« Le sujet de cette thèse traitera du Liban entre les deux retraits israélien et syrien, 2000 – 2005.En effet, cette récente période s’inscrit comme l’une des plus critiques dans l’histoire contemporaine du Liban. La guerre civile déclenchée en avril 1975 est officiellement terminée en octobre 1990 par une « paix syrienne » imposée aux belligérants Libanais, soutenue par la Ligue Arabe et la communauté internationale. Cette période de paix entre 1990 et 2005, fut d’une part une période de reconstruction et de développement du Liban. Mais d’autre part, ces quinze années témoignent d’un profond malaise et mécontentement inscrits dans une situation globale apparemment paisible mais en fait marquée de fragilités politiques, sociales et communautaires profondes.Deux évènements majeurs - les retraits : israélien en 2000 et syrien en 2005 - viennent bouleverser ce statut quo libanais et déclenchent le processus inévitable d’une nouvelle « démocratisation » du Liban dont les conséquences ne cessent de se ressentir et de rebondir à ce jour. Entre ces deux retraits, un troisième « évènement choc », le 11 septembre 2001 semble au regard de certains Libanais la perspective d’une nouvelle politique américaine et européenne dans la région.Cette période sera marquée au Liban, par les événements d’août 2000, arrestations arbitraires à l’encontre des opposants au régime prosyrien, la fermeture forcée de la chaîne de télévision libanaise anti syrienne MTV, les discours virulents des prélats maronites de l’église du Liban et du patriarche du Liban contre le régime en place, la nouvelle politique du leader druze Walid Joumblatt, l’éloignement du Premier Ministre libanais Rafic Hariri de la politique syrienne, et le début de la création d’une opposition multiconfessionnelle contre la reconduction du président libanais prosyrien Emile Lahoud, le vote de la résolution 1559 au conseil de sécurité de l’ONU, et finalement le « 11 septembre libanais » ou l’assassinat de Rafic Hariri, en février 2005 et la « révolution du Cèdre » qui en suit. / «The subject of that thesis will deal with Lebanon between both Israeli and Syrian withdrawals, on 2000 - 2005. Indeed, this recent period joins as one of the most critical in the contemporary history of Lebanon. The civil war started in April, 1975 is officially ended in October, 1990 with a " Syrian peace " compulsory for the Lebanese belligerent parties, supported by the Arab League and the international community. This peace period between 1990 and 2005, was on one hand a period of reconstruction and development of the Lebanon. But on the other hand, these fifteen years testify of a profound faintness and a dissatisfaction registered in an apparently peaceful global situation but in fact marked with deep political, social and community fragilities:Two major events - withdrawals: Israeli in 2000 and Syrian in 2005 come to upset this Lebanese status quo and activate the inevitable process of a new "democratization" of Lebanon of which the consequences do not stop feeling the effects and bouncing to this day. Between these two withdrawals, the third " event shock ", September 11th, 2001 seems with regard to certain Lebanese the perspective of a new American and European policy in the region.This period will be marked in Lebanon, by the events of August 2000, arbitrary arrests against the opponents of the proSyrian regime, the forced closure of the Lebanese anti Syrian television channel MTV, the virulent speeches of the Maronite prelates of the church and the patriarch of Lebanon against the regime in position, the new policy of the Druze leader Walid Joumblatt, the estrangement of the Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri of the Syrian politics, and the beginning of the creation of a multidenominational opposition against the renewal of the proSyrian Lebanese president Emile Lahoud, the vote of the resolution 1559 in the United Nations Security Council, and finally on the " Lebanese September 11th " or the murder of Rafic Hariri, in February, 2005 and the " revolution of the Cedar ".

