The work presents competing discourses around bilingualism that surround fluctuating national identity in Ukraine. The use of Ukrainian and Russian languages has been for a long time a highly sensitive issue, repeatedly taking shape as an instrument of political campaigns and overt propaganda, and continues to be a subject of debates and tensions. Crimean crisis and the war in the East of Ukraine are not merely clearly-cut results of Russian military strategy and aggression. Other poignant factors are: long-lasting unresolved language issues, artificially imposed linguistic monism, and conflicted national identity that constituted a conflicted form of life characteristic to Ukraine. They are attributable to centuries of particular historical development and bewildering post-Soviet heritage but constructed through Russian political propaganda and forced Ukrainian policies toward exclusion. This work explores national identity through the language situation in Ukraine to gain a holistic grasp of how exclusive Ukrainian language legislation influences the nation's cultural-linguistic settings. The given study claims that the development of the linguistic landscape in Ukraine climaxed in a setting of de jure monolingual, yet de facto bilingual country: the new language legislation requires all...

This thesis is concerned with the ways in which Muslims in Russia’s Povolzhye region define, and strive towards, spiritual and material well-being. It explores how pious subjectivities are cultivated in a secular and often politically hostile environment. In addition, it deals with Povolzhye Muslims’s pursuit of worldly success in the context of social change brought about by Russia’s transition to a market economy. Povolzhye is a prosperous, multi-ethnic and multi-confessional historical region, home to Russia’s second largest ethnic group, the Volga Tatars. Although the Tatars have been Sunni Muslims for centuries, the post-Soviet emergence of cosmopolitan, scripturalist piety trends – which I collectively refer to as Povolzhye’s ‘halal movement’ – has raised unprecedented concerns and disputes about the meaning of Muslimness and the place of Muslims in Russian society. Scripturalist virtue-ethics projects have been underrepresented within the expanding body of anthropological literature concerning Islam in the former USSR, and particularly in the Russian Federation. With its explicit ethnographic focus on Povolzhye’s halal movement, this work aims at filling this gap. The halal movement is characterised by its hypermodern transnational imagery as well as significant discursive overlapping with the realms of business and economy. The pursuit of a virtuous existence is particularly appealing to those ascending sectors of society that most successfully engage with Russia’s post-socialist free-market environment, while the idiom of piety both communicates and dissimulates novel forms of stratification and exclusion. This project brings together anthropological theories of ethical self-cultivation with approaches that focus on power, social change, and political economy. In order to explore the political life of the halal movement vis-à-vis both state institutions and the market, I employ Giorgio Agamben’s notions of ‘form-of-life’ and ‘rule/law’, which shed light on the relationship between power and virtue in original ways. In addition, particular attention is given to the social distribution of virtue and the role it plays in reproducing distinction, status, and a ‘capitalist spirit’.

