The author's Habilitationsschrift--Universität Düsseldorf. / Some text in French. Includes bibliographical references and indexes.

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Gregoriana in Rom, 1980. / Includes indexes. Includes bibliographical references (p. 445-469).

Hegel führt die traditionelle formale Logik, wie sie in Kants Konzept der reinen allgemeinen Logik ihre für ihn abschließende Gestalt erfahren hat, innerhalb seiner Systematik auf die Psychologie der produktiven Einbildungskraft und des Denkens zurück. Kants Konzeption der transzendentalen Logik, und mit ihr die neuzeitliche Erkenntnistheorie, wird aus gesamtsystematischer Hinsicht in der Philosophie des subjektiven Geistes verortet, und insbesondere in der Phänomenologie des Geistes und der Psychologie der Anschauung und Vorstellung. In logischer Hinsicht leistet Kant nach Hegel nur eine Übersetzung phänomenologischer Inhalte der psychologischen Vorstellung in relativ unterentwickelte und isolierte objektivlogische Strukturen (reine Reflexions- und wesentliche Verhältnisbestimmungen), wodurch er über den psychologischen Reflex des Begriffs nicht hinauskommt. Der logische Inhalt bzw. der objektive Gedanke dagegen basiert in seiner formalen Dimension auf die Realisierung des Begriffs im Prozess der endlichen Teleologie, aus deren Perspektive auch phänomenologische und logische Dimensionen von Struktur- und Verhältnisbestimmungen differenziert werden können (Inhalte der kontemplative Erwägung der Konstruktionsbedingungen des unausgeführten subjektiven Zwecks im ersten Fall, Funktionalität von Strukturverhältnissen im Prozess der Ausführung des subjektiven Zwecks im zweiten Fall). Der logische Inhalt ist konkret im Vergleich zum phänomenologischen Inhalt der psychologischen Vorstellung und abstrakt im Vergleich zum realsystematischen Inhalt als Korrelat der absoluten Methode. / Within his system Hegel relegates traditional formal logic, as it found its fulfillment in Kant´s concept of pure general logic, to the psychology of productive imagination and thought. Kant´s conception of transcendental logic, and with it a modern epistemological standpoint more generally, is also allocated in the philosophy of subjective spirit, and more specifically in the phenomenology and the psychology of intuition and representation. From a logical standpoint Kant does not, according to Hegel, go beyond translating phenomenological contents of the psychological representation into the relatively simple structures of the determinations of reflection and essential relations, thereby staying within the realm of the mere psychological reflex of the concept. Determinate logical content or objective thought on the contrary is based in its formal dimension on the actualization of the concept in the process of finite teleology. From this perspective it is possible to coherently distinguish between phenomenological and logical dimensions of structural and relational determinations (contents of the contemplative assessment of the conditions of construction of the yet unexecuted subjective finite end on the one hand, functionality of structural relations in the process of executing this end on the other). The logical content is concrete compared to the phenomenological one and abstract compared to the content of the real parts of the system as the correlate of absolute logical method.

The theme of this thesis are The Czech philosophical magazines issued in the first half of the twentieth century. The first part of my work describes particular personalities, trends and problems of the Czech philosophy in the first half of 20th century. The second part of my work is devoted to characteristic of the magazines of Česká mysl (Czech Mind), Ruch filosofický (Philosophical Stir) and Filosofická revue (Philosophical Revue). The development of the Czech positivist philosophy and idealism is assessed in the way as it was formed on pages of philosophical magazines in the first half of 20th century. The aim of this work is to sum up the participation of philosophical magazines in formation of the Czech philosophy in the first half of the 20th century.

While Berkeley's position on the materialism of the world is undoubtedly idealistic, Leibniz's position is somewhat problematic: in metaphysical texts, he seems to be an idealist, while in texts concerned with natural philosophy and physics, he seems more like a dualist similar to Aristotle. We will even see that Leibniz wants to be both an idealist/phenomenalist and a realist. Moreover, in his remarks to Berkeley, he criticizes Berkeley's idealism and his rejection of matter. The aim of this paper is to map Leibniz's idealistic position, compare it with Berkeley's, and decide whether Leibniz's objections to Berkeley are justified and whether their positions are any similar

In dieser Arbeit schlage ich eine phänomenalistische Interpretation von Kants Idealismus vor, die sich jedoch in einigen Punkten von Standard-phänomenalistischen Interpretationen unterscheidet. Erscheinungen sind in meiner Lesart der Inhalt von Vorstellungen, aber nicht das eigentliche Objekt der Erkenntnis. Denn Erscheinungen sind von den erscheinenden Objekten verschieden. Diese sind vielmehr die Dinge an sich, welche wir zum transzendentalen Gegenstand der Erkenntnis machen. Allerdings erkennen wir sie lediglich, wie sie erscheinen, und nicht, wie sie sind. Somit bleibt die Unerkennbarkeit der Dinge, wie sie an sich sind, gewahrt. Im Verlauf meiner Argumentation diskutiere ich zahlreiche Aspekte von Kants Philosophie. Darunter sind die Unterscheidung zwischen Erscheinungen und Dingen an sich, Kants Verhältnis zur Cartesischen Epistemologie, die Widerlegung des Idealismus, sowie nicht zuletzt seine Theorie der Synthesis zu nennen. Mein Ziel ist dabei nicht nur zu zeigen, dass Kant ein Phänomenalist ist, sondern auch die Art seines Phänomenalismus zu charakterisieren. / This publication defends a phenomenalist interpretation of Kant’s idealism, which, however, deviates from usual phenomenalist interpretations in several respects. According to my reading, appearances are the content of representations, but not the true object of cognition. The object to which our cognition refers is rather the thing itself as the transcendental object. Nonetheless, we only cognize them as they appear and not as they are in themselves. Thus the unknowability of things as they are in themselves is retained. In the course of my presentation, I discuss a number of aspects of Kant’s philosophy, among which are the distinction between appearances and things in themselves, Kant’s relationship to Cartesian epistemology, the refutation of idealism, and not least his theory of synthesis. My aim is not only to show that Kant is a phenomenalist, but also to characterize the kind of his phenomenalism.

