This thesis investigates the relationship between Fascist Italy and the League of Nations (LoN) during the interwar period, with a particular focus on the years from 1922 to 1935. This relationship was contradictory, shifting from moments of active collaboration to moments of open disagreement. The existing historiography on the Italian membership of the League has not reflected this oscillation in policy, focusing disproportionally on the crises Italy caused at the League. However, Fascist Italy remained in the League for more than 15 years, ranking as the third-largest power, and was fully engaged in the institution's work. This dissertation investigates the dynamics that developed between Fascist Italy and the LoN through a systematic study of the Italians involved. In so doing, it contributes to the historiography of the LoN and of the Italian foreign policy in the interwar period. The thesis argues that there was more to the Italian membership of the LoN than the Ethiopian crisis. It reveals the extent of the Italian presence and activity in the institution from the beginning, and demonstrates that the organization was more important to the Italian government than previously recognized. Membership of the League was essential to guarantee Italy international legitimation and recognition. Through an active appropriation of internationalism, the Italian government hoped to obtain practical benefits in the colonial sphere. The thesis uncovers the depth and variety of interactions between nationalism and internationalism in the case of Italy and the League, establishing that they did not oppose each other but rather interacted. This dissertation illustrates the complexity of being an Italian working in the League, as well as the grey areas between nationalism and internationalism evident within individual experiences. Finally, it shows the continuity of actors and expertise in Italy's international cooperation between the interwar and the post-1945 period.

This thesis challenges the prevailing academic and journalistic consensus that ASEAN states, bound by a cast-iron norm of non-interference, do not intervene in other states’ internal affairs. It argues that ASEAN states have frequently engaged in acts of intervention, often with very serious, negative consequences. Using methods of critical historical sociology, the thesis reconstructs the history of ASEAN’s non-interference principle and interventions from ASEAN’s inception onwards, drawing on sources including ASEAN and UN documents, US and UK archives, and policymaker interviews. It focuses especially on three case studies: East Timor, Cambodia, and Myanmar. The thesis argues that both the emergence of ideologies of non-intervention and their violation can be explained by the social conflicts animating state policies. Non-interference was developed by embattled, authoritarian, capitalist elites in an attempt to bolster their defence of capitalist social order from radical challenges. Where adherence to non-intervention failed to serve this purpose, it was discarded or manipulated to permit cross-border ‘containment’ operations. After communism was defeated in the ASEAN states, foreign policy continued to promote the interests of dominant, state-linked business groups and oligarchic factions. Non-interference shifted to defend domestic power structures from the West’s liberalising agenda. However, ASEAN elites continued meddling in neighbouring states even as containment operations were discarded. This contributed to the collapse of Cambodia’s ruling coalition in 1997, and ASEAN subsequently intervened to restore it. The 1997 Asian financial crisis dealt a crippling blow to ASEAN. To contain domestic unrest in Indonesia, core ASEAN states joined a humanitarian intervention in East Timor in 1999. In the decade since, non-interference has been progressively weakened as the core members struggle to regain domestic legitimacy and lost international political and economic space. This is expressed most clearly in ASEAN’s attempts to insert itself into Myanmar’s democratisation process after decades of failed ‘constructive engagement’.

Although both Canada and the United Kingdom had experienced terrorism prior to the attacks that occurred in the United States on September 11, 2001, Roach has argued that the events of that day ‘produced a horrible natural experiment that allows us to compare how international institutions and different countries responded’. Arguably, the most significant international response post-9/11 was the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373, which set a 90-day deadline for states to implement measures in accordance with the Resolution. Despite the fact that both Canada and the United Kingdom already had in place extensive provisions to deal with terrorism, both countries responded swiftly and their legislative responses reflect the histories and legal, political and social cultures of each country. This thesis tests the hypothesis that national security remains a bastion of national sovereignty, despite the force of international legal instruments like UN Security Council Resolution 1373 and, as such, the evolution of counter-terrorism policies in different jurisdictions is best analyzed and understood as a product of local institutional structures and cultures. To test this hypothesis, this thesis engages in comparative analyses of legal and political structures and cultures within Canada and the United Kingdom. It analyses variations in the evolution of counter-terrorism policies in the two jurisdictions and explores the domestic reasons for them. In its analysis of security certificates and bail with recognizance/investigative hearings in Canada, and detention without trial, control orders and TPIMs in the UK, this thesis reveals how domestic structures and cultures, including the legal system, the relative stability of government, local human rights culture, and geopolitical relationships all influence how counter-terrorism measures evolve.

