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Hegel's Defense of the Ontological Argument for the Existence of GodHarrelson, Kevin Joseph 01 January 2004 (has links)
The following dissertation is a study of the "ontological proof' for God's existence, specifically of the controversy concerning this proof from the seventeenth through the nineteenth centuries. As the title indicates, the primary theme is Hegel's defense and reformulation of the proof. I argue for a metaphysical interpretation of Hegel's Science of Logic, by showing that one of Hegel's chief goals in the Logic is to provide a demonstration for the thesis that "necessary existence belongs to God's nature." I conclude that while Hegel offers a coherent and informative account of this thesis, his analysis does not overcome one of the principal shortcomings of the ontological proof, namely, that the argument involves an appeal to intuition. The ontological proof is thus, if in some sense valid, not persuasive.
The discussion of Hegel is preceded by a detailed analysis of Descartes' formulation of the proof. I argue that Descartes consistently defends his argument by appealing to metaphysical and epistemological doctrines as premises, so that the proof represents a conclusion of his entire philosophical system. I also provide a lengthy treatment of Kant's objections to the proof, and I conclude (1) that most of his arguments are repetitions of older objections and (2) that even his best arguments are question-begging. I show that Hegel sides with Descartes, and against Kant, on every relevant issue, and that Hegel's metaphysical system brings Descartes' assumptions to their ultimate consequences.
In the concluding chapters I examine some of the problems that underlie the theoretical philosophies of Kant and Hegel. I argue that Hegel fails to show that Kant's philosophy is self-refuting, and that Kant's critique of the ontological argument is consistent with the basic principles of his philosophy. The shortcoming of Kant's view is merely that he fails to justify some of those principles. In the final chapter I argue that any transcendental critique of the ontological argument, or of metaphysics in general, is doomed to failure.
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Suárezův důkaz Boží existence / Suárez's Proof of the Existence of GodPavlorek, David January 2013 (has links)
of the Paper The goal of submitted paper is to show Suárez's proof of the existence of God as the main task of his metaphysics and to show the influence of St. Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus on his own system of metaphysics. As will be shown, the importance of this preeminent thinker of so called second scholasticism is in his synthesis of relatively incompatible doctrines of thomism and scotism. This paper will therefore deal with main problems of precedening tradition of Aristotelian metaphysics, especially with analogy of being as applied to God and creatures, then with theory of causality and other connected questions. Keywords Suárez - Thomas Aquinas - Duns Scotus - metaphysics - proof of existence of God
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Richard Swinburne's Inductive Argument for the Existence of God – A Critical AnalysisBeckman, Emma January 2008 (has links)
<p>This essay discusses and criticizes Richard Swinburne's inductive argument for the existence of God. In his The Existence of God, Swinburne aims at showing that the existence of God is more probable than not. This is an argument taking into consideration the premises of all traditional arguments for the existence of God. Swinburne uses the phenomena and events that constitute the premises of these arguments as evidence in an attempt to show that his hypothesis is more probably true than nor. Swinburne pursues this task by way of applying Bayes' theorem. The aim of this essay is normative - to judge the strength of Swinburne's argument for the existence of God. My primary objections towards Swinburne is that he professes a subjective concept of probability, that he relies too heavily on simplicity as a virtue of plausible and probable hypotheses and that his concept of God involves an incoherent picture of God's nature. I question not only the actual success of Swinburne's project but what his argument, if it had been successful, would have been able to establish.</p> / <p>Denna uppsats diskuterar och kritiserar Richard Swinburne's induktiva argument för Guds existens. I sin The Existence of God, försöker Swinburne visa att Guds existens är mer trolig än inte. Detta argument tar alla traditionella argument för Guds existens i beräknande.. Swinburne använder de fenomen och händelser som utgör premisser för dessa argument som bevis i ett försök att visa att hans hypotes är mer trolig än inte. Han genomför detta genom att använda sig av Bayes teorem. Syftet med denna uppsats är normativt - att bedöma styrkan I Swinburnes argument för Guds existens. Mina primära invändningar mot Swinburne är att han använder sig av ett subjektivt sannolikhetsbegrepp, att han förlitar sig allt för starkt på enkelhet som en förklaringsmässig dygd och att hans Gudsbegrepp inbegriper en inkoherent bild av Guds natur. Jag ifrågasätter den faktiska framgången i Swinburnes projekt, och även vad Swinburne hade kunnat fastställa om hans projekt hade varit framgångsrikt.</p>
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Richard Swinburne's Inductive Argument for the Existence of God – A Critical AnalysisBeckman, Emma January 2008 (has links)
This essay discusses and criticizes Richard Swinburne's inductive argument for the existence of God. In his The Existence of God, Swinburne aims at showing that the existence of God is more probable than not. This is an argument taking into consideration the premises of all traditional arguments for the existence of God. Swinburne uses the phenomena and events that constitute the premises of these arguments as evidence in an attempt to show that his hypothesis is more probably true than nor. Swinburne pursues this task by way of applying Bayes' theorem. The aim of this essay is normative - to judge the strength of Swinburne's argument for the existence of God. My primary objections towards Swinburne is that he professes a subjective concept of probability, that he relies too heavily on simplicity as a virtue of plausible and probable hypotheses and that his concept of God involves an incoherent picture of God's nature. I question not only the actual success of Swinburne's project but what his argument, if it had been successful, would have been able to establish. / Denna uppsats diskuterar och kritiserar Richard Swinburne's induktiva argument för Guds existens. I sin The Existence of God, försöker Swinburne visa att Guds existens är mer trolig än inte. Detta argument tar alla traditionella argument för Guds existens i beräknande.. Swinburne använder de fenomen och händelser som utgör premisser för dessa argument som bevis i ett försök att visa att hans hypotes är mer trolig än inte. Han genomför detta genom att använda sig av Bayes teorem. Syftet med denna uppsats är normativt - att bedöma styrkan I Swinburnes argument för Guds existens. Mina primära invändningar mot Swinburne är att han använder sig av ett subjektivt sannolikhetsbegrepp, att han förlitar sig allt för starkt på enkelhet som en förklaringsmässig dygd och att hans Gudsbegrepp inbegriper en inkoherent bild av Guds natur. Jag ifrågasätter den faktiska framgången i Swinburnes projekt, och även vad Swinburne hade kunnat fastställa om hans projekt hade varit framgångsrikt.
