Demokratizacija ar liberalizacija – ilgi ir sudėtingi procesai. Tai labai gerai atsispindi Centrinės Azijos regione. Čia po SSRS žlugimo, kaip ir kitos po-sovietinės valstybės taip Kirgizija bei Kazachstanas, turėjo sukurti naujas arba stipriai modifikuoti senas konstitucijas bei rinkimų sistemas. Oficialiai abi šalys pasirinko demokratinius režimus. Tai pažymima abiejų valstybių konstitucijų pirmosiose pastraipose. Tačiau reali valstybių politika iki šiol koncentruojasi ties jų lyderiais ir „klanais“ bei atskirais regionais. Aptariamose valstybėse de Jure ir de facto demokratija įkūnijama įvairiais būdais. Iš principo esminės demokratinės teisės, tokios kaip: žodžio laisvė, spaudos laisvė, religijos ir bendravimo laisvės yra uždraustos arba iš dalies suvaržytos. Šiame darbe bus pristatomos skirtingos demokratinės tranzicijos teorijos, bei jų taikymo galimybė Kazachstano ir Kirgizijos atvejais. Peržvelgiama ne tik teorijų raida, bet ir pateikiama demokratizacijos ir liberalizacijos klasifikacija. Trumpai pristatomi abiejų valstybių istorinės raidos ir dabartinis kontekstai. Darbe dėmesys labiausiai sutelkiamas rinkimų sistemos ir konstitucijų formavimuisi pokomunistinių laikotarpiu bei tolimesnei jų raidai. Išskiriami atskiri valstybių valdymo atvejai, kuriuos įteisino kintančios konstitucijos ar rinkimų įstatymai. / Democratization and liberalization are very elaborate processes. This is very obvious in the region of Central Asia. Just after collapse of USSR countries like Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan had to create new or completely modify old constitutions and electoral laws. Officially both countries had chosen democratic systems. That is also marked in the first articles of their constitutions. However real politics in these countries is based on their leaders, “clans” and separate regions preferences. De jure and de facto democracies are accomplished in many different ways. Traditionally democratic freedoms such as freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of religion and freedom of association – while provided for in the constitutions - are suppressed and/or severely limited. Several democratic transition theories and their adoption in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan will be presented in this study. It will be overviewed not only their development but also marked different classification. Most of the study will be concentrated into electoral systems development and development of each country’s constitutions after collapse of USSR. It will be marked different types of ruling systems, which have provided each electoral law or constitution amendments.

Magistro baigiamajame darbe „Rinkimų sistemų poveikis balsavimo rezultatams: 2004 m. ir 2008 m. Lietuvos Respublikos Seimo rinkimų atvejų analizė“ nagrinėjama kaip būtų susiklostę abiejų paskutinių LR Seimo rinkimų rezultatai, jei rinkimai vyktų ne pagal dabar taikomą paralelinę mišrią rinkimų sistemą. Šio darbo tikslas – išanalizuoti ir eksperimentiškai patikrinti kaip skirtingos rinkimų sistemos įtakoja LR Seimo rinkimų rezultatus ir kaip nuo to keičiasi parlamentinių partijų svoris bei įtaka. Uždaviniai: 1. Apžvelgti šiuo metu pasaulyje naudojamas rinkimų sistemas; 2. Pateikti pagrindinių rinkimų sistemų detalią analizę išskiriant jų privalumus bei trūkumus; 3. Atlikti 2004 m. ir 2008 m. LR Seimo rinkimų atvejų analizę pritaikant skirtingas rinkimų sistemas; 4. Palyginti galimus 2004 m. ir 2008 m. LR Seimo rinkimų rezultatus taikant skirtingas rinkimų sistemas bei apibendrinti gautus rezultatus. Hipotezės: 1. Sąrašinė proporcinė rinkimų sistema parankesnė naujai susikūrusioms partijoms ir savo ruožtu neparanki tradicinėms; 2. Mažoritarinės rinkimų sistemos neparankios naujai susikūrusioms partijoms; 3. Tautinių mažumų partijoms ir nepartiniams kandidatams parankiausia “pirmas-prie-finišo” rinkimų sistema; Atliktoje analizėje su 5 skirtingomis rinkimų sistemomis, patvirtinamos keltos hipotezės, kad proporcinio atstovavimo rinkimų sistemos palankios naujai besikuriančioms partijoms ir leistų joms turėti iki 80% daugiau atstovų įstatymų leidžiamojoje institucijoje, kai tuo... [toliau žr. visą tekstą] / Master‘s Degree final paper work „Electoral systems impact on voting results: 2004 and 2008 Lithuanian parliament elections‘ case study“ pays main attention to what the results would be of the two last elections to Lithuanian parliament if other than parallel electoral system was used. Main goal is to analize and experimentaly check how do different electoral systems impact Lithuanian parliament results and how depending on results do the party position, weight and influence change. Object: 1. To review electoral systems currently used in the world; 2. To make detailed analysis of main electoral systems stressing their advantages and disadvantages; 3. To analyse 2004 and 2008 Lithuanian parliament elections using five different electoral systems (party list, two round, first-past-the-post, MMP and limited voting); 4. To compare possible results of 20004 and 2008 Lithuanian parliament elections using different electoral systems and conclude the results Hypothesis: 1. Party list system provides new parties with additional seats in the parliament; 2. Plurality / majority systems provides new parties with less seats comparing to parallel system; 3. First-past-the-post provides additional seats (comparing to parallel system) to minority parties and non-partisan candidates. Detailed analysis results confirm, that party list system provides new parties with additional seasts in the parliament. At the same time, two biggest traditional parties would lose up to 28,89% seats comparing... [to full text]

Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal

Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal

The EU, over time, has garnered international recognition and acclaim as a successful agent of democratisation in third countries. The transitions of Greece, Spain and Portugal in the 1980s coupled with the recent Eastern enlargements of the EU into erstwhile communist space attest to the success of the EU in fostering tangible democratisation. However, as the EU rapidly approaches its institutional capacity, questions remain as to its viability as an agent of democratisation in the post-enlargement setting where the EU can no longer offer full membership as an incentive for political and economic reform. This thesis attempts to examine the viability of the EU as a democratic facilitator in the post-enlargement setting, through examination of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), a policy described by the EU as ‘everything but institutions’. Two mechanisms of normative transfer relative to the ENP were identified in the literature: conditionality, where the EU attaches incentives for successful political and economic reform, and socialisation, a newer notion whereby norms are transferred via interaction through generating close links with domestic actors. It was ascertained that in the context of the ENP, socialisation represented the dominant mechanism for normative change; conditionality was still utilised as a mechanism, however its scope had reduced greatly. To illuminate the phenomenon of EU democratic promotion, the case study of Armenia was chosen, a small but politically intriguing state in the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood which had experienced (as is the case with the majority of post-Soviet states) stagnation and regression of the democratisation process since independence. Two facets of the EU’s democratisation strategy inherent in the ENP were chosen as empirical research areas: free and fair elections and interaction with domestic civil society organisations (CSOs). Free and fair elections offered evaluation of the conditionality aspects of the ENP through examining the 2008 Armenian presidential election. Interaction with domestic Armenian CSOs presented a rich phenomenon to examine the impact of socialisation in the ENP through utilising a case study examining four democratically minded NGOs. Ultimately, this thesis contends that through the ENP, the EU can no longer effectively wield conditionality as a viable mechanism of normative change and currently lacks the tools or a suitable environment to initialise normative transfers through socialisation. Consequently, it is argued that the EU has had little effect in facilitating democratisation in Armenia since the advent of the ENP.

