Efforts to control small arms and light weapons (SALW) in the periods following violent conflict can have positive or negative impacts on peacebuilding efforts. Similarly, peacebuilding activities can both support or endanger efforts to place SALW under greater control. Despite the regular occurrence of SALW control and peacebuilding activities in the same time and space in post violent conflict contexts, there is insignificant analysis of how the two sets of activities interrelate, and how these interelationships can be strengthened to improve the contribution that SALW control efforts make to peacebuilding, and vice-versa. The effects of interrelationships over time (contingency); in the same geographic space (complementarity) and the effects of public perceptions and social construction are particularly important and provide a framework for establishing these interrelationships through analysing a wide universe of cases of SALW control attempted in countries emerging from violent conflict, five mini-cases studies and a major analysis of interrelationships in Kosovo.

L'intervention militaire au Kosovo conduite dans le cadre de l'opération « Force alliée » est souvent présentée comme une rupture vis-à-vis de la pratique traditionnelle des États en matière de politique étrangère: une guerre humanitaire et morale dont les intérêts nationaux seraient, sinon absents, à tout le moins secondaires dans les motivations des décideurs. Cette recherche revient sur cet épisode marquant des relations internationales en s'efforçant de comprendre une décision de politique étrangère, celle prise par la France et le Canada de participer à cette intervention. Quel est le sens, la signification de cet évènement au regard de la politique étrangère de ces deux pays? Quels indices nous donne-t-elle sur son évolution? En quoi la guerre du Kosovo a-t-elle contribué à améliorer notre compréhension du processus de décision au Canada et en France? Y a-t-elle seulement contribué? En guise de réponse, cette recherche tente de vérifier l'hypothèse selon laquelle le concept d'intérêt national reste pertinent dans le champ de la politique étrangère, à la fois pour comprendre le comportement d'une partie des élites dirigeantes mais également celui d'une partie des gouvernés. Non pas qu'il soit possible de déterminer un intérêt national objectif et rationnel à partir duquel on juge les décisions prises par les États. En revanche, existe l'idée d'intérêt national en tant que concept structurant au niveau du discours et de la pratique en politique étrangère. Encore trop peu exploré dans les travaux de langue française, cette recherche s'interroge sur les outils conceptuels à disposition du chercheur pour appréhender l'objet politique étrangère aujourd'hui. En prenant pour point de départ un triple questionnement -par qui, pourquoi et comment la politique étrangère est-elle construite -cette thèse tente de mettre en dialogue les approches classiques de la décision (réalisme, analyses décisionnelles) et celles s'inscrivant dans ce qu'il est coutume d'appeler le tournant sociologique des Relations internationales (transnationalisme, constructivisme) et propose l'élaboration d'un cadre d'analyse original. De ce point de vue, le cas étudié confirme que les premières offrent des outils tout à fait pertinents, mais qu'elles auraient avantage à mettre ceux-ci plus en lien avec les pistes interprétatives ouvertes par les secondes. Au « qui », cette étude montre que la décision dans ce champ est indissociable du cadre mondial dans lequel elle s'insère et qu'il n'est plus possible pour les acteurs traditionnels de faire fi de l'émergence d'autres acteurs, non étatiques le plus souvent. Il n'en reste pas moins qu'au vu des efforts déployés par les « professionnels de l'État » pour conserver le contrôle de la gestion de la crise, le sentiment qui prédomine est que l'hypothèse du monopole traditionnel de l'exécutif en politique étrangère n'a pas complètement disparu. Au « pourquoi », cette démarche consent à une complexification des logiques qui, loin de répondre à la seule poursuite égoïste d'intérêts collectifs et/ou individuels, mettent en jeu des valeurs, des normes, des cultures et des identités propres et distinctes, qui agissent non pas comme des variables individuelles mais aussi comme des « standards holistes ». A cet égard, la dichotomie classique entre politiques et bureaucrates reste, malgré des différences importantes en France et au Canada, un point de départ valable pour comprendre le fonctionnement du noyau décisionnel dans les deux États. Enfin, au « comment », cette recherche montre que la décision est avant tout une construction et un processus complexe, au sein duquel intérêts et identités se mêlent, et où le langage tout comme les rapports de pouvoir symbolique jouent un rôle essentiel. Dans cette perspective, malgré de nombreux points communs entre la France et au Canada, cette recherche s'arrête surtout sur ce qui les distingue, ce qui dans la perspective d'une réflexion plus globale sur l'évolution des politiques étrangères dans le système mondial, est riche d'enseignements.

It has been claimed that internationalized, or "hybrid" courts, courts which mix international and local personnel and international and domestic law, can be used to replace or complement the work of the International Criminal Court. Four such hybrid courts---courts located in Kosovo, East Timor, Cambodia and Sierra Leone, have either just completed their work or are far enough along in their operation to provide a type of "justice laboratory" to test this claim. Analysis reveals that the performance of these courts has been poor. It shows that the courts in Kosovo and East Timor were doomed to failure, that the court in Cambodia is headed in the same direction, and that only the court operating in Sierra Leone offers a possibility that something close to justice will result. The summary recommendation drawn from the analysis is that hybrid courts should only be employed where: (1) international personnel control the proceedings, (2) the legal framework of the court conforms to international standards, and (3) the sponsors of the enterprise possess a clear ability, and demonstrate a credible commitment, to try and punish those most responsible for committing gross human rights offenses.

