivation. This thesis also acknowledges, as in most dual-process theories, the determinant role of working memory capacity (WMC) in the interplay between the explicit/reflective/controlled and implicit/impulsive/automatic processes. The ability to control and direct attention, as measured by WMC, is an important individual differences that can explain why some dual-process effect might be working for some individuals but not for the other (Barrett, Tugade, & Engle, 2004). In this dissertation, my hypotheses were anchored in SDT and inspired by the implicit social cognition approach. Accordingly, I aimed at exploring the internalization process of university students in the educational context. To that end, I proposed three original studies described in three different articles. In Article 1, I first developed a lexical decision task of implicit AM based on the preliminary work of Burton, Lydon, D'Alessandro, and Koestner (2006). I hypothesized that explicit and implicit AM should interact in a synergistic manner in the prediction of subsequent academic achievement. Moreover, this synergistic effect should depend on the WMC of the students, as the integrative process is likely to be cognitively challenging. A sample of 272 university students were recruited and participated in a lab study (INSPIRE lab). Results of moderated regression analysis revealed that explicit AM was a significant predictor of semester GPA, but only for students with high level of implicit AM, and average to high levels of WMC. This prediction was double the size of past meta-analyses estimate (β = .445), thus demonstrating that incorporating a dual-process perspective of AM enable a more precise account of internalization. In Article 2, I extended the lexical decision task with additional stimuli, replicated the effect of Article 1 with Bayesian estimation and tested a reciprocal hypothesis between academic AM and achievement. I hypothesized that the past academic achievements of students are likely to influence the development of AM for university studies. Again in the INSPIRE lab, 258 undergraduate students participated in this study. Results of a mediational model revealed a significant reciprocal effect of past academic achievement, explicit AM and subsequent academic achievement at university. Moreover, results from study 1 were included as informative prior in the Bayesian analysis of study 2. A moderated-moderation mediation model was tested and revealed a significant synergistic effect between explicit and implicit AM, thus replicating the effect found in study 1. This effect was also moderated by WMC, once again replicating the results of study 1, by demonstrating that sufficient WMC is needed for the synergistic effect of AM to be operant. Lastly, in Article 3 I developed an in-lab learning situation to evaluate if dispositions of AM could be activated outside of the students’ awareness and enable explicitly declared AM to be predictive of subsequent learning performance (math and verbal components). The beneficial effect of explicit AM on subsequent learning performance was only observed for the students who were subliminally primed with AM words. This experimental study thus stressed on the importance of the environment in shaping individuals’ behavior, even when that environment is unconsciously perceived. The findings of this experimental study were thus repositioned in a person x environment interpretation, as opposed to study 1 and 2 which were framed in a person x person interpretation. Of particular interest, contrary to studies 1 and 2, only students with low to average levels of WMC seemed to benefit from the situational priming of AM words. Students with lower levels of WMC can thus benefit from implicit situational cues of AM, as the results demonstrate that it can activate the synergistic effect of AM and ultimately help them perform better on the exam. Overall, this thesis has provided empirical evidence for adopting a dual-process perspective of AM combining motivation and cognitive research in the prediction of academic achievement.

This research investigates the mutual influence between self-management as organizational structure and intuition in decision-making. Self-management as organizational structure has recently developed as a response to current challenges in society and business, thus constitutes an emerging research field. This study is contributing empirically to this under-research field while at the same time building on the well-researched field of decision-making. In particular, this study is building on the positive view of intuition in decision-making that comes along with dual-process theories. The empirical contribution of this study is collected through semi-structured interviews with a multiple-case study research design. This study’s main finding is the confirmation of a mutual influence, even more, a positive mutual influence, between self-management as organizational structure and intuition in decision-making. Furthermore, first findings on how they are influencing each other are brought forward as well as insights into the diversity of decision-making processes when applying self-management as organizational structure.