The diploma thesis explores how the selected Czech and French media inform about the Israeli- Palestinian conflict using the operation Protective Edge, from summer 2014, as an example. Theory of the thesis is based on the relationship between power and media in society and examines reciprocal impact between political and media power. Two national daily newspapers from each country were chosen for the analysis. These two newspapers also present opposite poles of the political spectrum in each country. Media contents of the daily newspapers Mladá fronta DNES, Právo, Le Figaro and Le Monde are analysed with combination of qualitative and quantitative methods. This methodology helps to create a comprehensive image of the conflict represented by the researched media. Quantitative analysis aims to describe the balance of the coverage and differences between French and Czech media in context with the representation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The research also focuses on the impact of the foreign policy of France and the Czech Republic on media contents of the analysed media. Qualitative analysis works with smaller sample of texts and aims to present the representation of the war by the French and Czech media.

Jordan due to its geographical location is located at the heart of the Arab-Israeli conflict. This fact significantly affects its domestic policy, foreign policy and economic development. An important aspect of Jordan's development is also the presence of Palestinians, who currently make up approximately half of the population. The aim of this thesis is to analyze the influence of internal and external factors on political and economic development of Jordan and especially on the formation of its foreign policy and then to assess the position of Jordan in actual international relations. Jordan's foreign policy is based on balancing between the relations with neighboring Arab states and the strategically important relationship with the Western powers, particularly the United States of America. Jordan is also a key participant in the Middle East peace process and is one of the few Arab countries that signed a peace treaty with Israel and maintains with Israel full diplomatic relations.

Après sa naissance en 1909, La ville de Tel Aviv continue son essor jusque dans les années 1930-1948 marquées par l'architecture modernes, sous l’influence de l’urbaniste Patrick Geddes. Celui-ci écrit son rapport à 1925, qui s’inspirent du modèle de la Cité Jardin. Le site comprend 3 000 bâtiments inspirés par des architectes modernistes européens : Mendelsohn, Le Corbusier, Gropius et autres. La déclaration d’indépendance d’Israël en 1948 entraîne l’établissement d’institutions nationales et la construction rapide de bâtiments publics et de logements. La prise de conscience de l’importance de la conservation de La Ville Blanche et sa patrimonialisation engendrent à leur tour un changement du tissu urbain et de son architecture (1977-2003). Nous tentons d’identifier ici les facteurs susceptibles de déclencher les mutations nombreuses qui ont pris place durant les années 1948 - 2003 et qui ont amené la ville de Tel Aviv jusqu'à son inscription au patrimoine mondial de l’UNESCO. Nous avons analysé l’apparition de certains modes d’adaptation de la ville aux changements, à la lumière des principes de planification de Geddes, issus de la biologie organique. Les mécanismes d’adaptation sont analysés en fonction de 3 facteurs : Les processus de planification, les décisions d'ordre politique et la réception du public. Afin de comprendre les différentes représentations de chacun des trois facteurs, nous avons consulté les archives historiques des plans de la ville, les protocoles, les débats et publications officielles de la municipalité, ainsi que les représentations de la ville telle qu’elle apparait dans la littérature pour enfants, le cinéma, et la presse. Pour chacune de ces époques, nous avons identifié un modèle de comportement récurrent des changements. Ainsi sont discernés les modes d’influence des trois coefficients de planification - architectes, décideurs, et le grand public - et leur influence réciproque sur la ville est démontrée. / After its creation in 1909, the city of Tel Aviv continued to develop until the years 1930 – 1948 during which the Modern style was predominant. That took place under the remarkable influence of the urban planner sir Patrick Geddes whose vision on the extension of the city was published in 1925 inspired by the ideas of Garden-City. The site of the White City includes 3,000 buildings designed by Jewish immigrants under the influence of Modern European architects such as Mendelssohn, Le Corbusier and Gropius. The Declaration of Independence of the state of Israel in 1948 brought about the establishment of national institutions and the need for the quick solutions of construction of public buildings and social housing, meant for thousands of refugees. The awareness and importance of the conservation of the White City brought about significant changes in the local approach towards the existing urban tissue, and its architecture (1977-2003). This research aims at identifying the factors susceptible to trigger the architectural mutations that took place during the years 1948 – 2003 up until the final inscription of the White City as world heritage site by UNESCO. We have analyzed the emergence of a number of types of adjustment to changes within the City, from the field of organic biology. The various mechanisms of adjustment are analyzed according to three different factors: Planning process, the political decision making, and the reception of the values and myths of the city by the Public. In order to understand the different representations of each of those 3 factors, we have checked the historical archives of the City Planning Department, including protocols, debates and official publications. We have then gone through the representation of the city as it materializes in children literature, movies and the media. For each time period, a recurrent pattern of behavior of changes was identified. This method allows pinpointing the various types of influence of each of the three coefficients of planning: architects, Decision Makers, and the Public. The reciprocal influence of those factors on each other can then at last conclusively be established.

