Wetgewing wat onbestaanbaar is met die bepalings van Wet 200 van 1993 as die hoogste reg is nietig tensy geoorloof volgens die maatstawwe van art 33 (1) 1 en die Konstitusionele Hof en die provinsiale en plaaslike afdelings van die Hooggeregshof is bevoeg om dit ongeldig te verklaar. Die beoordeling van die geldigheid van wetgewing waardeur inbreuk gemaak word op 'n Fundamentele Reg of Vryheid in Hoofstuk 3 verleen 1 vereis in eerste instansie die vertolking van die betrokke bepaling van die Hoofstuk. In die lig van die besondere karakter van 'n grondwet en die gebrek aan omlyning van die verleende regte en vryhede 1 moet die vertolking nie volgens geykte metodes geskied nie I maar wel doelgerig aan die hand van die waardes onderliggend tot die Handves as geheel. Waardes wat nie herleibaar is tot die grondwet self nie en die persoonlike filosofiee van die regters behoort die howe egter nie te beinvloed nie. / Legislation inconsistent with the provisions of Act 200 of 1993 as the supreme law is of no force and effect and the Constitutional Court and the provincial and local divisions of the Supreme Court may declare it invalid, unless it complies with the criteria of a permissible limitation under sec 33(1). Before the validity of legislation impinging upon a Fundamental Right or Freedom conferred in Chapter 3 can be considered, the relevant provision of the Chapter must first be interpreted. In view of the special nature of a constitution and the generality of the conferred rights and freedoms, the ordinary methods of interpretation should not be applied. Chapter 3 must be interpreted purposively taking into account the values underlying the Bill of Rights as a whole. Values not founded in the Constitution and the personal philosophies of the judges ought not to influence the courts. / Private Law / LL.M.