<p>Declining industries are privileged at the expense of new innovative ones in some cities but not others. In order to understand why, I develop an argument about how politics aggregates the demand for industrial rents across space. Geographically concentrated industries produce electorates with homogenous preferences in favor of supporting established local firms. In electoral systems where politicians are beholden to voters in a narrow geographic constituency, politicians will support efforts to prop up these industries even as these measures stymie innovation. Conversely, in electoral systems where politicians are beholden to broad party interests, politicians will support nationally important and geographically dispersed industries. Concentrated industries, by contrast, are more likely to die a rapid death and leave public resources available for new pioneering firms. Thus, the intersection between electoral and political geography provides insight into the Schumpeterian creative destruction needed to transform a city into a post-industrial economy. I formalize my argument in two models: one analyzing the demand of subsidies over public goods by voters and another exploring the tradeoff between rent-seeking and innovation by firms. I test the resulting hypotheses through cross-country statistical regressions and two in-depth case studies. Using firm-level data across many countries I show that political geography conditions the provision of subsidies to declining firms, and that electorally important firms are less likely to innovate. Then, using original field data I investigate the causal impact of political institutions and economic geography on the provision of subsidies by utilizing exogenous shocks in Thailand and India.</p> / Dissertation

Nei paesi democratici, le elezioni rappresentano il principale meccanismo per garantire che, una volta eletto, un politico agisca effettivamente nell'interesse della collettività. Nel primo capitolo, presento una rassegna della letteratura sull'electoral accountability. Nel secondo capitolo, mostro come la presenza delle elezioni possa essere la causa della riluttanza dei politici ad investire in beni pubblici di lungo periodo (political short-termism), e come tale comportamento possa essere ottimale per la collettività. Nel terzo capitolo, mostro come l'interesse per la rielezione possa indurre un politico a continuare una politica che aveva intrapreso in passato anche quando sarebbe ottimale per la collettività cambiare politica , e a non continuare una politica introdotta in passato da un politico rivale anche quando sarebbe ottimale per la collettività non cambiare politica. Questi risultati possono aiutare a spiegare perchè i politici in carica hanno un "vantaggio elettorale" rispetto ai nuovi politici. / In the democratic countries, elections are the primary mechanism for ensuring that, once in office, a politician actually acts in the collectivity's interest. In the first chapter, I present a survey of the literature on electoral accountability. In the second chapter, I show that the presence of the elections may be the cause of the politicians' reluctance to invest in long-term public goods (political short-termism), and such behavior may be optimal for the collectivity. In the third chapter, I show that reelection concern may induce a politician to continue a policy he introduced in the past even when a policy change would be optimal for the collectivity, and not to continue a policy introduced in the past by a rival politician even when a policy change would not be optimal for the collectivity. These results may help to explain why the incumbent politicians have an "electoral advantage" over new politicians.

Il primo capitolo sviluppa un modello di gioco strategico di voto costoso per due candidati dove il processo elettorale può essere illecitamente influenzato da uno dei due. Si assume che vi sono due tipi di meccanismi di frodi elettorali: incidenza diretta sui costi di voto o probabilita’ di pivotality. Si dimostra che la frode può effettivamente aumentare l’affluenza. Per assicurare la vittoria al margine, l’affluenza degli elettori che sostengono entrambe le alternative sono aumentate rispetto ai casi senza frodi. Nel secondo capitolo si stima l'effetto delle frodi elettorali sull'affluenza analizzando un panel di elezioni a livello nazionale in più di 130 paesi dalla fine del 1970. Controllando per una serie di importanti variabili di sistema politico e socioeconomico otteniamo che le frodi a livello intermedio , ceteris paribus , deprimono l'affluenza di circa 3-4 punti percentuali , mentre interventi a livello elevato non hanno alcun effetto significativo. Il terzo capitolo riguarda dinamiche di protezione dei diritti di proprietà nelle economie in transizione che possono influenzati da parte del governo non benevolente. Possiamo osservare dinamiche positive dei diritti di proprietà se un governo e’ relativamente più efficiente ad estrarre rendite dalla redistribuzione del PIL piuttosto che dai pagamenti diretti degli agenti che se ne appropriano, anche con una moderata pressione politica. / In the first chapter a costly strategic voting game over two candidates is modeled and electoral process can be illicitly influenced by one of two candidates. Fraud mechanisms are assumed to be of two types: affecting directly voting costs or pivot probabilities. It is demonstrated that fraud may actually increase turnout. In particular, if it is of a magnitude to ensure a victory at the margin, then participation rates of voters sustaining both alternatives are increased compared to no fraud situation. In the second chapter we estimate the effect of electoral fraud on turnout by analyzing a panel of national level elections in more than 130 countries since the end of 1970s. Controlling for a set of important institutional, political system and socio-economic variables we obtain that medium fraud, ceteris paribus, depresses turnout by around 3-4% points, whereas high fraud has no significant effect. The third chapter deals with dynamics of property rights protection in transition economies, which can be influence by non-benevolent government. Whenever a government is relatively more efficient in extracting private rents from GDP redistribution rather than from direct payments of appropriating agents, positive dynamics in property rights protection can be observed, even with moderate political pressure.

