Este trabalho trata da relação entre a teoria formalista do direito elaborada por Ernest Weinrib e sua teoria de fundamentação da responsabilidade civil derivada do formalismo. O objetivo do trabalho é mostrar que, apesar de o formalismo apresentar uma formulação distintiva e inovadora de racionalidade jurídica, que enfatiza a relação entre forma e conteúdo do direito, o modelo de racionalidade jurídica do formalismo não fornece uma explicação adequada para algumas áreas do direito e, especificamente no caso da responsabilidade civil, da responsabilidade objetiva, que, nessa visão, é considerada um erro jurídico. O formalismo jurídico weinribiano é um projeto teórico ambicioso que a um só tempo procura rechaçar posições céticas como os estudos críticos do direito (critical legal studies) e posições instrumentalistas, especialmente a análise econômica do direito e o positivismo jurídico. Ele apresenta uma teoria geral que mostra o direito como um lócus de racionalidade moral imanente e um método, fundado na inteligibilidade imanente, para compreender essa racionalidade e ver o direito como um fenômeno autônomo em relação à política e a outras esferas de racionalidade. O método formalista permite a intelecção do direito como um fenômeno imanentemente coerente por meio da apreensão das estruturas organizadoras e justificadoras implícitas nos arranjos jurídicos, isto é, as formas da justiça corretiva e da justiça distributiva. Com base nisso, o formalismo sustenta que a forma imanente ao direito privado e, consequentemente, à responsabilidade civil é a justiça corretiva. Este trabalho reconstrói criticamente as principais teses que integram o formalismo e que são fundamentais para entender a rejeição à responsabilidade objetiva, considerada uma monstruosidade conceitual, com especial ênfase na premissa epistemológica formalista da inteligibilidade imanente como a melhor maneira de se compreender o direito e na premissa da coerência estrutural que os arranjos jurídicos devem apresentar. A tese discute o modo como o formalismo jurídico se insere no debate metodológico contemporâneo, definindo o formalismo jurídico como uma teoria de avaliação e justificação jurídica e, portanto, dotada de uma dimensão prescritiva, e apresentando o impacto dessa definição na postura que o formalismo assume em relação à responsabilidade objetiva. A tese ainda analisa a relação entre essa dimensão prescritiva e o posicionamento do formalismo em relação à responsabilidade objetiva, rotulando-a de erro jurídico, e conclui com uma discussão sobre as razões desse posicionamento que, argumentase, é equivocado , que se baseiam na assunção das premissas da inteligibilidade imanente e do critério de coerência estrita que marcam o método de conhecimento formalista. / This dissertation focuses on the relationship between juridical formalism as elaborated by Ernest Weinrib and his theory of the foundation of tort law. The dissertation argues that despite formalisms distinctive and innovative account of legal rationality that emphasizes the relationship between laws form and substance, this account does not provide an adequate explanation for specific areas of law. Particularly in the case of tort law it does not adequately explain strict liability, which is deemed a juridical error. Weinribs juridical formalism is an ambitious theoretical project that challenges: skeptical accounts of law, such as critical legal studies; instrumentalists account of law exemplified by economical analysis of law; and juridical positivism. Weinribs theory attempts to explain law as a locus of immanent moral rationality. The theory is based on a methodology that adopts the premise of immanent intelligibility as a way to comprehend this rationality. This approach allows the theorist to grasp law as a phenomenon autonomous from politics and other spheres of rationality. The formalist method allows the intelligibility of law as an immanently coherent phenomenon through the apprehension of the organizing and justifying structures implicit in juridical arrangements, i.e., the forms of corrective justice and distributive justice with which formalism argues that the immanent form of private law and, therefore, of tort law is corrective justice. This dissertation reconstructs critically the main theses that support formalism, which are essential to understanding its rejection of strict liability considered a conceptual monstrosity. This dissertation focuses on the formalist epistemological assumption of immanent intelligibility as the best way of comprehending law and on the premise of internal structural coherence that juridical arrangements should display. This thesis discusses the way in which juridical formalism can be located within the contemporary methodological debate, and defines formalism as an evaluative and justificatory juridical theory. As such, formalism encompasses a prescriptive dimension. This dissertation also identifies how the definition of formalism as a prescriptive theory impacts on its analysis of strict liability. The dissertation then analyses the relationship between this prescriptive dimension and the formalist position regarding strict liability. It concludes that formalisms mistake regarding strict liability can be traced back to its epistemological assumptions regarding immanent intelligibility and coherence.

