<p>On January 1, 2010, the Swedish government changed the national rule on taxation of loans between Swedish companies and their shareholders to also comprise loans granted by foreign companies. By changing the rule to also comprise foreign companies, the government aimed to eliminate the newly discovered tax planning which is carried out by an owner establishing a holding company in another Member State from which he lends tax-free means for private consumption. These proceedings result in major tax revenue losses for Sweden since the shareholder’s income was not taxable in Sweden before the change. This change has been subject for criticism by the consultative bodies in the government bill and in the legal debate. The expression of discontent is due to the fact that the changes do not comply with the freedom of establishment. As far as is known, no one has analyzed whether this statement is correct. Therefore, this thesis aims to provide an answer to whether the changes of the rule on taxation of prohibited loans are compatible with the freedom of establishment and consequently whether the Swedish government made a mistake when changing the rule to also comprise foreign companies. Due to the freedom of establishment, it is prohibited for the Member States to take measures which restrict or make nationals refrain from establishing abroad. Intra-state loans are prohibited why they hardly ever occur and the taxation on loans therefore in practice only applies to foreign companies. Legislation in a Member State which only applies to foreign persons constitutes prohibited discrimination. Further, the high tax burden hinders nationals from taking advantage of another Member State’s more favourable legislation and makes the nationals refrain from establishing in other Member States. It is therefore considered that the rule is restrictive to the freedom of establishment. However, such a restrictive rule as in this case is justified by the aim of preventing tax avoidance taken together with the balanced allocation of taxing power between the Member States. Thus, the government makes Sweden breach EU law since the rule is not proportionate despite the justifications. The rule is too general designed since it is restrictive to all foreign undertakings and not just the holding companies with which the tax planning are performed. Further, there are other less restrictive solutions to the problem which have the same effect as the rule in question.</p>

<p>Direct taxation is an area which has not been harmonized entirely within the European Community. Nevertheless, the ECJ has in its case law stated that even though direct taxation falls within the competence of the Member States, they may not exercise that competence by breaching EC law. At the same time the EC Treaty provides certain exceptions in the form of justifications for national measures resulting in such breach of EC Law. The justification grounds provided by the EC Treaty are, however, limited and general and not suitable for justifying tax measures. That is why the rule of reason has played such an important role within the area of direct taxation. The rule of reason made it possible to in-voke justification grounds that were not expressly mentioned in the EC Treaty. Since the list of justifying grounds, not provided by the EC Treaty, is open-ended, Member States have been invoking several different justifying grounds which were suitable for tax measures. One of those justification grounds which has been used the most is the preservation of the cohesion of the national tax system.</p><p>The first time the cohesion of a national tax system was brought forward as a justifying reason for a restrictive measure was in the Bachmann case. There the ECJ held that the Belgian legislation could be justified on the ground of the cohesion of the national tax system. However, the ECJ has been applying the cohesion justification very restrictively and never accepted it as a valid justification ground after the Bachmann case. What the ECJ has done in subsequent cases is to develop the meaning of the principle and adding new criteria which must be fulfilled in order for the cohesion justification to be successfully invoked. However, during this course the ECJ has been very unclear and inconsistent, harming legal certainty, which taxpayers are supposed to expect. Even in the doctrine, authors have been questioning the validity of the cohesion justification due to the ECJ’s reluctance to accept it again. In connection with recent case law concerning cross-border dividend taxation, voices have been heard, demanding the ECJ to address the cohesion justification once more in order to set out clear boundaries for its application and to disperse the current legal uncer-tainty regarding the matter. As a consequence the aim of this paper is to analyze the appli-cation of the cohesion justification to cross-border dividend situations from a legal certainty perspective. As becomes clear from analyzing recent cross-border dividend cases, the ECJ seems to have departed from earlier established criteria and a new line of thought seems to direct the development towards the introduction and application of new criteria.