Thesis (LLM)--University of Stellenbosch, 2000. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: South African administrative law has undergone drastic changes since the inception of the interim Constitution, which elevated 'administrative justice' to a constitutionally entrenched fundamental right in section 24. Although the successor of this section, the 'must administrative action' clause in section 33 FC, did not enter into force on 5 February 1996 with the rest of the Constitution, it required more changes to administrative law in the form of legislation, when read together with item 23 Schedule 6 FC. The two most significant factors that brought about change were the passage of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 in terms of section 33 FC read with item 23 Schedule 6, and the ruling of the Constitutional Court in the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers case. This study shows that in order to give effect to the requirements of the Constitution, the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act and the ruling of the Constitutional Court, administrative law must be reorganised. When this happens, section 33 FC, which gives force to the common law that informs administrative law, becomes the starting point in administrative law matters. Although the Act exists under the Constitution and parallel to the common law, Parliament foresees that the Act and the common law will in time become one system of law. It further provides for the direct application of the Constitution by those who cannot find a remedy in the Act. The study further shows that, as not all the common law constitutional principles that previously provided the common law grounds for review of administrative action have been taken up by the Constitution, the possibility exists that some of the common law grounds do not continue to be relevant to the review of administrative action. The Act, which articulates the right to 'just administrative action' as viewed by government, contains most of the common law grounds for review. It is therefore argued that, after the Act has entered into force, the continued relevance of those that have been omitted from the Act, needs to be determined before they can be used through the direct application of section 33 FC. To test for relevance, the requirements in section 33(1) Fe, 'lawfulness', reasonableness' and 'procedural fairness', are therefore interpreted in the study in order to determine which statutory grounds relate to each and which common law grounds have been omitted from the Act. The conclusion reached is that grounds available for the review of administrative action consist of the statutory grounds for review together with the omitted common law grounds that continue to be relevant to the judicial review of administrative action. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Sedert die inwerkingtreding van die interim Grondwet, wat 'administratiewe gerigtigheid' tot 'n grondwetlike reg verhef het in artikel 24, het die Suid-Afrikaanse administratiefreg drastiese veranderinge ondergaan. Al het die reg op 'n 'regverdige administratiewe optrede' in artikel33 FG nie op 5 Februarie 1996 in werking getree saam met die res van die Grondwet nie, het die klousule nog veranderinge, in die vorm van wetgewing, vereis. Die twee belangrikste faktore wat veranderinge to gevolg gehad het, was die aanneming van die Wet op die Bevordering van Administratiewe Geregtigheid, Wet 3 van 2000, en die beslissing van die Konstitusionele Hof in die Pharmaceutical Manufacturers-saak. Hierdie studie bevind dat die administratiefreg heringedeel sal moet word om effek te gee aan die vereistes van die Grondwet, die Wet op die Bevordering van Administratiewe Geregtigheid en die beslissing van die Konstitutionele Hof. As dit plaasvind, word artikel 33 FG, wat aan die gemenereg krag verleën, die beginpunt in administratiefregtelike aangeleenthede. Al bestaan die Wet onder die Grondwet en parallel tot die gemenereg, voorsien die regering dat die Wet en die gemenereg in die toekoms een stelsel word. Daar word verder voorsiening gemaak vir die direkte toegpassing van artikel33 deur persone wat nie 'n remedie in die Wet kan vind nie. Die studie bevind verder dat, omdat al die gemeenregtelike konstitusionele beginsels wat voorheen die gronde van hersiening verskaf het nie in die Grondwet opgeneem is nie, die moontlikheid bestaan dat sekere van die gemeenregtelike gronde nie relevant bly vir die hersiening van administratiewe handelinge nie. Die Wet, wat die reg op 'n '[r]egverdige administratiewe optrede' verwoord soos dit gesien word deur die regering, bevat meeste van die gemeenregtelike gronde van hersiening. Daarom word daar geargumenteer dat die voortgesette relevantheid van die gemeenregtelike gronde van hersiening wat uitgelaat is uit die Wet eers bepaal moet word voordat hulle gebruik kan word deur die direkte toepassing van artikel 33 nadat die Wet in werking getree het. Om te toets vir relevantheid, moet die vereistes in artikel 33 FG, 'regmatigheid', 'redelikheid' en 'prosedurele billikheid' geïnterpreteer word om te bepaal watter statutêre gronde onder elk klassifiseer en watter gemmenregtelike gronde uitgelaat is uit die Wet. Die gevolgtrekking is dat die gronde van hersiening beskikbaar vir die hersiening van administratiewe handelinge bestaan uit statutêre gronde van hersiening sowel as die weggelate gemeenregtelike gronde van hersiening wat relevant bly vir die judisiële hersiening van administratiewe handelinge.

published_or_final_version / abstract / Law / Master / Master of Philosophy

The scholarly consensus on the political foundations of independent constitutional review – that it invariably stems from electoral and inter-branch competition – has been weakened by recent empirical discoveries which demonstrated that constitutional courts in a number of authoritarian states are actually more activist than previously assumed. This dissertation examines this phenomenon using the case of Hong Kong, an authoritarian polity first under the sovereignty of Britain and then of China. It is widely believed that the competence of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal – a cosmopolitan common law final appellate court – to strike down legislative and executive acts, and its ability to induce the regime’s compliance with its rulings, is intrinsic to the Basic Law, just as it is in liberal democracies. Nevertheless, two interrelated anomalous phenomena – the Court’s repeated issuance of activist rulings with near-complete impunity, and the continuing forbearance of China’s foremost constitutional authority, the National People’s Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC), faced with the Court’s aggressive assertions – necessitates careful explanation. This dissertation proposes an explanatory Constitutional Investment Theory, which highlights the similarities between “investment” in constitutional review and investment in financial assets, to explain the activation, consolidation, and ascendancy of independent constitutional review in authoritarian settings. It shows how strong incentives to signal its ideological commitment to the “One Country, Two Systems” scheme, both internationally and domestically, first drove the NPCSC to acquiesce in the Court’s self-aggrandisement; how internal divisions within and external opposition to the Hong Kong regime have rendered retaliation a costly option; and how the Court’s strategic resolution of the Basic Law’s ambiguities has encouraged continuous political investment in its jurisdiction and autonomy. Altogether, these have contributed to the formation of a dynamic equilibrium of constitution control, under which the Court and the NPCSC dynamically developed their own jurisprudence within their respective bailiwicks.