C’est avec le lancement de la Coopération Politique Européenne (CPE) en 1969/70 que les six États membres de la Communaute européenne (CE) ont tourné une page dans l’histoire de l’intégration européenne. À partir de cette date les membres de la CE se sont consultés sur des questions de politique étrangère afin d’harmoniser leurs vues et d’élaborer des positions communes. Dès le début la France avait le plus grand intérêt à mettre le Proche-Orient sur l’agenda des Six. Comme les deux chocs pétroliers de 1973/74 et de 1979 risquaient de peser lourd sur les relations euro-arabes, les autres États membres de la Communauté ont consenti en principe à développer une position commune envers le Proche-Orient. Ainsi une politique proche-orientale des Six, et àpartir de 1973 des Neuf, s’est institutionnalisée au cours des années 1970 qui était basée d’une part sur des déclarations communes sur la situation au Proche-Orient et d’autre part sur une coopération économique interrégionale plus étroite, notamment dans le cadre du dialogue euro-arabe. Sous la présidence de Georges Pompidou tout comme sous la présidence de Valéry Giscard d’Estaing la France a été le moteur dans le développement des relations euro-arabes des années 1970. Même si l’action française qui visait à faire adopter sa propre politique proche-orientale par ses partenaires européens n’était pas toujours couronnée de succès la déclaration commune du 6 novembre 1973 et surtout la déclaration commune de Venise du 13 juin 1980reflètent nettement position pro-palestinienne de la France. / By launching European Political Cooperation (EPC) in 1969/70 the six member states of the European Community (EC) openend a new chapter in the history of European Integration. Henceforward the six member states consulted each other in foreign policy issues in order to develop commun positions where possible. From the beginning France showed the greatest interest in putting the Middle East on the European agenda. As the two oil price shocks of 1973/74 and 1979 put a strain on the euro-arab relations the other member states of the EC supported the French request to develop a commun European Near-Eastern policy. Consequently, the 1970ies were marked by a process of institutionalisation of commun policy towards that region that was, on theone side, based on common European declarations, and, on the other side, on a more intense euro-arab cooperation in the field of economics, and this especially within the framework of the euro-arab dialogue. Both under the presidency of Georges Pompidou and under the presidency of Valéry Giscard d’Estaing France can be described as motor of the development and the extension of euro-arab relations. Even if the French diplomacy that tried to make her Near-Eastern policy a common European policy has not always been crowned with succes the common Brussels declaration of November 1973 and especially the common Venicedeclaration of June 1980 reflect clearly the pro-Palestinian stance of France.

