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<p>The instrumental conception of epistemic rationality is the view according to which beliefs, or doxastic states generally, are epistemically rational insofar as they promote the achievement of an epistemic goal, and they are epistemically irrational to the extent that they fail to promote such a goal. The thesis that I defend here is that the instrumental conception is not satisfactory as a general account of epistemic rationality.</p> <p>I proceed by examining a number of reasons one might offer for accepting the instrumental account, and I find them wanting. I also consider various ways of formulating the epistemic goal, attempting to determine the best one, in order to show the instrumental conception in its best light. I consider and reject the attempt to ground the instrumental conception on the proper function of our cognitive systems. Finally, I consider three arguments against the instrumental conception of epistemic rationality, and some objections to them. I conclude that, even shown in its most favourable light, the instrumental conception cannot give us a satisfactory general account of epistemic rationality.</p> / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

The scientific aim which distinguishes applied social psychological research from basic social psychological research is that of using social psychological theory to develop interventions meant to rectify social and practical problems in hopes of fostering a flourishing or thriving social sphere. In developing their interventions, however, many applied social psychologists have failed to consider their pre-investigatory philosophical commitments, commitments which imply the kind of flourishing social life that may come as a result of interventions rooted in them. The aim of this dissertation is to invite applied social psychologists to consider if their frequently noted, yet often unexamined, commitment to psychological egoism (i.e., human nature is inescapably self-interested) and instrumentalism (i.e., human rationality is inherently calculative towards self-interest) imply the kind of thriving social life they truly intend for their interventions to foster, or if other philosophical commitments might allow them to better fulfill that scientific aim. To do this, a comparative analysis is given between the vision of social flourishing implied in psychological egoism and instrumentalism, as illustrated in the prevalent Social Exchange Theory and its interventions, referred to as the modern vision, and an alternate vision implied in the Aristotelian understanding of human nature with its concomitant interventions, referred to as the Aristotelian vision. Overall, this dissertation suggests that the Aristotelian vision of a flourishing social life shies away from the instrumentalizing of human relationships implied by the egoistic vision and thus provides more fertile ground for applied social psychologists to accomplish their aim.

What contributes to sectarian conflict? Some existing literature essentializes sectarian identities and blames ancient hatred between different groups as the cause of conflict, this thesis argues that sectarian conflict occurs when sectarianism is politically employed by elite actors facing state weakness. The proposed theory suggests that a drop in state capacity regardless of the cause, can motivate political elite actors to instrumentalize the salience of sectarian identities as a form of either repression or cooptation targeting the sectarian outgroup for the purposes of regime survival. The theoretical claims in this study are examined using a qualitative comparative case study analysis of the Saddam Hussein and Nouri Al Maliki regimes in Iraq. The findings reveal that both Hussein and Maliki instrumentalized sectarian rhetoric and exploited divisions as a strategy of gaining or preserving political power during periods of increased state weakness. For example, Saddam's use of the Faith Campaign fueled the increased salience of sectarian identities in Iraq while Maliki's political purge campaigns marginalized the Sunnis. Furthermore, the approach of this study reveals variation in the forms of regimes that can successfully exploit and instrumentalize sectarian rhetoric, ranging from minority and majority sectarian coalitions to personalist autocratic and semi-democratic governments. The findings of this thesis can allow policymakers to identify the root causes of sectarian based conflicts more accurately. In addition, ethnic and sectarian identity groups can be influenced by politicians and potentially shaped by external actors under certain conditions outlined in the thesis.

