How should Australian criminal trial courts treat evidence deriving from illegally or improperly obtained evidence? The fact that derivative evidence gives rise to factors distinct from primary evidence makes it deserving of an examination of its peculiarities. In doing so, the assumption may be put aside that derivative evidence falls wholly within the established general discourse of illegally or improperly obtained evidence. Just as the judicial response to primary evidence must be intellectually rigorous, disciplined and principled, so must be the response to derivative evidence. As such, a principled analysis of how Australian courts should approach derivative evidence can significantly contribute to the discourse on the law with respect to the exclusion of illegally or improperly obtained evidence. This thesis provides that principled analysis by arguing that the principles which underpin and inform the discretionary exclusionary frameworks within Australia require an approach which is consistent as between illegally obtained derivative evidence and illegally obtained primary evidence.

The bulk of the matrimonial property regimes operating in Botswana were inherited from the country's colonial past. Since independence there ha'> not been any realistic attempt to reform them. The thesis set out to appraisal the legal regimes governing the determination of matrimonial property on divorce to ascertain their efficacy in realising the legitimate aspiration of married couples. Comparisons were made with similar countries to determine how these have tackled problems relating to determination of matrimonial property on divorce. The study found that where there is a dispute about matrimonial property in marriages out of community, the courts have no discretion to readjust the rights of the parties. This situation adversely affect nonworking wives who spent most of their time looking after their husbands and children without being able to acquire capital assets. Recognition is not given to such domestic contribution to the welfare of the family. It was also found that the exercise of the marital power by husbands of marriages in community of property deprives wives of those marriages the right to administer the joint estate. The patriarchal nature of customary law, which governs the majority of disputes about matrimonial property, discriminates against women. Consequently, the following, inter alia, are suggested as reform measures. (a) The courts should be g1ven a wide discretionary power, circumscribed by statutory guidelines, to reallocate matrimonial property on divorce irrespective of the matrimonial property regime that governs the marriage. TI1e underlying principle should be equality of sharing but this may be departed from where the circumstances of the particular case warrant it (b) A spouse's domestic contribution towards the welfare of the family should be recognised. (c) The marital power of husbands should be abolished. (d) The provisions of the Matrimonial Causes Act should be made applicable to customary marriages. / Private Law / LL.D.

The bulk of the matrimonial property regimes operating in Botswana were inherited from the country's colonial past. Since independence there ha'> not been any realistic attempt to reform them. The thesis set out to appraisal the legal regimes governing the determination of matrimonial property on divorce to ascertain their efficacy in realising the legitimate aspiration of married couples. Comparisons were made with similar countries to determine how these have tackled problems relating to determination of matrimonial property on divorce. The study found that where there is a dispute about matrimonial property in marriages out of community, the courts have no discretion to readjust the rights of the parties. This situation adversely affect nonworking wives who spent most of their time looking after their husbands and children without being able to acquire capital assets. Recognition is not given to such domestic contribution to the welfare of the family. It was also found that the exercise of the marital power by husbands of marriages in community of property deprives wives of those marriages the right to administer the joint estate. The patriarchal nature of customary law, which governs the majority of disputes about matrimonial property, discriminates against women. Consequently, the following, inter alia, are suggested as reform measures. (a) The courts should be g1ven a wide discretionary power, circumscribed by statutory guidelines, to reallocate matrimonial property on divorce irrespective of the matrimonial property regime that governs the marriage. TI1e underlying principle should be equality of sharing but this may be departed from where the circumstances of the particular case warrant it (b) A spouse's domestic contribution towards the welfare of the family should be recognised. (c) The marital power of husbands should be abolished. (d) The provisions of the Matrimonial Causes Act should be made applicable to customary marriages. / Private Law / LL.D.

