This dissertation aims to develop an ethical system that can properly frame such questions as the morality of large-scale efforts to transform inanimate parts of nature, for example, proposals to terraform Mars. Such an ethics diverges from traditional approaches to ethics because it expands the class of entities regarded as morally considerable to include inanimate entities. I approach the task by building on the environmental ethical theory of Paul W. Taylor, as developed in his 1986 book Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics. I discuss various criticisms of Taylor and propose two extensions to his theory: an expansion of the scope of moral considerability to include all concrete material objects and the introduction of the concept of variable moral significance (the notion that all entities have inherent worth but some have more than others). Using Taylor’s modified and extended theory as a foundation, I develop something I call universal ethics. This is an ethical framework whose key elements are a fundamental ethical attitude of respect for the world and a principle of minimal harm. Universal ethics regards all concrete material entities, whether living or not, and whether natural or artefactual, as inherently valuable, and therefore as entitled to the respect of moral agents. I offer a defence of this ethical framework and discuss a number of practical applications, including criticism of proposals for the terraforming of Mars. I conclude that terraforming Mars or any other celestial body at this point in our history would be morally wrong. I also suggest that universal ethics provides an ethical foundation for efforts to protect Antarctica, and that it has implications for our relations to other inanimate parts of our world, including artefacts.

This dissertation aims to develop an ethical system that can properly frame such questions as the morality of large-scale efforts to transform inanimate parts of nature, for example, proposals to terraform Mars. Such an ethics diverges from traditional approaches to ethics because it expands the class of entities regarded as morally considerable to include inanimate entities. I approach the task by building on the environmental ethical theory of Paul W. Taylor, as developed in his 1986 book Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics. I discuss various criticisms of Taylor and propose two extensions to his theory: an expansion of the scope of moral considerability to include all concrete material objects and the introduction of the concept of variable moral significance (the notion that all entities have inherent worth but some have more than others). Using Taylor’s modified and extended theory as a foundation, I develop something I call universal ethics. This is an ethical framework whose key elements are a fundamental ethical attitude of respect for the world and a principle of minimal harm. Universal ethics regards all concrete material entities, whether living or not, and whether natural or artefactual, as inherently valuable, and therefore as entitled to the respect of moral agents. I offer a defence of this ethical framework and discuss a number of practical applications, including criticism of proposals for the terraforming of Mars. I conclude that terraforming Mars or any other celestial body at this point in our history would be morally wrong. I also suggest that universal ethics provides an ethical foundation for efforts to protect Antarctica, and that it has implications for our relations to other inanimate parts of our world, including artefacts.

L’étude du paléomagnétisme des roches extraterrestres fournit des informations sur les champs magnétiques présents dans le système solaire il y a plusieurs milliards d’années. A travers ce travail de thèse nous avons exploré deux grands aspects : un champ de dynamo sur un corps différencié, la Lune, et des champs magnétique dans le système solaire primitif avec l’étude de chondrites (CM et les rumurutites). Notre étude des échantillons lunaires a permis de confirmer l’existence d’un champ de dynamo ancien de forte intensité (~50 µT) entre 3.8 et 3.3 Ga. En utilisant l’anisotropie de susceptibilité magnétique comme indicateur de paléohorizontale et en faisant l’hypothèse d’une géométrie de champ dipolaire, nous avons déterminé que l’axe de cette dynamo était centré sur l’axe de rotation actuel de la Lune. Les chondrites CM et les Rumurutites ont enregistré des champs magnétiques anciens quelques millions d’années après la formation du système solaire. L’aimantation rémanente des chondrites CM constitue probablement le plus ancien enregistrement paléomagnétique jamais mis en évidence. L’estimation de la paléointensité (2 µT) et les contraintes chronologiques dont nous disposons ne permettent pas de trancher entre un champ d’origine externe (solaire ou nébulaire) ou d’origine interne (dynamo). Cette dernière hypothèse laisse entrevoir la possibilité de la formation de corps partiellement différenciés dès les premiers millions d’année du système solaire. Dans les rumurutites, les conclusions sont similaires, avec une paléointensité également estimée à 2 µT. Cependant l’aimantation étant plus jeune, une origine interne est favorisée. / Paleomagnetic studies of extraterrestrials rocks provide information on magnetic fields that prevailed in the solar system several million years ago.Through this work we have explored two main aspects: a field dynamo on a differentiated body, the moon, and magnetic fields in the early solar system with the study of two chondrites classes; CM and rumurutites. Our study of lunar samples confirmed that an old dynamo field of high intensity (~50 µT) existed on the Moon between at least 3.8 and 3.3 Ga. Using the anisotropy of magnetic susceptibility as a proxy for paleohorizontale and assuming a dipole field geometry, we determined that the dynamo axis was centered on the actual rotation axis of the Moon.CM chondrites and Rumurutites recorded old magnetic fields acquired few million years after the formation of the solar system. The remanent magnetization of CM chondrites is probably the oldest paleomagnetic record never evidenced. The estimated paleointensity (2 µT) and time constraints not allowed to discriminate between a field of external (solar or nebular) or internal origin (dynamo). This latter hypothesis suggests that formation of partially differentiated body could occur during the first million years of the solar system history. In rumurutites, conclusions are similar, with a paleointensity also estimated at ~2µT. However, the magnetization is younger and an internal origin is favored.

