Thesis advisor: Rosemarie Bodenheimer / By focusing on the predominance of semi-conscious and unconscious states in both nineteenth-century British literature and psychology, this dissertation outlines the recognizable and multi-faceted relation existing between literature and psychology. Besides their obvious prevalence in sensation novels later in the period, these states, which I call ecstatic states, appeared in many of the most prominent, canonical novels of the nineteenth century. Prominent Victorian psychologists, such as Robert MacNish, John Abercrombie, James Cowles Prichard, and Forbes Winslow among others, connected ecstatic states, including fiction reading, to insanity, since these states exhibited an underlying component of self-loss in which the boundaries of the conscious self--time, will, and identity--dissolved. They were a troubling, yet common phenomenon of the mind that preoccupied the entire spectrum of middle class Victorian intellectual life--businessmen, novelists, literary critics, and psychologists--and these states are still fascinating neuroscientists today. This study shows how the Victorian medical practice of moral management sought to control these states by calling for the regulation and often the confinement of the imagination. What began as a method used solely in the insane asylum came to undergird much of Victorian life, including the many hostile reactions to the addictive and class-leveling powers of the novel. My dissertation emphasizes how certain Victorian novelists not only took up the role of psychologists themselves but also resisted and revised accepted psychology within their novels. Charlotte Brontë, Charles Dickens, and George Eliot reacted in distinctive ways against the oppressive tenets of moral management. My readings of the novels Jane Eyre, Villette, Hard Times, Our Mutual Friend, The Mill on the Floss, and Romola show how it is the unrelenting regulation of the imagination that creates the various forms of mania and becomes ultimately devastating to the self. For these novelists, the dismantling of conscious thought and will, so alarming to the advocates of moral management, formed the crux of personal growth, moral choice, and ethical responsiveness. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2013. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: English.

Em diversas passagens, Tomás de Aquino afirma que é impossível o nosso intelecto, unido ao corpo, inteligir algo em ato sem se converter aos fantasmas (conversio ad phantasmata). Segue-se, portanto, que a conversão aos fantasmas [i.e., o direcionamento natural do intelecto para as imagens recebidas pelos sentidos] é a condição de possibilidade da intelecção humana. Agora, se tal intelecção depende da conversão aos fantasmas, e estes, por sua vez, dependem da afecção dos entes materiais sobre os sentidos, conclui-se que o conhecimento intelectual humano só é possível a partir do conhecimento sensível. Se é correta essa simplificação, então, podemos continuar perguntando pela questão que, de fato, interessará aqui, a saber, se é possível o conhecimento dos incorpóreos, dos quais não existem fantasmas (imagens recebidas). Ora, se é indubitável que dos incorpóreos não temos fantasmas, então, como poderíamos inteligilos, uma vez que a intelecção humana depende necessariamente da conversio ad phantasmata? Para dar conta dessa problemática, propomos primeiro explicar porque a conversão aos fantasmas é a conditio sine qua non da intelecção humana. Somente depois disso, consideraremos o objetivo central desta investigação que é explicitar como Tomás de Aquino argumenta a favor da possibilidade do conhecimento de Deus, do qual não temos fantasmas / In several passages, Thomas Aquinas states that it is impossible for our intellect, united to the body, can actually to understand without conversion to the phantasms (conversio ad phantasmata). It follows therefore that the conversion to the phantasms (i.e., the natural direction of the intellect to the images received by the senses) is the condition of possibility of human intellection. Now, if such intellection depends on the conversion to the phantasms, and these, in turn, depend on the affection of the material ones on the senses, it is concluded that the human intellectual knowledge is only possible from sensitive knowledge. If this simplification is correct, then we can keep asking the question that really concern us here, namely, the question of the possibility of knowledge of incorporeal things, of which there are no phantasms (received images). While it is no doubt that we have no phantasms of incorporeal things, so how could we to understand them, since human intellection necessarily depends on the conversio ad phantasmata? To resolve this issue, we propose first explain why the conversion to the phantasms is the conditio sine qua non of human intellection. Only after that, we consider the main objective of this research: to explain how Aquinas argues for the possibility of knowledge of God, of which we have no phantasms