As the field of humanitarian aid continues to grow exponentially, the politicization of humanitarian aid is an increasing concern. The European Union's humanitarian aid office (ECHO) is the world's second largest aid donor and widely understood to be unpoliticized due to its multilateral nature, relative institutional isolation, needs-based mandate and use of standardized assessment indicators. Using primary and secondary literature and interview sources, this thesis takes a critical look at the EU's aid program and ECHO's work with operating partners using a framework of four degrees of politicization. These degrees are applied throughout the thesis and in a short case study of the EU's aid programs during the Kosovo crisis of 1999. It finds that while ECHO offers an outstanding example of official policy commitments to unpoliticized aid, in practice, it too is subject to the influences of politicization. The thesis concludes with an assessment of how ECHO might address the politicization of aid to improve future aid programs.

Univ., Diss.--Passau, 2005.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Georgetown University, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references.

Following the war in Kosovo in 1999, the international community embarked on the most extensive international peace- and state-building project to date. From the early UN administration of Kosovo until the end of 'supervised independence' in 2012, various international organisations played a critical role in shaping the post-war polity. Throughout this engagement, the international community was driven by normative commitments to multi-ethnicity. However, while international organisations were committed to making Kosovo 'multi-ethnic', lack of clarity prevailed about what this goal entailed, or why it was so important. The thesis seeks to answer two inter-related questions: what was meant by multi-ethnicity on the part of its proponents, and what explains the prominence of commitments to this idea. Taking the form of three sections, the thesis examines these commitments' origins, manifestations, and explanations. International normative commitments to multi-ethnicity are found to originate in a shifting conception of the relationship between ethnic diversity and legitimate statehood during the twentieth century. Their manifestations in Kosovo are studied in three policy domains: the return of displaced persons, decentralisation of government to the local level, and minority rights. The thesis finds that international efforts in the pursuit of multi-ethnicity in Kosovo exhibited conflicting notions of multi-ethnicity, which shifted from integrationist ambitions to notions that reconciled the reality of segregation between ethnic groups on the ground through a 'politics of recognition'. The goal of multi-ethnicity remained, but was transformed. Explanations for the commitments to multi-ethnicity are found in both normative and consequentialist considerations, by uncovering unspoken underlying assumptions, and in the identity and self-image concerns of international actors. These findings indicate the power of the normative environment in shaping the actions of international organisations and provide insights into the thus far under-theorised normative dimension of the international state-building project in Kosovo.

The aim of this thesis is to describe the origin and development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and Common Security and Defense Policy within the European Union and its functioning in the events of two selected conflicts - between Kosovo and Serbia and between Georgia and South Ossetia and Russia. The thesis deals with the European Union´s approach towards Kosovo and Georgia before the conflicts, during the post-conflict situations and with civilian missions in the framework of Common Security and Defense Policy, which operates in both countries.

The theories on how to use airpower as coercion are divided between those who advocate strategic bombing and those who advocate support for land operations. The purpose of this study is to analyze whether Pape and/or Warden´s airpower theories applied on Operation Allied Force can explain how NATO´s air force was used. The result shows that both the Warden´s Enemy as a system and Pape´s Denial strategy can partly explain the outcome. Warden´s 5-ring system is the only variable in the survey assigned with a high variable value; this is because the analysis shows that it is judged to influence the outcome extensively. Parallel attacks occurred at low frequency and have a low variable value. Pape´s theory occurred with high frequency in variable support for the ground forces, however, the analysis shows that no variable value from Pape´s theory received higher variables than the medium. The conclusion is that both theories can explain how NATO used airpower during the operation but to different degrees.

Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-11T19:27:59Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2009-06-22Bitstream added on 2014-06-13T18:56:58Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 dallevedove_lu_me_mar.pdf: 777815 bytes, checksum: b018ab0f827300baf43f15d384f965d6 (MD5) / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) / Neste trabalho, avaliamos se a intervenção da OTAN no Kosovo corresponde a uma nova concepção de segurança desenvolvido pela Organização, conforme defendem seus países-membros em documentos oficiais da década de 1990. A Organização do Tratado do Atlântico Norte (OTAN) constituiu-se, desde sua fundação no final da década de 1940, numa aliança militar entre Estados Unidos e Europa Ocidental contra a ameaça de invasão a partir da União Soviética. Seu aparato defensivo e uma série de outros arranjos cooperativos foram articulados com base nessa premissa, que teria sido revista a partir do fim da Guerra Fria. Nos anos 1990, portanto, a organização reviu seu conceito estratégico e propôs um novo conceito de segurança, apregoando adaptar-se a um novo ambiente internacional. Em 1999, a OTAN interveio militarmente na então República Federal da Iugoslávia com vistas a interromper o enfrentamento entre seu governo, organizações autonomistas ou separatistas da província autônoma do Kosovo e a população civil daquele local, alegando garantir auxílio humanitário e a interrupção de violações de direitos humanos, algo associado a sua nova concepção estratégica. / The pursuit of this work is to analyze if NATO‟s intervention in Kosovo corresponds to a new security conception developed by the organization, as its member States argue in official documents at the 1990‟s. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was constituted, since its foundation at the end of the 1940‟s, of a military alliance among United States, Canada and West Europe against a threat of invasion by the Soviet Union. Its defensive structure and a wide range of cooperative arrangements were based on this argument having it been reviewed by the end of the Cold War. At the 1990‟s the organization remodeled its strategic concept and purposed a new security concept, affirming to adapt itself to the new international environment. In 1999, NATO intervened militarily against the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia aiming to interrupt the conflict among its government, autonomist or separatist organizations from the autonomous region of Kosovo and the civil population of that region, alleging to guarantee humanitarian aid to interrupt hard human rights violations, something associated later to its new strategic concept.