My thesis deals with the legal concept of sovereign Parliament, the very keystone of British constitution according to A. V. Dicey. This model has been challenged both normatively and descriptively. Concerning the normative point of view, concept of unlimited sovereignty is incoherent. Descriptively, courts don't simply take the parliamentary supremacy for granted, even if they say so. Relationship between the Parliament and courts is certainly more complex than Dicey suggested. Goals of this thesis are rather tentative. Since the popularity of this topic among British constitutional lawyers, comprehensive analysis is implausible due to the limited space. This paper aims to gather fundamental theories and disputes regarding the parliamentary sovereignty and its relationship with courts. In other words, it explores connection between the Parliament and courts in contemporary British constitution. First chapter analyses the constitutional conventions, which forms the basics of several other fundamental concepts in UK constitution. It suggests that there are no clear boundaries between law and conventions. Second chapter focuses on the general concept of sovereignty and Diceyan classic theory of Parliamentary sovereignty. There is also a brief explanation of sovereignty's connection to Scot's law....

Cette acception n'est plus vraie puisque le droit français montre une consécration plus importante de l'exclusion d'un associé. C'est en raison de l'utilité que peut présenter ce procédé qu'il y a eu une multiplication des cas d'exclusion depuis le XXe siècle. Cette multiplication a pour objectif principal de préserver l'intérêt de la société ou de l'entreprise, et de sanctionner l'associé fautif. Cependant, son utilité n'a pas pu fonder une généralisation d'un droit d'exclusion en droit des sociétés. Jusqu'ici, l'exclusion unilatérale demeure une hypothèse rejetée.En effet, la généralisation du droit d'exclusion se heurte à d'importants risques d'exercice arbitraire des gérants ou des organes de société. C'est donc au niveau de la mise en œuvre de l'exclusion que se fondent les hésitations concernant la validation de l'exclusion comme technique ordinaire et utile, indépendamment de toute clause ou texte légal. Notre présente étude met l'accent sur l'utilité de l'exclusion dans ses deux formes validées par le législateur (imposée et acceptée), ainsi que sur les failles dans les règles régissant la mise en œuvre de ces formes d'exclusion. La mise en œuvre de l'exclusion est une question qui préoccupe toujours la jurisprudence et la doctrine. / The endorsement of the exclusion technique was linked to the context of social capital variability. This articulation is no longer valid since the French laws showed a more important utilization of the concept of “exclusion”. There has been an increase in cases of exclusion during the 20th century because of the utility in presenting this process. This rise's main objective is to preserve the interests of the companies or businesses, and to punish the guilty partner. Its usefulness did not lead to generalize the exclusion laws into corporate laws. The unilateral exclusion is a hypothesis rejected until now. Indeed, the generalization of an exclusion law faces significant risks of arbitrary usage by the managers or members of society. It is the implementation of exclusion that makes the basis for hesitations concerning the validation of exclusion as a common and useful technique regardless of any clause or legal text. Our present study focuses on the usefulness of the exclusion in its two forms approved by the legislature (imposed and accepted), as well as the loopholes in the rules governing the realization of these forms. Till date, the implementation of exclusion remains a perplex matter, jurisprudence and doctrine.