</p><p>Conclusively, we have found that the application of the cohesion justification by the ECJ has been very inconsistent and that this inconsistency has led to a considerable degree of legal uncertainty, making it difficult to predict the outcomes of future cases. Therefore, we conclude that the ECJ should take the opportunity, which has presented itself in recent cases concerning cross-border dividend taxation, to clarify the cohesion justification and set out clear definitions for how to apply it.</p>

<p>The free movement of goods constitutes one of the fundamental principles of the European Union and entitles goods entrance to the internal market. Sweden had before 1995 few monopolies concerning the import, export, manufacturing, distribution and retail on alcohol, and had to as a result of entering EU abolish four of these. The monopoly on retail, Systembolaget, was retained, and is still today strictly controlled by limited number of stores as well as restricted openly-hours. Systembolaget contributes an important part of the Swedish Alcohol Policy, which main purpose is to limit the accessibility of alcohol in Sweden. Another essential purpose is to prevent alcohol to reach people under the age of twenty, and this is upheld by strict age-controls when purchasing alcohol from Systembolaget.</p><p>Lately it has been argued that the Swedish prohibition of private import of alcohol con-stitutes a restriction of the free movement of goods and in breach of Article 28 EC. The exception of such restriction is presented in Article 30 EC and allows Member States to obtain national trade barriers if a justification based on the protection of the public health could be made. The Commission is of the opinion that the Swedish prohibition constitute such a restriction referred to in Article 28 and is not willing to accept the justification to protection of the public health. The Swedish government however, is reluc-tant to remove the prohibition and argues that consumers that require a certain product can import alcohol through Systembolaget. An elimination of the ban would undermine the core purpose with Systembolaget which is to protect the public health and prevent alcohol to be distributed to people under the age of twenty.</p><p>According to the Alcohol Act a person who has turned twenty can legally import alco-hol to Sweden when he is travelling with the goods if those products are for his personal use. A proposal has been presented to a redefinition of private import, which would in-clude situation where the buyer is not personally travelling with the goods, yet the transportation is carried out on the buyer’s behalf. Such purchases are often referred to distance purchase, and in those situations should the excise duty be laid down in the coun-try where the good was released for consumption. In distance sales the seller is respon-sible for the transportation of the goods but also to pay excise duty on the products in the country of destination.</p><p>A redefinition of private import to include transportation made on the buyer’s behalf could create problems since there is no actual contract between the seller and the transporting-company. Problems can then arise since the seller has no possibility to control that the buyer is of the legal age or guaranteeing that the alcohol is for that person’s use</p> / <p>Den fria rörligheten av varor utgör en grundstomme inom den Europeiska Unionen, vilken erkänner varor från medlemsstaterna tillträde till den gemensamma marknaden. Sverige hade fram till 1995 fem olika monopol som reglerade importen, exporten, tillverkningen, distributionen och försäljningen av alkohol, men var tvungen som ett led i inträdet till EU att avveckla fyra av dessa. Kvar återstod försäljningsmonopolet, Systembolaget, vilket än idag är strikt reglerat genom begränsat antal butiker och öppet-tider. Systembolaget utgör in viktigt beståndsdel i den svenska alkoholpolitiken, vilken har till syfte att begränsa alkoholen och dess skadeverkningar i Sverige. Ett viktigt mål är också att motverka att alkoholen når ut till ungdomar under 20år, varvid strikta kon-troller av ålder sker vid köp på Systembolaget.