This masters thesis analyses how Iraqi national identity is constructed before and after 2003. It explores what relation the national identity has to Sunni-Arab ethnicity. The study is qualitative and uses social constructivism as a methodological outline. Qualitative interviews are done with six Iraqi-Arab-Sunnis living in Sweden. Diaspora is not an analytical scope. The theoretical framework consists of Benedict Anderson’s theory about nations and nationalism where imagined communities is a key concept. Furthermore, Thomas Hylland Eriksen’s theory about ethnicity and nationalism where social identification is a central concept. Drawn conclusions are that Iraqi nationalism, partly constructed by Sunni hegemony, is the main identification and what the community is imagined from. Sunni ethnicity is mostly rejected, and a Sunni community barely exists. Unlike previous research which argues that Sunnis have redefined themselves through Sunni ethnicity. Iraqi nationalism is constructed against the anomaly which is other nations Iran and the US. It is also constructed by idealizing and remembering the past from a nationalistic perspective. It is constructed as kinship, as equal and with pride. However, the Sunni hegemony implies that Iraqi nationalism is not equal but privileges Sunni ethnicity. Sunni ethnicity is barely visible, but mostly post 2003 through victimhood. Sunni ethnicity was under communicated before 2003 but is over communicated after 2003, especially amongst national institutions. An exclusion of Sunni ethnicity occurs amongst national institutions post 2003.

Memoria (licenciado en ciencias jurídicas y sociales) / El objetivo de este trabajo radica en verificar si la guerra pre preventiva, se enmarca dentro de la Carta de Naciones Unidas, para ello se analiza la guerra de Estados Unidos contra Irak, pues a través de este conflicto se desarrollo la hipótesis a nivel internacional de un nuevo tipo de guerra y la interrogante sobre la legitimidad de ésta

La caduta di Baghdad per mano delle forze della Coalizione nell’aprile del 2003 ha segnato un momento di cesura fortissima nella storia della moderna sintesi statuale irachena, ponendo le basi per la creazione di un “nuovo Iraq” federale, unito e democratico, chiamato a risorgere dalle ceneri di una tra le più sanguinarie dittature della storia, per dar vita ad un nuovo ordine in grado di divenire un punto di riferimento per l’intero scenario regionale. A distanza di pochi anni, però, lo iato esistente tra l’Iraq “immaginato” dai sostenitori dell’operazione Iraqi Freedom e quello emerso dopo anni di fortissima instabilità interna si è palesato in tutta la sua eccezionale profondità, mettendo in dubbio le capacità di sopravvivenza stesse dello stato iracheno e la sua coerenza intrinseca. Il presente progetto di ricerca si pone l’obiettivo di contribuire al dibattito sviluppatosi negli ultimi anni attraverso l’adozione di un approccio storico-politico volto a prendere in esame le linee di continuità e discontinuità palesatesi lungo tutto il corso della storia della moderna sintesi statuale irachena. / The fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003 has represented an exceptional turning point in the history of the modern Iraqi State. The creation of a federal, united and democratic Iraq should have marked the beginning of a new era for the Iraqi people as well as for the whole region. A few years later, widespread violence and continuous political instability seemed to have swept away the above-mentioned scenario, sparking serious doubts about the very survivability of the Iraqi state, as well as its coherence. This thesis aims to contribute to the ongoing debate adopting an historical-political approach in order to delineate the continuities and discontinuities emerged during the modern history of Iraq and to match them with the current situation on the ground.

Uppsatsen avhandlar Rapid Dominance genom Shock and Awe. En teori utvecklad av författarna Ullman och Wade som publicerades i ett paper 1996. Papret vid namn Shock and Awe, Achieving Rapid Dominance var ämnat att utveckla ett nytt sätt för den amerikanska militären att planera och genomföra operationer på. Efter det kalla krigets slut skulle oundvikliga förändringar av den amerikanska militärens resurser ske. För att hantera denna förändring ville författarna utveckla ett koncept som skulle kunna fungera som en doktrin i framtiden. Konceptet skulle kräva färre resurser men ge samma eller till och med högre effekt än vad de tidigare koncepten medgav. Teorin åskådliggörs genom en undersökning om hur teorin tillämpades i planeringen av Irakkriget 2003. Irakkriget som skulle präglas av en plan med syfte att nyttja modern teknik för verkan mot utvalda irakiska militära mål i militärledningen och informationsspridning för att skapa förvirring inom de irakiska förbanden i syfte att viljan att strida skulle upphöra genom den chock och fruktan de upplevde. Studien avslutas med en diskussion om planering av operationer och generaliserbarheten i Ullman och Wades teori. Författaren kommer fram till att tankar om teorin går att finna i återgivningar av planeringen av operationen. Dock är det svårt att även under planeringsskedet svårt att planera för att uppnå Rapid Dominance genom Shock and Awe även om det finns tillgång till modern krigsmateriel och metoder. / The thesis discusses Rapid Dominance and Shock and Awe. A theory developed by the authors Ullman and Wade, published in a paper 1996. The paper called Shock and Awe Achieving Rapid Dominance was intended to develop a new way for the U.S. military to plan and execute operations. After the Cold War were inevitable changes of the U.S. military's resources taking place. United States Armed Forces would be reduced. The authors of the theory wanted to develop a concept that made the Armed Forces able to manage this change. To manage this change, the authors wanted to develop a concept that could work as a doctrine in the future. The concept would require fewer resources but provide the same or even more power than they previously admitted concepts. The theory is illustrated by a study on how the theory applied in the planning of the Iraq war in 2003. Iraq war which would be characterized by a plan intended to utilize modern technology for activity against selected Iraqi military targets in the military command and information dissemination to create confusion in the Iraqi troops to the will to fight would end by the shock and awe they experienced. The study concludes with a discussion about the planning of operations and the generalization of Ullman and Wade's theory. The author concludes that the thoughts of the theory can be found in depictions of the planning of the operation. However, it is difficult even in the planning stages is difficult to plan to achieve Rapid Dominance by Shock and Awe although there is access to modern military equipment and methods.