A opção pela forma federativa de governo importa em compromisso com a existência de mais de um ente responsável, em territórios sobrepostos, pela realização das tarefas de arrecadação e gasto público, além de suas inerentes atividades políticas. O exercício dessas tarefas pode ser definido com rigor, em um regime dual, ou com possibilidade de auxílios mútuos, em um regime de cooperação. O Brasil adotou, como cláusula pétrea em sua Constituição, a forma de federação cooperativa, estruturada em três níveis de governo, tendo como consequência a divisão de competências materiais entre os componentes dessa federação. Apesar disso, os Tribunais brasileiros têm insistido em sustentar a tese de solidariedade obrigacional entre todos os entes federados em processo que tenham por objeto o controle de políticas públicas sociais. A imposição dessa obrigação solidária, além de desrespeitar a estrutura federativa e afrontar os princípios da efetividade e economicidade da administração com sobreposições e sobrecargas que facilitam o desperdício de verbas e a corrupção ainda não atenta para a regra de ouro da imposição de solidariedade obrigacional, que é a menção expressa em dispositivo legal ou constitucional. Conforme será demonstrado, as decisões proferidas pelos Tribunais nacionais em sede de controle jurisdicional de políticas públicas vem ignorando todo o arcabouço jurídico acerca do tema, além de impor aos entes federados desnecessária dificuldade de gestão de suas competências e de seus recursos financeiros. A defesa de responsabilidades divididas, porém, poderia gerar efeitos nefastos. É que, em sede processual, a demanda ajuizada em face do ente não diretamente responsável pela execução da política pública questionada poderia ser extinta sem resolução do mérito, impondo atrasos à efetivação de direitos sociais decorrentes de óbices processuais. Como os direitos fundamentais categoria na qual estão inseridos os direitos sociais exigem efetivação imediata e são sindicáveis judicialmente a partir dos comandos genéricos dados pela Constituição, foi preciso recorrer a uma técnica antiga já prevista no Brasil, porém mal compreendida de integração subjetiva da demanda por ordem do juiz, a intervenção iussu iudicis. Para evitar a repetição de erros, será refeito o caminho histórico de surgimento e desenvolvimento dessa técnica para melhor compreensão de seus escopos. / The option for the federal form of government matter commitment to the existence of more than one entity responsible, in overlapping territories, for performing the tasks of public collection and spending beyond their inherent political activities. The exercise of these tasks can be defined rigorously, in a dual system, or with the possibility of mutual aid, in a regime of cooperation. Brazil has adopted as entrenchment clause in its Constitution, a cooperative federation, structured in three levels of government, resulting in the division of powers between the material components of this federation. Nevertheless, the Brazilian Courts insisted on supporting the thesis of a mandatory solidarity among all federal entities in the suits whose purpose is the control of public policies. The imposition of such solidarity, besides disregarding the federal structure and defy the principles of effectiveness and economy of administration - with overlays and overloads that facilitate waste of money and corruption - not attentive to the golden rule imposing mandatory solidarity, which is the expressly stated in law or constitutional provision. As will be shown, the decisions handed down by national courts in the seat of judicial control of public policies has ignored the whole legal structure of the topic, and impose to federal entities an unnecessary difficulty in managing their skills and their financial resources. The defense of divided responsibilities, however, could generate adverse effects. Is that in procedural field, a suit filed in the face of an entity not being directly responsible for the execution of the questioned public policy demand could be terminated without resolution, imposing delays to the realization of social rights under procedural obstacles. As fundamental rights - the category in which they belong social rights - require effective immediately be investigated and are chargeable from generic commands given by the Constitution, it was necessary to resort to an old technique - already foreseen in Brazil, but poorly understood - a subjective integration demand by the judge\'s order, the intervention iussu iudicis. To avoid repeating mistakes, will be redone historical path emergence and development of this technique to better understand their scopes.

