隨著國際化發展及企業併購相關法令陸續開放，愈來愈多國內企業以控股及 併購方式來提升競爭力，衍生出來的商譽性質特殊，且可能金額重大，因此，公 司管理當局有可能需要高審計品質會計師來提升商譽認列、管理及續後評價之品 質與公信力。近年來在公允價值的趨勢下，大家更關心商譽會計處理準則改變所 帶來的影響，本研究首先就我國近十年商譽及其減損的會計實務發展，進行基本 概況分析，並探討會計師選任與商譽及其減損之關聯性。 實證結果顯示，針對特殊科目商譽，產業界不但有委任高審計品質會計師的 需求，並且有委任商譽科目專家的現象。除此之外，相較於其他會計師事務所， 大型會計師事務所能抑制公司藉由認列商譽減損損失來操縱盈餘，特別是在公司 認列商譽減損損失前已是虧損的情況下，其抑制公司洗大澡的效果更為顯著。 / With the development of internationalization and the release of related regulations, more and more companies enhance their competitiveness by means of investment and acquisition, which is often followed by the recognition of goodwill. Since the nature of goodwill is unique and its amount is often significant, the demand of high quality auditors is on the increase. Companies need them to improve and monitor the recognition, management and evaluation of goodwill. Recently, due to the fair value accounting concept, more attention is drawn on the change of goodwill accounting. Therefore, in this study we summarize the accounting treatment of goodwill and its impairment in Taiwan during the past ten years. Our main objective is to examine whether specialist auditor choice is associated with the importance of goodwill. We find evidence that goodwill is positively associated with the choice of auditors who specialize in auditing goodwill account. Additionally, compared to the other auditors, big 4 auditors can restrain earnings management, especially when companies experienced financial distress and tended to take a big bath by recognizing goodwill impairment.

本研究以我國1994年至2003年由四大會計師事務所查核簽證之上市上櫃公司為研究對象，探討會計師之產業專精與任期及其交互作用對於查核品質之影響，其中以裁決性應計數作為查核品質之代理變數，並同時採用會計師事務所及合夥會計師在特定產業之市場佔有率，作為產業專家之衡量指標。實證結果發現，產業專家可以限制受查客戶透過裁決性應計數從事盈餘管理，而以合夥會計師為基礎所計算之市場佔有率較會計師事務所為基礎所計算之市場佔有率，更能解釋審計品質的差異。在任期方面，研究結果顯示，會計師任期愈長愈能限制盈餘管理，而任期對於裁決性應計數絕對値之影響係反映於任期較長會計師之查核年資。但進一步檢測會計師對管理當局操弄盈餘向上或向下的態度是否隨著任期之增長而有所不同時，本研究發現，當管理當局操弄盈餘使其降低時，會計師任期增長愈能抑制管理當局向下操弄盈餘以預留未來盈餘空間；而在管理當局操弄盈餘使其增加時，會計師任期增長則沒有理由支持具查核品質。此外，在產業專家與任期之交互作用對查核品質影響方面，實證結果發現，產業專家會計師抑制盈餘管理的能力較非產業專家好，所以較不須要透過任期的增加來提升其偵測盈餘管理的能力。 / This study uses the sample comprised of listed and OTC firms in Taiwan during 1994-2003 and examines the effects of auditor industry specialization, auditor tenure and the interaction on audit quality. I use discretionary accruals as proxies for audit quality and industry specialization is measured in terms of both audit firm market share in an industry and auditor market share in an industry. My empirical results provide evidence that industry specialist auditors can restrict accruals-based earnings management and explain the differentiation of audit quality more than industry specialist audit firms. About auditor tenure, I find that absolute discretionary accruals decline with auditor tenure and tenure traced at the longer auditor tenure is superior to shorter auditor tenure. The results show that longer auditor tenure enhances audit quality. In addition, a further analysis shows that the clients have motivations on income-decreasing earnings management, auditors can limit management’s ability to create reserve to manage future earnings. But the clients have motivations on income-increasing earnings management, the study did not provide sufficient evidences to explain that audit quality is improved with tenure. Besides, the result of empirical analysis support my estimation about the interaction between auditor industry specialization and auditor tenure. The industry specialist auditors mitigate earnings management more than nonspecialist auditors and don’t enhance audit quality through extending auditor tenure.