OPSOMMING Gebeurlikhede kan omskryf word as onsekere omstandighede van positiewe of negatiewe aard wat, onafhanklik van die verweerder se optrede en indien dit sou realiseer, waarskynlik 'n persoon se gesondheid, inkomste, verdienvermoë, lewenskwaliteit, lewensverwagting of onderhoudsafhanklikheid in die toekoms kan beïnvloed of in die verlede kon beïnvloed het en wat gevolglik op billike en realistiese wyse in ag geneem moet word ter bepaling van die skadevergoedingsbedrag. Die skadevergoedingsbedrag kan vanweë gebeurlikhede verminder of vermeerder word waar die eiser wel met `n oorwig van waarskynlikheid die volle omvang van die skade bewys het, maar die hof nie kon oortuig dat geen ander oorsaak die skade waarskynlik ook sou kon veroorsaak nie (sg "gebeurlikheids-aanpassings"). In gevalle waar die eiser nie die volle omvang van die skade op `n oorwig van waarskynlikheid kon bewys nie, kan die hof nogtans `n verminderde bedrag toeken op grond van die gebeurlikheid dat die skade wel waarskynlik in die toekoms kan realiseer (sg "gebeurlikheidstoekennings"). Die eiser moet getuienis voorlê van gebeurlikhede wat die skadevergoedingsbedrag sal verhoog, en die verweerder van gebeurlikhede wat die skadevergoedingsbedrag sal verlaag. Die waarskynlikheid dat die gebeurlikheid sal realiseer, moet deur die hof aan die hand van objektiewe maatstawwe en op grond van feitelike bewerings en logiese afleidings uit deskundige en ander getuienis in die vorm van `n waarskynlikheidsgraad van tussen vyf persent en tagtig persent uitgedruk word. Hipotetiese kousaliteit word deur die hof aangewend om gebeurlikhede op `n billike wyse in ag te neem en verwys na die kousale ketting van hipotetiese feite wat waarskynlik sou gerealiseer het indien die skadestigtende gebeurtenis nie plaasgevind het nie. Gebeurlikhede kan in twee kategorieë geklassifiseer word: Algemene gebeurlikhede wat gewoonlik in enige stadium by alle persone kan voorkom (bv vroeë dood, siekte ens) en spesifieke gebeurlikhede wat gewoonlik op spesifieke tydstippe by spesifieke individue kan voorkom (bv hertroue, egskeiding ens). Terwyl die hof geregtelik kennis behoort te kan neem van die invloed van algemene gebeurlikhede, behoort die hof hoofsaaklik op grond van ondersteunende getuienis van die invloed van spesifieke gebeurlikhede oortuig te word. Algemene gebeurlikheidsaanpassings is gewoonlik relatief laag (gemiddeld tien persent), terwyl gebeurlikheidsaanpassings vir spesifieke gebeurlikhede fluktueer (gewoonlik tussen vyf persent en vyftig persent), afhangende van die getuienis en omstandighede van die eiser. Gebeurlikheidstoekennings is gewoonlik laer as vyftig persent. SUMMARY Contingencies can be described as uncertain circumstances of a positive or negative nature which, independent of the defendant's conduct and if it should realise, would probably influence a person's health, income, earning capacity, quality of life, life expectancy or dependency on support in future or could have done so in the past, and which must consequently be taken into account in a fair and realistic manner in the quantification of damages. Contingencies can be used to increase or reduce damages in circumstances where the plaintiff succeeded in proving the full loss on a preponderance of probability, but could not convince the court that there was no probability that any other cause could also have given rise to the loss (so-called "contingency adjustments"). In circumstances where the plaintiff could not prove the full loss on a preponderance of probability, the court can nevertheless award a reduced amount on the basis of the contingency that loss could probably realise in future (so-called "contingency allowances"). The plaintiff must adduce evidence of contingencies that can increase damages, and the defendant of contingencies that can reduce damages. The degree of probability that the contingency will realise, must be expressed by the court as a percentage of between five percent and eighty percent, in view of objective measures and on the basis of factual allegations and logical deductions derived from expert and other evidence. Hypothetical causation assists the court in taking account of contingencies in a fair manner and refers to the causal link of hypothetical events which would probably have realised if the damage-causing event did not occur. Contingencies can be classified into two categories: General contingencies that usually can be present in the lives of all people at any point in time (eg early death, sickness, etc) and specific contingencies that usually are present in the lives of specific individuals at specific times (eg remarriage, divorce, etc). While the court should be able to take legal notice of the influence of general contingencies, the court should be convinced of the influence of specific contingencies primarily on the basis of supporting evidence. General contingency adjustments are usually relatively low (on average ten per cent), while contingency adjustments for specific contingencies fluctuate (usually between five per cent and fifty per cent), depending on the evidence and circumstances of the plaintiff. Contingency allowances are usually lower than fifty per cent. / Jurisprudence / LL.D