This thesis is an institutional ethnography of the Nigeria Police Force. It concentrates on evidence from 18 months of fieldwork in one particular police station, in the pseudonymised town of Dutsin Bature in central Nigeria, and draws comparative evidence from examples and locations elsewhere in Nigeria. The fieldwork evidence is also supported by analyses of public discourse, literature reviews, some formal interviews and historical research. The thesis aims to fill a gap in empirical scholarship by looking at policing in Nigeria primarily from the level of everyday practice, and deriving understandings of the ways the overall system works, rather than by taking normative structural approaches and basing suppositions of actual behaviour upon these. It also aims to document emic perspectives on policing in Nigeria, in contrast to most existing scholarship and public discourse which takes an external perspective, from which the voices and worldviews of police themselves are absent. The thesis situates this ethnography within three theoretical terrains. First, developing understandings of policing and public security in Africa, which have often neglected in-depth studies of formal police forces. Secondly, enlarging the ethnographic study of formal institutions in African states, to develop a closer understanding of what state systems are and how they function, beyond the overtly dysfunctionalist perspectives which have dominated recent scholarship. Thirdly, informing ongoing debates over state and society in Africa, problematising understandings which see these as separate entities instead of mutually constitutive, and drawing attention to the ways in which the two interpenetrate and together mould the public sphere. The thesis begins with a historical overview of the trajectory of formal policing in Nigeria, then examines public understandings and representations of policing, before moving inside the institutional boundaries, considering in turn the human composition of the police, training and character formation, the way police officers do their work in Dutsin Bature, Nigerian police officers’ preoccupation with risk and the systemic effects of their efforts to mitigate it, and finally officers’ subjective perspectives on their work, their lived realities, and on Nigeria in an era of transition. These build together to suggest some conclusions pertinent to the theoretical perspectives.

This dissertation focuses on international actors' response to the ethnic cleansing perpetrated during the 1992 – 1995 Bosnian War. The work illuminates the multilateral attempt to reverse one of the outcomes of ethnic cleansing following the war, through the return of displaced people. The policy emphasis on "re-mixing" people, interpreted through a strategy of minority returns, and supported and coordinated on an international scale, was unprecedented. This dissertation asks: why did powerful states and international organizations pursue a re-mixing policy as a response to ethnic cleansing in Bosnia? At first glance, the choice seems counterintuitive. The policy was expensive. Post-1989, the West no longer needed "to keep Yugoslavia afloat." Furthermore, reversal required a degree and duration of international involvement that, at the time, was thought to be politically, militarily, and financially impossible. There are two existing explanations for this surprising phenomenon: international moralism and norm evolutionism. International moralists posit that international actors were moved to re-mix Bosnians out of a sense of guilt. Norm evolutionists argue that international norms governing appropriate responses to ethnic cleansing have shifted during the twentieth century towards support for re-mixing. In contrast to these two dominant views, this dissertation argues that the re-mixing policy initially emerged as a practical fix to a series of pressing, context-specific political challenges. State policymakers justified the re-mixing policy, however, on normative grounds. Though not the original incentive for action, international organizations on the ground then adopted the policy, empowered by states' normative justifications and thereby transformed the political rhetoric into concrete action. This dissertation corrects a common assumption that the origins and motivations behind the re-mixing policy were normative in nature, it contributes to a better understanding of how normative discourses emerge, mature, and transform into policy and it offers policy recommendations based on lessons learnt from this important and seemingly contradictory case.

This thesis offers a critical assessment of anti- child trafficking discourse, policy and practice, using a case study of the situation in Southern Benin. It seeks to achieve two main goals. First, to transcend the reductiveness of the dominant paradigm around child trafficking, including dominant representations of it and prevailing policy approaches to dealing with it. Second, to complicate the simplistic nature of much of the academic literature that explains the existence and persistence of this dominant paradigm. Based on 14 months of multi-sited fieldwork, the thesis demonstrates, first, that the institutional narrative of ‘child trafficking’ misrepresents what would be better understood as adolescent labour migration in Benin, and second, that mainstream policy approaches to tackling this fail to account for the sociocultural or political-economic conditions that underpin it. The thesis suggests that this can be interpreted as a result of the power of three framing orders of discourse – ‘Apollonian Childhood’, Neoliberalism and that of the Westphalian State – which structure both what ‘trafficking’ can mean and what can be done about it. The thesis suggests that the material and power structures of the anti-trafficking discourse- and policy-making field are such that, even where individuals within it reject both the dominant paradigm and its (and the field’s) framing orders of discourse, little space exists for them to construct meaningful alternatives. The result is a degree of formal and representational stability, hiding practical hybridity. The conclusion is offered that, while anti-trafficking discourse is presumed to be accurate and while antitrafficking policy is justified in terms of its contribution to ‘beneficiaries’, theprinciple achievement of both is the depoliticised reproduction of the institutions, orders of discourse and political-economic context within which they are constructed.