La question palestinienne est depuis un siècle sans solution. Les Palestiniens qui, tout comme les peuples arabes de la région, espéraient obtenir leur indépendance à l'issue de la 1ère Guerre mondiale se sont vus placés sous Mandat britannique octroyé par la Société des Nations. Depuis la Palestine est la terre d'un affrontement de deux nationalismes ; arabe palestinien d'un côté et juif sioniste de l'autre. L'intervention de l'ONU en vue de résoudre la question par le partage de la Palestine (un Etat arabe et un Etat juif) n'a pas apporté la solution. Au contraire, cela a aggravé la situation. Plusieurs guerres ont éclaté créant des situations humaines terribles notamment en ce qui concerne les réfugiés palestiniens et l'occupation des territoires palestiniens en 1967. De plus, le conflit israélo-arabe a pris un caractère durable. Depuis 1967 le Droit International dans son organisation actuelle se trouve tantôt inappliqué tantôt bloqué. En effet, Bien que les droits nationaux du peuple palestinien à l'autodétermination et à l'indépendance étatique aient été reconnus et à mainte reprise rappelés fussent l'occupation israélienne perdure. L'échec du Droit International dans le règlement de la question a laissé place à des négociations politiques, entre Israël et les Palestiniens représentés par l'OLP, et qui se sont soldées par la mise en place d'un régime transitoire vers la formation d'un Etat palestinien souverain. La dynamique d'Oslo a consolidé le droit du peuple palestinien à l'autodétermination, notamment par la territorialisation de la direction palestinienne dans les Territoires Occupés et l'instauration des structures institutionnelles autonomes, pouvant servir de base à la construction étatique. Toutefois, forcé de constater une inertie dans les négociations, qui durent depuis dix-huit ans, et un non respect du calendrier établi par les Accords. Aussi, plusieurs éléments mettent en doute la possibilité d'un Etat souverain et indépendant sur les frontières de 1967 : le durcissement de la position israélienne sur la question territoriale ; la volonté manifeste d'Israël de conserver le contrôle sur une partie de la Cisjordanie ; le refus d'évacuer les territoires selon le calendrier ; la multiplication des faits accomplis ; la poursuite de la colonisation et la construction du mur de séparation dans les Territoires Occupés. / For a century, the Palestinian issue has been unresolved. Following the First World War, Palestinians, like other Arab people in the region, hoped to gain their independence but were placed under British mandate granted by the League of Nations. Since then, Palestine has been a place where two nationalisms have clashed: Palestinian Arab nationalism on the one side and Jewish Zionism on the other. The UN intervention to resolve the issue by a partition of Palestine (one Arab state and one Jewish state) failed to provide a solution. On the contrary, it aggravated the situation. Several wars erupted which generated terrible human situations, regarding in particular the Palestinians refugees or the occupation of the Palestinian territories in 1967. Furthermore, the Arab-Israeli conflict became a long standing one. Since 1967, International Law, in its current form, is sometimes unimplemented sometimes blocked. Despite the rights of the Palestinian people to self-determination and independent statehood having been recognized and repeatedly reaffirmed, the Israeli occupation endures. International law's failure in resolving the issue has given way to political negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians represented by the PLO. Such negotiations led to the establishment of a transitory system towards the creation of a sovereign Palestinian state. The dynamics of Oslo has strengthened the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, including by the territorialisation of the Palestinian authority in the occupied territories and the establishment of autonomous institutional structures which can form the basis for state building. However, forced to conclude to a lack of progress in the negotiations, under way for the past eighteen years, as well as to a failure to comply with the timetable established by the Agreements. Therefore, several factors cast doubt on the possibility of a sovereign and independent state to be established on the 1967 borders: the hardening of the Israeli stand on the territorial issue, Israel's clear desire to retain control over part of the West Bank; its refusal to evacuate the territories according to schedule; its policy of fait accompli, its continuation of settlement activities and the construction of the separation wall within the Occupied Territories.

No description available.

