O presente trabalho de pesquisa tem por objetivo analisar algumas das inúmeras decisões do Supremo Tribunal Federal e do Superior Tribunal de Justiça, bem como do Tribunal de Justiça de São Paulo, em matéria de controle jurisdicional dos atos administrativos discricionários e verificar se é possível identificar mudança substancial nos limites desse controle. O trabalho foi dividido em duas partes, sendo a primeira constituída por uma pesquisa bibliográfica destinada, essencialmente, a situar o tema da discricionariedade administrativa, num enfoque conceitual e histórico. A segunda parte refere-se à pesquisa sobre o tema na jurisprudência do Supremo Tribunal Federal, Superior Tribunal de Justiça, Tribunal de Justiça de São Paulo e, ainda, no acórdão relativo à apelação cível nº. 1.422 do Tribunal de Justiça do Rio Grande do Norte, cuja relatoria ficou a cargo de Miguel Seabra Fagundes. Os atos administrativos discricionários, por muito tempo foram considerados insindicáveis pelo Poder Judiciário, ou seja, imunes à apreciação jurisdicional. Contudo, é possível identificar o surgimento de alguns parâmetros jurídicos que objetivaram restringir a atividade administrativa discricionária, inserindo-a, sob determinados aspectos, no âmbito da apreciação jurisdicional. O balizamento inicial restringiu-se à lei, permanecendo o mérito do ato administrativo intocado. Nesse processo de tentativa de contenção dos atos administrativos discricionários desenvolveram-se teorias de controle, como a teoria do desvio de poder e a teoria dos motivos determinantes. Cite-se, também, a teoria dos conceitos jurídicos indeterminados e, mais recentemente, a teoria da vinculação dos atos administrativos aos princípios constitucionais. O mérito do ato administrativo é o espaço que ainda suscita algumas controvérsias. A pesquisa jurisprudencial foi realizada, em sua maioria, diretamente nos sítios do Tribunal respectivo. Nota-se, ao analisar a jurisprudência, que há uma tendência no STF e no STJ em acolher a tese de uma apreciação mais ampla pelo Poder Judiciário, como foi o caso do Resp 429570/GO, cuja relatoria ficou a cargo da Ministra Eliana Calmon; se bem que é ainda, bastante comum, os acórdãos explicitarem que não cabe apreciação pelo judiciário sob o aspecto da conveniência e oportunidade do ato administrativo, ou seja, do mérito do ato. / This research aims to examine some of the numerous decisions of the Supremo Tribunal Federal and Superior Tribunal de Justiça, as well as the Tribunal de Justiça de São Paulo, regarding judicial control of discretionary administrative acts and verify that is possible to identify substantial change in the limits of this control. The work was divided into two parts, the first consisting of a literature research aimed essentially to place the issue of administrative discretion, in a conceptual and historical focus. The second part refers to research on the topic in the jurisprudence of the Supremo Tribunal Federal, Superior Tribunal de Justiça, Tribunal de Justiça do Estado de São Paulo and also in the judgment on the civil appeal nº. 1422 of the Tribunal de Justiça do Rio Grande do Norte, whose rapporteur was entrusted to Miguel Seabra Fagundes. Discretionary administrative acts were long disregarded by the judiciary, in other words immune to judicial review. However, it is possible to identify the rise of some legal parameters that aimed to restrict the discretionary administrative activity by inserting it, in certain respects, within the scope of judicial review. The initial marking was restricted to the law, remaining the substance of the administrative act untouched. In this process to attempt to contain discretionary administrative acts were developed theories of control, as the deviation of power and the theory of determinants reasons. Is mentioned, too, the theory of indeterminate legal concepts and, more recently, the theory of binding administrative acts to constitutional principles. The merit of the administrative act is the space that still shows some controversies. The jurisprudential research was conducted, for the most part, directly on the websites of the respective Court. It is noted, when considering the case law, that there is a trend in the STF and STJ to welcome the idea of a wider appreciation by the judiciary, like was the case Resp 429570/GO, whose rapporteur was in the responsibility of the Minister Eliana Calmon, although it is still quite common, the judgments stating that it is not for consideration by the judiciary under the aspect of convenience and opportunity of the administrative act, in other words, the act of merit.

The Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) is seen as a landmark piece of constitutional legislation that brought about many legal and political changes in the United Kingdom's human rights architecture. Yet the HRA is vulnerable to repeal; successive governments have promised to repeal or otherwise alter the HRA. In this climate, the Supreme Court has instructed counsel to argue common law rights first, with the HRA there to supplement and fill the gap on the occasions where the common law does not go as far as the HRA. The logical conclusion of this is that the Supreme Court, or at least some Justices, think that the common law adequately protects rights to a level near, if not the same as, the HRA does; the results of arguing the common law will often be the same as those resulting from reliance on the HRA. The academic commentary regarding these judicial statements has been far from enthusiastic. The consensus is that common law rights do not go as far as the HRA in terms of their width, that the enforcement mechanisms lack rigour compared to s 3 HRA and the proportionality principle, and that they are vulnerable to legislative override. Therefore, a loss of the HRA would be a loss for the legal protection of rights. This thesis disputes the conclusion stated in the foregoing paragraph. It argues that one has to view the vectors against which one can measure the potency of common law rights through the lens of the rule of law. This principle, the controlling factor in the constitution, promises protection against arbitrary behaviour by state actors because it embodies the value of equality of concern. Once this is appreciated, an entirely new dimension of common law rights becomes apparent; the reach of rights, their rigour of protection, and their constitutional resilience are revealed to be much stronger than orthodoxy suggests.

Emergente a partir do final do século XX, o constitucionalismo popular enquanto campo acadêmico, tem buscado desconstruir a narrativa que legitima a afirmação da supremacia do judicial review estadunidense. Segundo seus expoentes, o melhor desenho envolveria a interpretação política, e não legal, da Constituição. Selecionados os exemplos de Larry Kramer, Mark Tushnet e Jeremy Waldron, o trabalho buscará abordar seus argumentos desde um ponto de vista individual, mas também os elementos que lhes são comuns. Nesse sentido, além da ofensiva à revisão judicial, busca-se identificar os debates que se fazem presentes, e atravessam o campo, tais como a utilidade de um tribunal que traga estabilidade ao sistema político, a ideia de melhor intérprete, a questão contramajoritária e o ideal de autogoverno democrático, em uma sociedade contemporânea atravessada pelo desacordo. Considerados os argumentos, busco chamar a atenção para a parcialidade do pensamento dominante, cuja recepção se ampara sobre bases problemáticas. / Since the late twentieth century, popular constitutionalism has risen as an academic field that seeks deconstructing the narrative that justifies the affirmation of the supremacy of the American judicial review. According to its supporters, the best design for it would not involve the legal, but the political interpretation of the constitution. Selecting the examples of Larry Kramer, Mark Tushnet and Jeremy Waldron, this work aims at addressing their statements not only as individual points of view, but also considering the elements they have in common. In this sense, besides being an assault on judicial review, this texts focuses on identifying the debates that arise and crisscross the field, such as the usefulness of a court which brings stability to the political system, the idea of best constitutional decision-making, the countermajoritarian difficulty, and the ideal of democratic self-government in a contemporary society pervaded by disagreement. Taking such issues into consideration, I propose drawing attention to the bias of mainstream constitutional thinking, whose reception lies on problematic bases.

Este trabalho é uma análise crítica do tema da mutação constitucional. Buscouse a partir da revisitação de temas como o constitucionalismo e do conceito de Constituição, construir uma dogmática da mutabilidade das normas constitucionais e assim procedendo, verificar empiricamente, com base em precedentes da jurisprudência do Supremo Tribunal Federal, o acerto desta construção. Uma vez estabelecidas as bases para a verificação do fenômeno da mutação constitucional, foi possível parametrizar os limites possíveis a esta hipótese de atualização das normas constitucionais. Pois bem, nesses termos, fixado o conceito, verificado a sua aplicabilidade na jurisprudência, bem como estabelecidos os limites de sua utilização, foi possível ainda a partir da análise do contexto atual em que se insere o instituto, vislumbrar as hipóteses de sua aplicação futura. Em suma, trata-se de um trabalho no qual se tenta compreender o papel da jurisdição constitucional com respeito ao tema de mutabilidade das normas constitucionais, sobretudo diante da realidade pós-moderna circundante, que pela sua complexidade, influencia, sensivelmente, a normatividade dos preceitos legais e, notadamente, dos constitucionais, objeto principal do estudo. / This work is a critical analysis of the issue of constitutional change. We sought from revisiting issues such as constitutionalism and the concept of constitution building a dogmatic mutability of constitutional norms and in so doing, to verify empirically, based on the precedents jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, the correctness of this construction. Once established the basis for the verification of the phenomenon of constitutional change, it was possible to parameterize the possible limits to this hypothesis update of constitutional norms . Well , in these terms , the concept set, verifying their applicability in case law as well as established the limits of their use, it was still possible from the analysis of the current context in which it appears the institute, envision the chances of its future application. In short, it is a work in which one tries to understand the role of constitutional jurisdiction with respect to the theme of mutability of constitutional norms, particularly in the surrounding postmodern reality, which by their complexity, significantly influences the normativity of legal precepts and especially, constitutional, the main object of study.