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The thesis consists of the novel, Stargate Atlantis: Exogenesis (Whitelaw and Christensen, 2006a) and an accompanying exegesis. The novel is a stand-alone tie-in novel based on the television series Stargate Atlantis (Wright and Glassner), a spin-off series of Stargate SG-1 (Wright and Cooper) derived from the movie Stargate (Devlin and Emmerich, 1994). Set towards the end of the second season, Stargate Atlantis: Exogenesis begins with the discovery of life pods containing the original builders of Atlantis, the Ancients. The mind of one of these Ancients, Ea, escapes the pod and possesses Dr. Carson Beckett. After learning what has transpired in the 10,000 years since her confinement, the traumatised Ea releases an exogenesis machine to destroy Atlantis. Ea dies, leaving Beckett with sufficient of her memories to reveal that a second machine, on the planet Polrusso, could counter the effects of the first device. When the Atlantis team travel to Polrusso, what they discover has staggering implications not only for the future of Atlantis but for all life in the Pegasus Galaxy. The exegesis argues that both science and science fiction narrate the dissolution of ontological structures, resulting in cognitive estrangement. Fallacy writers engage in the same process and use the same themes and tools as science fiction writers to resolve cognitive estrangement: they technologise mythology. Consequently, the distinction between fact and fiction, history and myth, is blurred. The exegesis discusses cognitive estrangement, mythology, the process of technologising mythology and its function as a novum that facilitates the resolution of cognitive estrangement in both fallacy and science fiction narratives. These concepts are then considered in three Stargate tie-in novels, with particular reference to the creative work, Stargate Atlantis: Exogenesis.

Derek Parfit är kanske en av vår tids mest kända moralfilosofer. Parfit inleder sin första bok Reasons and Persons med att ställa frågan: vad har vi mest skäl att göra? Hans fråga berör vad som egentligen har betydelse, en fråga som han fortsätter att beröra i sin andra bok On What Matters. Filosofen Toby Ord argumenterar i sin bok The Precipice för att den utmaning som definierar vår tid, och bör ha en central prioritering, är utmaningen att skydda mänskligheten emot så kallade existentiella risker. En existentiell risk är en typ av risk som hotar att förstöra, eller förhindra, mänsklighetens långsiktiga potential. Ord menar att vi idag befinner oss vid en kritisk tidpunkt i mänsklighetens historia som kan vara helt avgörande för om det ens kommer existera en framtid för mänskligheten. Men om vi bör skydda mänskligheten emot existentiella risker, så kan en lämplig följdfråga vara i vilken ordning vi bör prioritera olika existentiella risker. Den svenske filosofen Nick Bostrom har liksom Ord länge förespråkat att existentiella risker bör tas på allvar. Han menar att preventiva åtgärder bör vidtas. I sin bok Superintelligens argumenterar Bostrom, både omfattande och väl, för att den existentiella risk som kan te sig som mest brådskande, och kanske allvarligast, är artificiell intelligens. Bostrom menar att vi har goda skäl att tro att utveckling av artificiell intelligens kan eskalera till den grad att mänsklighetens öde kan hamna bortom vår egen kontroll. Det han syftar på är att människan just nu är den dominerande agenten på jorden och därför innehar en stor kontroll, men att så inte alltid behöver vara fallet. Bostroms tes kunde te sig som okonventionell då den presenterades, men kan även te sig så idag vid en första anblick. Han har dock fått explicit medhåll av personer som Bill Gates, Stephen Hawking, Elon Musk, Yuval Noah Harari och Max Tegmark, som antingen håller med eller resonerar i liknande banor. Även jag själv finner Bostroms antaganden välgrundade. Slutsatsen som många drar är därför att vi bör betrakta artificiell intelligens som en existentiell risk som ska prioriteras högt. Jag kommer dock i denna text att argumentera för tesen att vi inte bör betrakta artificiell intelligens som en existentiell risk. Tesen följer från en invändning som jag kommer att kalla för AI-paradoxen. Det tycks enligt invändningen som att artificiell intelligens inte kan leda till en existentiell katastrof givet vissa premisser som flera i debatten om artificiell intelligens tycks acceptera. Texten i uppsatsen är strukturerad på följande sätt. I avsnitt 2 kommer jag att återge det övergripande argumentet som cirkulerar i debatten om artificiell intelligens som ett hot. I avsnittet kommer jag också förklara några viktiga termer och begrepp. I avsnitt 3 börjar jag med att titta på den första premissen i argumentet, samt resonera om dess rimlighet. I avsnitt 4 går jag sedan vidare till den andra premissen i argumentet och gör samma sak med den. Väl i avsnitt 5 så väljer jag att presentera min egen idé som jag kallar för AI-paradoxen, vilket är en invändning mot argumentet. I avsnitt 6 diskuterar jag sedan AI-paradoxens implikationer. Avslutningsvis, i avsnitt 7, så ger jag en övergripande sammanfattning och en slutsats, samt några sista reflektioner. / Derek Parfit is perhaps one of the most famous moral philosophers of our time. Parfit begins his first book Reasons and Persons by asking the question: what do we have most reason to do? His question touches upon what really matters, a question he continues to touch upon in his second book On What Matters. The philosopher Toby Ord argues in his book The Precipice that the challenge that defines our time, and should have a central priority, is the challenge of safeguarding humanity from so-called existential risks. An existential risk is a type of risk that threatens to destroy, or prevent, humanity’s longterm potential. Ord means that today we are at a critical time in the history of humanity that can be absolutely decisive for whether there will even exist a future for humanity. But if we are to safeguard humanity from existential risks, then an appropriate question may be in what order we should prioritize different existential risks. The Swedish philosopher Nick Bostrom, like Ord, has long advocated that existential risks should be taken seriously. He believes that preventive measures should be taken. In his book Superintelligence Bostrom argues, both extensively and well, that the existential risk that may seem most urgent, and perhaps most severe, is artificial intelligence. Bostrom believes that we have good reason to believe that the development of artificial intelligence can escalate to the point that the fate of humanity can end up beyond our own control. What he is referring to is that humans are currently the dominant agent on earth and therefore has great control, but that this does not always have to be the case. Bostrom's thesis may have seemed unconventional when it was presented, but it can also seem so today at first glance. However, he has been explicitly supported by people like Bill Gates, Stephen Hawking, Elon Musk, Yuval Noah Harari and Max Tegmark, who either agree or reason similarly. I myself also find Bostrom's assumptions well-founded. The conclusion that many draw is therefore that we should regard artificial intelligence as an existential risk that should be given a high priority. However, in this text I will argue for the thesis that we should not regard artificial intelligence as an existential risk. The thesis follows from an objection of my own, which I call the AI ​​paradox. According to the objection, it seems that artificial intelligence cannot lead to an existential catastrophe given certain premises that many in the debate about artificial intelligence as a threat seem to accept. The text in the essay is structured as follows. In section 2 I will present the main argument circulating in the debate about artificial intelligence as a threat. In the section I will also explain some important terms and concepts. In section 3 I begin by looking at the first premise in the argument, and also reason about its plausibility. In section 4 I proceed to the second premise in the argument and examine it similarly. Once in section 5 I choose to present my own idea, which I call the AI ​​paradox, which is an objection to the argument. In section 6 I discuss the implications of the AI ​​paradox. Finally, in section 7, I give an overall summary and a conclusion, as well as some last reflections.