[pt] Este trabalho apresenta uma reflexão sobre a comensurabilidade entre as perspectivas chomskyana e wittgensteiniana da linguagem em geral e, em particular, no que diz respeito à questão do sentido. O objetivo da pesquisa foi examinar, nos textos do Wittgenstein maduro, nos desenvolvimentos mais recentes de Chomsky — levando em consideração as sucessivas mudanças na teoria gerativa — e nas obras de outros autores que se alinham com as ideias de um e outro ou se dedicam a estudá-los, convergências e divergências relevantes entre eles. A pesquisa adotou uma perspectiva pragmática e antiessencialista da linguagem, mais especificamente a versão dessa perspectiva oferecida pela filosofia mais madura de Wittgenstein, sobretudo nas suas Investigações filosóficas. Sem renunciar a essa perspectiva, foram analisadas as teorias sobre a linguagem humana defendidas por Noam Chomsky, geralmente tidas como opostas às do filósofo vienense, partindo da hipótese de que fosse possível encontrar, no diálogo entre elas, possíveis complementações para uma melhor compreensão do funcionamento da linguagem humana. As teses que resultam do trabalho são as seguintes: (1) Que os pontos de vista de Chomsky e Wittgenstein sobre a linguagem não são inteiramente irreconciliáveis e podem existir convergências, divergências e possíveis complementações que valem a pena serem exploradas, (2) Que as versões contemporâneas das teorias de Chomsky estão mais abertas à aproximação com Wittgenstein do que versões passadas, (3) Que algumas contradições entre as análises de Wittgenstein e Chomsky podem ser atribuídas à diferença entre o ponto de vista e os métodos de um filósofo e os de um cientista da linguagem, ou a confusões conceituais provocadas pelas armadilhas da própria linguagem — termos usados por eles próprios ou por seus mais destacados comentadores de formas que parecem altamente contraditórias, podendo nos levar à conclusão de que existe uma incompatibilidade insuperável entre seus pontos de vista, (4) Que, ao menos parcialmente, algumas dessas contradições podem ser atribuídas ao choque entre a tese chomskyana da autonomia da sintaxe e a preocupação quase exclusiva de Wittgenstein pelo sentido. Entre outros aspectos relevantes das ideias de ambos os pensadores, analisamos o uso que eles fazem de termos como representação, mente, descrição e explicação; de questões fundamentais para ambos, como suas ideias sobre o que seja aprender uma língua e seguir uma regra, e de algumas noções distintivas do pensamento de cada um, como a noção wittgensteiniana de forma de vida e a hipótese inatista de Chomsky. Por último, analisamos de forma mais aprofundada duas controvérsias explícitas entre Chomsky e Wittgenstein, a partir de dois textos do primeiro que fazem detalhadas críticas a aspectos importantes da filosofia do segundo: o argumento da linguagem privada e a crítica à ideia de que existem processos cerebrais correlacionados com o pensamento. / [en] This work reflects on the commensurability between the Chomskyan and the Wittgenstenian perspectives of language in general, and in particular it deals with issues on meaning. The goal of the research was to examine, in the mature texts of Wittgenstein, in the most recent developments of Chomsky — taking into consideration the successive changes in generative theory — and in the works of other authors that align themselves with the ideas of one or the other or devote themselves to study them, convergences and divergences relevant to them. The research adopted a pragmatic and anti-essentialist approach to language, more specifically the version of this approach offered by Wittgenstein s more mature philosophy, mostly in his Philosophical Investigations. Without renouncing this approach, the theories of human language supported by Noam Chomsky were analyzed, which are generally considered as opposed to those of the Viennese philosopher, starting from the hypothesis that it is possible to find, in the dialog between them, possible complementarities for a better understanding of how human language works. The present work are guided by following thesis: (1) Chomsky s and Wittgenstein s points of view about language are not completely irreconcilable and there can be convergences, divergences and possible complementarities that are worth exploring; (2) the contemporary versions of Chomsky s theories can be more open to a rapprochement with Wittgenstein than past versions; (3) some contradictions