A tradição histórica da doutrina e prática constitucionais elegeu o Poder Legislativo como o centro por excelência de manifestação das aspirações de autogoverno. A revisão judicial, nesse cenário, costuma suscitar críticas e defesas das mais variadas, que contrapõem seu exercício à consolidação de direitos engendrada, por sua vez, no âmbito das legislaturas. Para uma compreensão geral do debate travado, é necessário compreender as raízes históricas norte-americanas do instituto da revisão judicial, assim como as teorias construídas para analisar o comportamento daqueles responsáveis por praticá-la os juízes. À luz de um renovado modelo comportamental fundado em aspectos institucionais, está-se diante de mudança de perspectiva quanto à análise da realização de direitos por diferentes atores políticos. Nesse sentido, não há que se falar na autoridade sobre última palavra decisória, mas na melhor solução por meio da interação entre instituições, no contexto das teorias do diálogo. / Traditional doctrine and constitutional practice have elected Parliament as the ultimate center for aspirations of self-government. Judicial Review, on that perspective, usually brings about all sorts of critics and defenses, in comparing its practice with the realization of rights entailed by legislative action and with regard to its legitimacy. For a general comprehension of the matter, one must first understand the historical roots of Judicial Reviews American origins, as well as the theories constructed in order to analyze the behavior of those responsible for practicing it the judges. In light of a renewed model for behavioral analysis that enhances the focus on institutional features, there is a change in perspective when it comes to the implementation of rights. No theories of last word on decisional authority can account for the new objectives in mind, since the best solution should be found through the interaction between institutions, an ideal prescribed by dialogue theories.

O presente trabalho de pesquisa tem por objetivo analisar algumas das inúmeras decisões do Supremo Tribunal Federal e do Superior Tribunal de Justiça, bem como do Tribunal de Justiça de São Paulo, em matéria de controle jurisdicional dos atos administrativos discricionários e verificar se é possível identificar mudança substancial nos limites desse controle. O trabalho foi dividido em duas partes, sendo a primeira constituída por uma pesquisa bibliográfica destinada, essencialmente, a situar o tema da discricionariedade administrativa, num enfoque conceitual e histórico. A segunda parte refere-se à pesquisa sobre o tema na jurisprudência do Supremo Tribunal Federal, Superior Tribunal de Justiça, Tribunal de Justiça de São Paulo e, ainda, no acórdão relativo à apelação cível nº. 1.422 do Tribunal de Justiça do Rio Grande do Norte, cuja relatoria ficou a cargo de Miguel Seabra Fagundes. Os atos administrativos discricionários, por muito tempo foram considerados insindicáveis pelo Poder Judiciário, ou seja, imunes à apreciação jurisdicional. Contudo, é possível identificar o surgimento de alguns parâmetros jurídicos que objetivaram restringir a atividade administrativa discricionária, inserindo-a, sob determinados aspectos, no âmbito da apreciação jurisdicional. O balizamento inicial restringiu-se à lei, permanecendo o mérito do ato administrativo intocado. Nesse processo de tentativa de contenção dos atos administrativos discricionários desenvolveram-se teorias de controle, como a teoria do desvio de poder e a teoria dos motivos determinantes. Cite-se, também, a teoria dos conceitos jurídicos indeterminados e, mais recentemente, a teoria da vinculação dos atos administrativos aos princípios constitucionais. O mérito do ato administrativo é o espaço que ainda suscita algumas controvérsias. A pesquisa jurisprudencial foi realizada, em sua maioria, diretamente nos sítios do Tribunal respectivo. Nota-se, ao analisar a jurisprudência, que há uma tendência no STF e no STJ em acolher a tese de uma apreciação mais ampla pelo Poder Judiciário, como foi o caso do Resp 429570/GO, cuja relatoria ficou a cargo da Ministra Eliana Calmon; se bem que é ainda, bastante comum, os acórdãos explicitarem que não cabe apreciação pelo judiciário sob o aspecto da conveniência e oportunidade do ato administrativo, ou seja, do mérito do ato. / This research aims to examine some of the numerous decisions of the Supremo Tribunal Federal and Superior Tribunal de Justiça, as well as the Tribunal de Justiça de São Paulo, regarding judicial control of discretionary administrative acts and verify that is possible to identify substantial change in the limits of this control. The work was divided into two parts, the first consisting of a literature research aimed essentially to place the issue of administrative discretion, in a conceptual and historical focus. The second part refers to research on the topic in the jurisprudence of the Supremo Tribunal Federal, Superior Tribunal de Justiça, Tribunal de Justiça do Estado de São Paulo and also in the judgment on the civil appeal nº. 1422 of the Tribunal de Justiça do Rio Grande do Norte, whose rapporteur was entrusted to Miguel Seabra Fagundes. Discretionary administrative acts were long disregarded by the judiciary, in other words immune to judicial review. However, it is possible to identify the rise of some legal parameters that aimed to restrict the discretionary administrative activity by inserting it, in certain respects, within the scope of judicial review. The initial marking was restricted to the law, remaining the substance of the administrative act untouched. In this process to attempt to contain discretionary administrative acts were developed theories of control, as the deviation of power and the theory of determinants reasons. Is mentioned, too, the theory of indeterminate legal concepts and, more recently, the theory of binding administrative acts to constitutional principles. The merit of the administrative act is the space that still shows some controversies. The jurisprudential research was conducted, for the most part, directly on the websites of the respective Court. It is noted, when considering the case law, that there is a trend in the STF and STJ to welcome the idea of a wider appreciation by the judiciary, like was the case Resp 429570/GO, whose rapporteur was in the responsibility of the Minister Eliana Calmon, although it is still quite common, the judgments stating that it is not for consideration by the judiciary under the aspect of convenience and opportunity of the administrative act, in other words, the act of merit.