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:21:28Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Marcelo Buzaglo Dantas.pdf: 2709557 bytes, checksum: 4449f809147a13fced63f7b0416611f1 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-12-10 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / Environmental law is a constitutional right and it frequently clashes with other protected rights. In these cases, differently from what happens to rule conflicts, in which, by the use of solution criterions, one of them is declared invalid, in competing principle cases, if harmonization is not possible, the solution is given by balancing, using the proportionality principle in its three dimensions (adequacy, necessity and strict proportionality), always through proper argumentation. There are some cases in which the proportionality test does not solve the conflict, and then judicial discretion appears. The object of this study is to analyze some situations where ecologically balanced environmental constitutional right clashes with others, such as cultural heritage, economic development, rule of law, res judicata, separation of powers, human dignity, living and traditional population rights in face of the creation of a protected area. The main target is to demonstrate that, since there are no absolute rights, in clash cases concerning ecologically balanced environmental right and other constitutional rights, if harmonization is not possible, any of them will prevail, according to the specificity of the case, as a result of balancing, using the proportionality principle and argumentation. The importance of this topic is immense because of its actuality and the fact that ecologically balanced environmental right is highly conflictive but, at the same time, very flexible, which stimulates practical agreement. The text was elaborated considering the most important issues that involve ecologically balanced environmental right, established by the Federal Constitution. It was searched, in specialized authors, the argumentation to demonstrate principles normative force and the technical solutions for hard cases, which, in a civil law tradition, means situations involving competing principles. In the end, specific situations in which environmental right clashes with other constitutional rights and the way Brazilian Courts have been solving these controversies were examined. The Supreme Court main decisions involving environmental issues were deeply analyzed. Polemic questions were brought to discussion, and different points of view about the controversy were shown. In order to clarify the analysis of some comparative law institutes, foreign references were brought, especially from the United States of America. The result was a systematization of a mostly complex and interesting topic, examined through actual doctrine and jurisprudence / O direito ao meio ambiente ecologicamente equilibrado é um direito fundamental de terceira geração e, como tal, colide com outros direitos fundamentais igualmente dignos de tutela. Em tais hipóteses, diferentemente do que se dá com os conflitos de regras, em que, ante a aplicação dos critérios de solução de antinomias, uma delas é declarada inválida, nos casos de colisão de princípios, caso impossível a harmonização, a solução é dada mediante ponderação, através do uso da máxima da proporcionalidade em suas três subdimensões (adequação, necessidade e proporcionalidade em sentido estrito), sempre mediante argumentação adequada. Há casos em que o teste da proporcionalidade não soluciona o conflito, dando margem ao recurso à discricionariedade judicial. O objeto do presente trabalho é analisar algumas hipóteses de colisão entre o direito fundamental ao meio ambiente ecologicamente equilibrado e outros direitos fundamentais, como o patrimônio cultural, o desenvolvimento econômico e a livre-iniciativa, a propriedade, o direito adquirido, o ato jurídico perfeito e a coisa julgada, a separação de poderes, a dignidade da pessoa humana e a moradia e os direitos das populações tradicionais diante da criação de unidades de conservação. O objetivo primacial