Historicamente, o ideal democrático apropriou-se do poder legislativo para se expressar. Imbuído da difícil missão de tornar factível a aspiração de autogoverno, esse poder parece encontrar no instituto da revisão judicial um grave escolho para sua tarefa. Quem deve ser o detentor da última palavra na conformação política da sociedade, judiciário ou parlamento? Sob qual justificativa um conjunto de juízes não eleitos e irresponsáveis perante o povo poderia derrubar uma decisão política tomada pela maioria de seus representantes? O principal objetivo desse trabalho consiste em reavaliar criticamente algumas das mais influentes respostas apresentadas contemporaneamente. Como conclusão geral, questiono o valor das próprias perguntas a partir das quais o debate costuma ser desenvolvido, indicando uma nova e mais promissora perspectiva de análise / Historically the democratic ideal has used the legislative to express itself. Charged with the difficult mission to make feasible the self-government aspiration, this power seems to find in judicial review a grave obstacle for its mission. Who must have the last word in societal political conformation, judiciary or parliament? Under what justification a group of unelected and unaccountable judges could strike down a political decision made by the majority of the people´s representatives? The major scope of this research is to reevaluate critically some of the most influential answers developed nowadays. As a general conclusion, I question the very question´s value from which the debate is usually developed, indicating a new and more promising analysis perspective.

O estudo das políticas públicas recentemente tem despertado a atenção da doutrina no âmbito do Direito. O presente trabalho busca apresentar um quadro geral das políticas públicas previdenciárias, demonstrando a intersecção existente entre o Direito e a Ciência Política, as contribuições de cada disciplina e as tênues fronteiras que as separam. A esfera do Direito, sob a perspectiva do Poder Judiciário, estabelece os parâmetros e limites do controle dos atos editados pelos outros Poderes, à luz dos instrumentos jurídicos previstos no ordenamento, tendo como objetivo a efetivação do direito fundamental à previdência social. A análise de casos concretos, colhidos da jurisprudência pátria, revela alguma oscilação do Poder Judiciário na defesa do direito fundamental em questão, especialmente em decorrência de argumentos de natureza econômica, introduzidos no texto constitucional por meio das reformas de 1998 e 2003. / The analysis of public policies has recently raised the attention in the scope of law. This study has the purpose of presenting a comprehensive view of the public policies on Social Security, by demonstrating the intersection between Law and Political Science, the contributions of each area of study as well as the tenuous frontiers separating them. The scope of law, under the perspective of the Judiciary, establishes the patterns and the limits to regulate the measures taken by Executive and Legislative Power, having as reference the juridical instruments stated by the legal system, whose purpose is to safeguard the right to social security. The analysis of concrete cases, gathered from the Brazilian case law, reveals a lack of coherence and consistency of the Judiciary to uphold the right to social security. This incoherence and inconsistency are mainly due to economic arguments, which were introduced in the Constitution by the time of the reforms carried out in 1998 and 2003.

O princípio da separação de poderes sofreu alterações fundamentais ao longo dos mais de três séculos desde sua consagração. Dentre as alterações na balança dos poderes, destaca-se a evolução do Poder Judiciário, com o alargamento de suas funções e aumento de sua importância se comparado em face da concepção clássica. No contexto brasileiro pós Constituição de 1988, dois fatores têm se mostrado fundamentais ao avanço do Poder Judiciário a uma posição de destaque no cenário político e constitucional: o desenvolvimento sistema de controle de constitucionalidade aliado às características das normas do texto constitucional, aliados a outros fatores, permitindo o seu avanço ao campo do chamado ativismo judicial. Dentro desta abordagem, o presente estudo busca apontar as implicações desta nova forma de atuação do Poder Judiciário denominada de ativismo judicial em face da democracia, analisando os principais pontos de tensão e críticas surgidas de seu confronto / The principle of separation of powers has undergone fundamental changes over the last three centuries since its establishment. Among the changes in the balance of powers, there is the evolution of the judiciary, with the enlargement of its functions and increase its importance compared in view of the classical conception of the separation of powers principle. In the Brazilian context after the 1988 Constitution, two factors have been shown to be fundamental to the advancement of the Judiciary to a prominent position in political and constitutional landscape, the development of the mechanisms of judicial review combined with the features of constitucional norms, also combined with other factors, allowing its advancement to the field of so-called judicial activism. Within this approach, this study seeks to identify the implications of this new form of action of the Judiciary called judicial activism in the face of democracy, analyzing the main points of tension and conflict that arises from them.