between the analysis of Chomsky and Wittgenstein can be attributed to the difference between the points of view and methods of a philosopher and those language of a scientist, or to conceptual confusions originated in the tricks of language itself – terms used by them or by their more outstanding commentators in ways that seem highly contradictory, leading us to the conclusion that there is an insurmountable incompatibility between their points of view; (4) at least partially, some of those contradictions can be attributed to the conflict between the Chomskyan hypothesis about the Autonomy of Syntax and the almost exclusive preoccupation of Wittgenstein for the meaning. Among other relevant aspects of the ideas of both authors, we will analyze how they use terms like representation, mind, description and explanation; fundamental questions for both, like their ideas about what it is to learn a language and follow a rule, and about distinctive notions of their thought, like the Wittgenstenian notion of form of life and the Chomskyan innate hypothesis. Finally, we analyze in deep two explicit disputes between Chomsky and Wittgenstein, taking as a starting point two texts of the former that formulate detailed criticism to important aspects of the latter s philosophy: the argument of private language and the criticism of the idea that there are brain processes correlated to thought. / [es] Este trabajo presenta una reflexión sobre la conmensurabilidad entre las perspectivas chomskyana y wittgensteiniana del lenguaje en general y, en particular, en lo que se refiere a la cuestión del sentido. El objetivo de la investigación fue examinar, en los textos del Wittgenstein maduro, en los desarrollos más recientes de Chomsky —teniendo en cuenta los sucesivos cambios en la teoría generativa— y en las obras de otros autores que se alinean con las ideas de uno y otro o se dedican a estudiarlos, convergencias y divergencias relevantes entre ellos. La investigación adoptó una perspectiva pragmática y antiesencialista del lenguaje, más específicamente la versión de esta perspectiva ofrecida por la filosofía más madura de Wittgenstein, sobre todo en sus Investigaciones filosóficas. Sin renunciar a esa perspectiva, fueron analizadas las teorías sobre el lenguaje humano defendidas por Noam Chomsky, generalmente consideradas como opuestas a las del filósofo vienés, partiendo de la hipótesis de que fuese posible encontrar, en el diálogo entre ellas, posibles complementaciones para una mejor comprensión del funcionamiento del lenguaje humano. Las tesis que resultan de este trabajo son las siguientes: (1) Que los puntos de vista de Chomsky y Wittgenstein sobre el lenguaje no son completamente irreconciliables y pueden existir convergencias, divergencias y posibles complementaciones que vale la pena explorar, (2) Que las versiones contemporáneas de las teorías de Chomsky están más abiertas a la aproximación con Wittgenstein que las versiones pasadas, (3) Que algunas contradicciones entre los análisis de Wittgenstein y Chomsky pueden ser atribuidos a la diferencia entre el punto de vista y los métodos de un filósofo y los de un científico del lenguaje, o a confusiones conceptuales provocadas por las armadillas del propio lenguaje — términos utilizados por ellos mismos o por sus más destacados comentadores de maneras que parecen altamente contradictorias, pudiendo llevarnos a la conclusión de que existe una incompatibilidad insuperable entre sus puntos de vista, (4) Que, al menos parcialmente, algunas de esas contradicciones pueden ser atribuidas al choque entre la tesis chomskyana de la autonomía de la sintaxis y la preocupación casi exclusiva de Wittgenstein por el sentido. Entre otros aspectos relevantes de las ideas de ambos pensadores, analizamos el uso que realizan de términos como representación, mente, descripción y explicación; de cuestiones fundamentales para ambos, como sus ideas sobre lo que sea aprender una lengua y seguir una regla, y de algunas nociones distintivas del pensamiento de cada uno, como la noción wittgensteiniana de forma de vida y la hipótesis innatista de Chomsky. Por último, analizamos más profundamente dos controversias explícitas entre Chomsky y Wittgenstein, a partir de dos textos del primero que hacen detalladas críticas a aspectos importantes de la filosofía del segundo: el argumento del lenguaje privado y la crítica a la idea de que existan procesos cerebrales correlacionados con el pensamiento.