é demonstrar que, como não há direito fundamental absoluto, nas hipóteses de colisão entre o meio ambiente ecologicamente equilibrado e outros direitos fundamentais, caso impossível a harmonização, tanto pode prevalecer um quanto o outro, dependendo das peculiaridades do caso concreto, o que é feito através do recurso à ponderação, com a aplicação da proporcionalidade e mediante argumentação. A importância do tema é imensa em virtude da sua atualidade e do fato de que o meio ambiente é um direito altamente conflituoso, mas, ao mesmo tempo, muitíssimo flexível, o que é um estímulo à concordância prática. O texto foi elaborado levando-se em conta as mais importantes questões que envolvem o direito ao meio ambiente ecologicamente equilibrado, previstas na Constituição da República.Buscaram-se, na doutrina especializada da Teoria Constitucional, as bases para se demonstrar a força normativa dos princípios e as técnicas de solução dos chamados casos difíceis (hard cases), que, para nós que seguimos a civil law, consistem nas situações que envolvem colisão de princípios. Ao final, examinaram-se hipóteses específicas em que o meio ambiente ecologicamente equilibrado colide com outros direitos fundamentais e a forma como os Tribunais brasileiros vêm solucionando tais controvérsias. As principais decisões do Supremo Tribunal envolvendo o tema meio ambiente foram objeto de detida análise. Questões altamente polêmicas foram trazidas à discussão, colacionando-se os diferentes entendimentos doutrinários acerca de cada controvérsia, buscando, sempre que possível, a tomada de posição. A fim de respaldar a análise de alguns institutos à luz do direito comparado, foram trazidas referências doutrinárias estrangeiras, principalmente dos Estados Unidos da América. O resultado que se pretendeu foi a sistematização de um tema dos mais complexos e instigantes, à luz da doutrina e da jurisprudência mais atuais

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:23:44Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Louise Vilela Leite Filgueiras Borer.pdf: 1049760 bytes, checksum: 38a748ff575e19aac52d4a1fc64921db (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-08-07 / The present work focuses the interpretation of the penalty reduction cause of the 4th paragraph of the 33th article of the 11.343/06 law, starting from the identification of the exegetical problems contained in its text, reaching to the solution that preserves its concrete application without harming constitutional principles, what´s done throughout the technique of the constitutional conforming interpretation. Basing this conclusion, the analysis begin with the actual modern context of the criminal thought in doctrine, the risks society and it´s influences, that enforce the need of promoting the guarantist constitutionalism proposed by Luigi Ferrajoli, in order to preserve the fundamental rights and of individuals and meet the constitution in all its terms . In this context, we make a criticism of the anti-guarantist practice of basing the penalty dosimetry on judicial discretion, that has been used to enable the application of the rule under consideration / O presente trabalho enfoca a interpretação da causa de diminuição de pena do parágrafo 4º do artigo 33 da Lei nº11.343/06, partindo da identificação dos problemas exegéticos que o texto da lei contém até chegar à solução que preserva a concreta aplicação da norma sem ferir princípios constitucionais, o que é feito através da técnica da interpretação conforme a constituição. Fundamentando essa conclusão, a análise se inicia com o contexto atual do pensamento criminal na doutrina, a sociedade de risco e suas influências, que fomentam a necessidade de se promover o constitucionalismo garantista proposto por Luigi Ferrajoli, de modo a preservar direitos fundamentais e cumprir a Constituição em todos os seus termos. Nesse contexto, fazemos uma crítica à prática antigarantista de basear a dosimetria da pena na discricionariedade judicial, que tem sido utilizada para viabilizar a aplicação da norma em consideração