</p><p>På senare tid har det diskuterat huruvida det svenska förbudet mot privat införsel av alkohol skall anses vara förenligt med den fria rörligheten av varor och den uppställda artikel 28 i EG-fördraget. Där stadgas det att inga importrestriktioner skall hindra varor tillträde till den gemensamma marknaden. Det uppställda undantaget i artikel 30 berättigar medlemsstaterna att behålla en sådan restriktion om det kan anses nödvändigt till skyddet för den allmänna hälsan. Kommission har i ett motiverat yttrande upplyst Sve-rige att förevarande förbud utgör en sådan restriktion som avses i artikel 28 och att förutsättningarna att behålla ett sådant förbud inte kan anses uppfyllda. Den svenska regeringen anser att förbudet fyller en viktig funktion genom att begränsa tillgängligheten av alkoholen på den svenska marknaden, samt upplyser att en konsument som önskar importera särskilda produkter kan göra detta genom Systembolaget. Att tillåta konsumenter att importera fritt skulle försvaga det ursprungliga syftet med Systembolaget, vilket är att skydda den allmänna hälsan och minska risken för att alkohol blir tillgänglig för ungdomar.</p><p>Enligt Alkohollagen kan en person som har fyllt 20 fritt importera alkohol till Sverige under förutsättning att denne reser in med varorna till Sverige och att dessa varor är för hans personliga nyttjande. En föreslagen utvidgning av definitionen privat import kan komma att inkludera varutransporter vilka sker för köparens räkning, ofta kallade distans köp. Detta skiljer sig då nämnvärt från distansförsäljning där säljare står för transporten, och är skyldig att betala punktskatt i destinationslandet för dessa varor. Vid distans köp skall ingen beskattning ske i destinationslandet, under förutsättning att dessa avgifter har betalts i varans ursprungsland.</p><p>En utvidgning av definition av privat import till att innefatta varutransporter organiserade av köparen kan skapa problem då inget riktigt kontrakt föreligger mellan säljaren och transportbolaget. Svårigheter kan då uppstå för säljarens då denne saknar möjlighet att kontrollera att köparen är av påstådd ålder och att alkoholen är avsedd för dennes personliga konsumtion.</p>

<p>Syftet med denna uppsats är att undersöka huruvida de nya reglerna angående ränteavdragsbegränsningar är förenliga med EG-fördragets fria etableringsrätt och om reglerna inte anses vara det - huruvida en sådan inskränkning kan rättfärdigas.</p><p>De nya reglerna avser en begränsning av avdragsrätten för ränteutgifter och gäller vid räntebetalningar mellan företag i intressegemenskap. Avdrag för ränteutgifter får göras under förutsättning att den inkomst som motsvarar ränteutgiften skulle ha beskattats med en skattesats som uppgår till minst tio procent (tio-procentsregeln) enligt lagstiftningen i den stat där det företag i intressegemenskapen som faktiskt har rätt till ränteinkomsterna hör hemma, om företaget bara skulle ha haft den inkomsten. Avdrag får även göras för ränteutgifter i de fall såväl förvärvet som den skuld som ligger till grund för ränteutgifterna är huvudsakligen affärsmässigt motiverade. Regeln är ett alternativ till tio-procentregeln och gäller därmed även i de fall ränteinkomsten inte beskattas med minst tio procent. Med ordet huvudsakligen avses 75 procent eller mer.</p><p>De svenska reglerna om ränteavdrag är tillämpliga på dotterbolag med både inhemska och utländska moderbolag. Reglerna får till följd att behandlingen av dotterbolag med inhemskt moderbolag skiljer sig från den av dotterbolag med utländskt bolag eftersom reglerna får den <em>effekten</em> att avdragsförbudet endast drabbar dotterbolag med utländskt moderbolag (under förutsättning att beskattningen är lägre än tio procent samt att transaktionen har affärsmässiga motiv som understiger 75 procent). Reglerna medför att det blir mindre attraktivt för bolag med moderbolag i andra medlemsstater att utöva etableringsfriheten och moderbolagen kan på grund av detta komma att avstå från att bilda eller bibehålla etableringar i Sverige där en sådan bestämmelse finns. EG-domstolen menar att detta resonemang även är tillämpligt då det lånegivande bolaget istället är det utländska moderbolagets dotterbolag som i likhet med moderbolaget är hemmahörande i en annan medlemsstat. Enligt vår mening utgör därför de nya reglerna en inskränkning av den fria etableringsrätten i enlighet med artikel 43 och 48 EG.