瑪格麗特‧愛特伍的《瘋狂亞當三部曲》描繪了當代讀者所熟悉的世界: 一個受新自由主義浪潮席捲的社會。當政府權力被龐大財團架空，自由國家的民主核心價值早已崩解。 本篇論文的論點延伸自Chris Vials 的文章，並試圖以新自由主義統治論述來解釋小說中民主與極權融為一體的情況。第一章解釋新經濟思維使個人與社會產生疏離，以統治極端分化的社會階層。第二章則闡述小說中的國家已陷入例外狀態，法律受到懸置，而圍牆的設立強化了排除生命的機制並且產生 “裸命”。在最後的章節將探討上帝的園丁會 “生命-形式” 的革命以及《瘋狂亞當》的主角澤伯所展現的 “無身份” 抵抗的可能性。 如同書中角色，身處於當代的讀者正受到這股 “未來的浪潮” 推進向前卻同時又受到過去的夢靨所困。世界大戰、猶太人集中營不只是已過去的歷史事實，他們以不同形式再現且縈繞不去。如何撿拾過去的傷痛與錯誤，承接死去之人的意志正是我們必須肩負的責任。 / In Margaret Atwood’s MaddAddam trilogy, the author imagines a near future that is too familiar for the reader who live in the contemporary period, a neoliberal society. Through the depiction of a hollowed-out nation replaced by a giant consortium, she lays bare a truth that democracy is going to collapse. Based on Chris Vials’ article, “Margaret Atwood’s Dystopic Fiction and the Contradictions of Neoliberal Freedom,” this thesis furthers to elaborate the integration of democratic regime and totalitarianism by discourse of neoliberal governance: the neoliberal rationality alienates individuals, uniting the divided social stratifications. In the second part, I suggest that the nation falls into an anarchy since it has already entered into a state of exception, which gives rise to “bare life.” The exclusion mechanism is represented by the construction of “the Walls.” The third chapter aims to discuss the possibility of resisting the new form of sovereign power in practice of the God’s Gardeners about how to live “form-of-life” and politics of “(non)-identity” deployed by Zeb, the protagonist of MaddAddam. Like the characters, we stand in the intersection of the “Wave of future” and the recurring nightmare in the past. Global wars and concentration camp are not only historical facts but recurring events. It is our responsibility to recall the memory, remember the pain, and inherit the will of the dead.

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On est consciemment ou inconsciemment influencé par le scientisme et le positivisme logique. Nous posons donc une question : Peut-on parler de Dieu aujourd’hui ? Pour répondre à cette question, nous choisissons deux philosophes : Wittgenstein et Simone Weil. Selon Wittgenstein, « sur ce dont on ne peut parler, il faut garder le silence ». Ce qu’il veut dire par là, ce n’est pas que Dieu n’existe pas ou que Dieu n’est pas intelligible comme le disent le scientisme et le positivisme logique. Ce qu’il veut dire par là, c’est que Dieu existe effectivement, mais que l’on ne peut parler de lui en raison de la limite de notre langage. Or, la faute de Wittgenstein consiste à détourner les yeux de l’intelligibilité religieuse ou métaphysique. En ce qui concerne Simone Weil, elle parle de Dieu dans ses écrits et ses lettres. Qu’est-ce qui lui permet de parler de Dieu ? C’est le premier intérêt de ce projet. Et le deuxième intérêt consiste à déterminer l’expérience mystique de Simone Weil, car l’utilisation du mot « mystique » dans les études sur elle est assez arbitraire. Le troisième intérêt est de mettre en relief la relation entre la non-lecture et l’intuition chez elle. Enfin, le cinquième intérêt est de traiter la relation entre le bouddhisme zen et la pensée de Simone Weil. A travers nos études sur le concept d’intuition chez Simone Weil, nous proposerons une autre vision du monde que le scientisme et le positivisme logique. / We are consciously or unconsciously influenced by scientism and logical positivism. So we asked a question: Can we speak of God today? To answer the question, we focus on two philosophers, Wittgenstein and Simone Weil. According to Wittgenstein, “Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.” What he means by that is not that God doesn’t exist or that God is not intelligible as say scientism and logical positivism. What he means by that is that God does exist, but we can’t talk about him because of the limits of our language. But the lack of Wittgenstein is to look away from religious or metaphysical intelligibility. As for Simone Weil, she speaks of God in her writings and letters. What allows her to speak of God? This is our first point of interest. And our second point of interest is to define the mystical experience of Simone Weil, because the use of the word “mystical” in studies of Weil is rather arbitrary. Our third point of interest is to highlight the relationship between “non-reading” and intuition in Simone Weil. Our fourth point of interest is to explore the relationship between Zen Buddhism and the thought of Simone Weil. Through studying them, we will answer this question and, through Weil’s concept of intuition, we propose a worldview that is different from scientism and from logical positivism.