O objetivo deste trabalho foi compreender, do ponto de vista da política internacional, os fatores que viabilizaram a fundação de Israel no território da Palestina, provocando um dos mais prolongados e dramáticos conflitos da história contemporânea. A criação de Israel, decidida na ONU, em 1947, violou os direitos fundamentais do povo árabe palestino (70% do total da população nesse ano), garantidos pela Carta das Nações Unidas e pelo Pacto da Sociedade das Nações, ambos fontes do Direito Internacional, e violou o título jurídico adquirido pelos árabes através do acordo firmado com os países da Entente, durante a Primeira Guerra Mundial, que garantia a independência da Palestina, causando revolta generalizada no mundo árabe, já profundamente ressentido do imperialismo ocidental na região. Considerando a conjuntura internacional desse período, delineada pela Guerra Fria, e considerando que os principais atores do sistema internacional tinham consciência de que tal decisão causaria a hostilidade dos países árabes, acarretando altíssimos custos militares, políticos e econômicos, uma vez que a Liga Árabe declarou não reconhecer uma decisão que considerava ilegal, tivemos interesse em conhecer quais foram as expectativas de ganhos que levaram os EUA, a ex-URSS e outros países a assumirem os riscos e os custos dessa decisão. Várias conclusões foram obtidas. Os EUA não tinham nenhuma expectativa de ganho com o apoio à criação de Israel, pelo contrário, esse evento acarretou pesados custos à nação norte-americana, advertidos permanentemente pelos Secretários de Estado e Defesa. A decisão pró-Israel foi uma iniciativa do Presidente Truman para defender seu interesse pessoal nas eleições seguintes, quando pretendia contar com o apoio da comunidade judaica de seu país. A posição de Truman garantiu a forte pressão dos EUA, na forma de chantagem e suborno, sobre vários países que sustentavam posições contrárias, na votação da partilha, na ONU. Quanto à decisão soviética, não há uma compreensão conclusiva. Stalin, durante muitos anos, um antagonista intransigente ao projeto sionista, surpreendeu a todos apoiando de última hora a criação de Israel, na votação na ONU. Grande parte dos estudiosos considera que o objetivo soviético era simplesmente prejudicar a Grã Bretanha. Aparentemente, nessa mudança de posição momentânea, houve um equívoco nos cálculos políticos, percebido pouco tempo depois, levando esse país a reconsiderar novamente sua posição em favor dos árabes. Grande parte dos países de ambos os blocos assumiram simplesmente o alinhamento automático às decisãos das duas superpotências. Por último, cabe destacar que o interesse do Brasil era permanecer alinhado com os EUA e, nesse sentido, Oswaldo Aranha, como Presidente da Assembléia Geral, prestou um serviço fundamental. No dia da votação, devido à avaliação de que a proposta pró-Israel seria derrotada, Oswaldo Aranha decidiu encerrar mais cedo os trabalhos, adiando a votação, dando, assim, aos sionistas o tempo que necessitavam para “convencer” os países contrários, a fim de mudar seu voto. / The aim of this research was understand, through the aproach of international policy, the factors that make possible to establish Israel in Palestine, event that caused one of the most extended and dramatic conflicts of contemporary history. The creation of Israel, decided at UN in 1947, violated the fundamental rights of the Palestinian Arab people (70% of the whole population in that year), rights that were assured by the UN Charter and by the Pact of the League of Nations, both sources of international law, and violated the juridical title acquired by Arab people through the agreement signed with the countries of the Entente, during the First World War, that guaranteed the independence of Palestine, provoking uprising in the whole Arab world, already deeply resentful of Western imperialism in the region. We had the interest to know what was the expectation of profits that led USA, former USSR and other countries to assume the risks and costs of this decision, taking into account the international scenery of the Cold War in 1947 and that the main actors of international system was aware that such decision would cause the hostility of Arab countries bringing high military, plitical and economic costs, since that Arab League declared not recognize that illegal decision. The conclusion was that USA didn’t have any expectation of gains supporting the creation of Israel, on the contrary, this event caused heavy costs to American nation. The decision of support Israel was a initiative of President Truman to defend his personal interest in the following election, opposing the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense, because he wanted guarantee the vote of American Jews. The decision of Truman assured the strong prssure of United States by extortion and bribery over many countries to make them to vote on behalf of the creation of Israel. We didn’t find a conclusive understanding about the Soviet decision. Stalin, that was for many years an intransigent antagonist to the Zionist project, surprised everybody supporting the creation of Israel at UN. Mostly of scholars consider that the Soviet intent was just to damage Britain. There seemingly was a mistake in the Soviet political calculation, perceived later, leading this country to change its position. Many countries of both blocs only asumed an automatic alignment with the decisions of the two superpowers. Finally, it’s important to point out that Brazilian interest was to remain aligned with the USA and, in this sense, Oswaldo Aranha, the President of General Assembly, was very useful. In the day of partition voting, due to appraisal that the pro-Israel proposal would be defeated, Oswaldo Aranha simply decided finish earlier the session, postponing the voting, in order to give time to Zionists make pressure and suborn over the opponent countries, to change their votes.