</p><p>En av de rättfärdigandegrunder som kan motivera en inskränkning av den fria etableringsrätten är skatteflykt. EG-domstolen är beredd att pröva skatteflykt som rättfärdigandegrund under förutsättning att reglerna har som syfte att hindra rent konstlade upplägg. Det är därmed tillåtet att försöka minimera sin skattebörda genom att etablera sig i andra medlemsstater så länge som de åtgärder som bolagen vidtar inte medför att vinstmedlen överförs genom konstlade upplägg.</p><p>Ett konstlat upplägg definieras av EG-domstolen som en etablering där ingen faktiskt ekonomisk verksamhet bedrivs. Ett riktmärke kan till exempel vara att lokaler, personal eller utrustning saknas. Förekommer det således affärsmässiga skäl anser vi att det inte kan röra sig om ett konstlat upplägg eftersom ett rent konstlat upplägg enligt definitionen ska sakna faktisk ekonomisk verksamhet. En affärsmässighet om 75 procent och ett konstlat upplägg om 25 procent är därmed omöjligt då ett konstlat upplägg i stort sett förutsätter noll procents motiverad affärsmässighet.</p><p>Enligt ”rule of reason”–doktrinen kan en nationell regel endast godtas om den är utformad på så sätt att den faktiskt säkerställer det syfte som eftersträvas och den får inte utgöra ett mer ingripande hinder i den fria rörligheten än vad som är nödvändigt för att uppnå syftet med regeln.Eftersom reglerna, med den lydelse de har idag, träffar fler transaktioner än de rent konstlade är de oproportionerliga i förhållande till sitt syfte. De kan därmed inte rättfärdigas och utgör således ett hinder för den fria etableringsrätten.</p>

<p>The transfer system was created in order to control player movement between football clubs and has existed since the late nineteenth century. During the negotiation of today’s transfer rules FIFA, UEFA and the Commission found that a breach of contract during the season could upset the balance of competition and therefore should be restricted. It was considered necessary to strengthen the contractual stability and to apply a special rule to preserve the regularity and proper functioning of competition. This was done by the means of a provision stipulating that a football player only can be registered to play with a national association during one of the two registration periods per year, generally known as the transfer windows.</p><p>Sport has never been included in the formal structures of the European Union and the regulation of sport has instead materialized through verdicts from the European Court of Justice. One of the most influential statements emerging from the Court is that sport is subject to Community law in so far it constitutes an economic activity. Consequently, if the activity is economic there is a risk that it infringes EU law. The purpose of this master thesis is to examine the FIFA transfer window system and to determine whether it violates Article 39 and/or Article 81 EC.</p><p>The transfer windows, a regulation strengthened by the ECJ in the case of <em>Lehtonen</em>, restrict the ability of players to seek alternative employment and could therefore be regarded as a violation of the free movement of workers. In order to trigger the Treaty provisions guarding the right of freedom of movement the person in question must be a national of a Member State of the European Union and the activity must have a territorial dimension beyond the borders of a single Member State of the European Union. The person in question must also be engaged in some kind of economic activity. It is, however, clear that football players who are members of the European Union and are applying for a job in another Member State, and are performing at a certain level, fulfil these requirements. Footballers should therefore be considered as workers within the meaning of Article 39 EC and the prohibition of discrimination contained in that article which catches non-discriminatory private collective measures, such as the transfer system, invented by regulatory bodies like FIFA and UEFA.</p><p>When considering the FIFA “windows system” it is clear that it is liable of restricting the ability of players to seek alternative employment in another Member State and should therefore be regarded as a violation of Article 39 EC. Nevertheless, restricted transfer periods have been found by the ECJ to be objectively justified as having sporting benefits in the Belgian Basketball league. It is, however, likely that the “window system”, as it operates in European football, goes beyond what is necessary to achieve team and player contract stability since it is too restrictive and somewhat redundant. Consequently, the FIFA transfer windows do not comply with the requirements of the principle of proportionality and should therefore, if challenged, be regarded as a violation of Article 39 EC.