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In the recent literature, there is some debate over Reid’s theory of perception. Commentators are divided on whether or not Reid’s theory is consistent with an acquaintance model of perception. I will show that Reid’s views are not consistent with an acquaintance model, but that he nevertheless had good reasons to subscribe to this model. There is, therefore, an interesting tension in Reid’s theory of perception. I then develop a modified Reidian acquaintance model of perception as a way of resolving these tensions in light of an argument contained in Reid’s Philosophical Orations, and defuse recent objections to the acquaintance interpretation in the process. / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) / In this dissertation I examine an ongoing debate in the contemporary literature on Thomas Reid over the nature of his account of perception. I argue that one interpretation of Reid’s theory of perception that has been entertained fails, and that this does not, for various reasons, bode well for the viability of his account. I argue that Reid had available a straightforward way to revise his theory in order to avoid this difficulty, and I explicate this simple revision.

Widely known definition of pedagogy as a science of education, which is a process of intentional action on the individual, doesn't accurately represent the true substance of upbringing and education according to Jan Patočka, one of the most important Czech philosopher. He asks for fundamental questions about the nature of education and their targets. Education is the foundation of humanity itself for him and it is essentially connected to philosophy. Primarily the education is the education to humanity for Patočka. It is about education, which is interpreted as a care of the soul, of the soul opened to the outside world. It should lead to awareness, it should be determined by a kind of moral idea and finally it makes us human. Patočka criticizes purely scientific and theoretical education full of positivist utilitarianism and POLYMATHIA. On the contrary, he puts the process of education and training to the field of the natural world, the world of human experience in which a person has to carry out his options and scheduling its life. The philosophy helps to orient in the natural world. Thus the education is the essence of philosophy. The thesis deals with the pedagogical and educational moments, which can be seen from Patočka's phenomenological philosophy, and it deals also with analysis of the...

Quelle obligation morale peut être désormais pensée et pratiquée, à l’heure du déclin des absolus religieux et des sciences évolutionnistes ? Tel est le problème auquel Jean-Marie Guyau, philosophe français de la fin du XIXème siècle, entend apporter une contribution décisive. Dans ce travail, nous proposons de redécouvrir l’itinéraire logique et chronologique suivi par Guyau pour élaborer sa propre pensée. Celle-ci doit se comprendre comme le dénouement logique d’une problématisation qui passe par l’étude de l’histoire de la philosophie morale. Après avoir élaboré une méthode de commentaire pour l’étude des doctrines passées, Guyau pense pouvoir interpréter l’histoire de la morale comme un antagonisme entre le naturalisme (d’Épicure à Mill et Spencer) et l’idéalisme (d’Épictète à Kant et Fouillée). Une exposition critique détaillée permet à Guyau de montrer les lacunes de chacune de ces traditions : l’idéalisme absolutise ce qui n’est qu’hypothétique ; l’obligation théorisée par le sensualisme est dissoute par cette théorie même ; et l’évolutionnisme, forme ultime que prend la science des mœurs, pense indûment l’avenir sur le modèle du passé. Dès lors, l’obligation ne peut plus être conçue ni comme catégorique ni comme instinctive : elle doit être pensée à partir du principe qui engage le moins de présupposés (la vie), et ne doit plus être considérée comme uniforme mais comme anomique. Partant des prémisses naturalistes, la philosophie de Guyau tente alors d’idéaliser l’existence morale de l’homme ; le principal relais de cet accroissement de la vitalité est l’éducation, dont Guyau reconsidère non seulement le but (la moralisation) mais encore les moyens (la suggestion). / At the time of evolutionist science and the decline of the religious absolute, what moral obligation can be thought and practised nowadays ? Such is the problem Jean-Marie Guyau, a French philosopher of the late 19th century, intends to make a decisive contribution to.In this research work, we suggest rediscovering the logical and chronological route followed by Guyau to elaborate his own thought. This thought has to be understood as the logical outcome of a raised issue which starts by studying the history of moral philosophy.After elaborating a method of comment upon past doctrines, Guyau thinks he can interpret the history of morality as an antagonism between naturalism (from Epicurus to Mill and Spencer) and idealism (from Epictetus to Kant and Fouillée). A thorough scrutiny allows Guyau to show the gaps of each of these traditions : idealism absolutises what is only hypothetical ; the obligation theorized by sensualism is dissolved by this same theory ; as for evolutionism, the ultimate shape taken by the science of customs, its view of the future is wrongfully based on the model of the past. From then on, obligation cannot be conceived either as categorical or as instinctive any more : it must be thought from the principle which involves as few presuppositions (life) as possible, and must not be considered as uniform but anomic any more. Relying on naturalist beginnings, Guyau’s philosophy then tries to idealize the moral existence of Man ; this increase in vitality is mainly handed over through education. Actually, not only does Guyau reconsider its purpose, i-e raising moral standards, but also its means, namely suggestion.