O foco principal da pesquisa é o capítulo I do Tratado teológico-político, no qual Espinosa discorre sobre as profecias. A exposição dos diferentes tipos de imagens proféticas mostra como, de maneira geral, a imaginação se constitui nos homens e como dela segue o conhecimento imaginativo. Os traços constitutivos da imaginação são idênticos em todo o gênero humano. Por conseguinte, Espinosa descreve a origem natural das imagens proféticas, negando a realidade do milagre ou de qualquer interferência divina extraordinária na natureza, já que a ordem natural segue leis necessárias que são, elas próprias, os decretos eternos de Deus. Tendo por exigência básica do método interpretativo prestar fidelidade à Escritura, o autor do Teológico-político a examina como uma coisa particular da natureza, elabora a história crítica dela com base na determinação natural de sua existência. À descrição histórica das profecias corresponde a dedução genética da imaginação efetuada na Parte II da Ética. Com base na estreita relação entre as duas obras, esta pesquisa consiste numa tentativa de provar que o ordenamento metódico dos diferentes tipos de profecias se funda e, ao mesmo tempo, explica a teoria espinosana da imaginação. A tipologia das imagens proféticas é um fator importante para se compreender a composição textual do Tratado e sua dimensão crítica frente à Escritura e aos intérpretes que, direta ou indiretamente, aparecem como interlocutores de Espinosa. / The research main focus is the Theological-political treatise first chapter, in wich Spinoza makes a speechs about prophecies. The exposition of different types of predictive images shows how, generally, the imagination constitutes in men and ho w the imaginative knowledge follows from it. The imagination constituent traces are identical in all human sort. Therefore, Spinoza describes the natural origin of predictive images, denying the miracle reality or any divine extraordinary interference in nature, since the natural order follows necessary laws, which are, themselves, the perpetual decrees of God. Having as his basic requeriment the interpretative method giving allegiance to the Scripture, the author of the Theological-political Treatise examines it as a particular thing, he elaborates its critical history based on its existence natural determination. To the prophecies historical description corresponds the imagination deduction effectued in Ethic\'s Part II. Based on the narrow relation between the two works, this research consists in proving that the methodical order of the different types of prophecies is established on, and, at the same time, explaining the spinozist imagination theory. The prophetical images tipology is an important factor to comprehend the Treatise\'s textual composition and its critical dimension front to Scripture and to interpreters who, directly or indirectly, appears as Spinoza\'s interlocutors.

A pesquisa tem como objeto a imaginação na filosofia de Pascal, a qual parece se revelar não propriamente como uma região da alma, mas como força e seus efeitos, os duplos o costume, a opinião e a fantasia , que são as formas segundo as quais a imaginação se expressa nas três ordens de realidade definidas por Pascal, ou seja, segundo as quais ela encarna e assume contornos visíveis. O objetivo é seguir os embates entre a imaginação nas duas ordens de realidade às quais Pascal atribui um papel positivamente epistemológico: aqueles entre imaginação e razão nos apresentarão seu duplo na ordem espiritual, a opinião, serão objeto do primeiro capítulo; os embates entre imaginação e coração gestam a fantasia na ordem da caridade e serão abordados no segundo capítulo. No terceiro e derradeiro capítulo da dissertação, examinaremos a relação entre imaginação e perspectiva para explorar outras dimensões dos instrumentos hermenêuticos que Pascal mobiliza em Pensamentos com o intuito de melhor fundamentar a hipótese dos duplos da imaginação. / This research has as object the imagination in Pascals philosophy, which seems reveals itself not properly as region of the soul but as a force and its effects, the doubles the custom, the opinion e the fantasy , that are the forms accordingly which the imagination express itself on the three orders of reality defined by Pascal, such as, accordingly which she embodies and and takes on visible contours. The goal is to follow the conflicts between imagination in the two orders of reality to which Pascal assigns a positive epistemological role: those between imagination and reason will present in his double in the spiritual order, opinion, will be the subject of the first chapter; the clashes between imagination and heart bear costume in the order of charity and will be discussed in the second chapter. In the third and final chapter of the this work, we examine the relationship between imagination and perspective to explore other dimensions of hermeneutical instruments Pascal mobilizes in The thoughts in order to better support the hypothesis of doubles of imagination.

My dissertation explores the role of narrative in the cultivation of empathy for ethical attitudes and behaviors. I begin by exploring an uncommon view of human nature, concluding that we are not autonomously individualistic rational deciders but ultrasocial moral intuitionists. Our intuitions are developed through our social engagements and the moral imagination. Intersubjective relations run deep in our psychology and provide the basis by which we shape the meaning of our lives as individuals in communities. It is because of this that we need to reconsider and redesign our moral cultivation programs both for the child-rearing years and throughout adult life. I look at empathy, the means of our mutual understanding, care, and help, as a key site for moral cultivation. I explicate the neurophysiological bases of empathy, both conscious and unconscious. Empathy is on the continuum with very primitive, automatic mirroring systems, which through varying levels of mimicry facilitate social cognition and moral insight and action. It is thus the ideal means of cultivating a skillful morality. Empathy enables us to enter the worlds and feelings of others in rich and full-bodied ways and so can reveal others in their full subjectivity. Such experiences can incite empathic regard and compassionate action, but empathy, like all of our psycho-social capacities, requires cultivation to develop its skillfulness in practice. Narrative is an obvious means of cultivating empathy because it is humanity’s primary meaning-making structure, utilizing the empathic imagination to seduce us into the inner worlds of others. Through narrative dramatizations of experience, we learn to see and feel from another’s point of view, sensitizing us to their inner states and outward behavior. Such sensitivity can facilitate improving our moral attitudes and action by dislodging preoccupation with self-concern and instigating higher regard for others. In narratives we can imaginatively practice various moral actions, witnessing possible results. Reflective engagement can then bring the moral insights of these imaginative experiences to life in our practical worlds by attuning us to what is morally salient. Narrative engagement is thus a natural and vital part of shaping empathic moral perception for compassionate action. By reading and feeling with others reflectively, we can expand empathy for the pluralistic communities in which we live, make meaning, and grow.