</p><p>The use of transfer windows in European football can also be considered to be an issue for competition law and in particular Article 81 EC. The article prohibits all agreements between undertakings that restrict competition and affect trade between Member States and has the objective to protect consumers, enhance their welfare and to facilitate the creation of a single European market. The ECJ has, however, acknowledged a certain type of sporting rule that, even though it restricts competition, will be granted immunity from Article 81 EC. The FIFA “windows system” should not be regarded as such a rule since it does not fulfil the required conditions.</p><p>The transfer windows do little for the competitive balance within the European football. It may be argued that it preserves the appeal and the unpredictability of the finishing stages of a championship. However, they also prevent clubs from developing their economic activity and restrict the free play of the market forces of supply and demand. Furthermore, the “windows system” hinders certain clubs from raising the quality of their sporting performance since clubs in minor leagues with a closed window are losing their best players to clubs in a better league with an open window, without being able to replace them. All of this affects the small and economically weak clubs and strengthens the position of the financially strong clubs. As a result a few strong clubs will, contrary to the best interest of consumers, continue to dominate European football. The FIFA regulation of transfer windows is therefore likely to fall under Article 81(1) EC.</p><p>It is unlikely that the pro-competitive benefits of the FIFA transfer windows outweigh its restrictive effects since it is improbable that they would be considered the least restrictive means of creating these benefits. Subsequently, the FIFA “windows system” would not qualify for an exemption under Article 81(3) EC and should, if challenged, be void under Article 81(2) EC.</p>

<p>Ekonomiska nackdelar som uppstår till följd av att en verksamhet bedrivs genom flera självständiga dotterbolag istället för under ett bolag med flera driftställen avhjälps normalt med lagregler om koncernbidrag. Dessa regler är emellertid endast tillämplig på nationella koncerner, dvs. koncerner där samtliga bolag har säte i ett och samma land. Problem uppstår emellertid när de olika dotterbolagen är belägna i olika länder. Denna uppsats behandlar problematiken kring gränsöverskridande förlustutjämningar inom EU. Grunden för uppsatsen är det kontroversiella målet Marks & Spencer där frågan om gränsöverskridande förlustavdrag ställdes på sin spets. Målet fick stor betydelse för rättsutvecklingen i såväl Sverige som övriga Europa.</p>

Sammanfattning Inom den direkta beskattningens område har medlemstaterna i den Europeiska Unionen till stor del behållit sin behörighet men ska likväl beakta EU-rätten vid utövandet av denna behörighet. EU-rätten har dock fått ett allt större inflytande på den direkta beskattningens område genom bestämmelserna om den fria rörligheten och etableringsfriheten som till viss del begränsar medlemsstaternas behörighet. Medlemsstaterna måste rättfärdiga en nationell bestämmelse som är i konflikt med etableringsfriheten för att få tillämpa den och ofta åberopas den principiellt accepterade rättfärdigandegrunden förhindra skatteflykt. Det är dock inte ovanligt att nationella bestämmelser anses oförenliga med etableringsfriheten om de syftar till att förhindra förlust av skatteintäkter. Att förhindra förlust av skatteintäkter är inte en accepterad rättfärdigandegrund då den anses vara grundad på rent ekonomiska intressen och således inte utgör ett tvingande hänsyn till allmänintresset. En medlemsstat vars nationella bestämmelse ämnar förhindra skatteflykt åsyftar dock högst sannolikt att indirekt förhindra att de skatteintäkter hänförbara till medlemsstaten går förlorade vilket tyder på att även denna rättfärdigandegrund kan anses grundad i ett ekonomiskt intresse från medlemstaterna. Frågan uppkommer därför om det finns en tydlig gränsdragning mellan dessa två rättfärdigandegrunder. Innebörden av förhindra förlust av skatteintäkter måste anses inrymmas i medlemsstaternas ändamål med att söka förhindra skatteflykt. Dessa två rättfärdigandegrunder har således samma syfte och därför kan uppdelningen av dessa