Tato disertační práce strukturuje náboženské a teologické myšlení Emanuela Rádla v kontextu jeho filosofických a politických textů. Profesor Emanuel Rádl, osobnost zejména v době první republiky zcela mimořádná, většinou kontroverzní, byl známý svou mimořádnou aktivitou společenskou, publikační i politickou. Cílem této disertační práce je Emanuela Rádla představit jako originálního náboženského myslitele, poukázat na religiózní strukturu jeho filosofického myšlení a tu srovnat z filosofii náboženství jeho učitele T. G. Masaryka.

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The thesis offers an exposition and tentative solution of two problems: a definition of the Idea of Progress, and classification of social philosophers and sociologists according to this definition. Twelve propositions, or assumptions, are used to define the Idea, and works of selected philosophers from Hesiod to Parsons are examined in the light of this definition. Historical examination reveals that the Idea's acceptance reaches a zenith in the early nineteenth century, after which it lost credibility, becoming virtually discarded by mid-twentieth century.

Abstract The study analyzes the theoretical basis of the Philosophy for Children (P4C) program elaborated by Matthew Lipman. The aim is, firstly, to identify the main philosophical and pedagogical principles of P4C based on American pragmatism, and to locate their pedagogization and possible problems in Lipman's thinking. Here the discussion is especially targeted to the thinking of John Dewey and George H. Mead as well as Lev Vygotsky, whom Lipman himself names as the most pivotal sources for his own thinking. On the other hand, the study aims at opening up new perspectives and thematizations on P4C from the viewpoint of the continental tradition of thought. The essential principles of P4C connected with reasonableness and judgment are ultimately interpreted as a neo-Aristotelian effort to contextualize philosophy by tracing it back to moderation, the man's ability to consider and solve problems that he meets in practical life kata ton orthon logon – by doing right things in the right place at the right time in the right way. This phronetic idea of 'humanizing modernity' combined with the evolution of the adult-child concept is argued to be one of the conditions for the possibility of P4C, yet leaving unsolved the basic problems involving pedagogical action as such. John Dewey's ideas arising from the critique of the modern philosophy of consciousness, focusing on the significance of philosophy in practical human life and linked to the basic nature of human knowing and intellectual growth and, further, to the ideal of a democratic community, are shown to form the main intellectual sources of P4C. Dewey's philosophy as a general theory of education means a solid linking of the concepts of experience and inquiry to the practice of education. This is based on the naturalistic conception of man according to which man is built in dynamic transaction with his environment, experiencing the true meanings of his ideas in the consequences of his actions as he tries to solve problematic situations. So, inquiry as a method of reflective thinking forms the basis for education based on intellectual growth. A condition for it is a context meaningful for the child in which the paradigm of inquiry can be realized authentically. It is therefore important in education to provide circumstances that stimulate the child's curiosity, initiating a process of inquiry that further enables, through the formation of reflective habits, the development of a democratic community. The purpose of the pedagogical interaction taking place in the process of inquiry is to produce educative experiences for the child, making the pedagogical relationship vanish at the same time. The idea is that in pedagogical action the child's subjectivity, his desire and impulses are adapted to the tradition, yet generating at the same time a prospective, reflective habit, thus freeing the educatee to think intelligently for himself. The study shows the articulation of these principles in Lipman's practical effort to convert the classroom into a community of inquiry, but it also argues that the above-mentioned Bildung