OPSOMMING Gebeurlikhede kan omskryf word as onsekere omstandighede van positiewe of negatiewe aard wat, onafhanklik van die verweerder se optrede en indien dit sou realiseer, waarskynlik 'n persoon se gesondheid, inkomste, verdienvermoë, lewenskwaliteit, lewensverwagting of onderhoudsafhanklikheid in die toekoms kan beïnvloed of in die verlede kon beïnvloed het en wat gevolglik op billike en realistiese wyse in ag geneem moet word ter bepaling van die skadevergoedingsbedrag. Die skadevergoedingsbedrag kan vanweë gebeurlikhede verminder of vermeerder word waar die eiser wel met `n oorwig van waarskynlikheid die volle omvang van die skade bewys het, maar die hof nie kon oortuig dat geen ander oorsaak die skade waarskynlik ook sou kon veroorsaak nie (sg "gebeurlikheids-aanpassings"). In gevalle waar die eiser nie die volle omvang van die skade op `n oorwig van waarskynlikheid kon bewys nie, kan die hof nogtans `n verminderde bedrag toeken op grond van die gebeurlikheid dat die skade wel waarskynlik in die toekoms kan realiseer (sg "gebeurlikheidstoekennings"). Die eiser moet getuienis voorlê van gebeurlikhede wat die skadevergoedingsbedrag sal verhoog, en die verweerder van gebeurlikhede wat die skadevergoedingsbedrag sal verlaag. Die waarskynlikheid dat die gebeurlikheid sal realiseer, moet deur die hof aan die hand van objektiewe maatstawwe en op grond van feitelike bewerings en logiese afleidings uit deskundige en ander getuienis in die vorm van `n waarskynlikheidsgraad van tussen vyf persent en tagtig persent uitgedruk word. Hipotetiese kousaliteit word deur die hof aangewend om gebeurlikhede op `n billike wyse in ag te neem en verwys na die kousale ketting van hipotetiese feite wat waarskynlik sou gerealiseer het indien die skadestigtende gebeurtenis nie plaasgevind het nie. Gebeurlikhede kan in twee kategorieë geklassifiseer word: Algemene gebeurlikhede wat gewoonlik in enige stadium by alle persone kan voorkom (bv vroeë dood, siekte ens) en spesifieke gebeurlikhede wat gewoonlik op spesifieke tydstippe by spesifieke individue kan voorkom (bv hertroue, egskeiding ens). Terwyl die hof geregtelik kennis behoort te kan neem van die invloed van algemene gebeurlikhede, behoort die hof hoofsaaklik op grond van ondersteunende getuienis van die invloed van spesifieke gebeurlikhede oortuig te word. Algemene gebeurlikheidsaanpassings is gewoonlik relatief laag (gemiddeld tien persent), terwyl gebeurlikheidsaanpassings vir spesifieke gebeurlikhede fluktueer (gewoonlik tussen vyf persent en vyftig persent), afhangende van die getuienis en omstandighede van die eiser. Gebeurlikheidstoekennings is gewoonlik laer as vyftig persent. SUMMARY Contingencies can be described as uncertain circumstances of a positive or negative nature which, independent of the defendant's conduct and if it should realise, would probably influence a person's health, income, earning capacity, quality of life, life expectancy or dependency on support in future or could have done so in the past, and which must consequently be taken into account in a fair and realistic manner in the quantification of damages. Contingencies can be used to increase or reduce damages in circumstances where the plaintiff succeeded in proving the full loss on a preponderance of probability, but could not convince the court that there was no probability that any other cause could also have given rise to the loss (so-called "contingency adjustments"). In circumstances where the plaintiff could not prove the full loss on a preponderance of probability, the court can nevertheless award a reduced amount on the basis of the contingency that loss could probably realise in future (so-called "contingency allowances"). The plaintiff must adduce evidence of contingencies that can increase damages, and the defendant of contingencies that can reduce damages. The degree of probability that the contingency will realise, must be expressed by the court as a percentage of between five percent and eighty percent, in view of objective measures and on the basis of factual allegations and logical deductions derived from expert and other evidence. Hypothetical causation assists the court in taking account of contingencies in a fair manner and refers to the causal link of hypothetical events which would probably have realised if the damage-causing event did not occur. Contingencies can be classified into two categories: General contingencies that usually can be present in the lives of all people at any point in time (eg early death, sickness, etc) and specific contingencies that usually are present in the lives of specific individuals at specific times (eg remarriage, divorce, etc). While the court should be able to take legal notice of the influence of general contingencies, the court should be convinced of the influence of specific contingencies primarily on the basis of supporting evidence. General contingency adjustments are usually relatively low (on average ten per cent), while contingency adjustments for specific contingencies fluctuate (usually between five per cent and fifty per cent), depending on the evidence and circumstances of the plaintiff. Contingency allowances are usually lower than fifty per cent. / Jurisprudence / LL.D