inte anses helt självklar. Gränsdragningen mellan dessa rättfärdigandegrunder anses således inte tillräckligt tydlig för att kunna hävda att förutsebarhet de facto föreligger för medlemsstaterna vid tillämpningen av respektive rättfärdigandegrund. / Abstract The Member States in the European Union have kept their authority within the area of direct taxation but must still observe Community law when exercising this authority. However, Community law has received a major influence on the area of direct taxation through the free movement provisions and the freedom of establishment, which limits the authority of the Member States. If a national measure restricts or hinders the freedom of establishment, the Member States must justify the measure in order to be able to apply it and the prevention of tax avoidance is an often referred ground of justification that is accepted in principle. It is however not unusual that a national measure is considered in breach with the freedom of establishment if it refers to the prevention of loss of tax revenue. The loss of tax revenue is not an accepted ground of justification as it is considered to be based on merely economic interests and thus not regarded as a matter of overriding general interest. A Member State whose national measure aims at preventing tax avoidance, most likely also aims to prevent that tax revenues derived from the Member State is not deprived from it. This indicates that prevention of tax avoidance also is based on an economic interest which arise the question whether or not there is a distinct differentiation between these grounds of justification. The meaning of the loss of tax revenue is considered to be included in the objective of the Member States when they seek to prevent tax avoidance. Accordingly, these two grounds of justification have the same purpose and the separation between them can therefore not be considered as obvious. The differentiation between these grounds of justification is hence not obvious enough to be able to claim that predictability is at hand for the Member States when applying concerned ground of justification.

On January 1, 2010, the Swedish government changed the national rule on taxation of loans between Swedish companies and their shareholders to also comprise loans granted by foreign companies. By changing the rule to also comprise foreign companies, the government aimed to eliminate the newly discovered tax planning which is carried out by an owner establishing a holding company in another Member State from which he lends tax-free means for private consumption. These proceedings result in major tax revenue losses for Sweden since the shareholder’s income was not taxable in Sweden before the change. This change has been subject for criticism by the consultative bodies in the government bill and in the legal debate. The expression of discontent is due to the fact that the changes do not comply with the freedom of establishment. As far as is known, no one has analyzed whether this statement is correct. Therefore, this thesis aims to provide an answer to whether the changes of the rule on taxation of prohibited loans are compatible with the freedom of establishment and consequently whether the Swedish government made a mistake when changing the rule to also comprise foreign companies. Due to the freedom of establishment, it is prohibited for the Member States to take measures which restrict or make nationals refrain from establishing abroad. Intra-state loans are prohibited why they hardly ever occur and the taxation on loans therefore in practice only applies to foreign companies. Legislation in a Member State which only applies to foreign persons constitutes prohibited discrimination. Further, the high tax burden hinders nationals from taking advantage of another Member State’s more favourable legislation and makes the nationals refrain from establishing in other Member States. It is therefore considered that the rule is restrictive to the freedom of establishment. However, such a restrictive rule as in this case is justified by the aim of preventing tax avoidance taken together with the balanced allocation of taxing power between the Member States. Thus, the government makes Sweden breach EU law since the rule is not proportionate despite the justifications. The rule is too general designed since it is restrictive to all foreign undertakings and not just the holding companies with which the tax planning are performed. Further, there are other less restrictive solutions to the problem which have the same effect as the rule in question.

