Constitution as Promise contends that constitutions are sets of promises. As such, it argues that they must be interpreted in a living constitutionalist manner. Chapter One argues that constitutions meet the analytic criteria to be considered promises. It is argued that constitutions are expressions of the intention of a government to bind itself to a set of principles. Absent this expression, citizens lack assurance of the protection of their rights and legal recourse when their rights are violated. Chapter Two considers the use of promise in contract theory and investigates its viability in constitutional theory. Some theories of contract are skeptical of promise as a basis for contract. The chapter argues that while promise may be an inadequate moral underpinning for the law of contract, it is apt for the law of constitutions. Chapter Three notes that constitutions are sets of vague promises. Vague promises ought not be interpreted solely in accordance with the intentions of promisors or promisees. Traditional forms of originalism contend that constitutions should be interpreted according to the intentions of their framers. So, constitution as promise rules out traditional forms of originalism. Chapter Four considers the positive consequences of constitution as promise. It argues that vague promises ought to be interpreted through a negotiation process between promisor and promisee. This negotiation should consider what moral reasoning reveals about the promise’s terms, the context in which the promise was uttered, the capacities and competing obligations of the promisor, and the expectations of the promisee. To properly consider these factors, the chapter maintains that the negotiation must occur on a case-by-case basis, incrementally specifying the promise’s terms. The chapter then notes the similarities between this negotiation process and the interpretive suggestions of living constitutionalism. It concludes that living constitutionalism is entailed by the promissory nature of constitutions. / Thesis / Master of Philosophy (MA) / Constitution as Promise investigates the interpretive consequences of conceptualizing constitutions as promises from governments to citizens. It first argues that constitutions satisfy the criteria to be considered promises. It then maintains that the morality of promising is apt for application to constitutional law. In the third and fourth chapters, it considers how one ought to interpret vague promises. Vague promises, it argues, should be interpreted incrementally, on a case-by-case basis. The promisor and the promisee must come to an agreement about what their vague promise requires, as new cases arise. When they cannot agree, promisor and promisee need an adjudicator. Since constitutions are sets of vague promises, they must also be interpreted incrementally, on a case-by-case basis and require adjudication where agreement is impossible. Constitution as Promise concludes that the only available interpretive theory that is sensitive to constitution’s nature as vague promise is living constitutionalism. As such, constitutions ought to be interpreted in a living constitutionalist manner.

No description available.

Conforme a Lei n.º 9.307, de 23 de setembro de 1996, as sentenças arbitrais nacionais produzem os mesmos efeitos das sentenças judiciais, independentemente de homologação. A despeito disso, elas se encontram sujeitas ao controle do Poder Judiciário. A Lei de Arbitragem disciplina os limites e meios para a impugnação judicial das sentenças arbitrais nacionais basicamente em dois dispositivos, os arts. 32 e 33. Optou-se por um regramento bastante sucinto, mas que é suficiente para resolver as situações práticas que podem se verificar quando uma sentença arbitral é impugnada. Compreendido que a arbitragem é processo de origem convencional (privada) e que por força daquelas e outras regras, como os arts. 17, 18, 20, § 2º, e 31 ela se insere no círculo da teoria geral do processo (aplicando-se-lhe, por conseguinte, os respectivos princípios e conceitos) e se sujeita aos ditames essenciais do devido processo legal, torna-se possível, a partir das técnicas interpretativas existentes, chegar a soluções para as diversas questões envolvendo o controle judicial das sentenças arbitrais nacionais das quais a Lei n.º 9.307 não tratou expressamente ou de que tratou de forma imprecisa. / According to Law n.o 9.307, which came into effect in September 23rd, 1996, domestic arbitral awards have the same effect on the parties as a ruling by a State Court, without the need for judicial confirmation. The Brazilian Arbitration Act regulates the limits and means for the judicial challenge of domestic arbitral awards in, essentialy, two articles, art. 32 and 33. The Act opted for brief rules on the issue, but they are sufficient to resolve the practical situations that may arise when an arbitral award is challenged. Understanding that arbitration is a process of conventional origin (private) and that due to those as well as other rules, such as articles 17, 18, 20, paragraph 2, and 31 it is contained in the field of general procedural theory (so that, consequently, the same principles and concepts are applicable) and is subject to the essential dictates of due legal process, it becomes possible, due to existing techniques of interpretation, to develop solutions to the many issues involving the judicial control of domestic arbitral awards that Law n.o 9.307 either did not expressly regulate or regulated imprecisely.