O objetivo deste trabalho foi compreender, do ponto de vista da política internacional, os fatores que viabilizaram a fundação de Israel no território da Palestina, provocando um dos mais prolongados e dramáticos conflitos da história contemporânea. A criação de Israel, decidida na ONU, em 1947, violou os direitos fundamentais do povo árabe palestino (70% do total da população nesse ano), garantidos pela Carta das Nações Unidas e pelo Pacto da Sociedade das Nações, ambos fontes do Direito Internacional, e violou o título jurídico adquirido pelos árabes através do acordo firmado com os países da Entente, durante a Primeira Guerra Mundial, que garantia a independência da Palestina, causando revolta generalizada no mundo árabe, já profundamente ressentido do imperialismo ocidental na região. Considerando a conjuntura internacional desse período, delineada pela Guerra Fria, e considerando que os principais atores do sistema internacional tinham consciência de que tal decisão causaria a hostilidade dos países árabes, acarretando altíssimos custos militares, políticos e econômicos, uma vez que a Liga Árabe declarou não reconhecer uma decisão que considerava ilegal, tivemos interesse em conhecer quais foram as expectativas de ganhos que levaram os EUA, a ex-URSS e outros países a assumirem os riscos e os custos dessa decisão. Várias conclusões foram obtidas. Os EUA não tinham nenhuma expectativa de ganho com o apoio à criação de Israel, pelo contrário, esse evento acarretou pesados custos à nação norte-americana, advertidos permanentemente pelos Secretários de Estado e Defesa. A decisão pró-Israel foi uma iniciativa do Presidente Truman para defender seu interesse pessoal nas eleições seguintes, quando pretendia contar com o apoio da comunidade judaica de seu país. A posição de Truman garantiu a forte pressão dos EUA, na forma de chantagem e suborno, sobre vários países que sustentavam posições contrárias, na votação da partilha, na ONU. Quanto à decisão soviética, não há uma compreensão conclusiva. Stalin, durante muitos anos, um antagonista intransigente ao projeto sionista, surpreendeu a todos apoiando de última hora a criação de Israel, na votação na ONU. Grande parte dos estudiosos considera que o objetivo soviético era simplesmente prejudicar a Grã Bretanha. Aparentemente, nessa mudança de posição momentânea, houve um equívoco nos cálculos políticos, percebido pouco tempo depois, levando esse país a reconsiderar novamente sua posição em favor dos árabes. Grande parte dos países de ambos os blocos assumiram simplesmente o alinhamento automático às decisãos das duas superpotências. Por último, cabe destacar que o interesse do Brasil era permanecer alinhado com os EUA e, nesse sentido, Oswaldo Aranha, como Presidente da Assembléia Geral, prestou um serviço fundamental. No dia da votação, devido à avaliação de que a proposta pró-Israel seria derrotada, Oswaldo Aranha decidiu encerrar mais cedo os trabalhos, adiando a votação, dando, assim, aos sionistas o tempo que necessitavam para “convencer" os países contrários, a fim de mudar seu voto. / The aim of this research was understand, through the aproach of international policy, the factors that make possible to establish Israel in Palestine, event that caused one of the most extended and dramatic conflicts of contemporary history. The creation of Israel, decided at UN in 1947, violated the fundamental rights of the Palestinian Arab people (70% of the whole population in that year), rights that were assured by the UN Charter and by the Pact of the League of Nations, both sources of international law, and violated the juridical title acquired by Arab people through the agreement signed with the countries of the Entente, during the First World War, that guaranteed the independence of Palestine, provoking uprising in the whole Arab world, already deeply resentful of Western imperialism in the region. We had the interest to know what was the expectation of profits that led USA, former USSR and other countries to assume the risks and costs of this decision, taking into account the international scenery of the Cold War in 1947 and that the main actors of international system was aware that such decision would cause the hostility of Arab countries bringing high military, plitical and economic costs, since that Arab League declared not recognize that illegal decision. The conclusion was that USA didn’t have any expectation of gains supporting the creation of Israel, on the contrary, this event caused heavy costs to American nation. The decision of support Israel was a