Does foreign lobbying affect foreign aid? In this dissertation I provide compelling evidence the answer is yes. Prior scholarship has almost unequivocally focused on international bargaining as an exchange of public goods such as military, economic, or political concessions. Foreign lobbying represents a fundamentally different form of international bargaining. It is the exchange of a private good for an international policy concession. I develop a theory of foreign lobbying and foreign policy that views foreign policy formation as a function of political actors weighing public goods alongside the benefits they receive from foreign lobbyist contributions. I utilize a Heckman selection model to test this theory and find compelling evidence that foreign lobbying influences U.S. foreign aid allocations.

In international relations, ¡§Foreign Aid¡¨ is a perfect tool to perform the diplomatic policy of a country. In the aspect of theory discussion, the development of foreign aid theory exists the arguments about idealism and realism. The idealist estimates the foreign aid policy according to humanism and moral standards, but the realist emphasizes the key point to provide foreign aid or not according to the benefit of nation. Since 1970, in order to get the identification, support, and the authority of the third world nations, and to compress the international society existence of Taiwan, the Communist Party of China uses plenty of economic aids as the tool to pursue their diplomatic objectives. In the post cold war era, the diplomacy competition for the third world nations between Taiwan and the Communist Party of China is more violent than ever. This situation can be known by the facts that the Communist Party of China had tried to join the United Nations vigorously before 1971 and that Taiwan is also more vigorous to return to the United Nations and to join the World Health Organization. No matter to return or to join the United Nations, Taiwan and the Communist Party of China both need more affirmative votes of the third world nations in the United Nations General Assembly to achieve their objectives. So, in the diplomacy competition of both sides of strait, Taiwan and the Communist Party of China need more support of the third world nations. Relatively, both sides of strait in order to get the identification of the third world nations both use foreign aid to draw an outsider to one¡¦s side and to establish diplomatic relations. That Taiwan and the Communist Party of China both use the influences of nations with foreign relation to generate the mutually beneficial and subtle interactive relations is worth to be observed and discussed.

The objective of this thesis is to examine the basic factors that motivate Turkey&rsquo / foreign aid policy towards Central Asia from a comparative perspective. Generally, the development aid aims eliminating the problems that have arisen from underdevelopment and contributing to regional and universal peace. In addition to this holistic goal, there are several other motivating factors. This thesis explores the reasons behind the foreign assistance programs of Turkey, the United States, Japan, and Russia towards Central Asia which ensure the development of the Central Asian countries and their integration within the international system. From a comparative perspective of the development aid provided by Turkey to the region and the aid provided by the other donor countries will also be presented. This thesis, argues that Turkey does not provide development assistance to the Central Asian countries merely as a result of its foreign policy interests, but also it aims to integrate these countries with the international system. This thesis consists of four chapters other than introduction and conclusion chapter. The second chapter examines relationship between foreign aid and foreign policy. The third chapter explores general characteristics of post- Soviet Central Asia. The forth chapter discuses Turkey&rsquo / s foreign aid policy towards Central Asia and the fifth chapter examines other donors&rsquo / foreign aid policy towards Central Asia.

Since China launched open door policy of economic reform in 1978, China has registering a sustained economic growth, which made it one of the worlds¡¦leading economies, also became the world's third biggest economy. Since late 1980s, China has not only became the world factory, with huge market, cheap labor force, and the main destination of foreign direct investments, but also became a world class political power whose influence is continuously growing in Asia and all over the world. China has also paid much attention to Africa region Since 1950s. China provided grant, interest-free loan, and low-interest loan to African nations at that time. After 1980s, in order to promote the share in common with Africa, China gradually took reform in foreign aid institutions and foreign aid management systems in various forms. After the end of the Cold-War, the foreign aid concept within western nations had put more focus on the development and cooperation. China was also deeply influenced by this trend; as a result, it led to the normalization of ¡§South-South Cooperation¡¨. In this research, the author analyses the development and strategies of China's Africa foreign aid policy, and tries to examine China's methods and objectives under the international political and economic new order. The result reveals that while China pursuing the political and economic interests through the foreign aid, it must be exchanged with African nations so that the internal and external of foreign aid project could move forward. The establishment of FOCAC in 2000 was a three year of frameworks and goals for Sino-Africa in relative cooperation areas. China published the ¡§China's Africa Policy¡¨ in January 2006, who also declared to establish a new strategic partnership relations with African nations. It was also a dollar diplomacy competing era between China and Taiwan since 1990s, and China tried to aid every African nation diplomatic ally in order to prevent other African nations from establishing relationships with Taiwan.