Conforme a Lei n.º 9.307, de 23 de setembro de 1996, as sentenças arbitrais nacionais produzem os mesmos efeitos das sentenças judiciais, independentemente de homologação. A despeito disso, elas se encontram sujeitas ao controle do Poder Judiciário. A Lei de Arbitragem disciplina os limites e meios para a impugnação judicial das sentenças arbitrais nacionais basicamente em dois dispositivos, os arts. 32 e 33. Optou-se por um regramento bastante sucinto, mas que é suficiente para resolver as situações práticas que podem se verificar quando uma sentença arbitral é impugnada. Compreendido que a arbitragem é processo de origem convencional (privada) e que por força daquelas e outras regras, como os arts. 17, 18, 20, § 2º, e 31 ela se insere no círculo da teoria geral do processo (aplicando-se-lhe, por conseguinte, os respectivos princípios e conceitos) e se sujeita aos ditames essenciais do devido processo legal, torna-se possível, a partir das técnicas interpretativas existentes, chegar a soluções para as diversas questões envolvendo o controle judicial das sentenças arbitrais nacionais das quais a Lei n.º 9.307 não tratou expressamente ou de que tratou de forma imprecisa. / According to Law n.o 9.307, which came into effect in September 23rd, 1996, domestic arbitral awards have the same effect on the parties as a ruling by a State Court, without the need for judicial confirmation. The Brazilian Arbitration Act regulates the limits and means for the judicial challenge of domestic arbitral awards in, essentialy, two articles, art. 32 and 33. The Act opted for brief rules on the issue, but they are sufficient to resolve the practical situations that may arise when an arbitral award is challenged. Understanding that arbitration is a process of conventional origin (private) and that due to those as well as other rules, such as articles 17, 18, 20, paragraph 2, and 31 it is contained in the field of general procedural theory (so that, consequently, the same principles and concepts are applicable) and is subject to the essential dictates of due legal process, it becomes possible, due to existing techniques of interpretation, to develop solutions to the many issues involving the judicial control of domestic arbitral awards that Law n.o 9.307 either did not expressly regulate or regulated imprecisely.

No description available.