The writer's problem as reported in this thesis is to make an analysis of certain curriculum principles in terms of five selected basic philosophic concepts: pragmatism, instrumentalism, humanism, rationalism, and idealism.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-02T20:13:05Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 DissCL.pdf: 1141798 bytes, checksum: 937f7ca204b0a90bbde9494a89d09b45 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2004-03-17 / Financiadora de Estudos e Projetos / Radical behaviorism was presented as the philosophy of science of human behavior. This has important consequences. One of them has to do with questions regarding scientific explanation. The present essay essentially deals with the following question: what is the model of explanation of radical behaviorism? Some characteristics of the explanation model of behavior are examined, based on a discussion of the ideas of Skinner and two others philosophers of science, to wit, David Hume and Ernst Mach. Hume offers a logical-empirical critique of the concept of causality as necessary connection, by arguing that causal relations can not be demonstrated on the basis of statements of fact. Moreover, experience does not furnish the necessary causal link between cause and effect. He concludes the human knowledge deals solely with constant relations. This critique was taken over by Skinner by way of Mach s functional descriptivism . Mach s substitution of the concept of cause by that of functional relations, and its consequent distinction between scientific explanation and causal explanation is based on Hume s critique. One might also argue that Mach advances on Hume s critique by asserting that the world is, in principle, probabilistic. Skinner, from the beginning, offered an interpretation of behavioral theory as description in accordance with Mach s philosophy of science. Accordingly, he limited himself to explaining behavior in terms of functional relationships. However, it is argued that the explanation of behavior is not only the discovery of functional relations. Skinner does not comply with the restrictions of descriptivism when he offers an interpretation, beyond the bounds of mere functional relations, of the origin of behavior, as is the case with philogenetic behavior and with cultural practices. Accordingly, interpretation is included in radical behaviorism s explanatory system. In this way, the theory of behavior, without rejecting descriptivism, may be associated with a version of scientific instrumentalism. This is done via Mach in a somewhat surprising way. Mach s emphasis on the notions of scientific concept and hypothesis leads us to a kind of reticent instrumentalism which emerges as a reaction to the realist view of theories. As a version of scientific instrumentalism, the theory of behaviorism can be seen as pragmatic, and so radical behaviorism enters the field of ethics. The alliance of descriptivism and instrumentalism rule out realist interpretations of the theory of behavior. A reading of Skinner s theory from the perspective of the philosophical works of Hume and Mach also weaken the association of radical behaviorism with the metaphysical determinism. It is concluded that the model of selection by consequences is a functional, instrumental and probabilistic, rather than causal, way of explaining behavior. / O behaviorismo radical se apresenta como a filosofia da ciência do comportamento humano. Essa asserção tem decorrências importantes. Uma delas esbarra, imediatamente, em questões concernentes à explicação científica. O presente trabalho trata essencialmente desta questão: qual o modelo de explicação do comportamento defendido pelo behaviorismo radical? Todavia, seu escopo é limitado. Foram examinadas algumas características do modelo explicativo comportamental através de um debate travado entre Skinner e outros dois filósofos da ciência, a saber: David Hume e Ernst Mach. Hume faz uma crítica lógicaempírica do conceito de causalidade como conexão necessária, afirmando que as relações causais, com respeito ao campo das questões de fato, não são passíveis de demonstração. Somado a isso, a experiência não fornece os elos causais que conectam inelutavelmente a causa ao efeito. Ao final, podemos tratar do conhecimento humano, apenas, em termos de relações constantes. Essa crítica foi legada a Skinner através de suas relações com o descritivismo funcional machiano. Mach incorporou a crítica de Hume ao substituir a noção de causa pela de relações funcionais, operando uma desvinculação entre explicação científica e explicação causal. É possível também argumentar que Mach avança a crítica de Hume afirmando que o mundo é, em princípio, probabilístico. Skinner, desde o início de sua obra, anunciou sua interpretação da teoria do comportamento como descrição nos moldes machianos. Com isso, confinou-se a explicar o comportamento em termos de relações funcionais. Entretanto, é possível identificar que a explicação do comportamento não se resume à descoberta de relações funcionais. Skinner rompe os limites do descritivismo interpretando a origem de comportamentos que ultrapassam descrições meramente funcionais, como é o caso do comportamento filogenético e das práticas culturais. O behaviorismo radical inclui no seu sistema explicativo a interpretação. Nesse sentido, a teoria do comportamento, sem renegar o descritivismo, conjuga-se como uma versão do instrumentalismo científico. A novidade está que o faz via relações com Mach. A ênfase dada por Mach com respeito às noções de conceito e hipótese científicas, nos leva a encontrar uma espécie de instrumentalismo reticente que emerge como uma reação à interpretação realista das teorias. Como uma versão do instrumentalismo científico, a teoria do comportamento também se afirma como um pragmatismo, que acaba inserindo o behaviorismo radical no campo da ética. A conjugação das versões descritivistas e instrumentalistas impede interpretações realistas da teoria do comportamento. Ademais, uma leitura da teoria de Skinner através dos textos filosóficos de Hume e Mach afasta o behaviorismo radical de laços com o determinismo metafísico. Conclui-se que o modelo de seleção por conseqüências se apresenta não como um modo causal, mas como um modo funcional, instrumental e probabilista de explicação do comportamento.

Many critics of rational choice theory aim at unrealistic psychological assumption of this theory. To what extent is this kind of critic relevant? If we analyze the formalized scheme of choice than we will find difficult to interpret this scheme as psychological theory that develops intentional explanations. We should rather understand this theory as a theory developing causal explanations that are generated by the structure of surrounding. Intencionality in this theory is only a auxiliary tool and the explanation is made in terms of structure, not in terms of mental states. From this perspective most of the critic aim at wrong target.