initiative of President Truman to defend his personal interest in the following election, opposing the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense, because he wanted guarantee the vote of American Jews. The decision of Truman assured the strong prssure of United States by extortion and bribery over many countries to make them to vote on behalf of the creation of Israel. We didn’t find a conclusive understanding about the Soviet decision. Stalin, that was for many years an intransigent antagonist to the Zionist project, surprised everybody supporting the creation of Israel at UN. Mostly of scholars consider that the Soviet intent was just to damage Britain. There seemingly was a mistake in the Soviet political calculation, perceived later, leading this country to change its position. Many countries of both blocs only asumed an automatic alignment with the decisions of the two superpowers. Finally, it’s important to point out that Brazilian interest was to remain aligned with the USA and, in this sense, Oswaldo Aranha, the President of General Assembly, was very useful. In the day of partition voting, due to appraisal that the pro-Israel proposal would be defeated, Oswaldo Aranha simply decided finish earlier the session, postponing the voting, in order to give time to Zionists make pressure and suborn over the opponent countries, to change their votes.

L’effondrement et le démantèlement de l’Empire ottoman à la suite de la Première Guerre mondiale ont conduit les Grandes puissances européennes à opérer un partage territorial du Proche-Orient, légitimé par le système des mandats de la Société des Nations (SDN). Sans précédent, cette administration internationale marqua le point de départ de l’internationalisation de la question de la Palestine, dont le droit international allait servir de socle à une nouvelle forme de colonialisme. Au lendemain de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, l’Organisation des Nations Unies (ONU) continua l’action entreprise par la SDN en s’occupant également de cette question sur la demande des Britanniques. En novembre 1947, l’ONU décida du partage de la Palestine en deux Etats pour résoudre les conflits entre sionistes et nationalistes arabes. Si ce partage fut accepté par les sionistes, il fut rejeté par les Etats arabes voisins et de nombreux Arabes palestiniens. Les affrontements opposant nationalistes arabes et sionistes de Palestine laissèrent place au conflit israélo-arabe après la proclamation d’Indépendance de l’Etat d’Israël en mai 1948. Au commencement de la guerre froide, les Etats-Unis et l’URSS prirent conscience de l’intérêt géostratégique de cette région, progressivement désinvestie par la France et la Grande-Bretagne. Dans cette étude, nous verrons comment la scène interétatique et la communauté internationale, successivement composée de la SDN puis de l’ONU, ont en partie scellé le sort du Proche et Moyen-Orient. Nous consacrerons également une analyse au rôle joué par les idéologies nationalistes arabes et sionistes, qui tiennent une place centrale au sein de ce conflit. / The collapse and dismantling of the Ottoman Empire following World War I, led the great European powers to engage in a territorial division of the Middle East, legitimized by the mandates system of the League of Nations. Without any precedents, that international administration marked the beginning of the internationalization of Palestine’s thorny issue. The international law would serve as the pillar for a new form of colonialism. The day after World War II, the United Nations continued the action taken by the League of Nations, as well as for the demand of the British. In November 1947, the UN decided to divide Palestine into two States. If the Zionists had accepted that split, their neighbors, Arab States and Palestinian Arabs, would have rejected it. The clashes opposing the Arab Nationalists and the Palestine Zionists gave space to the Arab-Israeli conflict after the independence of Israel, on May 14, 1948. At the beginning of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union became aware of the geo-strategic interest in this region, gradually divested by France and Great Britain. In this study, we will see how the interstate scene and the international community, successively composed by the League of Nations and the United Nations, have partially sealed the fate of the Near and the Middle East. We will also devote a preliminary analysis related to the role played by the Arabs and Zionists nationalist ideologies, which are central in this conflict.