Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2017-03-30T13:29:23Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Cristiano de Jesus Pereira Nascimento.pdf: 1164959 bytes, checksum: 7040ee38b6f7c12d44d4876c135b43d6 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-03-30T13:29:23Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Cristiano de Jesus Pereira Nascimento.pdf: 1164959 bytes, checksum: 7040ee38b6f7c12d44d4876c135b43d6 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-03-20 / The brazilian Supreme Court has taken an unprecedented leading role in brazilian institutional history. Following the great relevance of Court's decisions, it is crucial to reflect on the quality of deliberation and decision-making process. Nowadays, there are three key factors involving decision-making process: the overwhelming caseload, the rapporteur empowering and the increasing number of law clerks. The burning caseload has lead to the rapporteur empowering and the law clerk explosion. Both measures were effective to cope with the caseload, but compromised the judicial decision-making process by the lack of collegiality and shallow judgment. The outstanding delegation of judicial functions and the bureaucratization of judicial decision-making process jeopardize the Court's mission and compromise the stability, integrity and consistency of its decisions / O Supremo Tribunal Federal exerce protagonismo inédito na história institucional brasileira. Diante da relevância das decisões da Corte, é necessário refletir sobre a formação de suas decisões e sobre a qualidade do processo decisório interno. Atualmente, há três elementos fundamentais no processo decisório do STF: o volume exorbitante de processos, a delegação de poderes ao relator e o elevado número de assessores. A sobrecarga de processos conduziu à concentração de poderes no relator e à explosão do número de assessores. As duas estratégias permitiram multiplicar a capacidade de proferir decisões, mas degradaram seriamente a capacidade dos membros da Corte de conhecer os processos, de acessar todas as informações disponíveis e de meditar sobre os vários ângulos da questão submetida à jurisdição do Tribunal. A marcante delegação das funções jurisdicionais e a burocratização do ato de julgar colocam em risco a missão do Tribunal e afastam a possibilidade de uma jurisprudência sólida, estável, coerente e íntegra

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:23:02Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Luis Arlindo Feriani.pdf: 608669 bytes, checksum: 7108d99041441b63b117daa9ba336385 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-08-18 / The thesis discusses how the legal issues are decided in the judicial context, but also the decisions under administrative proceedings. The primary goal is more specifically the treatment that should be given to the discretion. Start with the analysis of the concept of discretion to conclude that it can be used by the judge as a means to interpret the facts and even can get to the applicable law, however, to decide, the conclusion will be the effect that the judge can not decide with discretion. Furthermore, efforts will be made to demonstrate that the same does not occur with the public administrator. Understanding is in the sense that, despite doctrinal position exists asserting that the administrator also can not decide with discretion, it can not maintain that administrative discretion has been entirely eliminated. Indeed, as will be shown, to the administrator should be given some portion of discretion in assessing the public interest in each case. As the legislator is unable to consider all possible occurrence of the daily routine, only the administrator in contact with social reality, can decide what seems better for the community. That way, the thesis will highlight that, while it requires the court to take the best decision, and not one among many possible and acceptable, administratively, although it can not fail to consider that there was a mitigation of the discretion, it continues to exist so that it can best be served to the public interest / A tese examina como são decididas as questões jurídicas no âmbito jurisdicional, como também as decisões no âmbito administrativo. O objetivo primordial é mais especificamente o tratamento que deve ser dado à discricionariedade. Parte-se da análise do conceito de discricionariedade para se concluir que ela pode ser utilizada pelo juiz como meio de interpretação dos fatos e até poder se chegar ao direito aplicável, porém, para decidir, a conclusão será no sentido de que o juiz não pode decidir com discricionariedade. Por outro lado, procurar-se-á demonstrar que o mesmo não ocorre com o administrador público. O entendimento é no sentido de que, a despeito de existir posição doutrinária asseverando que o administrador também não pode mais decidir discricionariamente, não de pode afirmar que a discricionariedade administrativa tenha sido inteiramente eliminada. Com efeito, como será demonstrado, ao administrador deve ser conferida alguma parcela de discricionariedade na avaliação do interesse público em cada caso concreto. Como o legislador não tem condições de considerar todas as possíveis ocorrências do dia a dia, só o administrador, em contato com a realidade social, poderá decidir o que se afigura melhor para a comunidade. Assim, a tese deixará evidenciado, que, ao mesmo tempo em que se exige do órgão jurisdicional a melhor decisão, e não uma dentre as possíveis e aceitáveis, na esfera administrativa, embora não se possa deixar de considerar que houve uma mitigação da discricionariedade, ela continua a existir para que melhor possa ser atendido o interesse público