Na Teoria dos Sentimentos Morais, Adam Smith estabelece um esquema pluralista para explicar a aprovação moral, com quatro tipos de juízos morais: 1) em relação ao motivo da ação, o juízo que determina a conveniência ou inconveniência (propriety ou impropriety); 2) em relação aos efeitos imediatos da ação, o juízo determina seu mérito ou demérito; 3) ao analisar o acordo entre o ato e determinada regra geral de conduta, o juízo determina se o indivíduo agiu de acordo com seu dever; e 4) em relação aos efeitos não imediatos do ato, isto é, à maneira como esse ato se insere no funcionamento global da sociedade (juízo que Smith analisa sob o nome de aparência de utilidade). Esses quatro tipos de juízos se fundam na imaginação e formam a totalidade do princípio de aprovação que estrutura a parte especulativa de sua teoria moral. / In The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Adam Smith establishes a pluralist scheme to explain moral approbation, with four kinds of moral judgments: 1) regarding the motives of the agent, the judgment determines its propriety or impropriety; 2) regarding the immediate effects of the action, the judgement determines its merit or demerit; 3) analyzing if this act is a particular case of a general rule, the judgement determines if the agent has acted according to his duty; and 4) regarding the remote effects of the action, that is, the way this action is a part of the global operations of society (a judgement that Smith calls the appearance of utility). These four kinds of moral judgments are grounded in imagination and form the totality of the principle of approbation that structure the speculative part of his moral philosophy.

Este trabalho é resultado da pesquisa desenvolvida sobre a concepção do certum em Giambattista Vico. O nosso interesse foi encontrar nos diversos escritos filosóficos de G. Vico (1668-1744) um novo modo de apreensão da concepção original do pensador acerca do Conhecimento e de que modo ele apreendeu e trabalhou essa visão de mundo, ao contrário da visão tradicional, que atribuiu valor lógico ao modo de conhecer mediante o verdadeiro e o falso. Vico concebeu o conhecimento tanto como ordem do certum quanto como ordem do verum, realçando o papel originário do certum. Esse novo modo de perceber a ordem do certum confere ao saber viquiano uma lógica própria: a lógica do verossímil. A verossimilhança é trabalhada enquanto elemento que nos leva à certeza mediante a exclusão de toda exatidão matemática conferida ao conhecimento, nos propiciando a possibilidade de alcançá-lo na sua incerta abrangência e/ou nos seus incertos limites. / This work is the result of the research developed about the conception of the certum in Giambattista Vico. Our interest was to found, in the various philosophical writings of G. Vico (1668-1744), a new way of understanding the original conception of the thinker about knowledge and how he worked and seized this vision of the world, unlike the traditional view which gave a logical value to the way of knowing before the true and false. Vico conceived the knowledge both as certum and verum, highlighting the original role of certum. This new way of perceiving the order of certum gives to the Vico´s knowing its own logic: the logic of credible. The credibility is treated like the element which leads us to the certainty before the exclusion of all mathematical accuracy given to knowledge in providing the possibility of reaching it in its uncertain scope and / or its uncertain boundaries.

The 'prevalence of the calm passions over the violent' is Hume's general formula for both virtue and happiness. I argue in this dissertation that Hume's detailed account of the causes and effects of the relative calmness and strength of motivating passions in Treatise 2.3 is a main goal of Hume's project in the Treatise, Books I and II, and the reason why he published them together in 1739 as a "compleat chain of reasoning by themselves." However, despite widespread recognition of the general importance of this doctrine to Hume's 'science of man', no adequate attempt has been made to investigate those sections of Treatise 2.3 which bear directly on a deeper understanding of the causes of this 'prevalence of the calm passions'. Such attention is particularly warranted because, as I argue, these sections of the Treatise constitute Hume's attempt at an 'anatomy' of deliberation which accounts for the principles of human nature by which we successfully regulate our conduct and remain constant in pursuit of our long-term greater good. However, these sections also give rise to interpretative challenges that threaten the coherence of this central doctrine. Accordingly, my aim in this dissertation is to analyze Hume's anatomy of deliberation and of the prevalence of calm passions in Treatise 2.3 and to work through the interpretative difficulties it poses. I present a novel resolution of these interpretative problems which calls attention to the importance both of Hume's Treatise, Book I account of causal belief and of his neglected account of the influence of the passions on the imagination and understanding for his theory of motivation. I demonstrate that it is only when we attend to these key features of Hume's account of human nature that we can appreciate the coherent Humean theory of prudential motivation that emerges from Treatise 2.3.