This research project assesses the role played by political sophistication in terms of itsimpact on the voters’ resort to cognitive shortcuts, with reference both to the consciousand non-conscious components of voting decisions. The investigation scrutinisesempirically the way both sophisticated and unsophisticated individuals make politicaljudgments when prompted with cognitive cues in three different settings. In each ofthem a specific type of cue impinges on the political judgment of individuals at adifferent level and leads to a specific decisional outcome. The overall findings castdoubts on the virtues of heuristic reasoning as effective remedy for voters who have tofind their bearings in the ballot box, but they also downplay the importance of politicalsophistication when visual or subliminal cues are involved in the decision. / Aquest projecte de recerca avalua el paper exercit per la sofisticació política en termesdel seu impacte sobre el recurs dels votants als atalls cognitius, amb referència tant alscomponents conscients i no conscients de les decisions de vot. La investigació examinaempíricament la manera com ambdós individus sofisticats i no sofisticats fan judicispolítics quan si li estimuli amb senyals cognitives de tres tipus diferents. En cada und'ells un tipus específic de atall incideix en el judici polític dels individus en un nivelldiferent i condueix a un resultat específic de presa de decisions. Els resultats generalsposen en dubte les virtuts del raonament heurístic com a remei eficaç per als votants ques’han d'orientar a les urnes, sinó que també minimitzen la importància de la sofisticaciópolítica, quan senyals visuals o subliminals estan involucrats en la decisió.

This thesis addresses the omission in the literature of how political context influences the performance of informational shortcuts. In line with this research gap, the first article suggests that parliamentarian and party-oriented systems encourage the performance of ideology, party identification and leadership, as their use increases the probability to participate in elections, while the effective number of parties has no impact. The second article focus on Spain and two contextual shortcuts - incumbency and electoral polls-. The findings indicate that peripheral voters has the highest propensity to vote for left wing parties when the polls show that the left party is going to win the elections and it is the challenger in salient elections or the incumbent in a nonsalient election. The third article analyses the Spanish case and the impact of leader evaluations and ideology on vote choice over time. The findings manifest that while ideology becomes more important, the utility of leader evaluation is reduced once the informational context becomes more fruitful and stable. / Esta tesis aborda la omisión en la literatura de cómo el contexto político influye en el funcionamiento de los atajos informativos. En línea con esta limitación en la literatura, el primer artículo examina qué instituciones promueven un mejor funcionamiento de la ideología, la identificación partidista y el liderazgo, midiendo los efectos de su uso en la probabilidad de participar en las elecciones. La evidencia muestra como los sistemas parlamentarios y los sistemas orientados a partidos promueven un mejor funcionamiento de los tres atajos, mientras que el número efectivo de partidos no tiene impacto. El segundo artículo se basa en España y dos atajos contextuales –estar en el gobierno y los sondeos electorales- para explorar el saber convencional de que un mayor porcentaje de voto beneficia a los partidos de izquierdas. La evidencia indica que los votantes periféricos tienen la mayor probabilidad de votar a partidos de izquierdas cuando en elecciones relevantes los sondeos muestran que el partido de izquierdas va a ganar las elecciones y está en la oposición o cuando está en el gobierno en elecciones no importantes. El tercer artículo analiza el caso español y el impacto de las evaluaciones de los líderes y la ideología en el voto a través del tiempo. Los resultados manifiestan que, si bien la ideología se vuelve más importante, la utilidad de la evaluación el líder se reduce una vez que el contexto informativo se vuelve más rico y estable.