<p>This essay seeks to discern the motives of the aid allocation of western governments. The aim of the essay is to find differences between three highly similar aid donors: namely Denmark, Norway and Sweden, by doing a comparative case study according to the most similar case method. The research has been conducted by analyzing material from two ministers of each government, the Foreign Ministers and Ministers for International Development, by using a motive-analysis method. Social constructivism and structural realism have been used as a theoretical explanation. These two theories have been helpful in understanding how International Relations work.The results showed that although the three countries were highly similar, they showed some crucial differences in their motivation for aid allocation, especially in the case of Denmark. Theoretically, this could be explained by social constructivism, i.e. that the states have different priorities and experiences.</p>

Research literature on foreign assistance suggests that the U.S. provides aid in order to serve both its own strategic interests as well as the development needs of aid recipient countries. Maintaining a focus on Africa, this report uses newly available data for official development assistance and attempts to verify whether prevailing hypotheses regarding the motivations behind U.S. aid giving still hold true. Specifically, the report analyzes whether aid giving patterns align with 1) the development needs of recipient countries as understood through the lens of internationally established priorities, or 2) with good political and economic policies within recipient countries vis-à-vis democratic institutions and open markets, or 3) with U.S. national strategic interests (be they political, military, or economic interests). A statistical analysis of U.S. Official Development Assistance (ODA) to 53 countries in Africa over the period of 1970 to 2010 was carried out for this purpose. The results suggest that, when it comes to aid that is specifically addressed towards development projects in Africa, the strategic considerations and political priorities of the U.S. are just as important, if not more important, than the development needs or economic performance of recipient countries. Political allies and countries that democratize receive more aid from the U.S., ceteris paribus. In addition, it was found that more aid is given to countries with larger populations - a result that contradicts earlier literature on aid's motivations. The report is organized as follows. I begin in Section 1 by providing a general overview of U.S. foreign aid. In Section 2, I detail why Africa is a significant continent for such an analysis of U.S. aid, and outline some of the trends in aid to Africa. The third section summarizes some of the most important existing hypotheses about why the U.S. gives development aid. Section 4 describes the data and methodology used for this study and provides a discussion of the results obtained from the statistical analysis. Finally, in Section 6, I conclude by offering broader policy implications and sketching out avenues for future research. / text

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Foreing aid, since its comparatively recent inception, continually has been the subject of polemics. Though volumes have been written concerning its rationale, implementation, burden, impact, etc., only recently, with the concept of grants economics, have asessments of economic aid on a quantitative subsify basis been possible. These pioneering efforts have led the way toward a clearer understanding of foreign aid by identifying the real transfers involved. The object of the following analysis is to ferret out the grant component of official United States economic aid to less-developed countries from 1953 to 1969. The United States is chosen due to availabiity of data and because U.S. aid historically has contirbuted over fifty percent of net global foreign aid...

The United States emerged from the Second World War determined to play a leading role in the maintenance of international order. Increasing levels of tension between the United States and the forces of communism after 1945, however, slowly forced a redefinition of what might be more distinctly termed America's "global" responsibilities, such that by 1961 John F. Kennedy declared that the United States would "pay any price. . .in order to assure the survival and success of liberty." An identifiable Cold War consensus took shape based on the assumption that it was America's responsibility to lead, protect, and defend, the "free-world." Since America was effectively waging a battle to ensure the successful spread of its own values, the Cold War consensus also served to severely limit debate—dissent essentially implied disloyalty. By the mid-1960s, however, the Cold War consensus began to crack and a debate over American foreign policy began to emerge. That debate is the focus of this dissertation, which looks at the opposition to Cold War policies which emerged in the Senate, most notably among the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee --many of whom had once played a role in developing the very foreign policies they now protested. The war in Vietnam provided the focal point for much of the dissent, but the foreign aid program also became heavily criticized, as did America's NATO policy, particularly the size of the American military presence in Europe. More important, however, Senate dissenters came to question the United States' very position as the principle defender of the free world. They did not dispute the idea that America had a significant role to play in the global arena, but they did not believe that role should consist of being the world's policeman, the self-appointed arbiter of other’s affairs, and the keeper of the status quo. Because of their views, the so-called dissenters were labelled as "neo-isolationists." They saw themselves the true "internationalists," however, believing that the Cold War had led to confusion between internationalism and indiscriminate global involvement.

<p>The effectiveness of foreign aid in bringing economic and social development is mired in controversy. However, despite the controversial debates on its effectiveness, poor countries of the world have been receiving and using aid as a leverage to relieve themselves from development constraints they faced. Ethiopia is no exception amongst developing countries. Since the time it joined the World Bank group in 1945, foreign capital inflow has remained an important source of revenue for the government. This paper examines the fiscal impact of aid inflow into Ethiopia using time series data for the period 1975-2005. The empirical findings reveal that inflow of foreign aid influences public decision on revenue and expenditure patterns. The result shows that a larger proportion of aid is allocated to capital expenditure and that only a small proportion goes to recurrent expenditure. There is a strong positive association between aid inflow and capital expenditure. The finding also shows that, while a very weak negative association exists between aid and taxation effort, aid and borrowing are used as alternative source of finance.</p>