This dissertation seeks to conceptualise and operationalise the concept of soft balancing in international relations by articulating a “theory of tripartite strategic balancing” which is applicable to both international and regional unipolar systems. It has a twofold purpose: one theoretical and the other empirical. First, it seeks to develop a theory of tripartite strategic balancing which encompasses three forms of strategic balancing: internal, external, and soft balancing. The second part seeks to test the theory’s utility in explaining international political outcomes in the post-Cold War international system. In particular, it seeks to ascertain whether and how “second-tier great powers” have strategically balanced against the United States on a global level since the end of the Cold War. The analyses will focus largely on the foreign policies of Russia and France – the chief soft balancers. However, this dissertation also seeks to extend the concept of soft balancing into the regional level of analysis by examining whether and how minor-regional powers soft balance against regional unipolar leaders. For instance, it will examine whether and how the Russian Federation has been soft balanced against by states in the “European Near Abroad.” The analyses will focus primarily on the foreign policies of Poland – the chief soft balancer in the region. The dissertation will employ three in-depth case studies – the Kosovo Crisis (1999), the Iraqi wars (1991-2003), and the Georgia Crisis (2008) – to verify whether or not tripartite strategic balancing is actually occurring as the theory predicts. It will heavily rely on sources and interviews conducted during my time working at the United Nations Security Council and the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These findings seek to contribute a more nuanced strand of thinking to the realist paradigm in international relations, and they offer practical implications for both US and Russian foreign policymaking.

Borderlands are critical security zones but remain poorly understood. In regions plagued by drug violence and conflict, violent groups compete for territorial control, cooperate in illegal cross-border activities, and substitute for the functions of the state in these areas. Despite undermining physical security, fuelling fear, and challenging the state’s sovereignty, the exact modi operandi of these groups are little known. Against this backdrop, this thesis explores how different interactions among violent non-state actors (VNSAs) in the Colombian-Ecuadorian and Colombian-Venezuelan borderlands impact on citizen security. These border areas attract rebels, paramilitaries and criminal organisations alike: they constitute geo-strategic corridors for the global cocaine industry and are sites of supply and operation for the major actors involved in Colombia’s decades-long armed internal conflict. Adopting an interdisciplinary approach, this thesis consolidates the literature on conflict, security and organised crime, borders and borderlands, and anthropological approaches to fear and violence. It integrates theories of cooperation among social actors with original empirical research. It is based on a comparative, multi-sited case-study design, using ethnographic methods complemented by quantitative data. The research involved over twelve months of fieldwork with 433 interviews and participant observation on both sides of the crisis-affected Colombia-Ecuador and Colombia-Venezuela borders, and in Bogotá, Caracas and Quito. Developing a typology of VNSA interactions, I argue that these create not only physical violence but also less visible types of insecurity: when VNSAs fight each other, citizens are exposed to violence but follow the rules imposed by the opposing parties. Fragile alliances produce uncertainty among communities and erode the social fabric by fuelling interpersonal mistrust. Where VNSAs provide security and are socially recognised, "shadow citizen security" arises: security based on undemocratic means. I show that the geography of borderlands reinforces the distinct impacts of VNSA arrangements on citizen security yet renders them less visible.