This study centered on a novel thermoelectric generator (TEG) integrated into the built environment. Designed by Watts Thermoelectric LLC, the TEG is essentially a novel assembly of thermoelectric modules whose required temperature differential is supplied by hot and cold streams of water flowing through the TEG. Per its recommended operating conditions, the TEG nominally generates 83 Watts of electrical power. In its default configuration in the built environment, solar-thermal energy serves as the TEG’s hot stream source and geothermal energy serves as its cold stream source. Two systems-level, thermodynamic analyses were performed, which were based on the TEG’s upcoming characterization testing, scheduled to occur later in 2011 in Detroit, Michigan. The first analysis considered the TEG coupled with a solar collector system. A numerical model of the coupled system was constructed in order to estimate the system’s annual energetic performance. It was determined numerically that over the course of a sample year, the solar collector system could deliver 39.73 megawatt-hours (MWh) of thermal energy to the TEG. The TEG converted that thermal energy into a net of 266.5 kilowatt-hours of electricity in that year. The second analysis focused on the TEG itself during operation with the purpose of providing a preliminary thermodynamic characterization of the TEG. Using experimental data, this analysis found the TEG’s operating efficiency to be 1.72%. Next, the annual emissions that would be avoided by implementing the zero-emission TEG were considered. The emission factor of Michigan’s electric grid, RFCM, was calculated to be 0.830 tons of carbon dioxide-equivalent (CO2e) per MWh, and with the TEG’s annual energy output, it was concluded that 0.221 tons CO2e would be avoided each year with the TEG. It is important to note that the TEG can be linearly scaled up by including additional modules. Thus, these benefits can be multiplied through the incorporation of more TEG units. Finally, the levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) of the TEG integrated into the built environment with the solar-thermal hot source and passive ground-based cold source was considered. The LCOE of the system was estimated to be approximately $8,404/MWh, which is substantially greater than current generation technologies. Note that this calculation was based on one particular configuration with a particular and narrow set of assumptions, and is not intended to be a general conclusion about TEG systems overall. It was concluded that while solar-thermal energy systems can sustain the TEG, they are capital-intensive and therefore not economically suitable for the TEG given the assumptions of this analysis. In the end, because of the large costs associated with the solar-thermal system, waste heat recovery is proposed as a potentially more cost-effective provider of the TEG’s hot stream source. / text