Por que a um grupo de indivíduos não eleitos é dado derrubar uma decisão política tomada pela maioria dos representantes do povo? Para justificar o papel contramajoritário de juízes e cortes, vários arranjos têm sido propostos ao longo de um debate ainda em curso na teoria constitucional. Autores como John Rawls e Ronald Dworkin sustentaram uma qualidade deliberativa do processo decisório judicial - magistrados, especialmente os das Cortes Supremas, teriam destreza e motivação institucional para apresentar argumentos mais apropriados sobre o significado da constituição e cartas de direitos. Críticos negam que a deliberação judicial seja um paradigma de razão pública e, especialmente no Brasil, afirmam que o órgão de cúpula do Judiciário possui um modelo decisório não-dialógico. Neste trabalho, portanto, o desempenho deliberativo interno do Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF) é investigado através de um modelo de análise denominado Escala de Deliberatividade Intrainstitucional (EDI). Os dados colhidos indicam que, apesar da existência de interação entre os membros do colegiado, a decisão final não valoriza os potenciais ganhos deliberativos da sessão de julgamento, tornando a prática decisória da Corte o que a dissertação chama de ação coletiva figurativa - quando, apesar de existir um momento de aparente de deliberação entre os membros, aquilo que faz o colegiado apresenta um produto de algo que os membros individuais fazem sozinhos, ou seja, daquilo que fazem sem pensar que estão agindo enquanto grupo. Sem rationes decidendi que expressem a opinião da Corte como um todo, prejudica-se a formação de precedentes e, consequentemente, a construção de uma jurisprudência constitucional íntegra, estável e coerente. / Why can a group of unelected individuals overturn a political decision taken by the majority of the people\'s representatives? To justify the countermajoritarian role of judges and courts, a lot of possibilities have been proposed throughout a debate that still occurring in constitutional theory. Authors such as John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin sustained a deliberative potential of judicial decision-making - judges, especially Supreme Court Justices, would have the skills and institutional motivation to present more appropriate arguments about the meaning of the constitution and charters of rights. Critics deny that judicial deliberation is a paradigm of public reason and, especially in Brazil, argue that the Supreme Federal Tribunal (STF) has a non-dialogical decision-making model. In this paper, the internal deliberative performance of STF is investigated through an analysis model called Intrainstitutional Deliberativity Scale (IDS). The results indicate that, despite the existence of interaction between the members of the collegiate, the final decision doesn\"t value the potential deliberative gains of the plenary session, making the decision model of the Court what we call collective figurative action - when, despite there is a moment of apparent deliberation among the members, what the collegial does presents a product that individual members do alone, i. e., what they do without thinking that they are acting as a group. Without common rationes decidendi, the Court undermines the precedential value of a case and, consequently, the construction of the jurisprudential integrity and authority.

The relationships among governmental institutions are some of the most studied phenomena in political science. Yet these complex interactions remain largely unexplained due to the difficult task of developing accurate measures that lead to quantifiable tests that enhance explanation and prediction. This work centers on the interactions of United States Supreme Court justices with other political actors. The goal of this dissertation is to better understand the relationship between the Supreme Court and its institutional environment. In short, I ask: What factors affect Supreme Court justices’ voting decisions? I approach this question from several different angles while making use of a unique dependent variable—Yearly Supreme Court justice ideal point. This variable is a variant of the ideal points calculated by Michael A. Bailey of Georgetown University (Bailey, 2007). My empirical models consider the effects of numerous independent variables on this dependent variable. One of the unique aspects of this study is that it considers the effects of a wide variety of factors purported to affect judicial behavior. There are four main theories of judicial decision-making, and my empirical analyses test notions exported from all of them. In designing and testing my models, I draw especially on the developing approach of new institutionalism—an approach to the study of judicial politics that emphasizes the influence of external, non-judicial political actors on judicial behavior. Ultimately this work will show what factors constrain the actions of Supreme Court justices and to what degree they do so. This research has many implications for larger theoretical concerns of political science, specifically formulating questions about the independence of the judiciary and contains relevant questions for democratic theory as well.

The relationship between gender and bail is an important yet understudied area of research. Studies that have found a relationship between gender and bail generally overlook important differences that shape how men and women enter into crime and the types of conditions imposed on their recognisances. This study utilizes 115 bail cases from the Provincial Courthouse in Kitchener, ON to examine the effect of accused gender on bail outcome. Results show that accused gender did influence decisions to grant or deny bail. While almost all accused persons required a surety and/or bail conditions to be released, the regression analysis suggests that women were more likely to be released compared to men. Based on the deep sample exploratory analysis, gender differences emerged around issues of mental health and drug use. Theoretical and policy implications from this study are discussed as are avenues for future research.