The National Credit Act 34 of 2005 and its Regulations came into full effect on 1 June 2007. In order to protect consumers by addressing over-indebtedness, the Act introduces a novel process of debt review in which a new agent, the debt counsellor, plays an important role to help relieve a consumer’s over-indebtedness. However, after the Act commenced, problems soon came to pass with regard to the debt review process. This was mainly due to loopholes and shortcomings in the National Credit Act and its Regulations. The key problems in debt review practice which are identified and analysed in this dissertation, are as follows: <ul>a) The interpretation of “the steps contemplated in section 129” in section 86(2). b) The application for debt review (Form 16 in the Schedule of the Regulations). c) The procedure to be followed when approaching the court. d) The format and contents of the “proposal” mentioned in sections 86 and 87. e) The omission of section 86(7)(c) in section 87. f) The non-provision for consent orders in terms of sections 86(7)(a) and 86(7)(c). e) The non-regulation of payment distribution agencies. f) The termination of debt review by the debt counsellor or a consumer. g) The qualifications, training and expertise of debt counsellors.</ul> Consequently measures taken by the industry or suggested by scholars to solve these problems are evaluated, for example the work stream agreement, the publication of two sets of new draft regulations, the request for a declaratory order in the High Court, a research commission to the UP Law Clinic and numerous conferences. Somewhat oversimplified, it can be said that most of the measures taken to solve the problems moved in the wrong direction, that is away from a simple, easy, quick, cheap and consumer-friendly process. At the moment the debt review procedures are very complex, extended, expensive and even consumer-hostile. In conclusion additional measures are proposed to those that other sources already recommended. Effective implementation of these measures would hopefully improve the practice of debt review in the Republic of South Africa, although it can realistically be assumed that there will always remain challenges in this regard. / Dissertation (LLM)--University of Pretoria, 2011. / Private Law / unrestricted

Substantive gender equality has yet to be achieved in South Africa. As such, when a decision is made for one of the spouses to a civil marriage to stay at home and care for the children born of the marriage, or make career sacrifices to care for children, that spouse is usually the wife. As a result, while the husband continues to amass wealth and grow his earning potential, the wife is unable to do so. In circumstances where such spouses are married out of community of property or subject to the accrual system with onerous exclusion clauses in the antenuptial contract, the wife may be left with little more than a claim for rehabilitative maintenance in the event of a divorce. The courts only have the discretion to make an equitable distribution of marital property in civil marriages with complete separation of property concluded prior to 1 November 1984 (or 2 December 1988) and customary marriages. It is arguable that this limitation of the judicial discretion violates the equality clause contained in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. A broad judicial discretion to equitably redistribute the spouses’ assets upon divorce is therefore proposed in this dissertation. / Private Law / LL.M.

Substantive gender equality has yet to be achieved in South Africa. As such, when a decision is made for one of the spouses to a civil marriage to stay at home and care for the children born of the marriage, or make career sacrifices to care for children, that spouse is usually the wife. As a result, while the husband continues to amass wealth and grow his earning potential, the wife is unable to do so. In circumstances where such spouses are married out of community of property or subject to the accrual system with onerous exclusion clauses in the antenuptial contract, the wife may be left with little more than a claim for rehabilitative maintenance in the event of a divorce. The courts only have the discretion to make an equitable distribution of marital property in civil marriages with complete separation of property concluded prior to 1 November 1984 (or 2 December 1988) and customary marriages. It is arguable that this limitation of the judicial discretion violates the equality clause contained in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. A broad judicial discretion to equitably redistribute the spouses’ assets upon divorce is therefore proposed in this dissertation. / Private Law / LL. M.