Parler de vulnérabilité en droit d’asile peut, à première vue, surprendre, tant la vulnérabilité des demandeurs de protection internationale semble être inhérente à leur statut et à leur parcours d’exil. La Cour européenne des droits de l’homme dans son arrêt M.S.S. contre Belgique et Grèce a d’ailleurs reconnu la vulnérabilité de l’ensemble des membres du groupe des demandeurs de protection internationale. Mais, cette approche globalisante s’oppose à l’approche individualisée de la vulnérabilité des demandeurs de protection internationale retenue dans le régime d’asile européen commun. Or, à plusieurs égards, c’est cette dernière approche qui permet de révéler tout l’intérêt du recours à la vulnérabilité en droit. Son analyse, à travers cette étude, permet d’affirmer que celle-ci tend à identifier des particularismes, des spécificités individuelles appelant une protection spécifique. En exigeant une individualisation de la vulnérabilité par l’existence d’une faiblesse caractérisée par des besoins particuliers en termes d’accueil et de procédure, le droit de l’UE circonscrit la notion de personne vulnérable à un nombre limité de demandeurs de protection internationale. Mais plus encore, cette acception retenue révèle la fonction principale de tout recours au concept de vulnérabilité en droit : assurer une protection renforcée et adaptée. C’est en effet à travers sa fonction, ici, une prise en charge physique et procédurale adaptée des demandeurs de protection internationale vulnérables, que se révèle l’effectivité de la vulnérabilité en droit européen de l’asile. D’un point de vue juridique, tous les demandeurs de protection internationale ne sont pas tous vulnérables, seulement certains d’entre eux, à savoir ceux ayant des besoins particuliers, peuvent être effectivement qualifiés de vulnérables. Cette étude de la vulnérabilité en droit européen de l’asile permet ainsi plus largement d’appréhender et de délimiter les contours et la fonction de la vulnérabilité en droit. / At first sight, talking about Vulnerability in the field of European Asylum Law could sound surprising, as the vulnerability of applicants for international protection seems to be inherent to their status and their exile course. The European Court of Human Rights in the M.S.S. versus Belgium and Greece case recognized indeed the vulnerability of the whole group of applicants for international protection. However, this globalizing approach is opposed to the individualized approach set in the instruments of the Common European Asylum System. In many ways, this last approach is the one that reveals the interest of using the concept of Vulnerability in Law. The analysis of Vulnerability, through the research conducted, allows to assert that Vulnerability aims at identifying particularities, individual specificities that require special protection. While demanding an individualization of Vulnerability through the existence of a characterized weakness entailing special needs in terms of reception and procedural guarantees, the EU Law effectively confines the notion of vulnerable person to a limited number of individuals. But, above all, it reflects the principal function of the use of Vulnerability in Law: to ensure an enhanced protection. It is indeed through its function, namely a material and procedural support adapted to the special needs of vulnerable applicants for international protection, that the effectiveness of Vulnerability is revealed in the field of the European Asylum Law. All the applicants for international protection are not per se vulnerable, just few of them are: only those who have special needs can be qualified as vulnerable. This analysis of the concept of Vulnerability in the field of European Asylum Law allows thus to comprehend and delimit its outlines and its functions in Law.

L’élaboration mais aussi le développement du marché unique a favorisé les échanges sur la base du commerce international, marqué depuis plusieurs années par la tertiarisation de l’activité économique. De ce fait, le secteur d’activité le plus dynamique de ces deux dernières décennies est celui des services, ce qui se matérialise sur le plan international par l’adoption de l’AGCS et au sein de l’Union, par l’élaboration et la mise en place de la directive « services ». La directive 2006/123/CE a de particulier la mobilisation sans égal qu’elle a provoqué. La matière est sensible car elle touche un large panel de domaine. La directive « services » constitue l’amorce d’un changement structurel profond, en ce sens qu’une approche purement économique de la question serait incomplète sans la prise en considération du facteur humain et que le texte est le dernier apport majeur sur la question. / The development of the single market has promoted the exchanges based on the international trade principles, which has been impacted for many years by the raise of the importance of the service sector in the economy. Therefore, the most dynamic sector of the past two decades is the service sector, which has been materialized internationally through the adoption of the GATS and in the European union through the development and the implementation of the directive on the "services". The directive EC /2006/123 has particularly mobilized as the subject is sensitive and affects a wide range of field. The Services Directive represents the beginning of a deep structural change as a purely economical approach to the issue would not be complete without the consideration of the human factor and because the text represents the last major contribution on the subject.