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Ce travail s'interroge sur les fondements de la phénoménologie husserlienne en exposant la genèse de la subjectivité transcendantale pour ensuite développer plus longuement la théorie phénoménologique de l'intersubjectivité. A l'intérieur de la sphère intersubjective, l'alter ego apparaît à l'ego par le mode de l'intropathie permettant le passage au monde de l'expérience étrangère. La primordialité d'autrui pour la découverte et la compréhension de l'ego lui-même, centre de nos préoccupations, devient donc thématique. Est mis à jour l'interdépendance des vies dans un monde environnant commun englobant une communauté des monades, qui fonde l'édification de la sphère sociale et culturelle grâce à des relations réciproques de communication. - La problématique constitutive de l'horizon intersubjectif permet de connaître le labeur préparatoire correspondant du fondateur du criticisme phénoménologique.

Ce mémoire retrace la réflexion de Husserl en ce qui a trait à la crise des sciences, telle que présentée dans la Krisis. Il s'agit en un premier temps de retracer l'évolution de la pensée scientifique depuis le tournant galiléen, pour ensuite interroger les présupposés qui se trouvent à l'origine de ce tournant. L'exposition des présupposés conduit à la découverte du domaine du monde-de-la-vie, fond commun de toute expérience. Cette découverte permet de replacer les diverses sciences au sein de l'horizon général du monde, et d'enrichir cet horizon par la notion de praxis. Cette régression achevée, il s'agit en un deuxième temps de procéder avec Husserl à une nouvelle lecture de l'histoire de la science, qui maintient ce qui fait la particularité de la science, sa visée d'universalité, et qui use des structures issues de l'analyse du monde-de-la-vie pour comprendre ce qui a conduit la science vers la crise que Husserl dépeint.

Este trabajo desarrolla la motivación fenomenológica de las vanguardias musicales del siglo XX y parte del interés por proponer una nueva escucha en conexión con el nuevo paradigma sistémico de la vida. Para lograr este propósito, en primer lugar, se presenta la crítica de Edmund Husserl al viejo paradigma de la ciencia, asociado este con la actitud cientificista moderna y su modelo matemático. A continuación, se retoma el aporte de la fenomenología husserliana a una teoría del conocimiento comprehensiva. Con estas herramientas, enseguida se describe y analiza brevemente algunas de las innovaciones musicales que propusieron las vanguardias de inicios de siglo XX al abrir las nociones tradicionales de “lo musical”, “lo sonoro” y “el tiempo musical”. Se describe, entonces, la ampliación del espectro de lo musical, la incorporación de nuevas organizaciones sonoras y la exploración de los límites de la rítmica y la temporalidad tradicionales, entre otras innovaciones que conducen a la apertura de nuevos horizontes para la escucha musical desde los frentes de la intencionalidad y la temporalidad husserlianas. A lo largo del texto se explicita las relaciones entre la revolución musical de las vanguardias y el novedoso paradigma actual de la ciencia. 3 / Tesis

Esta investigación comenzó como el intento de profundizar en las tesis de licenciatura de algunos estudiantes de la Facultad de Ciencias y Artes de la Comunicación en la Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú (PUCP). Esos trabajos de tesis presentaban y analizaban experiencias creativas y artísticas en poblaciones excluidas, al interior de las cuales se generaron espacios novedosos de reconocimiento entre sus participantes, a menudo con el apoyo de los jóvenes autores de esas investigaciones. Los procesos, las historias y las personas que se dejaban mostrar en sus páginas han informado en los últimos años mis preguntas como profesor, estudiante de doctorado y profesional interesado en temas de desarrollo, ciudadanía e interculturalidad. Me han confirmado también que la investigación académica puede seguir aportando a una comprensión más profunda de estos espacios de nuestra realidad actual y contribuir a su fortalecimiento. / Tesis

Law, Ki Fung. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2013. / Includes bibliographical references. / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstracts also in Chinese.

Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2017-10-03T12:32:14Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Lucíola Maria de Sousa Brandes.pdf: 1006890 bytes, checksum: efac1c10aa9cf55e9628af6de3ad0ad0 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-10-03T12:32:14Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Lucíola Maria de Sousa Brandes.pdf: 1006890 bytes, checksum: efac1c10aa9cf55e9628af6de3ad0ad0 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-09-18 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / The present work tries to interpret the concept of intentionality treated in the Fifth Investigation of the work Logical Investigations, of Edmund Husserl (1859-1938). In order to do so, it aims at three objectives: to show that intentionality is not an external relation; prove that intentionality does not presuppose the existence of two different entities; and explicit aspects necessary for the occurrence of intentionality. The development of this study is organized in three chapters. The first takes care of the conception of intentionality in Franz Brentano (1838-1917) and Kasimir Twardowski (1866-1938). In this section, questions about the structure of psychic phenomena and their classification are contemplated, including the characteristics of the representation, the represented object and the content. The second, which constitutes the core of the dissertation, exposes Husserl's concept of intentionality, elaborated in the Fifth Research, based on the central conceptual analyzes and distinctions of this author. This chapter clarifies the structure of intentional living; displays the classification of acts and their fundamental relationships; and provides the four senses of representation. The third examines Husserl's criticisms of Brentano and Twardowski's conceptions of intentional phenomena. The result of this philosophical study indicates that: intentionality, according to Husserl, is based on an inner moment of the experience itself. Husserl distinguishes consciousness from actual objects and representations of fantasy, predictions, memories, and so on; and the object intentionally visualized is neither part of consciousness and is not contained in it, i.e. intentionality is characterized by its independence from existence / O presente trabalho procura discernir o conceito de intencionalidade tratado na Quinta Investigação da obra Investigações Lógicas, de Edmund Husserl (1859-1938). Para tanto, tem em vista três objetivos: mostrar que a intencionalidade não é uma relação externa; provar que a intencionalidade não pressupõe a existência de duas entidades diferentes e; explicitar aspectos necessários para a ocorrência da intencionalidade. O desenvolvimento do estudo está organizado em três capítulos. O primeiro cuida da concepção de intencionalidade em Franz Brentano (1838-1917) e Kasimir Twardowski (1866-1938). Nessa seção, estão contempladas questões sobre a estrutura dos fenômenos psíquicos e a classificação desses fenômenos psíquicos, assim como são assinaladas características da representação, do objeto representado e do conteúdo. O segundo, que constitui o núcleo da dissertação, expõe o conceito de intencionalidade de Husserl, elaborado na Quinta Investigação, alicerçado nas análises e distinções conceituais centrais desse autor. Esse capítulo clarifica a estrutura da vivência intencional; exibe a classificação dos atos e das relações de fundação entre eles e; fornece os quatros sentidos de representação. O terceiro examina as críticas de Husserl às concepções do fenômeno intencional concebidas por Brentano e Twardowski. O resultado desse estudo filosófico indica que: (1) a intencionalidade husserliana tem por fundamento um momento interior da própria vivência; Husserl distingue a consciência dos objetos efetivamente existentes e das representações da fantasia, predições, lembranças etc. (2) o objeto visado intencionalmente não é parte da consciência e nem está contido nela, ou seja, a intencionalidade é caracterizada por sua independência da existência

Jacques Derrida's deconstruction of the metaphysical priority of the present simultaneously validates presence as the absolute form of meaning. In order to succeed, deconstruction is bound to offer the most robust defence of transcendental phenomenology's systematic articulation of the very constitution of experience in its absolute and irrecusably present form. Edmund Husserl's late philosophy of history accounts for the contradiction of atemporal truth—how it is created in time, and how it is possible for the historical investigation of this truth to determine its meaning with absolute certainty. Through the necessity of an ideal and phenomenologically reduced history—not only for the work of historical investigation in its own right, but as a constituent of the meaning of any truth— Derrida explains why Husserl devotes so much effort to explicating the structure and process of the formation of ideal objects in the course of what is ostensively an explanation of the origination of the geometrical science itself out of subjective experience. The purpose of this is only ever implied in Husserl's own work “The Origin of Geometry”, and the implications are subtle. The purpose of this thesis is to detail how the structures of Husserl's system serve the end clearly elucidated by Derrida. It first explains how objective truth is constituted and an ideal history made possible through Husserl's examination of their appearance in the living present, and following this it examines the problems raised by Derrida's deconstruction itself.

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In this thesis, I investigate the nature of geometric knowledge and its relationship to spatial intuition. My goal is to rehabilitate the Kantian view that Euclid's geometry is a mathematical practice, which is grounded in spatial intuition, yet, nevertheless, yields a type of a priori knowledge about the structure of visual space. I argue for this by showing that Euclid's geometry allows us to derive knowledge from idealized visual objects, i.e., idealized diagrams by means of non-formal logical inferences. By developing such an account of Euclid's geometry, I complete the "standard view" that geometry is either a formal system (pure geometry) or an empirical science (applied geometry), which was developed mainly by the logical positivists and which is currently accepted by many mathematicians and philosophers. My thesis is divided into three parts. I use Hans Reichenbach's arguments against Kant and Edmund Husserl's genetic approach to the concept of space as a means of arguing that the "standard view" has to be supplemented by a concept of a geometry whose propositions have genuine spatial content. I then develop a coherent interpretation of Euclid's method by investigating both the subject matter of Euclid's geometry and the nature of geometric inferences. In the final part of this thesis, I modify Husserl's phenomenological analysis of the constitution of visual space in order to define a concept of spatial intuition that allows me not only to explain how Euclid's practice is grounded in visual space, but also to account for the apriority of its results.