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This thesis first examines the overall development of the EEC-China trade and economic relations. It then analyses the changing Chinese economy, the non-market economy theory, its application and implication in EEC-China bilateral trade relations. It is suggested that China is no longer a traditional NME after ten years of reform; its economy is in a transitional stage changing from an NME towards a mixed economy. The thesis then reviews the 1978 EEC-China trade agreement. It is found that this agreement provides a highly restrictive MFN treatment between the parties, because China is not a member of the GATT, and is classified as an NME. The thesis analyses the legal framework and problems under the 1978 agreement, and its nature and possible legal effect both in the Community legal system and in the Chinese legal system. It then goes on to look at the Community internal regulations which govern imports from China. The thesis also reviews the 1985 economic cooperation agreement between the EEC and China. It analyses the background and development of the agreement; the areas for cooperation and the investment clause. The cooperation agreement, it is submitted, is more an expression of political goodwill rather than a comprehensive economic cooperation framework such as the home convention. A particular area, namely, antidumping, is separately discussed. This is not only because China is one of the principal targets of the EEC antidumping proceedings, but also the EEC employs a special set of rules against imports from China, as well as other NIlE countries. Trade in textiles is also special interested. It consists of major European imports from China, and as such has a special legal regime. The analysis suggests that trade in textiles between the EEC and China has become more restrictive since 1979. Finally, both the impacts of a single market in 1992 and China's efforts to rejoin the GATF are discussed. It is suggested that the EC should continue to be committed to free trade in theory and more importantly in practice, and to remove existing restrictions on imports from China; whereas China should continue its economic reform and gradually open up its own market to the EC.

In this dissertation I examine the reasons why the U.S. film industry lost the GATT-Uruguay Round negotiations on audiovisual services and intellectual property rights (IPRs) related to copyright. I revisit the political economy approach to communication and implement Mosco's (1996) suggestions on the approach's renewal. Mosco notes that political economists of communication thematically view the state as supporting transnational business (1996, p. 94). However, Jarvie's (1992) analysis of the relationship between the U.S. government and film industry between 1920 and 1950 suggests that this 'support' theme does not adequately capture the often antagonistic and unproductive relationship between the two parties. I extend Jarvie's (1992) work by developing themes from his scholarship and applying them to a case study on the Uruguay Round. I review the literature on the media-cultural imperialism thesis and focus on Herbert Schiller's (1969 [1992], 1976, 1989) scholarship. Schiller's thesis implies that outcomes in international relations are dictated by domestic determinants such as the influence of corporate lobbyists. However, I argue that the reasons why Hollywood lost lie not in domestic determinants alone, but in a broader perspective (derived from the discipline of international relations) that focuses on the interaction between domestic trade politics and international relations (Putnam, 1988 [1993]). Putnam characterises international negotiations as an interactive process involving the bargaining between negotiators and the separate discussions each delegation has with constituents in its domestic market on the ratification of the agreement. I assess themes from Jarvie's work and propositions from Schiller's thesis using Putnam's (1988 [1993]) two-level analysis and empirical evidence from primary documents and thirty-five interviews conducted over a three-year period (1994 to 1997) with U.S. and European negotiators and film executives. I argue that U.S. domestic trade politics hampered efforts by U.S. negotiators to reach a bilateral accord on audiovisual services and IPRs related to copyright because of linkages forged by EU Member States between progress in those talks and progress in talks on agriculture, maritime transport services, geographic indications related to wines and anti-dumping. A second obstacle to a bilateral accord was an influential hawkish minority of the Hollywood lobby, who set an aggressive agenda for U.S. negotiators and set off a chain reaction in the final moments of the Round that led to Hollywood's defeat. Finally, I present an alternative scenario to the argument (cf. Waregne, 1994; Dehousse and Havelange, 1994; Joachimowicz and Berenboom, 1994) that the French government dictated the outcome of the audiovisual services and IPRs negotiations. My scenario emphasises the preeminent status of the General Affairs Council, the role of EU Member States other than France, and Commission efforts to forge a bilateral deal. In the end, the hawks dictated the outcome of the audiovisual services talks, while a majority of EU Member States dictated the outcome of the talks on IPRs related to copyright.

Universität Salzburg, Diss., 2006/2007.

Universiẗat, Diss., 1992--Heidelberg.

No description available.

Subsidijos yra vienas iš sudėtingiausių ir daugiausia ginčų sukeliančių tarptautinės teisės klausimų. Viena vertus, vyriausybės teikia subsidijas siekdamos visiškai teisėtų nacionalinės ekonominės ir socialinės politikos tikslų. Tačiau, kita vertus, subsidijos gali sukelti nenumatytus tarptautinės prekybos iškraipymus. Dėl jų neigiamo poveikio subsidijos yra sudėtingo tarptautinės ir viršvalstybinės teisės normų rinkinio, kuriuo siekiama atskirti ir reguliuoti „nesąžiningas“ subsidijas, subjektas. Šiame magistro darbe nagrinėjama apsaugos nuo neigiamo subsidijų poveikio prekybos partnerių interesams problematika, ieškant atsakymų į klausimus, kodėl apsauga yra būtent tokia, ir ar subsidijų (ir joms atsverti taikomų kompensacinių muitų) naudojimą reglamentuojančios taisyklės yra pakankamos. / Subsidies are one of the most complicated and contentious questions in international law. On the one hand, subsidies are used by governments to serve fully legitimate objectives of national economic and social policy. On the other hand, however, subsidies may create unintended distortions in international trade. Due to adverse effects subsidies are the subject to an intricate set of legal rules of international and supra-national law, which attempts to distinguish and regulate „unfair“ subsidies. This master‘s thesis examines the issue of protection from adverse effects on the interests of trading partners, attempting to answer the questions, why this is the case and whether the disciplines governing the use of subsidies – and countervailing duties to offset them – is complete.

Univ., Diss.--Heidelberg, 1992.

Zugl. Diss. Univ. Genf, 1994. / La thèse a paru sous le titre: Le système politique suisse face à la Communauté européenne et au GATT. Bibliogr.: p. 383-398.

Master of Arts / Department of Economics / Peri da Silva / Rose (2004) reports that GATT/WTO membership produces no positive effects on international trade. This is a remarkable determination given the widespread belief in academic and policy circles that the WTO successfully promotes trade flows by reducing barriers to international trade. Empirical literature measuring the GATT/WTO trade effects has produced notably diverse results since Rose's (2004) paper. This report introduces the history of GATT/WTO and describes the GATT/WTO’s aim to promote trade using multilateral rounds of trade negotiations. It confirms that the efforts toward trade liberalization made by the GATT/WTO are partially achieved by tariff reductions and other trade obligations. In discussing the literature related to Rose’s surprising results, we argue that the gravity model employed by Rose (2004) is not theoretically sound since it omits multilateral resistance terms and fails to capture unobserved bilateral heterogeneity. However, we find that even an accurate specification gravity model that controls multilateral resistance, unobserved bilateral heterogeneity, and individual regional trade agreement effect cannot fully account for Rose’s GATT/WTO trade effects findings. The present report suggests that a new approach, specifically the nonparametric method used by Chang and Lee (2011), may offer sound guidance for future research attempting to understand Rose’s mysterious findings.