No description available.

本文首先對於長久以來質疑司法權的民主正當性的看法 從古典民主理論 與修正民主理論兩者的基本差異進行分析 發現古典民主理論受到許多新 興理論的挑戰 其當初理論的許多基本假設其實與許多人類共同經驗有相 當大的認知差異 修正民主理論較能真正反應政治實際運作的景象 也為 現代多數政治學者所接受 只要司法違憲審查的權力能夠受到民主多數的 同意與其制度能夠受到多數民意隨時的改變司法違憲審查權也能獲得民主 正當性 本文以先進民主國家的美國憲政運作為對象 分別 從總統固有的 行政權 司法裁判權 國會的立法否決權以及獨立管制委員會幾個部份分析 結果發現權力分析理論在解釋與適用上可分別採取形式論的途徑與功能論 的途徑來進行為了了解我國憲政運作的實際情況 本文以大法官解釋為研 究對象 權力分析為研究理論透過形式論與功能論為兩個研究途徑分析近 五十年大法官所為四百二十多件解釋 相互交叉比對 所得到的二十一種關 係類型 經過分析發現 整體而言大法官所採取的解釋途徑是相當平均的 但是 差異是發生在與司法權相關的關係上 形式論解釋途徑的使用明顯超 過功能論 本文亦發現這種途徑的特性 往往使其被用於不同意見書中以反 對司法權介入某種憲政爭議上 這也適度的反證多數的司法院大法官對違 憲審查權的行使是較積極的 我國國會議員在具有特權及國會自律的保障 下 往往導致權力之濫用 然而國會自律功能極為不彰 對於民意代表的行 為幾乎束手無策而毫無拘束力 但是司法權基於該項原則卻自我設限而給 予迴避 因此本文的主張在政治哲學的價值導引下採取權力分立功能論的 解釋途徑 對於民意代表的特權及國會自律加以司法上的監督 以維護憲政 制度的良性運作 / The question to the judicial power is in the view to democratic legitimacy, the analysis from the basic difference between "classic democracy" and "reformed democracy theory". there are many challenges to the assumptions ofthe "classic democracy theory", which beyond human common experience. Most ofthe political scientist are able to accept "reformed democracy theory". If the power of judicial review is basis on people consent and changed by most of the people anytime, the power of judicial review is owned democratic legitimacyIn the functional approach of constitution explanation which should make thejudicial power into legislative discipline area.

Thesis (LL.M.)--University of Hong Kong, 1996. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available in print.

What I dub the “worst-result” principle is a criterion that identifies civil war and tyranny as the worst evils that could befall a state, and prescribes their prevention. In this thesis, I attempt to define the worst-result principle’s concrete prescriptions and institutional arrangements to meet these. To do so, I explore different understandings of the worst-result principle, that each contributes to the general argument. Montesquieu’s crucial insight concerns the separation of powers to prevent the state from collapsing into despotism. Judith Shklar shows that ‘damage control’ needs to be constantly performed so as to minimize chances of governmental brutality. Roberto Unger points at the importance of encouraging citizens’ involvement in the political process to safeguard freedom. I finally argue, in the light of historical evidence, that it would be unreasonable to think that the task of preventing tyranny can be effectively performed in the absence of courts entrusted with checking powers.