Este trabalho trata da relação entre a teoria formalista do direito elaborada por Ernest Weinrib e sua teoria de fundamentação da responsabilidade civil derivada do formalismo. O objetivo do trabalho é mostrar que, apesar de o formalismo apresentar uma formulação distintiva e inovadora de racionalidade jurídica, que enfatiza a relação entre forma e conteúdo do direito, o modelo de racionalidade jurídica do formalismo não fornece uma explicação adequada para algumas áreas do direito e, especificamente no caso da responsabilidade civil, da responsabilidade objetiva, que, nessa visão, é considerada um erro jurídico. O formalismo jurídico weinribiano é um projeto teórico ambicioso que a um só tempo procura rechaçar posições céticas como os estudos críticos do direito (critical legal studies) e posições instrumentalistas, especialmente a análise econômica do direito e o positivismo jurídico. Ele apresenta uma teoria geral que mostra o direito como um lócus de racionalidade moral imanente e um método, fundado na inteligibilidade imanente, para compreender essa racionalidade e ver o direito como um fenômeno autônomo em relação à política e a outras esferas de racionalidade. O método formalista permite a intelecção do direito como um fenômeno imanentemente coerente por meio da apreensão das estruturas organizadoras e justificadoras implícitas nos arranjos jurídicos, isto é, as formas da justiça corretiva e da justiça distributiva. Com base nisso, o formalismo sustenta que a forma imanente ao direito privado e, consequentemente, à responsabilidade civil é a justiça corretiva. Este trabalho reconstrói criticamente as principais teses que integram o formalismo e que são fundamentais para entender a rejeição à responsabilidade objetiva, considerada uma monstruosidade conceitual, com especial ênfase na premissa epistemológica formalista da inteligibilidade imanente como a melhor maneira de se compreender o direito e na premissa da coerência estrutural que os arranjos jurídicos devem apresentar. A tese discute o modo como o formalismo jurídico se insere no debate metodológico contemporâneo, definindo o formalismo jurídico como uma teoria de avaliação e justificação jurídica e, portanto, dotada de uma dimensão prescritiva, e apresentando o impacto dessa definição na postura que o formalismo assume em relação à responsabilidade objetiva. A tese ainda analisa a relação entre essa dimensão prescritiva e o posicionamento do formalismo em relação à responsabilidade objetiva, rotulando-a de erro jurídico, e conclui com uma discussão sobre as razões desse posicionamento que, argumentase, é equivocado , que se baseiam na assunção das premissas da inteligibilidade imanente e do critério de coerência estrita que marcam o método de conhecimento formalista. / This dissertation focuses on the relationship between juridical formalism as elaborated by Ernest Weinrib and his theory of the foundation of tort law. The dissertation argues that despite formalisms distinctive and innovative account of legal rationality that emphasizes the relationship between laws form and substance, this account does not provide an adequate explanation for specific areas of law. Particularly in the case of tort law it does not adequately explain strict liability, which is deemed a juridical error. Weinribs juridical formalism is an ambitious theoretical project that challenges: skeptical accounts of law, such as critical legal studies; instrumentalists account of law exemplified by economical analysis of law; and juridical positivism. Weinribs theory attempts to explain law as a locus of immanent moral rationality. The theory is based on a methodology that adopts the premise of immanent intelligibility as a way to comprehend this rationality. This approach allows the theorist to grasp law as a phenomenon autonomous from politics and other spheres of rationality. The formalist method allows the intelligibility of law as an immanently coherent phenomenon through the apprehension of the organizing and justifying structures implicit in juridical arrangements, i.e., the forms of corrective justice and distributive justice with which formalism argues that the immanent form of private law and, therefore, of tort law is corrective justice. This dissertation reconstructs critically the main theses that support formalism, which are essential to understanding its rejection of strict liability considered a conceptual monstrosity. This dissertation focuses on the formalist epistemological assumption of immanent intelligibility as the best way of comprehending law and on the premise of internal structural coherence that juridical arrangements should display. This thesis discusses the way in which juridical formalism can be located within the contemporary methodological debate, and defines formalism as an evaluative and justificatory juridical theory. As such, formalism encompasses a prescriptive dimension. This dissertation also identifies how the definition of formalism as a prescriptive theory impacts on its analysis of strict liability. The dissertation then analyses the relationship between this prescriptive dimension and the formalist position regarding strict liability. It concludes that formalisms mistake regarding strict liability can be traced back to its epistemological assumptions regarding immanent intelligibility and coherence.