The public sector has opened its eyes to the possibilities of artificial intelligence (AI) transforming and streamlining their organizations. However, they are lagging behind the private sector organizations in competency, knowledge, as well as resources, and have difficulties implementing any type of change. While there are studies on change within public sector, along with AI use in such organizations, there is a lack of research concerning perceptions of AI in public organizations, and organizational analysis based on those perceptions. This study aims to address this gap, by studying a department within Umeå Municipality with technology determinism and instrumentalism in mind, examining their attitudes and views of AI, and how those may affect a future implementation. The findings made through the study involve a thorough analysis, showing both deterministic and instrumentalist views, coming from both the municipality and the department. While there is a lack of competency and resources, the employees show an understanding, a need, and motivation for including AI and other digital tools in their work. The study describes possible approaches the department can take, and has contributed to the beginning of filling the mentioned research gap.

Ce mémoire propose une conception naturaliste et normative de l'axiologie scientifique contemporaine, c'est-à-dire des buts de la science et des scientifiques. Nous commençons par présenter le naturalisme en philosophie des sciences, en particulier ses dimensions scientifique, méthodologique et ontologique. Nous discutons le sophisme naturaliste et l'objection de la normativité souvent adressée aux approches naturalistes, principalement à travers le prisme de l'épistémologie naturalisée de Quine (1969). Nous illustrons ensuite ces thèmes - naturalisme, normativité, et axiologie scientifique - au moyen de la théorie de Laudan (1987), qui articule un début de théorie axiologique de la science qui se veut naturaliste et normative. Nous soulignons le caractère insatisfaisant de sa théorie, et proposons une conception plus riche et plus détaillée de l'axiologie scientifique. Nous analysons pour ce faire différents liens entre la science, l'industrie, le gouvernement et la société. Nous dégageons en particulier une tendance axiologique pragmatique de la science contemporaine. Finalement, nous ébauchons un cadre normatif instrumental inspiré de Laudan (1987)pour réfléchir sur l'axiologie scientifique. / This master proposes a naturalist and normative conception of contemporary scientific axiology, i.e., of science's and scientists' goals. We start off by discussing some naturalistic positions in philosophy of science, their scientific, methodological and ontological dimensions as well. We review the naturalistic fallacy and the normativity objection against naturalistic approaches, mostly in light of Quine's (1969) naturalized epistemology. We then illustrate these themes - naturalism, normativity, and scientific axiology - by discussing Laudan's (1987) naturalistic and normative theory of scientific axiology. We underscore the unsatisfying character of his theory, and propose instead a richer and more detailed one. In order to do that, we analyse some relations between science, industry, government and society. We identify and discuss a pragmatic axiological trend in particular. Finally, we sketch an instrumental normative framework for thinking about scientific axiology.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited / This thesis analyses the causes and evolution of the conflict in the Republic of Moldova and capabilities of three conflict-regulating mechanisms to facilitate the final political solution of this conflict. The leading cause of the conflict is the competition among post-Soviet politicians, fighting over the division of the Soviet state and redistribution of politico-economic benefits. In their fight for power, the elites mobilized instrumental and primordial grievances of the population, thus giving an ethnic aspect to the confrontation. As an important intervening variable for the conflict escalation into a military confrontation is Russian interest in maintaining politico-economic and military domination over the region. Over time, all ethnic causes had been eliminated, thus creating the necessary conditions for the final political settlement of the conflict. However, the status quo, created around this conflict, suits the politico-economic interests of the Transdniestrian elites, and reinforced by the Russian interest in keeping the region under its influence, is encouraging them to promote a radical position toward the process of negotiations and to demand anything but independence, a fact that cannot be accepted by the legal Moldovan Government. In such circumstances, the final solution depends on the attitudes of the external players. However, the international players are dispersed over the methods of resolving this conflict, thus reinforcing the deadlock situation in the process of negotiation. This thesis argues that under the current circumstances, none of the conflict regulating mechanism, partition, confederation and federation will solve that particular conflict. However, the federalism has the most potential to serve as a tool for unification and conflict-resolution, but only if the international community and internal players will promote democratic values, rule of law and free marked orientation in the region, will reduce the benefits of the status quo situation and, finally, will offer substantial politico-economic and cultural autonomy combined with fair representation at the central level to the Transdniestrian region. / Lieutenant Colonel, Armed Forces of the Republic of Moldova