本研究旨在針對中國審計市場探討財務報表品質是否受到註冊會計師事務所的品牌聲譽(reputation)、產業專業化(indusrty specialist)，及客戶重要性(client importment)之影響。 單變量結果顯示，國際四大會計師事務所查核之財務報表品質較佳，然而，在控制其他影響財務報表品質之因素後，本研究無法發現四大所查核之財務報表品質優於非四大所查核之公司。此外，在額外考慮客戶議價能力且僅對四大會計師事務所的客戶分析當中，本研究發現在特定衡量方式下，相對於議價能力高的客戶而言，國際四大會計師事務所在面對議價能力低的客戶時，較能抑制其管理當局操縱盈餘，因此在中國，客戶議價能力在某程度上，的確傷害四大所的審計品質。 在產業專家方面，本研究也未能發現產業專家事務所查核之公司，其財務報表品質優於非產業專家查核公司的證據。此外，本研究也無法發現客戶議價能力會對產業專家事務所造成影響。造成此結果之可能係因掛靠制度及政府之尋租行為所造成之區域性分割使得上市公司對事務所的選擇並不重視其審計品質的高低，而是更看重會計師事務所的掛靠單位，再加上中國審計市場集中度不高，使事務所無發展產業專家之誘因。 至於客戶重要性方面，研究結果顯示當客戶支付之公費金額愈高時，即使其公費佔事務所總公費之比例並不高，仍使會計師允許客戶操弄盈餘的幅度愈大，且此現象主要反映於管理當局操弄盈餘減少時。 / In this study, we examine how auditor’s brand name reputation, industry specialization, and client importmance affect the quality of financial statements in China. Using three kinds of abcdrmal accruals to proxy for earnings quality, our empirical results are as follows: First, univariate results suggest that fiancial statemenets audited by Big 4 are better than those audited by non-Big 4. But after controlling for variables established in prior work to be related to abcdrmal accruals, we find no evidence that clinets of Big 4 have lower abcdrmal accruals than clients of non-Big 4. Besides, we find that when we use discretionary accruals (DAC) to proxy for earnings quality, evidence shows that DAC are lower when clients of Big 4 are small and have little bargaining power. Therefore, client bargaining power indeed impairs audit quality in some extent in China. Second, we don’t find a statistically significant association between abcdrmal accruals and industry specialization. We also find no evidence that client bargaining power will affect industry specialization. Third, we use total fees and ratio of client’s total fees to audit firm’s total revenue as our two proxies for client importance. Evidence shows that total fees are positively associated with magnitude of abcdrmal accruals, especially when abcdrmal accruals are negative.

本研究之目的為瞭解投資人對新式查核報告之因應。研究結果顯示關鍵查核事項項目數與股價呈現負相關，說明大部分投資人對關鍵查核事項之回應與關鍵查核事項之揭露呈現負相關。然而，當企業聘請四大會計師事務所或產業專精為期查核財務報告，結果將反轉。確切來說，相較非四大會計師事務所或非產業專精之查核客戶，財務報告經由四大會計師事務所或產業專精查核之企業，其累積異常報酬率較大。此外，本研究亦將產業專精分為三等級：會計師事務所層級、會計師個人層級及同時為事務所層級兼個人層級，以衡量關鍵查核事項與股價之關係。最後於敏感性分析之部分，以關鍵查核事項風險權重作為關鍵查核事項項目數之替代，並且以不同預期模式衡量累積異常報酬，結果都與預期相符。