Submitted by Haroudo Xavier Filho (haroudo.xavierfo@ufpe.br) on 2016-04-19T13:37:12Z No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 1232 bytes, checksum: 66e71c371cc565284e70f40736c94386 (MD5) Thesis - doutorado - JOSÉ MÁRIO WANDERLEY GOMES NETO - PPGCP.pdf: 3518425 bytes, checksum: 444d5191f5baf897a0a79d96a01bf1c9 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-19T13:37:12Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 1232 bytes, checksum: 66e71c371cc565284e70f40736c94386 (MD5) Thesis - doutorado - JOSÉ MÁRIO WANDERLEY GOMES NETO - PPGCP.pdf: 3518425 bytes, checksum: 444d5191f5baf897a0a79d96a01bf1c9 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-07-15 / Por que o Judiciário decidiria a favor do Executivo e contra as suas próprias decisões? Essa questão é explorada teórica e empiricamente com referência ao pedido de suspensão - um mecanismo pelo qual o Poder Executivo nos diversos níveis federativos pode pedir ao Presidente de um Tribunal para suspender os efeitos concretos de uma decisão proferida por órgão judicial de hierarquia inferior. Para responder a questão de pesquisa um conjunto de hipóteses formuladas à luz dos principais modelos teóricos existentes na literatura sobre os processos decisórios das decisões judiciais– legalista, atitudinal e estratégico – são testadas a partir de em uma base dados contendo uma amostra de 319 decisões sobre o pedido de suspensão no STF no período 1993-2012. Os achados dos modelos econométricos estimados (Logit) na tese são consistentes com a interpretação dos modelos estratégico e atitudinal: os juízes atuam como atores que buscam maximizar sua preferências em um contexto de separação de poder e seu padrão decisório é também marcado pela ideologia dos governos responsáveis por sua nomeação. / Why the Judiciary’s bodies would decide in favor of the Executive and against their own decisions? This issue is explored theoretically and empirically with reference to the writ of suspension - a mechanism by which the Executive branch may request the Chief Justice of a Court to suspend the concrete effects of a judgment given by another court of lower hierarchy. To answer the research question a set of assumptions were made based in the main existing theoretical models in the literature on decision-making processes of judicial decisions – legalistic, attitudinal and/or strategic – and were tested from in a database containing a sample of 319 decisions on writ of suspension filled in the Brazilian Supreme Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal) in 1993-2012 period. The findings of the estimated econometric models (Logit) in this thesis are consistent with the interpretation of strategic and attitudinal models: the judges act as actors seeking to maximize their own preferences in the context of separation of power and its decision-making pattern is also marked by the ideology of governments responsible for their appointment.

No description available.

This thesis focuses on how well indicators of judicial ideology and institutional constraints predict whether a judge will vote to increase abortion access. I develop a model that evaluates a judge's decision in an abortion case in light of ideological factors measured at the time of a judge's nomination to the bench and legal and institutional constraints at the time a judge decides a case. I analyze abortion cases from all of the U.S. Federal District Courts from 1973-2004. Unlike previous studies, which demonstrate that the president and the home state senators are the best predictors of judicial ideology, I find that the Senate Judiciary Committee at the time of the judge's nomination is the only statistically significant ideological indicator. Also, contrary to conventional wisdom, Supreme Court precedent (a legal constraint) is also a significant predictor of judicial voting behavior in abortion cases.

The incidence of sexual assault inundates the courts with many cases each year. Given the unique nature of the crime, judges and juries are faced with an array of different scenarios to which they are required to make fair, justifiable and consistent decisions. I examine child sexual assault cases of Dallas County 1999-2005, I look at both legal and extralegal factors including case characteristics, institutional characteristics and characteristics of the defendants and the victims. First, I examine the impact of the independent variables on sentence length using regression analysis to determine influences on sentencing for judges and juries. Second, I examine the same factors using Probit analysis to determine which characteristics make a life sentence more probable for those decision-makers.

This thesis examines the effects of the change from strict scrutiny to the undue burden standard in Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992). A history of abortion in the United States and the various ways in which government regulates it is explored. Particular attention is focused on the role of the federal judiciary in abortion regulation. Theories of judicial decision making are discussed as means to understand the outcome of cases. Several models are tested to determine which, if any, model explains judicial decision making. The effect of the change in standard, as well as an alternate precedent, are examined.