Le phénomène de conventionnalisation du droit de la famille, plus précisément le rôle assigné à la volonté individuelle lors d'un divorce se développe de manière exponentielle. Les sources des obligations conventionnelles étant multiples, il convient de définir les éléments qui les composent. Le contrat ne constitue pas l’unique source des obligations conventionnelles. Cette catégorie doit comprendre l’ensemble des actes juridiques conventionnels. Ceux-ci se définissent comme des manifestations de volonté produisant des effets de droit.En droit du divorce, nombreux sont les accords de volontés que les époux peuvent conclure afin de régler les conséquences patrimoniales et extra-patrimoniales de leur rupture. Cette place croissante, accordée par la loi aux volontés individuelles dans l’aménagement des conséquences du divorce, invite à s’interroger sur la qualification des accords conclus par les époux. L’étude des obligations conventionnelles nées du divorce permet de démontrer que des contrats de droit commun s’épanouissent dans le droit du divorce et que parallèlement des conventions du divorce, caractérisées par l’intervention du juge, se développent en marge des principes issus du droit des contrats.En définitive, dans un contexte où est promue la liberté individuelle, les contrats de droit commun constituent un instrument privilégié pour des époux qui souhaitent organiser les conséquences patrimoniales de leur rupture. Cependant, l’ordre public familial inhérent au domaine extra-patrimonial persiste. À cet égard, il faut souligner que la théorie générale des obligations n’a pas vocation à mettre en péril l’état des personnes qui par nature doit demeurer indisponible. / The phenomenon of conventionalisation of family law and more precisely the role assigned to individual will in divorce has been increasing exponentially. As the sources of conventional obligations are multiple, it appears essential to define the variouselements that make up this specific group. Contracts are not the only source of conventional obligations. This last category should include all conventional legal acts which can be defined as expressions of will intending to produce legal effect.In divorce law, the voluntary agreements spouses are allowed to conclude in order tosettle the patrimonial and extra-patrimonial consequences of their separation are numerous. The growing importance given by law to individual will in order to settle the consequences of divorce calls for the examination of the genuine qualification ofspouses’ agreements. The analysis of the conventional obligations originating from divorce demonstrates that common law contracts flourish in divorce law while, at the same time, divorce agreements develop on the fringes of the guiding principles of contract law. Regarding these conventions, judges’ interventions add to individual willso as to reach perfect agreements. Eventually, in a context where individual freedom is promoted, common law contracts are a privileged tool for spouses who wish to organize themselves the patrimonial consequences of their separation. However, matrimonial public order legislation remains and cannot be dissociated from the extra-patrimonial field. In this regard, it should be noted that the general theory of the law of obligations does not intend to endanger the status of persons which must inherently remain inalienable.

Abstract This thesis examines the various biographical threads, which created the complex fabric of Sergei Parajanov’s life and work, especially his films. His origins, education, marriages, family life, and friendships forged in film school and in the various studios, where he worked, are used to frame his cinematic productions. However, the most novel features of this study result from an examination of his letters from prison and the artistic output, drawings, collages, scripts/scenarios, assemblages, etc., created in the gulag and outside during the time that he was denied the right to make films. An argument is made that the Soviet authorities jailed him as a dissident although he never considered himself one, being rather simply an honest creative individual, who would not abide the censoring or redaction of his work. His homosexuality was the pretext for Soviet authorities to incarcerate him, but Parajanov’s queerness has been almost completely omitted from purportedly authoritative memoirs and biographies meant to capture the late filmmaker’s legacy. These publications written by Soviet and post-Soviet critics, Parajanov’s close friends, and numerous confidants make a deliberate effort to erase his self-professed queer identity. Foreign aficionados of his work, on the other hand, have little hesitancy acknowledging his queerness. My research centers on Parajanov’s queer identity as the underlying source of his bold and innovative artistic output.

Politics and social life are essentially about decision making, but great parts of that which politics aims to govern, that which social life revolves around and that which is studied in political science is not necessarily the result of conscious decisions. This some philosophers and political theorists would attribute to spontaneous order, arguing that certain norms, customs and institutions have evolved as the result of human action without, for that matter, being the result of human design. The theory of spontaneous order was primarily developed by the Austrian-British philosopher and economist Friedrich Hayek (1899–1992). To him, spontaneous order was a way of solving problems with information deficits in society as well as an important part of his economic, political and institutional theory. However, Hayek’s social theory, which is largely based on the idea of spontaneous order, gives rise to a number of questions. The purpose of this essay is to examine the relationship between individual freedom, constitutionalism and spontaneous order in Friedrich Hayek’s social theory, and to critically evaluate this relationship in the light of that same theory. The purpose is achieved through critical analysis and by answering the following three questions: How does individual freedom, constitutionalism and spontaneous order relate to each other according to Hayek? Is Hayek’s proposal for constitutional design logically compatible with the theory of spontaneous order? Are there institutions, according to Hayek, that limit individual freedom, but are legitimate nevertheless by virtue of having developed spontaneously? The general conclusion of the essay is that Hayek’s proposal for constitutional design is logically compatible with the theory of spontaneous order, and that the principles of individual freedom, constitutionalism and spontaneous order are related to each other in a logically valid manner, but that the other institutions that Hayek proposes give rise to contradictions and indeterminacy vis-à-vis the fundamental principles of his theory.