Iraq, 2003 : une coalition menée par les États-Unis et le Royaume-Uni engagea une action militaire juridiquement fondée sur une autorisation de recourir à la force implicitement contenue dans la résolution 1441 (2002) du Conseil de sécurité. Ce fondement fut également mis en avant au Kosovo (1999) ou encore au Liberia (1992).Ces trois cas illustrent l'application d'une pratique qualifiée d'autorisation implicite en matière de recours à la force. Alors que l'autorisation de recourir à la force doit résulter d'une mention explicite du Conseil de sécurité, l'autorisation implicite repose sur une interprétation entre les lignes des résolutions du Conseil afin d'y mettre en évidence une telle autorisation. Les États qui y recourent n'ont guère manqué de préciser qu'un précédent ne saurait se révéler de cette pratique en marge de la légalité internationale. Malgré son caractère controversé, ce moyen juridique tend cependant à devenir le support privilégié des États en l'absence d'une autorisation explicite.D'où, un paradoxe de l'autorisation implicite dont il nous reviendra d'en évaluer la légalité en examinant les modalités de son élaboration et de son application. Les difficultés à trancher la question de sa validité en droit international nous amèneront notamment à dépasser ce standard de légalité pour lui substituer celui de conformité, plus souple, dans un cadre juridique original : la légalité d'exception. Nous verrons enfin que l'approche téléologique de l'autorisation implicite souffre de lacunes substantielles au point de réaffirmer la double exigence du mandat clair ainsi que du contrôle des résolutions du Conseil de sécurité autorisant le recours à la force. / Iraq 2003: a coalition led by the United States and the United Kingdom undertook military action based on a legal authorization to use force implicitly contained in Security Council Resolution 1441 (2002). This argument was also highlighted in Kosovo (1999), and Liberia (1992).These three cases illustrate the application of a practice known as the implied authorization for use of force. While the authorization for use of military force must result from explicit Security Council Resolution, the implied authorization is based on an interprÉtation between the lines of Security Council Resolutions in order to highlight such an authorization. The States that had recourse to it made it abundantly clear that a precedent cannot result of this practice on the sidelines of international legality. However, despite its controversial nature, it tends to become the privileged support of the State in the absence of an explicit authorization.Hence a paradox of the implied authorization which we will assess the legality, by examining the modalities of its elaboration and its application. The difficulties by resolving the question of its validity under international law will lead us to overcome this particular standard of legality by substituting it for that of conformity, more flexible, in an original legal framework: the legality of exception. We shall finally see that the teleological approach of the implied authorization suffers substantial gaps so that we will reaffirm the dual requirement of the clear mandate and the control within the Security Council Resolutions authorizing use of force.

This thesis asks two central questions: (1.) Is there a link between atrocities committed during American counterinsurgency campaigns and race? (2.) Is there continuity between the counterinsurgency techniques deployed in the Philippines and in Iraq in this respect? In an effort to answer these questions I propose to briefly outline the chapters which are to follow. In Chapter 1 I propose to tackle the question of race using the following questions as broad guides to my investigation: what is it? how do we understand it? how will it be operationalized? In other words, this first chapter serves both as a literature review and an outline of the theoretical framework to be adopted in the later sections of this thesis. It outlines the current state of the concept ‘race’ in the literature of various fields of politics with an eye to finding space for a critical approach. In the end, I settle on the elegant framework set forth by Roxanne Lynn Doty. In Chapter 2, carrying forward Doty’s operationalized concept of race, I undertake an analysis of the discourse and practice surrounding American Counterinsurgency Policy during the invasion of the Philippines from 1899-1903. First; I investigate the role that racialized discourse played in the domestic and international contexts surrounding the invasion of the Philippines. Second; I delve into the empirical historical record to attempt to sketch out how racism was deployed on the ground in the counterinsurgency in the Philippines and what relationship the acts of atrocity committed there had with racial discourse. Following the findings of Chapter 2 I attempt to investigate the extent to which these mechanisms existed in the counterinsurgency in Iraq in Chapter 3. The investigation of Iraq is structured similarly to that of the Philippines but, due to the absolute abundance of information on Iraq, it is broken into three sections. The first section examines the role of race in the 2 domestic politics of the United States before, during, and after September 11, 2001. The second section sketches out an emerging international logic concerning military intervention and development. The final section sketches out the empirical reality of how race was used in atrocity in Iraq.