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Rethinking Causality: Thomas Aquinas' Argument From Motion & the Kalām Cosmological ArgumentSánchez, Derwin, Jr. 01 January 2020 (has links)
Ever since they were formulated in the Middle Ages, St. Thomas Aquinas' famous Five Ways to demonstrate the existence of God have been frequently debated. During this process there have been several misconceptions of what Aquinas actually meant, especially when discussing his cosmological arguments. While previous researchers have managed to tease out why Aquinas accepts some infinite regresses and rejects others, I attempt to add on to this by demonstrating the centrality of his metaphysics in his argument from motion. Aquinas cannot be properly understood or debated with a contemporary view of causality, but rather must wrestle with the concepts he actually employs in the arguments. To demonstrate this, I will compare the Thomistic argument from motion to the contemporary Kalām cosmological argument of William Lane Craig. Although some may consider it beneficial to base theistic arguments on more modern principles, this analysis shows that the metaphysical framework used by Aquinas is much less vulnerable to the rebuttals that otherwise challenge the Kalām argument, and that their differences in strength rest on their differences in metaphysics.
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Idé och verklighet : En komparativ studie av det ontologiskagudsbeviset hos S:t Anselm av Canterbury ochRené Descartes / Idea and Reality : A Comparative Study of the OntologicalArgument of St. Anselm of Canterbury andRené DescartesForss, Elin January 2022 (has links)
This essay consists of a comparative study of the ontological argument for the existence of God asformulated by St. Anselm of Canterbury and René Descartes. The comparative analysis itselfconsists of two parts. Firstly, a comparative study of the argument itself, and an examination of theunderlying metaontological commitments that form the basis of the respective arguments, whichare then likewise contrasted. The stated purpose is to examine whether two versions of theontological argument that appear to be similar may have an underlying framework that makes themfundamentally fundamentally distinct in a way that is not immediately apparent. The analysis foundthat this was the case, and that there are significant differences in how the argument is formulated.This is of interest especially as these two thinkers wrote in and were influenced by widely differingcultural, intellectual and academic contexts, which may be reflected in their work. Ontologicalarguments for the existence of God as a phenomenon is a metaphysical argument that seeks toprove that God exists without relying on empirical and observational evidence. Rather, one seeksthrough these ontological arguments to show that the existence of God is self-evident.With Anselm and Descartes this happens in a seemingly very similar yet fundamentally differentway. The results of this study demonstrate differences that appear primarily in the starting point forthe respective discourses, as well as in the methodology that is applied. Anselm bases his discourseon a distinctly neoplatonic foundation regarding the highest good, which he later extrapolates to amore comprehensive reasoning regarding the distinction between different natures according togreatness, of which goodness is one such greatness. Descartes, on the other hand, anchors hisdiscourse in scholastic philosophy and especially the idea of the causal principle of transference,especially in relation to human consciousness and the idea or the concept of God which manifeststherein. These results have been achieved primarily by examining Anselm's arguments based onsecondary sources that relate both directly and indirectly to his ontological argument, which in itssimplicity otherwise consists almost in its entirely of a self-evident descriptive definition of whatGod is. However, the differences that emerge are not of such a degree that a division of these twoargument into different categories can be made with a high degree of confidence. On the otherhand, it is of interest to analyze these underlying frameworks for ontological arguments in order toalso be able to analyze the potential influence or impact of various contextual aspects such as place,time and prevailing academic culture as this essay attempts to do.