“The Ontological Imagination: Living Form in American Literature” proposes a new theory of the imagination as a way forward from the long academic critique of the human subject. It is unclear how we should conceive of the human—of our potential, for example, for self-knowledge, independent thought, or moral choice—after the critiques of self-presence, intentionality, and autonomy that have come to define work in the humanities. This dissertation offers an image of the human responsive to such challenges. I argue that a set of major nineteenth-century American writers (Ralph Waldo Emerson, William James, Henry James, and Walt Whitman) held a paradoxical conception of the imagination as both the mark of human uniqueness—the faculty that raises the mind above the world’s sheer givenness, allowing for creative action—and the space of our greatest intimacy with the nonhuman world. For these writers, the highest human achievements simultaneously differentiate us from the rest of nature and abolish our difference from it. Chapter 1, “Emerson’s ‘Doctrine of Life’: Embryogenesis and the Ontology of the Fragment,” presents an Emerson whose investigations of emotional numbness reveal a disintegrative force immanent to living beings. In the new science of embryology—a model of life at its most impersonal—he finds a non-teleological principle of growth by which a human life or an imaginative essay might attain fragile coherence. Chapter 2, “‘Concrete Imagination’: William James’s Post-Critical Thinking,” claims that James’s multifaceted career is best understood as a quest for an intellectual vitality that would not abandon self-consistency. I argue that an ontology of thinking underlies his seemingly disparate projects: his theory of the will as receptivity, his conception of faith as mental risk, and his late practice of exemplification over sequential argument. Chapter 3, “‘The Novel is a Living Thing’: Mannerism and Immortality in The Wings of the Dove,” argues that Henry James envisions the novel as an incarnation, a means of preserving the life of a beloved young woman beyond her death. Through formal techniques inspired by painterly mannerism, James creates a novelistic universe that unfixes the categories of life and death. Chapter 4, “‘Like the Sun Falling Around a Helpless Thing’: Whitman’s Poetry of Judgment,” emphasizes the figural and perspectival features of Whitman’s poetry at even its most prosaic in order to show how the imagination grounds us in a common world rather than detaching us from it. In opposition to an ethics for which realistic recognition of the world demands suppression of the imagination, Whitman’s realism requires acts of imaginative judgment. In sum, “The Ontological Imagination” hopes to reorient study of nineteenth-century American literature by revising both its traditional humanist reading and its recent posthumanist critique. On the level of the discipline, by defining literary form as a singular space in which the human imagination and impersonal life are revealed as indivisible, I make a case for the compatibility of the new formalist and ontological approaches to literary study.

De acordo com a primeira edição da Dedução Transcendental de 1781, a faculdade da imaginação é a faculdade fundamental que une de um lado a intuição e, de outro, o entendimento. Essa união só pode ser possível, entretanto, se a imaginação possuir um caráter não apenas sensível pois ela é uma faculdade que pertence à sensibilidade mas também intelectual. Mostrar, neste sentido, que ela é essa faculdade fundamental sensível e intelectual torna possível uma «doutrina da imaginação», a partir da qual se estabelece uma determinada leitura da Crítica da Razão Pura de Kant. Para isso é necessária uma compreensão do tempo (na Estética Transcendental) e de como o pensamento categorial se constitui em relação a ele através dessa «doutrina da imaginação», ou seja, através de uma explicação das relações entre a imaginação e o tempo e dela com as categorias do pensamento. / According to the first edition (1781) of the Transcendental Deduction, the faculty of imagination is the fundamental faculty which binds, on the one hand, the intuition, and on the other hand, the understanding.This union can only be possible, however, if the imagination has not only a sensible character - for it is a faculty that belongs to the sensibility - but also an intelectual character. To show, in this sense, that imagination is that fundamental faculty - both sensible and intelectual - makes possible a \"doctrine of imagination\", from which is founded a certain reading of Kant\'s Critique of Pure Reason. For this, is necessary an understanding of time ( in the Transcendental Aesthetic) and of how the categorial thought is constituted in relation to it through a \"doctrine of imagination\", that is, through an explanation of the existing relations between imagination and time and also between imagination and the categories of thought.