theoretical core problem of pedagogical action, related to its paradoxical special characteristics to produce autonomous subjectivity, is not thematized. In connection with this issue, the educational thinking of Kant and Hegel is discussed especially from the viewpoint of philosophy teaching. To provide a new perspective for the discussion, the study outlines the community of inquiry as an 'educative space' from the viewpoints of the pedagogical relationship typical of hermeneutic pedagogy and of non-reflective functional structures and phenomena based on pedagogical intuition that are linked to it. / Tiivistelmä Tutkimuksessa eritellään Matthew Lipmanin kehittelemän Filosofiaa lapsille (P4C) ohjelman teoreettisia perusteita. Tarkoituksena on ensinnäkin identifioida P4C:n amerikkalaiseen pragmatismiin palautuvat filosofiset ja pedagogiset pääperiaatteet sekä paikallistaa niiden pedagogisoituminen sekä mahdolliset ongelmat Lipmanin ajattelussa. Tällöin tarkastelun kohteena on erityisesti John Deweyn ja Georg H. Meadin ajattelu sekä lisäksi Lev Vygotsky, jotka kolme Lipman itse nimeää oman ajattelunsa merkittävimmiksi lähteiksi. Toisaalta tutkimuksessa pyritään avaamaan P4C:lle uusia näkökulmia ja tematisointeja mannermaisen ajatteluperinteen näkökulmasta. P4C:n keskeiset järkevyyteen ja arvostelukykyyn liittyvät periaatteet tulkitaan viimekädessä uusaristotelisena pyrkimyksenä kontekstualisoida filosofia palauttamalla se kohtuullisuuteen, ihmisen kykyyn harkita ja ratkaista käytännöllisessä elämässä kohtaamiaan ongelmia kata ton orthon logon – tekemällä oikeita asioita oikeassa paikassa oikeaan aikaan oikealla tavalla. Tämä 'modernin inhimillistämisen' froneettinen idea yhdistyneenä aikuinen-lapsi käsitteen evoluutioon argumentoidaan P4C:n yhdeksi mahdollisuusehdoksi, joka jättää kuitenkin pedagogiseen toimintaan sinänsä liittyvät perusongelmat ratkaisematta. John Deweyn modernin tietoisuusfilosofian kritiikistä nousevat, filosofian merkitystä ihmisen käytännöllisessä elämässä korostavat näkemykset, jotka liittyvät inhimillisen tietämisen ja älyllisen kasvun perusluonteeseen sekä edelleen demokraattisen yhteisön ideaaliin osoitetaan P4C:n keskeisiksi intellektuaalisiksi lähteiksi. Dewey'n filosofia yleisenä kasvatuksen teoriana merkitsee kokemuksen ja tutkimuksen käsitteiden kiinteää kytkemistä kasvatuksen käytäntöön. Tämä perustuu naturalistiseen ihmiskäsitykseen, jonka mukaan ihminen rakentuu dynaamisessa transaktiossa ympäristönsä kanssa kokien ideoidensa todet merkitykset toimintansa seurauksissa pyrkiessään ratkaisemaan ongelmallisia tilanteita. Tällöin tutkimus reflektiivisen ajattelun metodina muodostaa perustan älylliseen kasvuun perustuvalle kasvatukselle. Sen ehtona on sellainen lapselle merkityksellinen konteksti, jossa tutkimuksen paradigma voi toteutua autenttisena. Kasvatuksessa on siten tärkeää luoda olosuhteet, jotka stimuloivat lapsen uteliaisuutta käynnistäen tutkimuksen prosessin, joka edelleen mahdollistaa reflektiivisten tapojen muodostumisen kautta demokraattisen yhteisön kehittymisen. Tutkimuksen prosessissa tapahtuvan pedagogisen interaktion tarkoituksena on tuottaa lapselle kasvattavia kokemuksia häivyttäen samalla pedagogista suhdetta. Ajatuksena on, että pedagogisessa toiminnassa lapsen subjektiviteetti, hänen halunsa ja impulssinsa sovittuvat traditioon generoiden samalla kuitenkin tulevaisuuteen suuntautuvaa, reflektiivistä tapaa vapauttaen näin kasvatettavan ajattelemaan älykkäästi itse. Tutkimuksessa osoitetaan näiden periaatteiden artikuloituminen Lipmanin käytännöllisessä pyrkimyksessä muuntaa koululuokka tutkivaksi yhteisöksi, mutta samalla kuitenkin argumentoidaan, että mainittu pedagogisen toiminnan sivistysteoreettinen ydinongelma liittyen sen paradoksaaliseen erityisluonteeseen autonomisen subjektiviteetin tuottamiseksi ei tematisoidu. Tämän kysymyksen yhteydessä tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan Kantin ja Hegelin kasvatusajattelua erityisesti filosofian opetuksen näkökulmasta. Uutena avauksena tutkimuksessa hahmotellaan tutkivaa yhteisöä 'kasvattavana tilana' hermeneuttiselle pedagogiikalle ominaisen pedagogisen suhteen ja siihen kytkeytyvien ei-reflektiivisten, pedagogiseen intuitioon perustuvien toimintarakenteiden ja ilmiöiden näkökulmasta.