<p>In accordance with the heterological tradition, this study emphasises the determining effect of theoretical assumptions on our conceptualizations of the past. This study scrutinises how classical archaeologists and ancient historians have conceptualized ethnic groups, in particular the Messenians.</p><p>Ethnic groups have traditionally been regarded as static with clear-cut boundaries. Each group has also been attributed with certain essential characteristics. According to this view, the Messenian ethnic identity was preserved during the period of Spartan occupation. This view is facilitated by a passive perspective, which regards evidence as reflections of reality and emphasises continuity. This culture historical perspective, which gives precedence to literary evidence and reduces archaeology to a handmaiden of history, has prevailed in classics from the 19th century until today. It can be juxtaposed with perspectives, discernable in classics from the 1960s onwards, which maintain that various parts of culture are manipulated in accordance with contemporaneous socio-political needs. These active perspectives — ranging from systems theoretical, functionalistic to processual models — resemble the instrumentalist model in anthropology which regards ethnicity as a dynamic and flexible strategy. Nevertheless, the instrumentalist redefinition of ethnicity did not influence classics until the late 1990s. According to the instrumentalist perspective, the Messenian ethnic identity emerged as a strategy of distinction in opposition to the Spartans. </p><p>Despite the variations, these perspectives can be regarded as part of a dogmatic tradition. Scholars within the dogmatic tradition tend to focus on the evidence and neglect the influence of the scholarly discourse on the conceptualizations of the past. This study, which is influenced by Michel de Certeau’s critique of the dogmatic tradition, elaborates on the discursive constraints of classical archaeology and ancient history. </p>

In accordance with the heterological tradition, this study emphasises the determining effect of theoretical assumptions on our conceptualizations of the past. This study scrutinises how classical archaeologists and ancient historians have conceptualized ethnic groups, in particular the Messenians. Ethnic groups have traditionally been regarded as static with clear-cut boundaries. Each group has also been attributed with certain essential characteristics. According to this view, the Messenian ethnic identity was preserved during the period of Spartan occupation. This view is facilitated by a passive perspective, which regards evidence as reflections of reality and emphasises continuity. This culture historical perspective, which gives precedence to literary evidence and reduces archaeology to a handmaiden of history, has prevailed in classics from the 19th century until today. It can be juxtaposed with perspectives, discernable in classics from the 1960s onwards, which maintain that various parts of culture are manipulated in accordance with contemporaneous socio-political needs. These active perspectives — ranging from systems theoretical, functionalistic to processual models — resemble the instrumentalist model in anthropology which regards ethnicity as a dynamic and flexible strategy. Nevertheless, the instrumentalist redefinition of ethnicity did not influence classics until the late 1990s. According to the instrumentalist perspective, the Messenian ethnic identity emerged as a strategy of distinction in opposition to the Spartans. Despite the variations, these perspectives can be regarded as part of a dogmatic tradition. Scholars within the dogmatic tradition tend to focus on the evidence and neglect the influence of the scholarly discourse on the conceptualizations of the past. This study, which is influenced by Michel de Certeau’s critique of the dogmatic tradition, elaborates on the discursive constraints of classical archaeology and ancient history.

Ce mémoire propose une conception naturaliste et normative de l'axiologie scientifique contemporaine, c'est-à-dire des buts de la science et des scientifiques. Nous commençons par présenter le naturalisme en philosophie des sciences, en particulier ses dimensions scientifique, méthodologique et ontologique. Nous discutons le sophisme naturaliste et l'objection de la normativité souvent adressée aux approches naturalistes, principalement à travers le prisme de l'épistémologie naturalisée de Quine (1969). Nous illustrons ensuite ces thèmes - naturalisme, normativité, et axiologie scientifique - au moyen de la théorie de Laudan (1987), qui articule un début de théorie axiologique de la science qui se veut naturaliste et normative. Nous soulignons le caractère insatisfaisant de sa théorie, et proposons une conception plus riche et plus détaillée de l'axiologie scientifique. Nous analysons pour ce faire différents liens entre la science, l'industrie, le gouvernement et la société. Nous dégageons en particulier une tendance axiologique pragmatique de la science contemporaine. Finalement, nous ébauchons un cadre normatif instrumental inspiré de Laudan (1987)pour réfléchir sur l'axiologie scientifique. / This master proposes a naturalist and normative conception of contemporary scientific axiology, i.e., of science's and scientists' goals. We start off by discussing some naturalistic positions in philosophy of science, their scientific, methodological and ontological dimensions as well. We review the naturalistic fallacy and the normativity objection against naturalistic approaches, mostly in light of Quine's (1969) naturalized epistemology. We then illustrate these themes - naturalism, normativity, and scientific axiology - by discussing Laudan's (1987) naturalistic and normative theory of scientific axiology. We underscore the unsatisfying character of his theory, and propose instead a richer and more detailed one. In order to do that, we analyse some relations between science, industry, government and society. We identify and discuss a pragmatic axiological trend in particular. Finally, we sketch an instrumental normative framework for thinking about scientific axiology.