This thesis concerns approaches to solving the problem of paradoxical sceptical arguments from ignorance within contemporary epistemology. In chapter 1, I critically discuss three frameworks for approaching the sceptical problem, and argue that theoretical responses are unsatisfactory. In chapter 2, I critically examine recent accounts of sceptical hypotheses, and argue against them on the grounds of generality, and in favour of my own account. In chapter 3, I critically examine recent accounts of the epistemic principles underwriting sceptical arguments from ignorance, and argue against them on the grounds of generality, and in favour of my own account. In chapter 4, I critically evaluate the adequacy of resolutions to sceptical paradoxes suggested by three prominent versions of epistemological contextualism. In chapter 5, I examine a central objection to the error theories implied by contextualist resolutions of sceptical paradoxes, which focuses on the notion of semantic blindness. Two assessments of the objection are set out, and contextualist responses to each. I argued that considerations of semantic blindness count against contextualist resolutions of sceptical paradoxes in favour of invariantists. In chapter 6, I assess the potential for an invariantist to provide an adequate error-theory concerning, and resolving, sceptical paradoxes. I critically assess approaches based on aspects of the heuristics and biases paradigm, and of dual-process theories of mindreading. I propose, instead, a novel anti-sceptical error-theory in terms of the default-interventionist model of dual-process theory of judgement and reasoning, together with my conclusions from chapters 2 and 3.

Decisions are performatives - or at least, they share important features with performative utterances that can elucidate our theory of what type of thought they are, and what they do. Namely, decisions have an analogous force to that of performatives, where the force of a propositional attitude or utterance is constituted by (i) its point, or purpose, which is mainly a matter of its direction-of-fit, and (ii) its felicity conditions. The force of both decisions and performatives is to bring into being the states of affairs represented in their intentional contents, merely in virtue of the decision or performative’s occurrence and the satisfaction of the felicity conditions they presuppose. The first chapter of the thesis explicates this general framework, and the second and third attempt to show some of the work it can do for a theory of decisions.

This thesis was interested in exploring the questions of why individuals typically do not respond strongly to climate change, and how individual motivations to do so might be strengthened. More specifically, this thesis explored two widely cited barriers to climate change action and the solutions commonly suggested to overcome them. The first barrier is the lack of personal experience with climate change, which is believed to inhibit relevant emotional processes. The second, not unrelated, barrier is that people typically perceive climate change as a distant threat, one that is not relevant to them personally, where they live, and in the present time. To test these explanations, two public surveys of residents of both the UK (n = 616) and Switzerland (n = 316) explored the relationships among negative emotions, perceptions of geographically proximal and distant climate change risks, and variables that capture people’s willingness to address climate change. The findings supported the idea that stronger negative emotions were positively related to more readiness to act against climate change. The relationship between spatially close versus distant risk perceptions and measures of different forms of action was, however, more complex. Specifically, the findings revealed a strong association between global risk perceptions and policy support and a strong association between local risk perceptions and personal intentions. One explanation for these (unexpected) associations is that they are due to spontaneous matches with regard to psychological distance: Local risk perceptions are psychologically proximal on the spatial dimension and personal intentions can be regarded as proximal on the social dimension. Likewise, the spatially remote global risk perceptions can be matched to support for policies, which can be regarded as distant on the social dimension. Studies 3 and 4 tried to experimentally untangle the complex relationships between psychological distance and people’s perceptions and actions that were 2 observed in the survey research. Specifically, in both studies participants were manipulated to adopt either a spatially proximal or distant perspective on climate change. Study 3 (n = 80) measured participants emotional responses to climate change and looked at how these predicted different attitudinal and behavioural responses under a proximal or distant framework, whereas Study 4 (n = 330) more directly explored the possible effects of activating negative emotions (i.e., fear) in combination with different distance frames as part of attempts to promote action on climate change. The findings of Studies 3 and 4 suggest that decreasing the psychological distance of climate change and inducing fear can both be potentially useful strategies to promote action on climate change. However, the operation of both these strategies is more complex than is often assumed and these complexities have implications for the effectiveness of each strategy. For one thing, both attempts to reduce distance and increase fear can initiate multiple psychological processes that simultaneously increase and decrease the likelihood of acting on climate change. Because these processes work in opposition, reduced distance and increased fear can have positive effects, negative effects, or no effect at all. Together, the findings across studies highlight that psychological distance is neither an insurmountable obstacle to action against climate change – it depends on what kind of action is being considered (Studies 1 & 2) – and nor is decreasing psychological distance a panacea to motivate action – this can trigger the same kind of defensiveness that have been observed in response to other strategies, such as the use of emotion (Studies 3 & 4). In the general discussion, the theoretical implications of these insights for different theoretical models of distance, emotion, and action are considered, as are the implications for the practice of promoting public engagement with and action on climate change.