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Une critique aš‘arite post-rušdienne de la cosmologie d’Avicenne : traduction et commentaire de la Quintessence des Intellects d’Abū al-Haǧǧāǧ al-Miklātī (m.1229) / A post-Rushdian Ash'arite criticism of Avicenna's cosmology : a translation and commentary of The Quintessence of Intellects by Abû al-Hajjâj al-Miklâtî (d. 1229)Adouhane, Yamina 12 December 2015 (has links)
Cette thèse contient un commentaire et une traduction complète d’un ouvrage polémique peu connu intitulé "La Quintessence des intellects en vue de réfuter les philosophes en matière de science des fondements (Lubāb al-‘uqūl fī al-radd ‘alā al-falāsifa fī ‘ilm al-uṣūl)". L’auteur, Abū al-Ḥaǧǧāǧ al-Miklātī, est un théologien aš‘arite de la deuxième moitié du XIIème siècle et du premier tiers du XIIIème, qui évolue entre le Maroc actuel et l’Andalousie musulmane. Il se situe à un moment clé de l’histoire de la pensée andalouse : celui de la condamnation de la philosophie en général et de celle d’Averroès en particulier. Par les usages variés qu’il fait de l’oeuvre rušdienne, al-Miklātī est un témoin rare à la fois de la réception d’Averroès par ses coreligionnaires et de ce que pouvait être l’opposition théologique que combattait Ibn Rušd. La cible principale de sa réfutation n’est toutefois pas le Cordouan mais bien Avicenne, incarnation à cette période de la falsafa. Al-Miklātī est par là pleinement l’héritier de l’aš‘arisme post-avicennien et l’influence d’al-Ğuwaynī, d’al-Ġazālī et d’al-Šahrastānī est manifeste. Pour mener à bien sa réfutation, al-Miklātī n’hésite pas à se servir d’Averroès, autre grand critique – bien que pour des raisons opposées – du philosophe persan. C’est ainsi que l’auteur de la Quintessence des Intellects reprend la présentation du système avicennien qu’il trouve dans le traité d’Averroès Sur le Premier Moteur, perdu aujourd’hui, nous offrant par là deux passages cruciaux pour la compréhension de la controverse qui opposa ce dernier à Avicenne concernant la preuve de l’existence de Dieu. / This PhD thesis is composed of a commentary and a full translation of a polemic work entitled The Quintessence of the intellects in response to philosophers on the science of principles (Lubāb al-‘uqūl fī al-radd ‘alā al-falāsifa fī ‘ilm al-uṣūl). The author, Abū al-Ḥaǧǧāǧ al-Miklātī, is an Aš‘arite theologian of the second half of the XIIth century, first third of the XIIIth, who evolved between present-day Morocco and Muslim Andalusia. He lives at a key point in the history of the Andalusian thought: that of the condemnation of philosophy in general and Averroes’ philosophy in particular. Through the various uses he makes of Averroes’ works, al-Miklātī is a rare witness of both the reception of the former by his own co-religionists and of the kind of theologians whom he must have been confronting. However, the main target of al-Miklātī’s refutation is not Averroes but Avicenna, who is at the time the incarnation of falsafa. In this sense, al-Miklātī is a true heir of post-Avicennian Aš‘arism and the influence of al-Ğuwaynī, al-Ġazālī and al-Šahrastānī is undeniable. To accomplish his refutation, he does not hesitate to use Averroes, another great critique – though for opposite reasons – of the Persian philosopher. He quotes the presentation of the Avicennian system he finds in Averroes’ treatise On the First Mover, which is lost today, thus offering us two crucial passages for the understanding of the controversy that opposed Averroes to Avicenna on the proof of God’s existence.
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L'UNUM ARGUMENTUM DI SANT'ANSELMO. ALLA RICERCA DELL'INTERPRETAZIONE AUTENTICA DELLA PROVA ANSELMIANA DELL'ESISTENZA DI DIOVETTORELLO, LUCA 12 April 2014 (has links)
Contro l’argomento anselmiano del Proslogion sono state sollevate varie obiezioni, come quelle, molto note, di Gaunilone, di san Tommaso e di Kant. In questo saggio si sostiene la tesi che tutte queste critiche si basano fondamentalmente su una interpretazione imprecisa del testo di Anselmo che, se correttamente letto, ne risulta invece al riparo.
Viene quindi offerta una nuova lettura dell’unum argumentum, con la quale, ricercandone lo spirito originario e più autentico, viene messa in risalto innanzitutto la sua struttura formale di dimostrazione per assurdo, illustrando in secondo luogo l’importante rapporto di complementarità che lega questa tipologia di prova a quelle strutturate in modo diverso, che procedono cioè a posteriori per costruzione diretta. / Many important Authors – as Gaunilo, Thomas Aquinas and Kant – have brought many well-known objections against the anselmian argument. This paper proposes the thesis that all these objections are based on an inaccurate interpretation of the Proslogion: in fact, an in-depth analysis of the text shows its fully validity.
Therefore, it is offered a new reading of the anselmian argument, that looks for its original and authentic sense: firstly, it is enlightened its formal structure of proof by contradiction, and secondly it is showed its important complementary relationship with the other kind of a posteriori proofs.
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