In the beginning of the 21st century counterinsurgency has been at the center of the scientific debate considering war-studies. Great efforts have been made to achieve success in conflicts against insurgents in the Middle East. Much of the scientific contributions have been implemented in doctrines and strategic approaches but unsuccessfully so. Given the complexity of these conflicts many theories that have emanated from the subject fail to grasp the insurgents’ actions altogether. Considering these statements, the purpose of this essay is to conduct an explorative study of the First Chechen war in order to contribute to the understanding of the insurgents’ success. The result of this study reveals that the theory I developed grasps the complexity of the conflicts but is overly detailed on how the insurgents should act. It is therefore not applicable to this conflict in its current form but cannot be dismissed, though. The Chechens mostly acted according to the theory. Therefore, the result of this study reveals that this insurgency had specific characteristics that need to be taken into consideration if one is to understand the outcome of the conflict. The study provides an indication that this might be true for other conflicts as well.

There is a discrepancy in today's view of how to succeed with counterinsurgency. On the one hand, we have legitimacy and on the other hand brutality as a method of achieving success the end state goals. The previous research is dominated by legitimacy, to contribute to the research I will examine brutality. Earlier scholars point out the use of brutal methods is required in order to achieve success, which contradicts with most democratic states’ values.  To contribute to the previous research, I will conduct a case study and investigate whether Gil Merom's theory of brutal counterinsurgency can explain the cases of the Second Chechen War and the Iraq War.  The results show that the theory can explain success and loss in counterinsurgency. Which strengthens the brutal counterinsurgency theory. The results of the study show that the use of brutal methods leads to success and thus proves the methods of brutality.

This thesis approaches the reasons behind the success of insurgencies in conflicts against greater nations. Why is it that a small group with limited resources can triumph against a great military power. This study seeks to analyze the conflicts in Afghanistan 1979-1989 and Chechnya 1994-1996 with the use of an adapted version of the SWORD-model in order to conclude whether the model can elucidate the separate outcomes. The original model is based on seven dimensions which all explains different aspects on how a state ought to combat insurgents in order to succeed, and has predominantly been used to analyze conflicts involving the US, not Russia or the USSR. A case study is then realized on the two conflicts in order to strengthen or weaken the analytic prowess of the adapted SWORD-model. The analysis concludes that the insurgents had the advantage in four and three respectively, out of the four adapted dimensions in Afghanistan and Chechnya, which indicates that the insurgents should have succeed in both conflicts which they did. Based on this, it can be argued that the analytic power of the adapted SWORD-model has been strengthened by explaining two additional partly unique conflicts involving alternative states.

Stridsfordon 90 togs fram för att möta en reguljär motståndare på vårt eget territorium. Dagens krav och förutsättningar är annorlunda då striden främst genomförs i konfliktzoner utomlands, men även på vårt eget territorium. Motståndaren vi möter nyttjar andra metoder för att genomföra sin strid och agerar på ett annorlunda sätt än vad vi är övade vid. Syftet med arbetet är att undersöka hur ett förband med stridsfordon 90 lämpar sig i strid på dagens stridsfält mot en irreguljär motståndare. För att ta reda på detta så beskriver jag fjärde generationens krigföring och stridsfordon9040Cför att sedan kunna analysera och jämföra den taktiska nivån utifrån de grundläggande förmågorna. Användningen av strf 90 och mekskytteplutonens taktik mot en 4GW motståndare är lämpliga att användaapligt på den taktiska nivån. Mekskytteplutonens taktik är flexibel och sätter få begränsningar mot taktiken hos en anfallande 4GW motståndare. / Combat vehicle 90 was developed to meet a conventional opponent on our own territory. Today's demands and conditions are different, today’s battles is mainly carried out in foreign conflict zones but also on our own territory. The opponent we face uses other means to carry out their combat, and acts in a different way than we are trained for.    The purpose of this work is to investigate how a unit equipped with combat vehicle 90 is suitable in today's battlefield against an irregular opponent. In order to answer this question, I have described the fourth generation warfare and combat vehicle 9040C, then analyzed and compared the tactical levels from the theory of the basic abilities.               The use of CV90 and the mechanized infantry platoons tactics against a 4GW opponent is appropriate to use at the tactical level. The flexible tactics of the mechanized infantry platoon gives an advantage over a 4GW opponent and the tactics used by such an opponent.