Thesis (LLM )--Stellenbosch University, 2011. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: In the field of administrative law, the judiciary has traditionally exercised control over the administrative actions of the executive through judicial review. However, judicial review is neither the most effective nor the most efficient primary control mechanism for systemic administrative improvement. In a country faced with a task of =transformative constitutionalism‘, and hindered with scarce resources, there is good cause to limit judicial intervention as the first response to administrative disputes. The major theme of this thesis is to investigate the feasibility of administrative tribunal reform in South Africa, using two other commonwealth countries, Australia and England, as a basis for comparison. Australia and England have been chosen for comparison because they share similar administrative law traditions and they can provide working models of coherent tribunal structures. The Australian tribunal system is well-established and consists of tribunals which fall under the control of the executive, while tribunals in England have recently undergone a significant transformation, and are now part of the independent judiciary. The South African government currently spends, indeed wastes, a significant amount of money on administrative law litigation. Due to the limitations of judicial review, even after the high costs of litigation and the long duration of court proceedings, the results achieved may still be unsatisfactory. Furthermore, judicial review is unsuited to giving effect to systemic administrative change and the improvement of initial decision-making. Australia and England have begun to move away from the traditional court model for the resolution of administrative disputes. Both have indicated a preference for the important role of tribunals in the administration of disputes. Tribunals have been shown to offer the advantage of being speedier, cheaper, more efficient, more participatory and more accessible than traditional courts, which contributes to tribunals being a more available resource for lay people or people without sophisticated legal knowledge, and provides wider access to remedies than courts. The English and Australian models indicate a few important trends which need to be applied universally to ensure a sustained tribunal reform and a system which provides a higher level of administrative redress than the over-burdened and institutionally inept courts currently do. These include co-operation among government departments and tribunals; open and accountable systemic change; the need for supervision and evaluation of the whole of administrative law by an independent and competent body; and ultimately a focus on the needs of users of state services. At the same time, there are arguments against administrative tribunal reform. These include the costs of reform; the ways to establish tribunals; and the level of independence shown by the tribunals. These arguments are especially relevant in the South African context, where the government faces huge social problems and a scarcity of resources. However, after an analysis of the valuable characteristics of tribunals and the role that they serve in the day to day administration of justice, it is difficult to see how these objections to tribunals can outweigh their potential importance in the administrative justice system. The need for sustained systematic reform in South Africa is one that cannot be ignored. Tribunals offer a valuable alternative to judicial review for the resolution of administrative disputes. Furthermore, the tribunal systems of Australia and England demonstrate how the effective creation and continued use of comprehensive tribunal structures contributes firstly to cost reduction and secondly to ease the administrative burden on courts who are not suited to cure large-scale administrative error. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: In die administratiefreg oefen die regsprekende gesag tradisioneel beheer uit oor die uitvoerende gesag deur middel van geregtelike hersiening. Geregtelike hersiening is egter nie die mees doeltreffende of effektiewe primêre beheermeganisme om sistemiese administratiewe verbetering teweeg te bring nie. In 'n land met die uitdagings van 'transformatiewe konstitusionalisme‘ en skaars hulpbronne, kan 'n goeie argument gevoer word dat geregtelike inmenging as die eerste antwoord op administratiewe dispute beperk moet word. Die deurlopende tema van hierdie tesis is 'n ondersoek na die lewensvatbaarheid van hervorming van administratiewe tribunale in Suid-Afrika, in vergelyking met die posisie in Australië en Engeland, waarvan beide ook, tesame met Suid-Afrika, deel vorm van die Statebond. Hierdie lande is gekies vir regsvergelykende studie aangesien hulle 'n administratiefregtelike tradisie met Suid-Afrika deel en beide werkende modelle van duidelike tribunale strukture daarstel. Die Australiese tribunale stelsel is goed gevestig en bestaan uit tribunale onder die beheer van die uitvoerende gesag, terwyl die tribunale stelsel in Engeland onlangs 'n beduidende hervorming ondergaan het en nou deel van die onafhanklike regsprekende gesag is. Die Suid-Afrikaanse regering mors aansienlike hoeveelhede geld op administratiefregtelike litigasie. Selfs na hoë koste en lang vertragings van litigasie mag die resultate steeds onbevredigend wees as gevolg van die beperkings inherent aan geregtelike hersiening. Tesame met hierdie oorwegings is geregtelike hersiening ook nie gerig op sistemiese administratiewe verandering en verbetering van aanvanklike besluitneming nie. Australië en Engeland het onlangs begin wegbeweeg van die tradisionele hof-gebaseerde model vir die oplossing van administratiewe dispute. Beide toon 'n voorkeur vir die belangrike rol wat tribunale in die administrasie van dispute kan speel Tribunale bied die bewese voordele om vinniger, goedkoper, meer doeltreffend, meer deelnemend en meer toeganklik te wees as tradisionele howe, sodat tribunale 'n meer beskikbare hulpbron is vir leke, oftewel, persone sonder gesofistikeerde regskennis en dus beter toegang tot remedies as tradisionele howe verskaf. Die Engelse en Australiese modelle dui op enkele belangrike tendense wat universeel toegepas moet word om volgehoue tribunale hervorming te verseker en om =n stelsel te skep wat 'n hoër vlak van administratiewe geregtigheid daarstel as wat oorlaaide en institusioneel onbekwame howe kan. Dit verwys bepaald na samewerking tussen staatsdepartemente en tibunale; deursigtige en verantwoordbare sistemiese veranderinge; die behoefte aan toesighouding en evaluasie van die hele administratiefreg deur 'n onafhanklike, bevoegde liggaam; en uiteindelik 'n fokus op die behoeftes van die gebruikers van staatsdienste. Daar is egter terselfdertyd ook argumente teen administratiewe tribunale hervorming. Hierdie argumente sluit in die koste van hervorming; die wyses waarop tribunale gevestig word; en die vlak van onafhanklikheid voorgehou deur tribunale. Hierdie argumente is veral relevant in die Suid-Afrikaanse konteks waar die regering voor groot sosiale probleme te staan kom en daarby ingesluit, 'n tekort aan hulpbronne ook moet hanteer. Daarenteen is dit moeilik om in te sien hoe enige teenkanting en teenargumente met betrekking tot die vestiging van administratiewe tribunale swaarder kan weeg as die potensiële belang van sulke tribunale in die administratiewe geregtigheidstelsel, veral nadat 'n analise van die waardevolle karaktereienskappe van tribunale en die rol wat hulle speel in die dag-tot-dag administrasie van geregtigheid onderneem is. Die behoefte aan volhoubare sistemiese hervorming in Suid-Afrika kan nie geïgnoreer word nie. Tribunale bied 'n waardevolle alternatief tot geregtelike hersiening met die oog op die oplossing van administratiewe dispute. Tesame hiermee demonstreer die tribunale stelsels in Australië en Engeland hoe die doeltreffende vestiging en deurlopende gebruik van omvattende tribunale bydra, eerstens om kostes verbonde aan die oplossing van administratiewe dispute te verlaag en tweedens, om die administratiewe las op die howe, wat nie aangelê is daarvoor om grootskaalse administratiewe foute reg te stel nie, te verlig.