The topic of this diploma thesis is ethnic groups in the space of the former Soviet Union in the time period 1994-2006 and their involvement in ethnic conflicts. The aim of this thesis is to identify key parameters driving these ethnic groups towards armed conflict as a response to their needs, interests and living conditions. Key assumptions of this thesis are derived from qauntitative as well as qualitative studies. Important characteristics of ethnic groups are also included in the analysis of possible causes of ethnic conflicts. The theoretical discussion shows three main factors which can make ethnic groups more prone to conflict: permanent exclusion, strong identity and lastly dissimilarity of an ethnic group. Influence of these factors is tested using descriptive statistics, odds ratio, correlation and logistic regression. Statistical results shows that strong identity as well as discrimination of ethnic groups increase the probability of ethnic conflicts.

Αφορμή για τη συγγραφή της παρούσας εργασίας συνιστά η διαμάχη μεταξύ του επιστημονικού ρεαλισμού και της εργαλειοκρατίας σχετικά με τις μη παρατηρήσιμες οντότητες Στόχος είναι να μελετηθεί και να αξιολογηθεί η εργαλειοκρατική προσέγγιση της επιστήμης , με έμφαση στην μορφή εργαλειοκρατίας που υποστηρίζεται στο έργο του Bastian Cornelis van Fraassen (The Scientific Image), δηλαδή τον κατασκευαστικό εμπειρισμό (constructive empiricism). Τα βασικά ερωτήματα που θα μας απασχολήσουν είναι τα εξής: 1)Τι πρεσβεύει ο επιστημονικός ρεαλισμός; 2)Τι εννοούμε όταν μιλάμε για την εργαλειοκρατική θεώρηση στην επιστήμη; 3)Ποια είναι η εργαλειοκρατική προσέγγιση της επιστήμης στο έργο του van Fraassen. Το πρώτο μέρος της εργασίας πραγματεύεται τον όρο «ρεαλισμός» θέτοντας ως αφετηρία τη Θεωρία των Ιδεών του Πλάτωνος, φτάνοντας μέχρι τον σύγχρονο επιστημονικό ρεαλισμό. Έτσι έχουμε: 1) τον Πλατωνισμό, 2) τον Άμεσο Ρεαλισμό, 3) τον Έμμεσο Ρεαλισμό, 4) τον Επιστημονικό Ρεαλισμό. Το καθένα από τα παραπάνω εκφράζουν τον όρο ρεαλισμό με διαφορετικό τρόπο. Στην παρούσα εργασία θα αναλυθεί περισσότερο ο επιστημονικός ρεαλισμός, διότι θα την αντιπαραβάλουμε με τις εργαλειοκρατικές προσεγγίσεις για την επιστήμη. Ο Επιστημονικός ρεαλισμός υποστηρίζει οτι ο σκοπός της επιστήμης είναι να μας δώσει μία κυριολεκτικά αληθή περιγραφή για τον κόσμο και ότι οι καλύτερες (πιο ώριμες) επιστημονικές θεωρίες μας προσφέρουν προσεγγιστικά αληθείς περιγραφές του κόσμου. Επομένως, οι οντότητες που περιγράφουν είναι πραγματικές (πχ. ηλεκτρόνια). Θα διατυπωθούν επιχειρήματα υπέρ του επιστημονικού ρεαλισμού, όπως: Α) το επιχείρημα του μη θαύματος: (Νo Μiracle Αrgument, ΝΜΑ): «ο ρεαλισμός είναι η μόνη φιλοσοφία της επιστήμης που δεν καθιστά την επιτυχία της επιστήμης ένα θαύμα». (Putnam, 1975). Β)το επιχείρημα της συναγωγής στη βέλτιστη εξήγηση(Inference to the Best Explanation, IBE): συνίσταται στο ότι από την ικανότητα μιας θεωρίας να προσφέρει την καλύτερη δυνατή εξήγηση των φυσικών φαινομένων έπεται η αλήθεια της. Συνεχίζουμε με τις βασικές μορφές της εργαλειοκρατίας: 1) την εξαλειπτική: οι όροι που δηλώνουν φυσικές μη παρατηρήσιμες οντότητες (θεωρητικοί όροι) , π.χ. ‘ηλεκτρόνιο’, μπορούν να εξαλειφθούν εντελώς από την επιστημονική γλώσσα και 2) την μη εξαλειπτική: δεν είναι σκοπός των επιστημονικών θεωριών να αναζητήσουν κάτι περισσότερο πίσω από τα φαινόμενα είτε αυτά υπάρχουν είτε όχι. Η αντιρεαλιστική θέση του van Fraassen ονομάζεται κατασκευαστικός εμπειρισμός (constructive empiricism)και υποστηρίζει οτι η επιστήμη σκοπεύει να μας δώσει θεωρίες, οι οποίες είναι εμπειρικά επαρκείς και η αποδοχή μιας θεωρίας ενέχει την πεποίθηση μόνο ότι αυτή είναι εμπειρικά επαρκής. Προϋπόθεση της θέσης του είναι η διάκριση παρατηρήσιμου και μη παρατηρήσιμου, η οποία εγείρει ενστάσεις. Από