Thesis (DPhil)--Stellenbosch University, 2008. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The use of psychiatric medication is an important part of modern medical and psychiatric practice. Clinical psychopharmacology raises a broad range of philosophical issues, including metaphysical, epistemological, and moral questions. This dissertation attempts to provide a conceptual framework for addressing several of these questions, and for formulating a conceptual basis for psychiatry in general and clinical psychopharmacology in particular. The dissertation begins by heuristically contrasting two broad approaches towards a range of questions in the philosophy of science, language, and medicine. A classical position takes an essentialist and objective view of categories while a critical position emphasizes that categories are often metaphoric and subjective. A synthetic or integrated position might be possible, in which radial categories are often based on metaphoric extensions of basic-level sensorimotor-affective experience, and are embodied in the brain-mind and in social practices. Rather than attempt to defend an integrated position in purely conceptual terms, the dissertation supports this view of categories using data from the cognitive-affective sciences. An important category for philosophy of medicine is disorder, and the dissertation argues that certain universal considerations explain agreement about prototypical disorders. Extensions of disorder metaphors are theory-driven and valueladen, and although disagreement about atypical conditions is likely, reasonable debate is possible. The dissertation then considers several conceptual questions, namely the nature of psychotropics, of emotion, and of the self. In each case, a classical position which attempts an essentialist definition is contrasted with a critical position which emphasizes that these constructs are socially constructed and crucially subjective. Cognitiveaffective data is then employed to support an integrative position which emphasizes the embodiment of complex brain-mind phenomena in the brain-mind and in social practices. Explanatory questions considered are how best to explain pharmacotherapy and psychotherapy, how to account for placebo responses, and the relevance of evolutionary explanations of disorder. It is argued that a functionalist account fails to explain psychopharmacological phenomena, including pharmacotherapy and placebo effects. Instead, an account which emphasizes how psychobiological mechanisms produce complex brain-mind phenomena is needed. Evolutionary explanations add to this account, but cannot by themselves differentiate disorder from non-disorder. Ethical questions include the question of whether psychiatric disorders should be treated, whether such disorders should be treated with psychotropics, and whether psychotropics should be used to enhance. The cognitive-affective sciences support the treatment of typical disorders. In more atypical cases, pharmacotherapy, psychotherapy, and non-medical interventions should be considered on an individual basis. As technologies expand, considerations about the value of accepting fate versus the value of attempting to improve life by a range of methods, will need to be weighed carefully. In summary, this dissertation puts forward a philosophy of psychopharmacology which argues that psychiatry practice can be viewed, naturalistically, as based on the natural and human sciences. At the same time, good psychiatric practice involves an engagement with the complex realities of the human condition, including a consideration of individuals’ suffering. Good psychopharmacological practice requires integrating the objective and the subjective, considering both explanation and understanding, and providing a balanced view of the good and bad of psychotropics that avoids both unrealistic optimism and undue pessimism. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die gebruik van psigiatriese medikasie maak belangrike deel uit van moderne mediese en psigiatriese praktyk. Psigofarmakologie bring wye reeks filosofiese kwessies ter sprake, met inbegrip van metafisiese, epistemologiese, en morele vrae. Hierdie proefskrif poog om konseptuele raamwerk te verskaf ten einde verskeie van hierdie vrae die hoof te bied, en na die formulering van konseptuele basis vir psigiatrie in die algemeen en kliniese psigofarmakologie in die besonder om te sien. Die proefskrif begin deur twee algemene benaderings ten opsigte van reeks vrae in die filosofie van wetenskap, taal en geneeskunde te kontrasteer. Klassieke posisie huldig essensialistiese en objektiewe siening van kategorieë, terwyl kritiese posisie klem daarop lê dat kategorieë dikwels metafories en subjektief is. Sintetiese of geïntegreerde posisie is dalk moontlik, met radiale kategorieë wat dikwels op metaforiese uitbreidings van konsepte op basiese vlak sensorimotor-affektiewe ervaring gebaseer word, en in die bewussyn-brein en in sosiale gebruike vergestalt word. Eerder as om te probeer om geïntegreerde posisie in suiwer konseptuele terme te verdedig, steun die proefskrif hierdie siening van kategorieë met behulp van data uit die kognitiewe-affektiewe wetenskappe. Belangrike kategorie vir die filosofie van geneeskunde is steuring, en die proefskrif voer aan dat sekere universele oorwegings ’n verklaring bied vir ooreenstemming ten opsigte van prototipiese steurings. Uitbreidings van die steuring metafoor is teoriegedrewe en waardebelaai, en alhoewel daar waarskynlik meningsverskil omtrent atipiese toestande kan voorkom, is redelike bespreking haalbaar. Die proefskrif neem dan verskeie konseptuele vrae in aanmerking, naamlik die aard van psigotropika, van emosie, en van die self. In elke geval word klassieke posisie wat essensialistiese definisie aandurf, gekontrasteer met kritiese posisie wat beklemtoon dat hierdie konstrukte sosiaal gekonstrueer en besonder subjektief is. Kognitiewe-affektiewe data word dan aangewend om integratiewe posisie te handhaaf wat die vergestalting van komplekse bewussyn-brein fenomene in die bewyssyn-brein en in sosiale praktyke beklemtoon. Verklarende vrae het aandag geskenk aan die beste wyse om farmakoterapie en psigoterapie te verklaar, aan die wyse waarop placebo-reaksies verklaar kan word, en aan die rol van proksimale en evolusionêre verklarings. Daar word aangevoer dat funksionalistiese verklaring nie daarin slaag om psigofarmakologiese verskynsels, met inbegrip van farmakoterapie en placebo-effekte, te verklaar nie. In plaas daarvan word verklaring wat beklemtoon hoe psigobiologiese meganisme komplekse fenomene kan laat ontstaan, benodig. Evolusionêre verklarings dra tot hierdie verklaring by, maar kan nie op sigself steuring van niesteuring onderskei nie. Etiese vrae sluit die vraag in of psigiatriese steurings behandel moet word, of sodanige steurings met psigotropika behandel moet word, en of psigotropika gebruik moet word om te verhoog. Die kognitief-affektiewe wetenskappe ondersteun die behandeling van tipiese steuringe. In meer atipiese gevalle moet farmakoterapie, psigoterapie, en nie-mediese intervensies op individuele basis oorweeg word. Algaande tegnologieë uitbrei, moet ons oorwegings van die waarde van lotsaanvaarding sowel as die waarde van ’n poging om ’n mens se lewe te verbeter, versigtig in ag neem. Ter opsomming, hierdie proefskrif stel filosofie van psigofarmakologie voor wat aanvoer dat psigiatriese praktyk naturalisties verstaan kan word, soos gebaseer op die natuur- en geesteswetenskappe. Terselfdetyd, behels goeie psigofarmakologiese praktyk ‘n verwantskap met die komplekse werklikhede van die menslike kondisie. Dit vereis ‘n omvattende oorweeging van en omgang met individuele pasiënte se lyding. Goeie psigofarmakologiese praktyk integreer die “objektiewe” en die “subjektiewe” aspekte van die menslike bestaan, streef na sowel verklaring en verstaan, verskaf ‘n gebalanseerde perspektief oor die goed en die sleg van psigiatriese medikasies, en middel tussen onrealistiese optimisme en buitensporige pessimisme.