Wetgewing wat onbestaanbaar is met die bepalings van Wet 200 van 1993 as die hoogste reg is nietig tensy geoorloof volgens die maatstawwe van art 33 (1) 1 en die Konstitusionele Hof en die provinsiale en plaaslike afdelings van die Hooggeregshof is bevoeg om dit ongeldig te verklaar. Die beoordeling van die geldigheid van wetgewing waardeur inbreuk gemaak word op 'n Fundamentele Reg of Vryheid in Hoofstuk 3 verleen 1 vereis in eerste instansie die vertolking van die betrokke bepaling van die Hoofstuk. In die lig van die besondere karakter van 'n grondwet en die gebrek aan omlyning van die verleende regte en vryhede 1 moet die vertolking nie volgens geykte metodes geskied nie I maar wel doelgerig aan die hand van die waardes onderliggend tot die Handves as geheel. Waardes wat nie herleibaar is tot die grondwet self nie en die persoonlike filosofiee van die regters behoort die howe egter nie te beinvloed nie. / Legislation inconsistent with the provisions of Act 200 of 1993 as the supreme law is of no force and effect and the Constitutional Court and the provincial and local divisions of the Supreme Court may declare it invalid, unless it complies with the criteria of a permissible limitation under sec 33(1). Before the validity of legislation impinging upon a Fundamental Right or Freedom conferred in Chapter 3 can be considered, the relevant provision of the Chapter must first be interpreted. In view of the special nature of a constitution and the generality of the conferred rights and freedoms, the ordinary methods of interpretation should not be applied. Chapter 3 must be interpreted purposively taking into account the values underlying the Bill of Rights as a whole. Values not founded in the Constitution and the personal philosophies of the judges ought not to influence the courts. / Private Law / LL.M.

No description available.

Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2016-08-09T13:09:47Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Bianca Ramos Xavier.pdf: 1868376 bytes, checksum: 709d0860aaadf206a69d052f98068979 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-08-09T13:09:47Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Bianca Ramos Xavier.pdf: 1868376 bytes, checksum: 709d0860aaadf206a69d052f98068979 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-03-31 / Analyze the ruling effects on the phenomenon of tax incidence will be the purpose of this doctoral dissertation. The goal is to investigate if the Judiciary can deconstitute it in cases of the favorable decision to the taxpayer's interests. In case of the positive answer to establish the deconstitution boundaries of the Carf's decision. This research will be very important because the judicial review main will result in the weakening of tax administrative litigation and the glut of tax litigations at the judicial level. The analysis will be carried out taking into account the role of the tax assessment on the tax incidence, the structure of the tax administrative litigation, the administrative judicial review of doctrine of administrative acts and, finally, the possibility of judicial review of 64 Carf's lawsuits / A proposta da presente tese de doutorado é analisar os efeitos da decisão administrativa sobre o fenômeno da incidência tributária. O objetivo é pesquisar se o Poder Judiciário pode desconstituí-la nas hipóteses em que a decisão for favorável aos interesses do contribuinte e, caso a resposta seja positiva, estabelecer os limites para a desconstituição da decisão proferida pelo Carf. A investigação é relevante, pois, a possibilidade ampla e irrestrita da revisão judicial acarretará no enfraquecimento do contencioso administrativo tributário e no abarrotamento das lides tributárias em âmbito judicial. A análise será realizada levando-se em consideração o papel do lançamento tributário no fenômeno de incidência tributária, a estrutura do contencioso administrativo fiscal, a visão da doutrina administrativista sobre a revisão judicial dos atos administrativos e, por fim, a possibilidade da revisão judicial das decisões do Carf, notadamente sobre o princípio da segurança jurídica, levando-se em conta, inclusive, as 64 ações judiciais ajuizadas com o propósito específico de discutir o mérito das decisões do Carf

Zugl.: Potsdam, Univ., Diss.