International cooperation on export controls for technology is based on three assumptions, that it is possible: to know against whom controls should be directed; to control the international transfer of technology; and to define the items to be controlled. These assumptions paint a very hierarchical framing of one of the central problems in export controls: dual-use technology. This hierarchical framing has been in continual contention with a competitive framing that views the problem as the marketability of technology. This thesis analyses historical and contemporary debates between these two framings of the problem of dual-use technology, focusing on the multilateral Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies. Using a framework of concepts from Science & Technology Studies and the theory of sociocultural viability, I analyse the Arrangement as a classification system, where political, economic, and social debates are codified in the lists of controlled items, which then structure future debates. How a technology is (not) defined, I argue, depends as much on the particular set of social relations in which the technology is enacted as on any tangible aspects the technology may have. The hierarchical framing is currently hegemonic within Wassenaar, and I show how actors that express this framing use several strategies in resolving anomalies that arise concerning the classification of dual-use technology. These strategies have had mixed success, and I show how they have adequately resolved some cases (e.g. quantum cryptography), while other areas have proved much more difficult (e.g. focal plane arrays and computers). With the development of controls on intangible technology transfers, a third, egalitarian framing is arising, and I argue that initial steps have already been taken to incorporate this framing with the discourse on dual-use technology. However, the rise of this framing also calls into question the fundamental assumption of export controls that technology is excludable, and therefore definable.

ABSTRACT: This thesis tries to understand and explain the problems facing African international organizations in peacekeeping operations. The focus is on the case of the intervention by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Ivory Coast. The analysis will also discuss, in order to permit comparative analysis, the intervention of this same organization in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau. This case study in comparative perspective can help to mitigate the disadvantage of a case study, whose main weakness is the problem of generalization from the results of one case. The literature in International Relations and peacekeeping operations is used to develop some hypotheses that we will try to test in this dissertation, specifically: the internal difficulties of international organizations; the problems of lessons learned in terms of peacekeeping operations; the balance of power between and the pursuit of the national interest by members states of the organization; the key role of international and foreign actors, such as former colonial masters, in the peace process; and finally, the problem of coordination between different actors. To answer to the research question, the dissertation will be written in the form of a story with different concentric circles. First, for the internal international organizations difficulties, we will use the functionalist approach which is one of the best theorizations of this issue. However, these internal obstacles are only the tip of the iceberg of the problem because behind the organization we have conflicts of interest between different member states and the intervention of former colonial masters that realists and the neo-marxists would anticipate. Nevertheless, these tend to emphasize more on states. As a consequence, they cannot help us to solve the huge issue of coordination between different actors. To respond to this problem, we turn to the model of multi-level governance and demonstrate its value in analysing this case. For the case of Ivory Coast, Liberia and Sierra Leone, we will use both primary and secondary literatures. However, for the case of Guinea Bissau, we will use only secondary literature. RESUME: Cette thèse vise à comprendre et à expliquer les difficultés des organisations internationales africaines dans le domaine du maintien de la paix. La question est étudiée par le moyen d’une étude de cas mais dans une perspective comparative. Car elle permet d’atténuer l’inconvénient majeur de l’étude de cas qui est la question de la généralisation. En effet, nous analyserons les difficultés de la communauté économique des États d’Afrique de l’Ouest (CEDEAO) dans la gestion de la crise ivoirienne en utilisant les interventions de cette même organisation au Libéria, en Sierra Leone et en Guinée Bissau pour la comparaison à des fins d’apprentissages. La littérature en Relations internationales et sur le maintien de la paix nous a suggéré les hypothèses suivantes que nous testerons : les difficultés intrinsèques des organisations internationales; les difficultés d’apprentissage de ces mêmes organisations dans le domaine du maintien de la paix; les jeux de puissances et d’intérêt entre États membres de l’organisation internationale; la confiscation incomplète des relations internationales ouest africaines par des acteurs, des enjeux et des intérêts étrangers; enfin, il y a la difficulté de la coordination des actions entre les différents acteurs impliqués dans les processus de résolution des crises. Nous répondrons à la question de recherche en forme de récit avec des cercles concentriques. D’abord pour aborder les difficultés intrinsèques, nous convoquerons les fonctionnalistes qui ont théorisé le mieux la question des organisations internationales. Mais, on s’est vite rendu compte que ces difficultés n’étaient que la face visible de l’iceberg et que derrière l’organisation se cachent des jeux de puissances et d’intérêt, mais aussi l’ingérence des anciennes puissances coloniales que les réalistes et les néo-marxistes avaient prévues. Mais ces derniers mettent surtout l’emphase sur l’État. Ce qui ne permet pas de résoudre la lancinante question de la pluralité des acteurs, des conflits de logiques et de l’articulation des efforts des différents intervenants que l’approche de la gouvernance à paliers multiples permet de prévoir. Pour la Côte d’Ivoire, le Libéria et la Sierra Leone nous utiliserons à la fois de la littérature primaire et secondaire. Mais pour la Guinée Bissau, nous nous appuierons uniquement sur de la littérature secondaire.