την ανάλυσή μας καταλήγουμε ότι η προσέγγισή του van Fraassen είναι ενδιαφέρουσα γιατί επιχειρεί να αποδώσει συστηματικά τη θέση της μη εξαλειπτικής εργαλειοκρατίας ότι η επιστήμη επιδιώκει να περιγράψει με ακρίβεια τα φαινόμενα χωρίς να μπορεί να αποφανθεί για κάτι βαθύτερο που βρίσκεται πίσω από αυτά. Οπότε, δεν έχει καταφέρει να καταρρίψει την οντολογική θέση του ρεαλισμού ότι υπάρχουν μη παρατηρήσιμες οντότητες. Η προσπάθειά του να αποδείξει τη διάκριση παρατηρήσιμου – μη παρατηρήσιμου ακολουθώντας τον δρόμο του κατασκευαστικού εμπειρισμού τον οδήγησε μάλλον στο να κάνει λήψη του ζητουμένου και άρα σε αδιέξοδο. Βέβαια , κάτι τέτοιο δεν μειώνει την αξία της προσφοράς του van Fraassen, αφού εκείνος είναι εισηγητής μιας νέας θεωρίας και νέων όρων, όπως η εμπειρική επάρκεια, δίνοντας έτσι το έναυσμα για περαιτέρω μελέτη και έρευνα στο πεδίο της φιλοσοφίας της επιστήμης. / The occasion of this dissertation is the conflict between the scientific realism and instrumentalism with regard to the unobservable entities. Specifically, the aim is to study and evaluate the instrumentalist approach to science, emphasising on the form of instrumentalism supported in the work of Bastian Cornelis van Fraassen (The Scientific Image), the constructive empiricism. The basic questions to be dealt with are:1) What advocates scientific realism? 2)What do we mean when we talk about the instrumentalist approach to science? 3) What is the instrumentalist approach to science in van Fraassen's work? The first part of the thesis deals with the term "realism" setting as a starting point the theory of Ideas of Plato, reaching the modern scientific realism. So we have: 1) Platonism, 2) the Direct Realism, 3) the Indirect Realism, 4) the Scientific Realism. Each of the above-expressing the term "realism" differently. This thesis focus more on the analysis of the scientific realism, because it will be compared with the instrumentalist approaches to science. The Scientific realism argues that the purpose of science is to give us a literally true description of the world and that the best (more mature) scientific theories offer us approximately true descriptions of the world. Therefore, entities that describe is real (eg. electrons). Arguments in favor of the scientific realism are the following: A)the argument of non-miracle (NMA), according to which "realism is the only philosophy of science that does not make the success of science a miracle." (Putnam, 1975). B)the argument of the Inference to the Best Explanation( IBE) is that from the ability of a theory to offer the best possible explanation of natural phenomena follows the truth of a theory. We continue with the basic forms of instrumentalism: 1) the eliminative: the terms that indicate physical unobservable entities (theoretical terms), eg 'electron', can be eliminated completely by the scientific language and 2) the non-eliminative: the aim of the scientific theories is not to seek something more behind the phenomena whether they exist or not. The van Fraassen's antirealistic view called constructive empiricism and it can be classifiable in the non-eliminative instrumentalism. Supports that science aims to give us theories which are empirically adequate and acceptance of a theory involves the belief that this is only empirically adequate. Precondition of his position is the distinction between observable and non-observable, which raises objections. His attempt to distinguish the observable from unobservable seem to have led his to an impasse. Of course, this does not diminish the value of its offer, since he is rapporteur of a new theory and new terms, such as empirical adequacy, thus triggering further study and research in the field of philosophy of science.