「Wason選擇作業」是推理心理學領域中相當經典的作業，由於原版的 「Wason 選擇作業」正確率相當低，引發許多學者相繼投入研究，並形成了各種理論。例如「實用推理基模理論」、「社會契約理論」、「相配偏誤理論」、「訊息獲得量理論」、「關聯性理論」等等。歷經約四十年的研究，「Wason選擇作業」從經典的推理作業至今則被許多研究者質疑其成為研究推理歷程作業的 適當性，有些研究者則認為「Wason選擇作業」應被視為決策作業而非推理作業，並認為參與者在這個作業上不會表現出合於邏輯的推理能力。本研究重新以「規範性理性」的角度探究參與者在這個作業上的表現。研究一以「命題解讀作業」做為輔助，發現至少三成的參與者在傳統抽象型式的「Wason選擇作業」中的選擇行為是符合邏輯對應的，這樣的比例並不低於「命題解讀作業」本身的「正確」率。由於在傳統「Wason選擇作業」上要有「正確」表現須正確解讀命題且無其他形式誤解題意再加上符合邏輯的選擇歷程，低正確率可能僅是各歷程「正確」率相乘的效果，而非「選擇歷程」不具邏輯性所致。研究二則以「雙思考系統理論」的觀點設計有利於「系統二」(即分析性系統)歷程表現的評估型「Wason選擇作業」，實驗一與實驗二分別有約四成及五成七的參與者表現符合「規範性理性」的預期。本研究認為過去多數「Wason選擇作業」的研究著重在研究「系統一」(即聯結性系統)的歷程，故未能觀察到參與者高程度的邏輯表現。本研究結果顯示「規範性理性」在「Wason選擇作業」仍扮演重要角色。本研究最後提出新的研究取向並討論「理性爭議」的課題。

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One of the factors significantly influencing our daily decisions is the so-called cognitive depletion.The theory of cognitive depletion postulates the existence of a limited mental resource that is necessary for self-regulation. If the resource is diminished by a task involving self-control, achievement in subsequent self-control task will be impaired. This project examines the effect of cognitive depletion on decisions in the Iowa Gambling Task designed to simulate real-life decision making involving gains and losses. Further, a possible effect of moderating factors that could be affected by cognitive depletion and consequently influence decisions in the Iowa Gambling Task -- risk preference and impulsivity -- is investigated. Dual-process theories postulate there are two systems involved in decision-making: faster, intuitive, emotional System 1 and slower, deliberative, rational System 2. It was found that cognitive depletion leads to enhancement of System 1. As advantageous decisions in the Iowa Gambling Task are closely related to emotional reactions -- domain of System 1 -- it was hypothesized that cognitive depletion will lead to not worse, or possibly even better results in depleted subjects. A controlled laboratory experiment was conducted involving 39 subjects in total. No difference was found in average desicions of depleted and non-depleted subjects in the Iowa Gambling Task, supporting the hypothesis. Further, short-term increase in impulsivity caused by cognitive depletion was very probably moderating choices in the IGT, leading to worse overall performance. Regarding risk preferences, we found that non-depleted subjects were generally more risk seeking in losses context, while depleted subjects exhibited rather loss aversion. This change in risk behaviors due to cognitive depletion very probably did not mediate choices in the Iowa Gambling Task.