Thesis (M.F.A.)--Rochester Institute of Technology, 1995. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 32-33).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1969. / Vita. Typescript. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Notre Dame, 2006. / Thesis directed by Gabriel A. Radvansky for the Department of Psychology. "July 2006." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 82-86).

Agile is an idea that has spread far within the corporate world and was originally designed for use in small, single- team project within IT. To this, limited is known about agile in larger settings and the purpose of this thesis is to explore the translation of agile in a large organization. Conducting an ethnographic study at SEB Pension & Försäkring we illustrate that the translation of agile imply adaption. We identify three processes of translation; (1) adaption through unifying the understanding of agile, (2) adaption through testing of agile elements, and (3) adaption through negotiations. The ethnography indicates that translation of agile in large organizations is challenging and individuals struggle to convey the essence of the idea, ending up in discussions through various interventions. Due to the popularity of agile the contributions is of value for organizations that attempts to become agile. The thesis is limited by the restricted time of conducting ethnographic studies. Further research is needed to explore the translation of agile in larger settings and to provide validity for the three processes of translation.

The purpose of this study was threefold: Examine middle school teachers' familiarity with, interest in, conceptual knowledge of and performance on light; Examine their ability to identify misconceptions on light and their suggested pedagogical ideas to address the identified misconceptions; and Establish the relationship between the middle school teachers' interest, familiarity, conceptual understanding, performance, misconception identification, and pedagogical ideas for light. Sixty six (66) middle school science teachers enrolled in three math and science teacher professional development projects at Southern Illinois University Carbondale participated in this study. This study used mixed-methods approach to collect and analyze data. The participants responded in writing to four different instruments: Familiarity and Interest Questionnaire, Conceptual Knowledge Test, Two-tier Performance Test, and Misconceptions Identification Questionnaire. Data was analyzed quantitatively by conducting non-parametric (Wilcoxon, Mann-Whitney U, and Kruskal-Wallis) and parametric (paired samples, independent samples, and One-Way ANOVA) tests. Qualitative data was analyzed using thematic analysis and open coding to identify emerging themes and categories. The results showed that the teachers reported high levels of familiarity with and interest in learning more about light concepts. However, they had low conceptual knowledge and performance on light concepts. As such, middle school teachers' perceived knowledge of light concepts was not consistent with their actual knowledge of light. To some extent, the teachers identified students' misconceptions expressed in some scenarios on light and also suggested pedagogical ideas for addressing such misconceptions in middle school science classrooms. However, most teachers did not provide details on their pedagogical ideas for light. Correlations among the four constructs (familiarity, interest, conceptual understanding, and performance) were only significant between performance and conceptual understanding, r (64) = .50, p = .000. There was no significant relationship between conceptual understanding and familiarity, and between performance and familiarity. In view of these findings, it is evident that some teachers did not have sound conceptual understanding and pedagogical ideas to effectively help their students develop the understanding of light concepts accentuated in the US national science education standards. These findings have implications on teacher education and science teaching and learning.