Recent case law from the ECJ on one of the most important EU contract law legislation has left questions open about the compatibility of Swedish con­tract law with the Unfair Contracts Term Directive. The case law on Article 6 (1) in the directive seem to have changed the view on how to deal with the legal consequence of an unfair term in consumer contracts; namely that unfair terms cannot be adjusted but need to be declared invalid. This essay examines how the effects from the ECJ case law provide new light upon Swedish contract law. The effect creates a clash of ideas and rationalities between Union law and Swedish contract law. Unfair terms cannot be adjusted as the relevant Swedish legislation provides. An unfair term needs to be invalid, and if necessary, such an unfair term can in certain circumstances be complemented with default rules from national contract law. This does not only seem to change the interpretation and application of the Swedish law, but it also form an underlying tension between the instrumental market-functional Union law and the more jus­tice oriented Swedish private law.  Furthermore, as we move towards a new European civil code, perhaps these tensions and clashes may say something about where the discipline of European Private Law is headed.

Ce mémoire s'inscrit dans la constellation de questions regroupées sous l'étiquette de l'éthique de la croyance. Plus spécifiquement, il cherche à analyser la viabilité des jugements tout bien considéré portant sur les croyances lorsque des raisons de types distincts (raisons épistémiques et raisons pragmatiques) entrent en conflit. Cette analyse se fera à l'aune d'une recherche portant sur l'instrumentalisme de la croyance, la position avançant que les croyances sont instrumentales à nos intérêts et que, par conséquent, la normativité de la croyance se jauge en fonction de nos objectifs. L'instrumentalisme de la croyance est tombé sous le coup de plusieurs critiques dans les dernières années et se mémoire se donne comme mission d'en évaluer la portée. Si d'aventure l'instrumentalisme de la croyance devait être une position viable, il y a lieu de penser qu'il existe une commensurabilité possible entre raisons de différents types. / This thesis is part of a larger group of philosophical inquiries usually placed under the label of "Ethics of Belief". Specifically, my aim is to examine the possibility of all things considered judgments concerning beliefs for which there is a conflict between reasons of distinct kinds (epistemic reasons and pragmatic reasons). This inquiry will mostly concern epistemic instrumentalism, the position holding that one's beliefs are instrumental to one's own objectives and thus, that the rationality of beliefs must be an instrumental rationality. It appears that this position has been the aim of a few criticism in the recent years and my goal is to evaluate the strength of such criticism. If epistemic instrumentalism ends up being a viable thesis, we can expect that there may not be any incommensurability between reasons for belief of different kinds.

Richard Rorty's main thesis in his work Philosphy and the Mirror of Nature centers on a critique of representationalism in a fundamentally relativistic way. The aim of this disseration is to grasp Rorty's ideas in broader sense as a critique of inadequate interpretation of knowing- that and shift the attention to knowing-how as a key to new understanding the success of natural sciences. The fact that something is reproducibly possible for us to make in the surrounding world is not relative, and it is precisely in this way that technology (knowing- how) spreads so successfully even at multi-cultural level. In contrast, the explanatory function (knowing-that) of the natural sciences is relative, making sense only in the context of what is already known and accepted. Natural sciences are so successful because their experiments and only then take agreement of hypothesis with experimental practice (knowing-how) as the criterion of its acceptability. This dissertation offers, as a way out of Rortian relativism, the concept of "open authority" and proposes a new development in philosophic pragmatism based on it.