The thesis deals with a philosophical conception of an Austrian thinker of the 20th century Ferdinand Ebner in his life?s work ?Das Wort und die geistigen Realitäten: Pneumatologische Fragmente? (1921). Not only his life and the persons who influenced Ebner?s work were taken into account, but also the cultural-historical context of the period in which his original thoughts evolved. The heart of this paper lies in the introduction and explanation of the basic terms and theses that are crucial for Ebner?s philosophy, or more precisely his pneumatology. This part also contains Czech translation of some of the most important passages of Ebner?s work.

This thesis deals with the philosophical works of Austrian thinker, Rudolf Steiner (1861-1925). Focusing mainly on his epistemological thinking, its main objective is to interpret Steiner's Theory of Knowledge. This work is structured in four chapters. After giving the reader insight into Steiner's life, it goes on to deal with the development of his thinking and work, with particular attention paid to the substance of his first and truly philosophical (not yet theosofical- anthroposofical) phase of working life. Following from this is a passage on his relationship with J. W. Goethe, whose intellectual (and especially scientific) legacy served as Steiner's main source of inspiration, while also laying out the basic form of Goethe's scientific methodology and its epistemological background, namely its empirical and simultaneously objective idealism, which deeply spoke to Steiner and motivated him to write his first philosophical work: Grundlinien einer Erkenntnistheorie der Goetheschen Weltanschauung (1886). The third chapter approaches this particular work, in which Steiner presents and describes the theory of knowledge, as aligned with that of Goethe. Analysed and interpreted are the three main successive sections of his work, in which he expresses his notion of experience, thinking and knowledge....

War Schelling ein politischer Denker? Und wenn ja, wie lässt sich seine politische Denkweise einordnen? Die Antworten auf beide Fragen gehen in der Forschung weit auseinander. Die vorliegende Dissertation schlägt daher eine neue Lesart vor, in dem sie Schelling als Antipolitiker deutet. Hierdurch gelingt es, der Ambivalenz und Breite Schellings Politikauffassung Rechnung zu tragen und die bisherige Forschung aus der Perspektive herauszuführen, die den Autor entweder als „unpolitischen Denker“ oder „politisch-reaktionären Denker“ verstanden wissen will. Die Arbeit begreift Antipolitik dabei als ein Unternehmen, welche das „Überinklusive“ und „Unausweichliche“ am Politik-Begriff zurückweist und im Gegenzug den Raum des Privatbürgerlichen, ja der Gesellschaft verteidigt. Die Praktikabilität des Begriffs wird in der Arbeit sowohl in Bezug auf Schelling als auch in Bezug auf spätere Fallbeispiele wie Heinrich von Treitschke, Constantin Franz oder Friedrich Nietzsche demonstriert. Außerdem plädiert die Untersuchung dafür, Antipolitik auch als ein aktuelles Phänomen zu begreifen, das sich in Gesellschaft immer dann formiert, wenn die Privatsphäre, der nichtpolitische Bereich, durch „staatliche Übergriffe“ oder „politisches Fehlversagen“ tangiert wird. / Was Schelling a political thinker? And if he was, what kind of political idea did Schelling prefer? These questions have been differently discussed in literature during the last decades. The following thesis argues for a new interpretation of Schelling as an antipolitician. The term antipolitics copes with Schelling’s ambivalent political thinking and avoids the recent perspective in research classifying him as a nonpolitical philosopher or reactionist. Antipolitics is described as an ambition that rejects the „unavoidable“ and „Überinklusive“ of politics in order to strengthen the area of privacy and society. The paper demonstrates the practicability of the term using the example of Schelling and also later authors like Heinrich von Treitschke, Constantin Franz or Friedrich Nietzsche. Moreover, the thesis argues that antipolitics can also be seen as a modern phenomenon, which usually takes place when privacy or the non-political space is restricted by political power.

The paper thematizes the concept of science in mid- and late thinking of Friedrich Nietzsche in the context of his understanding of scientific cognition of both: human and its world. The study introduces the problem of science and cognition in general in connection with significant motives of Nietzsche's thinking: morality, the revaluation of all values, thinking and living "beyond good and evil", freedom, human body, the superhuman motive, ascetic ideals, and more. Emphasis is put on the problem of veracity in the context of Nietzsche's attitude to idealism. Keywords Human; Superhuman; Nietzsche; Moral Philosophy; Cognition; Truth; Error; Intelect; Body; The Will to Power; Drive and Instinct; Evolution; Idealism; Nihilism; Amor fati; Beyond Good and Evil; Freedom; Ascetic ideals