O objetivo deste trabalho é o exame da concepção espinosista da verdade, com ênfase no Tractatus de intellectus emendatione (TIE). Para tanto, empreendemos a análise da teoria das idéias, presente nesse texto, em um cotejo com as demais obras do autor. Apesar disso, privilegiamos o TIE dentre as demais, com o propósito de mostrar que essa obra não é uma fase superada. Com efeito, tem-se considerado o TIE como um fracasso de Espinosa pelo fato de o filósofo não ter conseguido nele elaborar a definição do intelecto. Entretanto, o que pretendemos mostrar é que, mesmo se nao inteiramente explicitada, a definição do intelecto pode ser ali encontrada e que, portanto, a tradicional interpretacao dos editores e comentadores - apesar de longamente endossada - está equivocada. De fato, tornou-se uma convenção dizer que o TIE não possui uma densa articulação com o sistema espinosista. Mostraremos, ao contrario, que ela não apenas existe, mas pode ser perfeitamente comprovada. / The objective of this work is to investigate the Spinozan concept of truth, with emphasis on the Tractatus de intellectus emendatione (TIE). In order to do so, we have analysed his theory of ideas, presented in this text, in close comparison with that presented in the rest of Spinoza\'s work. Despite this, we have given pride of place to the TIE over the rest, with the firm purpose of showing that this work is not merely a passing phase. In effect, the TIE has been considered, over the years, a Spinoza failure for its (apparent) lack of elaboration of the definition of the intellect. However, what we intend to do is to show that, even if not in an explicit way, the definition of the intellect is there and, therefore, that the editors\' and commentators\' traditional interpretation - despite its being amply endorsed - is wrong. In fact, it has become conventional to say that the TIE does not articulate easily with the core of Spinoza\'s system. It is our purpose, nonetheless, to show that not only does this articulation exist, but also that it can be thoroughly and consistently supported.

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This essay examines Aaron Stalnakers,” Overcoming Our Evil: Human Nature and Spiritual Exercises in Xunzi and Augustine”; with respect to how he manages to avoid misinterpretations and anachronism in the face of handling two separate traditions of thought, as is required in comparative studies.

O objetivo desta dissertação é problematizar o papel exercido pelas ideias da razão da formulação do conhecimento, isto é, mostrar como as ideias contribuem para que seja possível conceber a natureza como uma totalidade sistemática cognoscível, bem como para que seja possível uma experiência sistemática que confira sentido ao ato conceitualizador do entendimento e à atividade científica como um todo, algo que, conforme defendemos, depende inevitavelmente que seja possível pensar o mundo como algo organizável. Na Crítica da Razão Pura Kant afirma que o conhecimento começa com intuições, passa por conceitos e termina com ideias e ainda que toda ciência tem uma ideia por base, de forma que, o que fazemos na primeira parte do texto, é justamente aclarar a natureza mesma das ideias, de forma que não paire dúvida sobre o que são, bem como procuramos enfrentar as objeções de alguns comentadores sobre a necessidade do emprego das ideias para o estabelecimento de conhecimento seguro. Na segunda parte analisamos o primeiro momento do Apêndice, localizando ali a questão aqui travada e mostrando como Kant estabelece os usos adequados para as ideias da razão de forma que os velhos erros da metafísica não sejam ressuscitados e por fim, na terceira e última parte, buscamos mostrar o caráter específico que a ideia de um Deus criador e arquiteto exerce para assegurar a ordem necessária para o estabelecimento do conhecimento, isto é, legando a uma ideia da razão o papel de fiadora da possibilidade de se conceber a natureza de forma ordenada e, por conseguinte, cognoscível. / The aim of this dissertation is to problematize the role played by the ideas of reason in the process of unfolding of knowledge, namely, to show in which manner the ideas of reason contribute into turning possible to conceive nature (or the world) as a knowable systematic totality and also turning possible the sort of systematic experience that gives meaning to the conceptualizer act of the understanding and to the scientific activity as a whole either, something that, as we argue for, inevitably depends on the chance to think the world as something organized. In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant asserts that knowledge starts with intuitions, goes through concepts and ends up with ideas, and also that every science has an idea on its basis, given this, what we do in the first part of the text is exactly to clarify the nature of ideas in themselves, in such a way that there is no doubt about what they are; we also seek to face some objections made by commentators about the necessity of the employment of the ideas to the constitution of safe knowledge. In the second part we analyze the first part of the Appendix, finding there the issue investigated here and showing how Kant sets the proper uses of the ideas of reason in a way that the old errors of metaphysics are not restored. At last, in the third part, we aim to show the particular character that the idea of an architect and creator God plays to ensure the necessary order to the settlement of knowledge, i.e., the attribution to an idea of reason the condition of founder of the possibility to conceive nature in an ordered way and, thereafter, knowable.

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